Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles) ISSN (Print) 0003-2638 - ISSN (Online) 1467-8284 Published by Oxford University Press[425 journals]
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Pages: 419 - 428 Abstract: According to the neo-Fregean abstractionism, numerical expressions of the form ‘the number of Fs’, introduced by Hume’s Principle, should be read as purportedly referential singular terms. I will explore the prospects of a version of abstractionism in which such expressions have presuppositional content, as in Strawson’s account. I will argue that the thesis that ‘the number of Fs’ semantically presupposes the existence of a number is inconsistent with the required ‘modest’ stipulative character of the truth of Hume’s Principle: since Hume’s Principle is true and provably presupposes that numbers exist, what it presupposes is also true; and so numbers exist. This, however, means that numbers are conjured into existence by a direct stipulation. PubDate: Thu, 15 Jun 2023 00:00:00 GMT DOI: 10.1093/analys/anac102 Issue No:Vol. 83, No. 3 (2023)
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Pages: 429 - 436 Abstract: AbstractPerceptual experience supports the assignment of confidences in belief – doxastic confidences. To explain this fact, many philosophers appeal to Perceptual Indeterminacy, which holds that perceptual content can be more or less determinate. Others instead appeal to Perceptual Confidence, which says that perceptual experience supports doxastic confidences because it assigns confidences too. Morrison argues that a primary reason to favour Perceptual Confidence is that it is uniquely capable of accounting for bell-shaped doxastic confidence distributions; we call this the bell curve objection to Perceptual Indeterminacy. Here we show that two recent defences of Perceptual Indeterminacy, due to Nanay and Raleigh and Vindrola, fail to adequately address the bell curve objection. But we also argue that all is not lost for proponents of Perceptual Indeterminacy. They can counter the bell curve objection by embracing a third view, which we call Perceptual Noise. PubDate: Mon, 12 Jun 2023 00:00:00 GMT DOI: 10.1093/analys/anad007 Issue No:Vol. 83, No. 3 (2023)
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Pages: 437 - 446 Abstract: AbstractThis paper offers a new insight on the Condorcet Jury Theorem (CJT) in the theory of epistemic democracy. This theorem states that democratic decision-making leads us to correct outcomes under certain assumptions. One key assumption is the ‘independence condition’, which requires that voters form their beliefs independently when they vote. This paper examines the role of an opinion leader as an informational source, which potentially violates independence. We demonstrate that voters’ beliefs may be correlated in the presence of the leader, and that the CJT can fail if the leader’s opinions are reliable. This leads us to the following paradoxical observation: for epistemic democracy, good leaders may be bad, while bad leaders may be good. PubDate: Wed, 19 Jul 2023 00:00:00 GMT DOI: 10.1093/analys/anad001 Issue No:Vol. 83, No. 3 (2023)
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Pages: 447 - 464 Abstract: AbstractIn ‘The logic of partial supposition’ (Analysis vol. 81), Benjamin Eva and Stephan Hartmann investigate partial imaging, a credence-revision method which combines the partiality familiar from Jeffrey Conditioning(The Logic of Decision, 1983) with the formal notion of imaging familiar from Lewis’s ‘Causal decision theory’ (1981). They argue that because partial imaging is non-monotonic, it ‘fail[s] to provide a plausible account of the norms of partial subjunctive suppositions’.In this note, I present a notion of partial imaging that does satisfy monotonicity, and discuss some of the applications and ramifications. The account frames conditioning as a form of imaging, and rejects Gärdenfors’s principle of linearity in ‘Imaging and conditionalization’ (1982). PubDate: Thu, 03 Aug 2023 00:00:00 GMT DOI: 10.1093/analys/anac036 Issue No:Vol. 83, No. 3 (2023)
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Pages: 465 - 473 Abstract: AbstractThis paper aims to provide a novel response on behalf of Process Reliabilism to the Swamping Problem. Unlike previous responses, the present response does not involve conditional probabilities (as Goldman and Olsson do), it does not appeal to permissivism or attitudes towards epistemic risk (as Pettigrew does), it will not depend on the generality of the problem (as Carter and Jarvis do) and it does not embrace either evidentialism or evidence monism (as Bjelde does). Instead it appeals to the modal properties of those beliefs formed through reliable process-types. What is more, the argument is generalizable: while I will frame my conclusion in Process Reliabilist terms, it should be of interest to anyone who is a truth monist regarding epistemic value. PubDate: Wed, 19 Jul 2023 00:00:00 GMT DOI: 10.1093/analys/anac062 Issue No:Vol. 83, No. 3 (2023)
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Pages: 474 - 482 Abstract: AbstractEpistemic accounts of luck define luck’s chanciness condition relative to a subject’s epistemic position. This could be put in terms of a subject’s evidence or knowledge about whether the event will occur. I argue that both versions of the epistemic account fail. In §2, I give two types of counterexamples to the evidence-based approach. In §3, I argue—contrary to the knowledge-based view—that an event can be a matter of good or bad luck for a subject even if she knows that it will occur. In §4, I argue that epistemic accounts cannot explain some instances of constitutive luck. Because of these problems, luck’s chanciness condition cannot be adequately defined in epistemic terms. PubDate: Sat, 17 Jun 2023 00:00:00 GMT DOI: 10.1093/analys/anad013 Issue No:Vol. 83, No. 3 (2023)
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Pages: 483 - 492 Abstract: AbstractFraser highlights an unattractive feature of Mohist ethics: the Mohists, while criticizing their Confucian contemporaries, restrict one’s pursuits to the most basic sorts of goods. Fraser suggests that the Mohists assume the perpetuity of scarce resources, which leads to a commitment to austerity, which in turn leads them to deny a plausible third way between austerity and excess. In their defence, I argue that the Mohists do not assume perpetuity of scarce resources but rather the hedonic treadmill. And instead of begging the question by assuming austerity and then denying a moderate alternative to excess, the Mohists take the hedonic treadmill to preclude a principled stopgap between austerity and excess, leaving austerity as the only acceptable option. Finally, these dynamics illuminate a feature that should make us wary of parallels to Millian utilitarianism: the maximization principle of the latter is absent from Mohism, and this goes hand-in-hand with austerity. PubDate: Sat, 20 May 2023 00:00:00 GMT DOI: 10.1093/analys/anad005 Issue No:Vol. 83, No. 3 (2023)
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Pages: 493 - 499 Abstract: AbstractCorreia and Rosenkranz have recently argued in Analysis (2020, 2022) that tense realism (understood as the view that there is a real difference between past, present and future) entails realism about temporal passage (and thus the idea that there is some change in which time is the present time). I argue that their argument is either unsound or question-begging. PubDate: Tue, 18 Jul 2023 00:00:00 GMT DOI: 10.1093/analys/anad006 Issue No:Vol. 83, No. 3 (2023)
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Pages: 500 - 506 Abstract: AbstractWhat grounds facts of the form <x= x>' One promising answer is: facts of the form <x exists>. A different promising answer is: x itself. Isaac Wilhelm has recently argued that the second answer is superior to the first. In this paper, I rebut his argument. PubDate: Sat, 10 Jun 2023 00:00:00 GMT DOI: 10.1093/analys/anad003 Issue No:Vol. 83, No. 3 (2023)
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Pages: 507 - 516 Abstract: AbstractPrawitz conjectured that the proof-theoretically valid logic is intuitionistic logic. Recent work on proof-theoretic validity has disproven this. In fact, it has been shown that proof-theoretic validity is not even closed under substitution. In this paper, we make a minor modification to the definition of proof-theoretic validity found in Prawitz’s 1973paper ‘Towards a foundation of a general proof theory’ and refined by Schroeder-Heister in ‘Validity concepts in proof-theoretic semantics’ (2006). We will call the new notion generalized proof-theoretic validity and show that the logic of generalized proof-theoretic validity is intuitionistic logic. PubDate: Wed, 19 Jul 2023 00:00:00 GMT DOI: 10.1093/analys/anac100 Issue No:Vol. 83, No. 3 (2023)
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Pages: 517 - 526 Abstract: AbstractMany philosophers are attracted to a complaints-based theory of the procreation asymmetry, according to which creating a person with a bad life is wrong (all else equal) because that person can complain about your act, whereas declining to create a person who would have a good life is not wrong (all else equal) because that person never exists and so cannot complain about your act. In this paper, I present two problems for such theories: the problem of impairable-life acceptance and an especially acute version of the problem of improvable-life avoidance. I explain how these problems afflict two recent complaints-based theories of the procreation asymmetry, from Joe Horton and Abelard Podgorski. PubDate: Fri, 14 Jul 2023 00:00:00 GMT DOI: 10.1093/analys/anac103 Issue No:Vol. 83, No. 3 (2023)
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Pages: 527 - 535 Abstract: AbstractThe consequence argument purports to show that determinism is true only if no one has free will. Judgments about whether the argument is sound depend on how one understands locutions of the form ‘p and no one can render p false’. The main interpretation on offer appeals to counterfactual sufficiency: s can render p false just in case there is something s can do such that, were s to do it, p would be false; otherwise, s cannot render p false. Here I show that, in the context of the consequence argument, this interpretation conflicts with widely endorsed principles governing the logic of counterfactuals. PubDate: Wed, 14 Jun 2023 00:00:00 GMT DOI: 10.1093/analys/anac090 Issue No:Vol. 83, No. 3 (2023)
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Pages: 539 - 541 Abstract: By BlockNedOxford University Press, 2022. 568 pp. PubDate: Wed, 22 Nov 2023 00:00:00 GMT DOI: 10.1093/analys/anac059 Issue No:Vol. 83, No. 3 (2023)
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Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Pages: 589 - 603 Abstract: Ethics of Socially Disruptive TechnologiesDutch Ministry of Education, Culture, and Science024.004.031Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research024.004.031 PubDate: Wed, 16 Aug 2023 00:00:00 GMT DOI: 10.1093/analys/anad032 Issue No:Vol. 83, No. 3 (2023)
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Pages: 604 - 616 Abstract: Calling for Explanation By BarasDanOxford University Press, 2022. 200 pp PubDate: Wed, 14 Jun 2023 00:00:00 GMT DOI: 10.1093/analys/anad033 Issue No:Vol. 83, No. 3 (2023)
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Pages: 616 - 626 Abstract: Being Rational and Being Right By ComesañaJuanOxford University Press, 2020. 240 pp PubDate: Wed, 22 Nov 2023 00:00:00 GMT DOI: 10.1093/analys/anac077 Issue No:Vol. 83, No. 3 (2023)
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Pages: 627 - 639 Abstract: A Perfectionist Theory of Justice By TahzibCollisOxford University Press, 2022. 368 pp PubDate: Sun, 11 Jun 2023 00:00:00 GMT DOI: 10.1093/analys/anad023 Issue No:Vol. 83, No. 3 (2023)
Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles)
