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- Confession of a causal decision theorist
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Pages: 203 - 213
Abstract: Abstract(1) Suppose that you care only about speaking the truth, and are confident that some particular deterministic theory is true. If someone asks you whether that theory is true, are you rationally required to answer ‘yes’' (2) Suppose that you face a problem in which (as in Newcomb's problem) one of your options – call it ‘taking two boxes’ – causally dominates your only other option. Are you rationally required to take two boxes' Those of us attracted to causal decision theory are under pressure to answer ‘yes’ to both questions. However, it has been shown that many existing decision theories are inconsistent with doing so (Ahmed 2014). A simple proof shows that the same goes for an even wider class of theories: all ‘suppositional’ decision theories. The moral is that causal decision theorists must either answer ‘no’ to one of the above questions, or else abandon suppositional decision theories.
PubDate: Sat, 26 Feb 2022 00:00:00 GMT
DOI: 10.1093/analys/anab040
Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 2 (2022)
- Tossing Morgenbesser’s Coin
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Pages: 214 - 221
Abstract: AbstractMorgenbesser's Coin is a thought experiment that exemplifies a widespread disposition to infer counterfactual independence from causal independence. I argue that this disposition is mistaken by analysing a closely related thought experiment.
PubDate: Thu, 07 Apr 2022 00:00:00 GMT
DOI: 10.1093/analys/anab091
Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 2 (2022)
- The actual challenge for the ontological argument
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Pages: 222 - 230
Abstract: AbstractMany versions of the ontological argument have two shortcomings: First, despite the arguments put forward, for example, by Hugh Chandler and Nathan Salmon, they assume that S5 is the correct modal logic for metaphysical modality. Second, despite the classical arguments put forward, for example, by David Hume and Immanuel Kant or the more recent arguments put forward, for example, by John Findlay and Richard Swinburne, they assume that necessary existence is possible. The aim of the paper is to develop an alternative version of the ontological argument that, by an appeal to the logic of ‘actually’, avoids these two shortcomings. The version helps to leave aside unnecessary debates about the modal logic S5 or about the possibility of necessary existence and to focus on the actual challenge for the debate about the ontological argument: the challenge to evaluate the claim that it is possible that God exists.
PubDate: Tue, 22 Mar 2022 00:00:00 GMT
DOI: 10.1093/analys/anab075
Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 2 (2022)
- Multidisjunctivism’s no solution to the screening-off problem
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Pages: 231 - 238
Abstract: AbstractNaïve realism is the view that veridical experiences are fundamentally relations of acquaintance to external objects and their features, and multidisjunctivism is the conjunction of naïve realism and the view that hallucinatory experiences don’t share a common fundamental kind. Multidisjunctivism allegedly removes the screening-off worry over naïve realism, and the relevant literature suggests that multidisjunctivism is one of the naïve realist responses to the worry. The present paper argues that the multidisjunctive solution is implicitly changing the subject, so the impression that the multidisjunctivist is addressing the screening-off problem is illusory.
PubDate: Wed, 23 Mar 2022 00:00:00 GMT
DOI: 10.1093/analys/anab090
Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 2 (2022)
- Relationality without obligation
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Pages: 238 - 246
Abstract: AbstractSome reasons are thought to depend on relations between people, such as that of a promiser to a promisee. It has sometimes been assumed that all reasons that are relational in this way are moral obligations. I argue, via a counter example, that there are non-obligatory relational reasons. If true, this has ramifications for relational theories of morality.
PubDate: Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:00:00 GMT
DOI: 10.1093/analys/anab072
Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 2 (2022)
- Universalism doesn’t entail extensionalism
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Pages: 246 - 255
Abstract: AbstractIn the literature on mereology it is often accepted that mereological universalism entails extensionalism. More precisely, many accept that, if parthood is assumed to be a partial order (and, thus, the relevant theory of parthood is taken to be at least as strong as ‘core mereology’), the thesis that every plurality of entities has a mereological fusion entails the thesis that different composite entities have different proper parts. Central to this idea is the principle known as ‘Weak Supplementation’ which many take to impose an important constraint on the relation of proper parthood. In this paper I argue that this claim is false as the principle that I will call ‘Minimal Supplementation’ appears to be capable of doing all the work done by Weak Supplementation but without entailing extensionalism if conjoined with universalism and core mereology.
PubDate: Mon, 28 Feb 2022 00:00:00 GMT
DOI: 10.1093/analys/anab034
Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 2 (2022)
- Two-faced compliments
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Pages: 255 - 263
Abstract: AbstractCompliments have received only cursory attention from speech act theorists and are usually characterised as run-of-the-mill illocutionary acts. Yet both intentionalist and conventionalist theories of illocutionary force struggle to accommodate ordinary language uses of ‘compliment’. I argue that this is because there are in fact two kinds of compliment: illocutionary compliments and perlocutionary compliments. This account illuminates the practice of complimenting, as well as its converse, insulting, and illustrates the complex relationship between illocutionary force and perlocutionary effect.
PubDate: Sat, 23 Apr 2022 00:00:00 GMT
DOI: 10.1093/analys/anac008
Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 2 (2022)
- A plan-based causal decision theory
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Pages: 264 - 272
Abstract: AbstractIn ‘An argument against causal decision theory’, Jack Spencer shows that standard formulations of causal decision theory run afoul of his Guaranteed Principle. In the sequential choice problem he employs to make this case, the transgression stems from an awkward discrepancy between how causalists typically value present vs future acts. This note suggests a version of causal decision theory that avoids this incongruity and so respects the Guaranteed Principle in Spencer’s problem. However, this formulation, and hence symmetric appraisal of present and future acts, is also shown to be insufficient to secure causalist satisfaction of the Guaranteed Principle in general.
PubDate: Fri, 25 Feb 2022 00:00:00 GMT
DOI: 10.1093/analys/anab064
Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 2 (2022)
- On a causal principle in an argument for a necessary being
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Pages: 272 - 277
Abstract: AbstractIn Necessary Existence, Pruss and Rasmussen give an argument for a necessary being employing a modest causal principle. Here I note that, when applied to highly general and fundamental matters, the principle may well be false (or at least not so obvious).
PubDate: Thu, 03 Mar 2022 00:00:00 GMT
DOI: 10.1093/analys/anab074
Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 2 (2022)
- General triviality for counterfactuals
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Pages: 277 - 289
Abstract: AbstractOn an influential line of thinking tracing back to Ramsey, conditionals are closely linked to the attitude of supposition. When applied to counterfactuals, this view suggests a subjunctive version of the so-called Ramsey test: the probability of a counterfactual If A, would B ought to be equivalent to the probability of B, under the subjunctive supposition that A. I present a collapse result for any view that endorses the subjunctive version of the Ramsey test. Starting from plausible assumptions, the result shows that one’s rational credence in a would-counterfactual and in the corresponding might-counterfactual have to be identical.
PubDate: Fri, 22 Apr 2022 00:00:00 GMT
DOI: 10.1093/analys/anab038
Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 2 (2022)
- Justification and being in a position to know
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Pages: 289 - 298
Abstract: AbstractAccording to an influential recent view, S is propositionally justified in believing p iff S is in no position to know that S is in no position to know p. I argue that this view faces compelling counterexamples.
PubDate: Fri, 18 Mar 2022 00:00:00 GMT
DOI: 10.1093/analys/anab086
Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 2 (2022)
- Erratum to: Russell–Myhill and grounding
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Pages: 298 - 298
Abstract: Analysis (2021), https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anaa068
PubDate: Mon, 14 Mar 2022 00:00:00 GMT
DOI: 10.1093/analys/anab071
Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 2 (2022)
- Erratum to: Moral worth and accidentally right actions
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Pages: 299 - 299
Abstract: Analysis (2021), https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anab011
PubDate: Sat, 26 Mar 2022 00:00:00 GMT
DOI: 10.1093/analys/anab076
Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 2 (2022)
- Erratum to: Is global consequentialism more expressive than act
consequentialism'-
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Pages: 299 - 299
Abstract: Analysis (2021), https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anab021
PubDate: Wed, 16 Mar 2022 00:00:00 GMT
DOI: 10.1093/analys/anab063
Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 2 (2022)
- Précis
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Pages: 303 - 306
Abstract: How Empirical Psychology Vindicates Armchair Philosophy By StrevensMichaelHarvard University Press, 2019. 360 pp.
PubDate: Tue, 05 Jul 2022 00:00:00 GMT
DOI: 10.1093/analys/anac021
Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 2 (2022)
- How to Vindicate the Armchair
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Pages: 306 - 321
Abstract: I like to talk with the gardener, and the cow-herd’s wife, and any workman who may relish a bit a bit of talk on Sundays, on their notions of how body and mind should be treated, and what they are living for, and what is wrong and right in morals. There is much amusement and instruction in hearing them lay down the law about health and duty. And then, when I meet a poet here, and a scholar there, and a Quaker or a Swedenborgian religionist somewhere else, it seems to me that I have been carried back some thousands of years, to the time when science was composed of dreaming, and when men’s instincts constituted the mythology under which they lived. It is all very interesting, however, and all worthy of respect. To us, who are in search of facts, there is no dream of any intellect, no dogmatic assurance, no stirring of any instinct, which is not full of interest and instruction. But I shall be glad of your answer to my question, as guidance in using the material furnished by my neighbours. (Martineau 1851)
PubDate: Tue, 05 Jul 2022 00:00:00 GMT
DOI: 10.1093/analys/anaa061
Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 2 (2022)
- Reformulating Philosophical Methodology or Rebuilding Our Picture of
Philosophy-
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Pages: 322 - 335
PubDate: Tue, 05 Jul 2022 00:00:00 GMT
DOI: 10.1093/analys/anaa072
Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 2 (2022)
- The Method of Cases’ Feet of Clay
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Pages: 335 - 343
Abstract: Michael Strevens’s Thinking Off Your Feet is an outstanding piece of philosophy; it is broad, tying together the psychology of concepts, the theory of reference, the metaphysics of kinds and metaphilosophy in a completely original manner. It builds on Strevens’s past work and extends it in fascinating new directions. It is delightfully written. It knocked me off my feet. But reading Thinking Off Your Feet was also a totally disconcerting, angst-inducing experience: agreeing with many premisses of the book and many of Strevens’s arguments, I found myself led to a conclusion I strenuously reject. I agree with his careful, patient criticism of conceptual analysis; I agree with his critical discussion of the psychology of concepts (or at least with much of it, see below), in particular, his criticism of psychological essentialism (see also Olivola and Machery 2014; Machery and Olivola 2014, MS); I share his rejection of essentialism; I find inductivism congenial; but I have repeatedly argued against the type of armchair philosophy – ‘the method of cases’ – that Strevens defends so ingeniously (Machery 2011, 2017). Unavoidably, I need to put my foot down somewhere, but where'
PubDate: Tue, 05 Jul 2022 00:00:00 GMT
DOI: 10.1093/analys/anac007
Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 2 (2022)
- Thinking Off Your Feet: Reply to My Critics
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Pages: 343 - 353
PubDate: Tue, 05 Jul 2022 00:00:00 GMT
DOI: 10.1093/analys/anac022
Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 2 (2022)
- Recent Work on Moral Revolutions
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Pages: 354 - 366
Abstract: AbstractIn the last few decades, several philosophers have written on the topic of moral revolutions, distinguishing them from other kinds of society-level moral change. This article surveys recent accounts of moral revolutions in moral philosophy. Different authors use quite different criteria to pick out moral revolutions. Features treated as relevant include radicality, depth or fundamentality, pervasiveness, novelty and particular causes. We also characterize the factors that have been proposed to cause moral revolutions, including anomalies in existing moral codes, changing honour codes, art, economic conditions and individuals or groups. Finally, we discuss what accounts of moral revolutions have in common, how they differ and how moral revolutions are distinguished from other kinds of moral change, such as drift and reform.
PubDate: Fri, 20 May 2022 00:00:00 GMT
DOI: 10.1093/analys/anac017
Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 2 (2022)
- Bortolotti on Epistemic Innocence
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Pages: 368 - 376
Abstract: According to the ‘heuristics and biases’ tradition in psychology, human beings are deeply irrational creatures (Kahneman 2011). We form beliefs and reason in ways that systematically violate epistemic norms (‘proportion your belief to the evidence’), the canons of decision and probability theory and even the laws of logic. We make extensive use of ‘heuristics’: rough-and-ready rules of thumb that work for the most part but go badly wrong in certain situations. This is because we need to balance our need to have true, well-grounded beliefs about the world against our limited time and cognitive resources. Thinking logically or in accordance with the axioms of probability theory is hard and the effort isn’t always worth it. The result is a tragic picture of human rationality: we are condemned to irrationality.
PubDate: Thu, 19 May 2022 00:00:00 GMT
DOI: 10.1093/analys/anac015
Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 2 (2022)
- Emotions and the ‘Central Test of Virtue’: Critical Notice of Gopal
Sreenivasan’s Emotion and Virtue-
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Pages: 377 - 386
Abstract: Gopal Sreenivasan’s Emotion and Virtue is a remarkable book.11 The fundamental thesis that Sreenivasan defends is that, in the case of many virtues (though perhaps not all), to be a reliable judge of what a given virtue requires in specific circumstances, an exemplar of that virtue must possess a specific, morally rectified, emotional trait. Sreenivasan presents this thesis in Ch. 2 and offers three separate arguments in its favour in Chs. 6–8, in the second part of the book. The central focus of the book is, thus, on the psychological constitution of an exemplar of virtue. But its overall scope is much broader than this. Indeed, the book covers many other important topics in virtue theory. For instance, in the first part, Sreenivasan offers a critique of eudaimonism (Chs. 1 and 4), a new argument for the disunity of the virtues (Ch. 4) and a rejection of the situationist critique, in the context of which Sreenivasan provides an account of the practical relevance of virtue theory (Ch. 5). In the third part, he defends a ‘modest agent-centered view’, which carves an intermediate position in the epistemological debate about how instances of virtue should be individuated, by assigning priority to character traits over acts in some, but not all, cases (Ch. 10); he rejects the ‘priority of principle’ model of moral justification, according to which for any particular moral conclusion to be justified, it must be possible to derive it from universally valid moral principles (Ch. 11), and he offers two arguments in favour of the provocative claim that virtues should not be taught (Ch. 12).
PubDate: Sat, 28 May 2022 00:00:00 GMT
DOI: 10.1093/analys/anac016
Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 2 (2022)
- Smelling the Brain’s Creation
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Pages: 386 - 396
Abstract: Norwegian Research Council10.13039/501100005416275456
PubDate: Fri, 27 May 2022 00:00:00 GMT
DOI: 10.1093/analys/anac023
Issue No: Vol. 82, No. 2 (2022)
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