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  Subjects -> PHILOSOPHY (Total: 762 journals)
Showing 601 - 135 of 135 Journals sorted alphabetically
Revista de Estudios Kantianos     Open Access  
Revista de Estudos Constitucionais, Hermenêutica e Teoria do Direito     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Revista de Filosofia     Open Access  
Revista de Filosofía (Madrid)     Open Access  
Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad de Costa Rica     Open Access  
Revista de Filosofía Open Insight     Open Access  
Revista de Filosofía y Teoría Política     Open Access  
Revista de Humanidades     Open Access  
Revista de la Academia     Open Access  
Revista Diacrítica     Open Access  
Revista Dialectus     Open Access  
Revista Eletrônica Espaço Teológico     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Revista Eletrônica Ludus Scientiae     Open Access  
Revista Enciclopédia     Open Access  
Revista Epistemologias do Sul     Open Access  
Revista Española de Filosofía Medieval     Open Access  
Revista Filosofía UIS     Open Access  
Revista Fragmentos de Cultura : Revista Interdisciplinar de Ciências Humanas     Open Access  
Revista Latinoamericana de Derechos Humanos     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofía     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Revista Perspectiva Filosófica     Open Access  
Revista Poiesis     Open Access  
Revista PRAXIS     Open Access  
Revista SURES     Open Access  
Revue d’études benthamiennes     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Revue Philosophique de Louvain     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Rhuthmos     Open Access  
Rivista di estetica     Open Access  
Rivista di storia della filosofia     Full-text available via subscription  
Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia     Open Access  
Rivista Italiana di Filosofia Analitica Junior     Open Access  
Roczniki Filozoficzne     Full-text available via subscription  
Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
Ruch Filozoficzny     Open Access  
RUDN Journal of Philosophy     Open Access  
Russell : the Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Russian Studies in Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription  
S : Journal of the Circle for Lacanian Ideology Critique     Open Access  
Saberes y Prácticas : Revista de Filosofía y Educación     Open Access  
SAINSTIS     Open Access  
Sapientia     Open Access  
Sartre Studies International     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Schutzian Research     Full-text available via subscription  
Science & Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Science et Esprit     Open Access  
Scientonomy : Journal for the Science of Science     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Scrinium : Journal of Patrology and Critical Hagiography     Open Access  
Semina Scientiarum     Open Access  
Semiotics     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Siegel Institute Ethics Research Scholars     Open Access  
Siegel Institute Journal of Applied Ethics     Open Access  
Sign Systems Studies     Open Access  
Signos Filosóficos     Open Access  
Simone de Beauvoir Studies     Full-text available via subscription  
Sincronía     Open Access  
Síntese : Revista de Filosofia     Partially Free  
Slagmark - Tidsskrift for idéhistorie     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
Social Epistemology: A Journal of Knowledge, Culture and Policy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 13)
Social Imaginaries     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Social Philosophy and Policy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 25)
Social Philosophy Today     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Social Psychology and Society     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Social Theory and Practice     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 8)
Società degli individui     Full-text available via subscription  
Socioaffective Neuroscience and Psychology     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
SOCRATES     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5)
Sophia : An African Journal of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Sophía : Colección de Filosofía de la Educación     Open Access  
South African Journal of Bioethics and Law     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
South African Journal of Philosophy = Suid-Afrikaanse Tydskrif vir Wysbegeerte     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Southwest Philosophy Review     Full-text available via subscription  
SPICE : Student Perspectives on Institutions, Choices & Ethic     Open Access  
Spontaneous Generations : A Journal for the History and Philosophy of Science     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
Studi di Estetica     Open Access  
Studia Humana     Open Access  
Studia Logica     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Studia Neoaristotelica     Full-text available via subscription  
Studia Phaenomenologica     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Studia Philosophica Estonica     Open Access  
Studia Poliana     Full-text available via subscription  
Studia z Historii Filozofii     Open Access  
Studia z Kognitywistyki i Filozofii Umysłu     Open Access  
Studier i Pædagogisk Filosofi     Open Access  
Studies in Christian-Jewish Relations     Open Access  
Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric     Open Access   (Followers: 7)
Studies in Philology     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
SubStance     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 7)
Suhuf     Open Access  
Symposion : Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences     Open Access  
Symposium : Canadian Journal of Continental Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription  
Synthesis (La Plata)     Open Access  
Tadris : Islamic Education Journal     Open Access  
Tajdida : Jurnal Pemikiran dan Gerakan Muhammadiyah     Open Access  
Teaching Ethics     Full-text available via subscription  
Teaching Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Techné : Research in Philosophy and Technology     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Temporal : Prática e Pensamento Contemporâneos     Open Access  
Temporalités     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Teoliterária : Revista Brasileira de Literaturas e Teologias     Open Access  
Teologia i Moralność     Open Access  
Teosofi : Jurnal Tasawuf dan Pemikiran Islam     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Teosofia : Indonesian Journal of Islamic Mysticism     Open Access  
Terrains / Théories     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
The Acorn     Full-text available via subscription  
The Biblical Annals     Open Access  
The Chesterton Review     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
The Chesterton Review em Português     Full-text available via subscription  
The Chesterton Review en Español     Full-text available via subscription  
The Chesterton Review en Français     Full-text available via subscription  
The Chesterton Review in Italiano     Full-text available via subscription  
The CLR James Journal     Full-text available via subscription  
The Heythrop Journal     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 21)
The Islamic Culture     Open Access  
The Leibniz Review     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
The Lonergan Review     Full-text available via subscription  
The Monist     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9)
The Owl of Minerva     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
The Person and the Challenges. The Journal of Theology, Education, Canon Law and Social Studies Inspired by Pope John Paul II     Open Access  
The Philosophers' Magazine     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5)
The Philosophical Forum     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
The Pluralist     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
The Southern Journal of Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6)
Thémata. Revista de Filosofía     Open Access  
TheoLogica : An International Journal for Philosophy of Religion and Philosophical Theology     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Theoria     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
THEORIA : An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Theoria and Praxis : International Journal of Interdisciplinary Thought     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
Think     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 6)
Thought : A Journal of Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6)
Thought and Practice : A Journal of the Philosophical Association of Kenya     Open Access  
Tijdschrift voor Filosofie     Full-text available via subscription  
Tópicos, Revista de Filosofía     Open Access  
Tópicos. Revista de Filosofía de Santa Fe     Open Access  
Topoi     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Tradition and Discovery     Full-text available via subscription  
Trans/Form/Ação - Revista de Filosofia     Open Access  
Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
Tsaqafah : Jurnal Peradaban Islam     Open Access  
ULUM : Journal of Religious Inquiries     Open Access  
Universidad de La Habana     Open Access  
Universitas : Revista de Filosofía, Derecho y Política     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Universitas Philosophica     Open Access  
Unoesc & Ciência - ACHS     Open Access  
Utilitas     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 11)
Utopian Studies     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Veritas : Revista de Filosofí­a y Teología     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Via Spiritus : Revista de História da Espiritualidade e do Sentimento Religioso     Open Access  
Vincentian Heritage Journal     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Visnyk of NTUU - Philosophy. Psychology. Pedagogics     Open Access  
Voluntaristics Review     Open Access  
Wacana : Journal of the Humanities of Indonesia     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Whiteness and Education     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice / Recueil annuel de Windsor d'accès à la justice     Open Access  
Zeitschrift für Ethik und Moralphilosophie : Journal for Ethics and Moral Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Zeitschrift für Kulturphilosophie     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
Zeitschrift für Medien- und Kulturforschung     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 6)
Zeitschrift für philosophische Literatur     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Zeitschrift für Religions- und Geistesgeschichte     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5)
Zeszyty Naukowe Centrum Badań im. Edyty Stein     Open Access  
Zibaldone : Estudios Italianos     Open Access  
Τέλος : Revista Iberoamericana de Estudios Utilitaristas     Open Access  
Гуманітарний вісник Запорізької державної інженерної академії     Open Access  
Філософія та політологія в контексті сучасної культури (Philosophy and Political Science in the Context of Modern Culture)     Open Access  

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Analysis
Journal Prestige (SJR): 1.038
Citation Impact (citeScore): 1
Number of Followers: 34  
 
  Hybrid Journal Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles)
ISSN (Print) 0003-2638 - ISSN (Online) 1467-8284
Published by Oxford University Press Homepage  [419 journals]
  • Confession of a causal decision theorist

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      Pages: 203 - 213
      Abstract: Abstract(1) Suppose that you care only about speaking the truth, and are confident that some particular deterministic theory is true. If someone asks you whether that theory is true, are you rationally required to answer ‘yes’' (2) Suppose that you face a problem in which (as in Newcomb's problem) one of your options – call it ‘taking two boxes’ – causally dominates your only other option. Are you rationally required to take two boxes' Those of us attracted to causal decision theory are under pressure to answer ‘yes’ to both questions. However, it has been shown that many existing decision theories are inconsistent with doing so (Ahmed 2014). A simple proof shows that the same goes for an even wider class of theories: all ‘suppositional’ decision theories. The moral is that causal decision theorists must either answer ‘no’ to one of the above questions, or else abandon suppositional decision theories.
      PubDate: Sat, 26 Feb 2022 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/analys/anab040
      Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 2 (2022)
       
  • Tossing Morgenbesser’s Coin

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      Pages: 214 - 221
      Abstract: AbstractMorgenbesser's Coin is a thought experiment that exemplifies a widespread disposition to infer counterfactual independence from causal independence. I argue that this disposition is mistaken by analysing a closely related thought experiment.
      PubDate: Thu, 07 Apr 2022 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/analys/anab091
      Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 2 (2022)
       
  • The actual challenge for the ontological argument

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      Pages: 222 - 230
      Abstract: AbstractMany versions of the ontological argument have two shortcomings: First, despite the arguments put forward, for example, by Hugh Chandler and Nathan Salmon, they assume that S5 is the correct modal logic for metaphysical modality. Second, despite the classical arguments put forward, for example, by David Hume and Immanuel Kant or the more recent arguments put forward, for example, by John Findlay and Richard Swinburne, they assume that necessary existence is possible. The aim of the paper is to develop an alternative version of the ontological argument that, by an appeal to the logic of ‘actually’, avoids these two shortcomings. The version helps to leave aside unnecessary debates about the modal logic S5 or about the possibility of necessary existence and to focus on the actual challenge for the debate about the ontological argument: the challenge to evaluate the claim that it is possible that God exists.
      PubDate: Tue, 22 Mar 2022 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/analys/anab075
      Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 2 (2022)
       
  • Multidisjunctivism’s no solution to the screening-off problem

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      Pages: 231 - 238
      Abstract: AbstractNaïve realism is the view that veridical experiences are fundamentally relations of acquaintance to external objects and their features, and multidisjunctivism is the conjunction of naïve realism and the view that hallucinatory experiences don’t share a common fundamental kind. Multidisjunctivism allegedly removes the screening-off worry over naïve realism, and the relevant literature suggests that multidisjunctivism is one of the naïve realist responses to the worry. The present paper argues that the multidisjunctive solution is implicitly changing the subject, so the impression that the multidisjunctivist is addressing the screening-off problem is illusory.
      PubDate: Wed, 23 Mar 2022 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/analys/anab090
      Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 2 (2022)
       
  • Relationality without obligation

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      Pages: 238 - 246
      Abstract: AbstractSome reasons are thought to depend on relations between people, such as that of a promiser to a promisee. It has sometimes been assumed that all reasons that are relational in this way are moral obligations. I argue, via a counter example, that there are non-obligatory relational reasons. If true, this has ramifications for relational theories of morality.
      PubDate: Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/analys/anab072
      Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 2 (2022)
       
  • Universalism doesn’t entail extensionalism

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      Pages: 246 - 255
      Abstract: AbstractIn the literature on mereology it is often accepted that mereological universalism entails extensionalism. More precisely, many accept that, if parthood is assumed to be a partial order (and, thus, the relevant theory of parthood is taken to be at least as strong as ‘core mereology’), the thesis that every plurality of entities has a mereological fusion entails the thesis that different composite entities have different proper parts. Central to this idea is the principle known as ‘Weak Supplementation’ which many take to impose an important constraint on the relation of proper parthood. In this paper I argue that this claim is false as the principle that I will call ‘Minimal Supplementation’ appears to be capable of doing all the work done by Weak Supplementation but without entailing extensionalism if conjoined with universalism and core mereology.
      PubDate: Mon, 28 Feb 2022 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/analys/anab034
      Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 2 (2022)
       
  • Two-faced compliments

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      Pages: 255 - 263
      Abstract: AbstractCompliments have received only cursory attention from speech act theorists and are usually characterised as run-of-the-mill illocutionary acts. Yet both intentionalist and conventionalist theories of illocutionary force struggle to accommodate ordinary language uses of ‘compliment’. I argue that this is because there are in fact two kinds of compliment: illocutionary compliments and perlocutionary compliments. This account illuminates the practice of complimenting, as well as its converse, insulting, and illustrates the complex relationship between illocutionary force and perlocutionary effect.
      PubDate: Sat, 23 Apr 2022 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/analys/anac008
      Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 2 (2022)
       
  • A plan-based causal decision theory

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      Pages: 264 - 272
      Abstract: AbstractIn ‘An argument against causal decision theory’, Jack Spencer shows that standard formulations of causal decision theory run afoul of his Guaranteed Principle. In the sequential choice problem he employs to make this case, the transgression stems from an awkward discrepancy between how causalists typically value present vs future acts. This note suggests a version of causal decision theory that avoids this incongruity and so respects the Guaranteed Principle in Spencer’s problem. However, this formulation, and hence symmetric appraisal of present and future acts, is also shown to be insufficient to secure causalist satisfaction of the Guaranteed Principle in general.
      PubDate: Fri, 25 Feb 2022 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/analys/anab064
      Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 2 (2022)
       
  • On a causal principle in an argument for a necessary being

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      Pages: 272 - 277
      Abstract: AbstractIn Necessary Existence, Pruss and Rasmussen give an argument for a necessary being employing a modest causal principle. Here I note that, when applied to highly general and fundamental matters, the principle may well be false (or at least not so obvious).
      PubDate: Thu, 03 Mar 2022 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/analys/anab074
      Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 2 (2022)
       
  • General triviality for counterfactuals

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      Pages: 277 - 289
      Abstract: AbstractOn an influential line of thinking tracing back to Ramsey, conditionals are closely linked to the attitude of supposition. When applied to counterfactuals, this view suggests a subjunctive version of the so-called Ramsey test: the probability of a counterfactual If A, would B ought to be equivalent to the probability of B, under the subjunctive supposition that A. I present a collapse result for any view that endorses the subjunctive version of the Ramsey test. Starting from plausible assumptions, the result shows that one’s rational credence in a would-counterfactual and in the corresponding might-counterfactual have to be identical.
      PubDate: Fri, 22 Apr 2022 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/analys/anab038
      Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 2 (2022)
       
  • Justification and being in a position to know

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      Pages: 289 - 298
      Abstract: AbstractAccording to an influential recent view, S is propositionally justified in believing p iff S is in no position to know that S is in no position to know p. I argue that this view faces compelling counterexamples.
      PubDate: Fri, 18 Mar 2022 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/analys/anab086
      Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 2 (2022)
       
  • Erratum to: Russell–Myhill and grounding

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      Pages: 298 - 298
      Abstract: Analysis (2021), https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anaa068
      PubDate: Mon, 14 Mar 2022 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/analys/anab071
      Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 2 (2022)
       
  • Erratum to: Moral worth and accidentally right actions

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      Pages: 299 - 299
      Abstract: Analysis (2021), https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anab011
      PubDate: Sat, 26 Mar 2022 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/analys/anab076
      Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 2 (2022)
       
  • Erratum to: Is global consequentialism more expressive than act
           consequentialism'

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      Pages: 299 - 299
      Abstract: Analysis (2021), https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anab021
      PubDate: Wed, 16 Mar 2022 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/analys/anab063
      Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 2 (2022)
       
  • Précis

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      Pages: 303 - 306
      Abstract: How Empirical Psychology Vindicates Armchair Philosophy By StrevensMichaelHarvard University Press, 2019. 360 pp.
      PubDate: Tue, 05 Jul 2022 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/analys/anac021
      Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 2 (2022)
       
  • How to Vindicate the Armchair

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      Pages: 306 - 321
      Abstract: I like to talk with the gardener, and the cow-herd’s wife, and any workman who may relish a bit a bit of talk on Sundays, on their notions of how body and mind should be treated, and what they are living for, and what is wrong and right in morals. There is much amusement and instruction in hearing them lay down the law about health and duty. And then, when I meet a poet here, and a scholar there, and a Quaker or a Swedenborgian religionist somewhere else, it seems to me that I have been carried back some thousands of years, to the time when science was composed of dreaming, and when men’s instincts constituted the mythology under which they lived. It is all very interesting, however, and all worthy of respect. To us, who are in search of facts, there is no dream of any intellect, no dogmatic assurance, no stirring of any instinct, which is not full of interest and instruction. But I shall be glad of your answer to my question, as guidance in using the material furnished by my neighbours. (Martineau 1851)
      PubDate: Tue, 05 Jul 2022 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/analys/anaa061
      Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 2 (2022)
       
  • Reformulating Philosophical Methodology or Rebuilding Our Picture of
           Philosophy

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      Pages: 322 - 335
      PubDate: Tue, 05 Jul 2022 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/analys/anaa072
      Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 2 (2022)
       
  • The Method of Cases’ Feet of Clay

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      Pages: 335 - 343
      Abstract: Michael Strevens’s Thinking Off Your Feet is an outstanding piece of philosophy; it is broad, tying together the psychology of concepts, the theory of reference, the metaphysics of kinds and metaphilosophy in a completely original manner. It builds on Strevens’s past work and extends it in fascinating new directions. It is delightfully written. It knocked me off my feet. But reading Thinking Off Your Feet was also a totally disconcerting, angst-inducing experience: agreeing with many premisses of the book and many of Strevens’s arguments, I found myself led to a conclusion I strenuously reject. I agree with his careful, patient criticism of conceptual analysis; I agree with his critical discussion of the psychology of concepts (or at least with much of it, see below), in particular, his criticism of psychological essentialism (see also Olivola and Machery 2014; Machery and Olivola 2014, MS); I share his rejection of essentialism; I find inductivism congenial; but I have repeatedly argued against the type of armchair philosophy – ‘the method of cases’ – that Strevens defends so ingeniously (Machery 2011, 2017). Unavoidably, I need to put my foot down somewhere, but where'
      PubDate: Tue, 05 Jul 2022 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/analys/anac007
      Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 2 (2022)
       
  • Thinking Off Your Feet: Reply to My Critics

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      Pages: 343 - 353
      PubDate: Tue, 05 Jul 2022 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/analys/anac022
      Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 2 (2022)
       
  • Recent Work on Moral Revolutions

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      Pages: 354 - 366
      Abstract: AbstractIn the last few decades, several philosophers have written on the topic of moral revolutions, distinguishing them from other kinds of society-level moral change. This article surveys recent accounts of moral revolutions in moral philosophy. Different authors use quite different criteria to pick out moral revolutions. Features treated as relevant include radicality, depth or fundamentality, pervasiveness, novelty and particular causes. We also characterize the factors that have been proposed to cause moral revolutions, including anomalies in existing moral codes, changing honour codes, art, economic conditions and individuals or groups. Finally, we discuss what accounts of moral revolutions have in common, how they differ and how moral revolutions are distinguished from other kinds of moral change, such as drift and reform.
      PubDate: Fri, 20 May 2022 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/analys/anac017
      Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 2 (2022)
       
  • Bortolotti on Epistemic Innocence

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      Pages: 368 - 376
      Abstract: According to the ‘heuristics and biases’ tradition in psychology, human beings are deeply irrational creatures (Kahneman 2011). We form beliefs and reason in ways that systematically violate epistemic norms (‘proportion your belief to the evidence’), the canons of decision and probability theory and even the laws of logic. We make extensive use of ‘heuristics’: rough-and-ready rules of thumb that work for the most part but go badly wrong in certain situations. This is because we need to balance our need to have true, well-grounded beliefs about the world against our limited time and cognitive resources. Thinking logically or in accordance with the axioms of probability theory is hard and the effort isn’t always worth it. The result is a tragic picture of human rationality: we are condemned to irrationality.
      PubDate: Thu, 19 May 2022 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/analys/anac015
      Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 2 (2022)
       
  • Emotions and the ‘Central Test of Virtue’: Critical Notice of Gopal
           Sreenivasan’s Emotion and Virtue

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      Pages: 377 - 386
      Abstract: Gopal Sreenivasan’s Emotion and Virtue is a remarkable book.11 The fundamental thesis that Sreenivasan defends is that, in the case of many virtues (though perhaps not all), to be a reliable judge of what a given virtue requires in specific circumstances, an exemplar of that virtue must possess a specific, morally rectified, emotional trait. Sreenivasan presents this thesis in Ch. 2 and offers three separate arguments in its favour in Chs. 6–8, in the second part of the book. The central focus of the book is, thus, on the psychological constitution of an exemplar of virtue. But its overall scope is much broader than this. Indeed, the book covers many other important topics in virtue theory. For instance, in the first part, Sreenivasan offers a critique of eudaimonism (Chs. 1 and 4), a new argument for the disunity of the virtues (Ch. 4) and a rejection of the situationist critique, in the context of which Sreenivasan provides an account of the practical relevance of virtue theory (Ch. 5). In the third part, he defends a ‘modest agent-centered view’, which carves an intermediate position in the epistemological debate about how instances of virtue should be individuated, by assigning priority to character traits over acts in some, but not all, cases (Ch. 10); he rejects the ‘priority of principle’ model of moral justification, according to which for any particular moral conclusion to be justified, it must be possible to derive it from universally valid moral principles (Ch. 11), and he offers two arguments in favour of the provocative claim that virtues should not be taught (Ch. 12).
      PubDate: Sat, 28 May 2022 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/analys/anac016
      Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 2 (2022)
       
  • Smelling the Brain’s Creation

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      Pages: 386 - 396
      Abstract: Norwegian Research Council10.13039/501100005416275456
      PubDate: Fri, 27 May 2022 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/analys/anac023
      Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 2 (2022)
       
 
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