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Abstract: Abstract According to the standard formulation, natural selection requires variation, differential fitness, and heritability. I argue that this formulation is inadequate because it fails to distinguish natural selection from artificial selection, intelligent design, forward-looking orthogenetic selection, and adaptation via the selection of nonrandom variation. I suggest adding a no teleology condition. The no teleology condition says that the evolutionary process is not guided toward an endpoint represented in the mind of an agent, variation is produced randomly with respect to adaptation, and selection pressures are not forward looking. PubDate: 2024-08-07
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Abstract: Abstract Minimal residual disease (MRD), a measure of residual cancer cells, is a concept increasingly employed in precision oncology, touted as a key predictive biomarker to guide treatment decisions. This paper critically analyzes the expanding role of MRD as a predictive biomarker in hematologic cancers. I outline the argument for MRD as a predictive biomarker, articulating its premises and the empirical conditions that must hold for them to be true. I show how these conditions, while met in paradigmatic cases of MRD use in cancer, may not hold across other cancers where MRD is currently being applied, weakening the argument that MRD serves as an effective predictive biomarker across cancer medicine. PubDate: 2024-08-03
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Abstract: Abstract The new foundation for the propensity interpretation of fitness (PIF), developed by Pence and Ramsey (Br J Philos Sci 64:851–881, 2013), describes fitness as a probability distribution that encompasses all possible daughter populations to which the organism may give rise, including daughter populations in which traits might change and the possible environments that members of the daughter populations might encounter. This long-term definition of fitness is general enough to avoid counterexamples faced by previous mathematical conceptions of PIF. However, there seem to be downsides to its generality: the ecological role of fitness involves describing the degree of adaptedness between an organism and the specific environment it inhabits. When all possible changes in traits and all possible environments that a daughter population may encounter are included in the concept, it becomes difficult to see how fitness can fulfill this role. In this paper, we argue that this is a feature of Pence and Ramsey’s view rather than a bug: long-term fitness accommodates evolvability considerations, which concern the role that variation plays in evolutionary processes. Building on the foundations, we show that Pence and Ramsey’s fitness—F—can be partitioned into fourths: adaptedness, robustness of adaptedness, and two facets of evolvability. Conceptualizing these last three components forces us to consider the role played by grains of description of both organisms and the environment when thinking about long-term fitness. They track the possibility that there could be a change in type in a daughter population as a way of responding to environmental challenges, or that the type persists in the face of novel environments. We argue that these components are just as salient as adaptedness for long-term fitness. Together, this decomposition of F provides a more accurate picture of the factors involved in long-term evolutionary success. PubDate: 2024-07-16
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Abstract: Abstract This essay review explores Steven Mithen’s interdisciplinary approach to the origins and evolution of language in The Language Puzzle (2024). It focuses mainly on what I call his iconic vocal origins hypothesis. Mithen challenges the prevalent gestural origins hypothesis, suggesting instead that early prehistoric languages were predominantly vocal and iconic, with conventionalization – as characteristic of symbol use – emerging later. The Language Puzzle draws on research from archaeology, philosophy, computer science, developmental psychology, and many other fields, thus assembling a wealth of insights from various disciplines. While intriguing, Mithen’s suggestion that prehistoric languages may have relied on iconicity instead of conventionalization faces substantial problems, which are discussed in this review essay. In the final section, I also briefly review the important conclusion chapter of Mithen’s book, which contains an imaginative outline of how language evolved from the last common ancestor up until modern H. sapiens. My criticisms of the iconic vocal origins hypothesis notwithstanding, The Language Puzzle is a valuable resource for anyone interested in language evolution, and once again showcases Mithen’s wide-ranging expertise and masterful writing. PubDate: 2024-07-16
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Abstract: Abstract Machine metaphors abound in life sciences: animals as automata, mitochondria as engines, brains as computers. Philosophers have criticized machine metaphors for implying that life functions mechanically, misleading research. This approach misses a crucial point in applying machine metaphors to biological phenomena: their reciprocity. Analogical modeling of machines and biological entities is not a one-way street where our understanding of biology must obey a mechanical conception of machines. While our understanding of biological phenomena undoubtedly has been shaped by machine metaphors, the resulting insights have likewise altered our understanding of what machines are and what they can do. PubDate: 2024-07-01
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Abstract: Abstract Are plants sentient' Several researchers argue that plants might be sentient. They do so on the grounds that plants exhibit cognitive behaviour similar to that of sentient organisms and that they possess a vascular system which is functionally equivalent to the animal nervous system. This paper will not attempt to settle the issue of plant sentience. Instead, the paper has two goals. First, it provides a diagnosis of the current state of the debate on plant sentience. It is argued that the current state of the debate on plant sentience cannot yield any progress because the behavioural and physiological similarities pointed to as a way of inferring consciousness are not, in themselves, indicative of consciousness. Second, the paper proposes we adopt the theory-light approach proposed by Birch (Noûs 56(1):133–153, 2022. https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12351) whereby we start to test for clusters of cognitive abilities facilitated by consciousness in plants. Currently, there are no such tests and therefore no evidence for plant sentience. The paper proposes that the task for future research on plants be in line with the tests outlined in the theory-light approach. PubDate: 2024-06-21
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Abstract: Abstract This paper analyzes three multiscale modeling techniques that are commonly used in biology and physics and uses those cases to construct a normative framework for tailoring multiscale modeling techniques to specific modeling contexts. I argue that the selection of a multiscale modeling technique ought to focus on degrees of relative autonomy between scales, the measurable macroscale parameters of interest, indirect scaling relationships mediated by mesoscale features, and the degree of heterogeneity of the system’s mesoscale structures. The unique role that these features play in multiscale modeling reveals several important methodological, epistemological, and metaphysical questions for future philosophical investigations into multiscale modeling. PubDate: 2024-06-19
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Abstract: Abstract To better understand the knowledge of language we study how it interacts with other kinds of knowledge in the performance of different abilities and their corresponding knowledge structures, for example in reading and writing or in comparing prose and singing. The more difficult study is to gain a better understanding of how language emerged in our species. Comparative research with other species focused on communication, especially when expression is vocal and reception is auditory, may help us to formulate the right questions. In the comparisons in which the mechanisms of communication and aspects of the underlying knowledge are learned, another dimension of the research program presents itself. A recent survey of the field by Nicolas Mathevon maps out some of the main results of this research in The Voices of Nature: How and Why Animals Communicate (2023). The following review essay will be selective, as the survey is wide-ranging and covers related topics that will take us too far, even though they are, ultimately, related. PubDate: 2024-04-23 DOI: 10.1007/s10539-024-09947-z
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Abstract: Abstract In this paper, I plan to show that the use of a specific population concept—Millstein’s Causal Interactionist Population Concept (CIPC)—has interesting and counter-intuitive ramifications for discussions of the reality of biological race in human beings. These peculiar ramifications apply to human beings writ large and to individuals. While this in and of itself may not be problematic, I plan to show that the ramifications that follow from applying Millstein’s CIPC to human beings complicates specific biological racial realist accounts—naïve or otherwise. I conclude with the notion that even if biological races do exist—by fulfilling all of the criteria needed for Millstein’s population concept (which, given particular worries raised by Gannett (Synthese 177:363–385, 2010), and Winther and Kaplan (Theoria 60:54–80, 2013) may not)—the lower-bound limit for the scope of biological racial realism is at the level of populations, and as such they cannot say anything about whether or not individual organisms themselves have races. PubDate: 2024-04-12 DOI: 10.1007/s10539-024-09946-0
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Abstract: Abstract In this paper, I aim to explore whether fitness, understood as a causal disposition, can be characterized as an emergent property of organisms, or if it is reducible to the anatomical, physiological, and environmentally relative properties that characterize them. In doing so, I refer to Jessica Wilson’s characterization of ontological emergence and examine if fitness meets her criteria for ontological emergent properties (dependence and autonomy); and, if so, to what degree (weak or strong). PubDate: 2024-03-26 DOI: 10.1007/s10539-024-09945-1
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Abstract: Abstract Justin Garson has recently argued that proper functions are proximal activities of traits selected by phylogenetic or ontogenetic selection processes, and that traits are dysfunctional only if they cannot perform their proper functions for constitutional reasons. We partially agree with Garson, but reject the view that functions are proximal activities, as well as his account of dysfunctions. Instead, we propose our own theory that biological functions are selected dispositions and that a trait is dysfunctional in virtue of not having the dispositions for which it was selected. This account can explain both defects (or dysfunctions in Garson’s sense) and dysfunctions due to environmental factors. Moreover, it offers a neat way to explain the graduality of dysfunction. PubDate: 2024-03-16 DOI: 10.1007/s10539-024-09944-2
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Abstract: Abstract The environment is a continuous source of matter and energy, which dynamizes the adaptive processes of biological systems, so that these systems emerge, persist or are extinguished as a consequence of their reactions to the environment. This perspective, forged from classical physics, gives way to multiple ecological theories, with evolution being the most prominent one. In all these cases, information would be both dependent and subsequent to matter and energy. Thus, the emergence and dynamics of genetic material or ecological attributes such as abundance, richness or diversity depend mainly on the interaction of these two fundamental states. However, recent approaches from quantum physics and complexity views put forward the notion that information can be independent and prior to matter and energy, which allows us to see ecological processes from another perspective, i.e., as including complex biological systems as capable of showing emergent properties such as cognition. We proposed here a set of postulates and ideas that suggests how the ability to manipulate (internalize, integrate, store and generate) information can be developed by those systems, which would directly and non-randomly influence ecological attributes and their dynamics; i.e., how this property can possibly help replacing the notion of the environment as the ultimate cause of changes. Besides fully detailing the sources of knowledge and our rationale in this sense, we have also discussed how these thoughts and possibilities can be employed in devising better and more comprehensive approaches for biological conservation strategies. PubDate: 2024-03-13 DOI: 10.1007/s10539-024-09942-4
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Abstract: Abstract The biomedical literature makes extensive use of the concept of a genetic program. So far, however, the nature of genetic programs has received no satisfactory elucidation from the standpoint of computer science. This unsettling omission has led to doubts about the very existence of genetic programs, on the grounds that gene regulatory networks lack a predetermined schedule of execution, which may seem to contradict the very idea of a program. I show, however, that we can make perfect sense of genetic programs, if only we abandon the preconception that all computers have a von Neumann architecture. Instead, genetic programs instantiate the computational architecture of Post–Newell Production Systems. That is, genetic programs are unordered sets of conditional instructions, instructions that fire independently when their conditions are matched. For illustration I present a paradigm Production System that regulates the functioning of the well-known lac operon of E. coli. On close reflection it turns out that not only genes, but also proteins encode instructions. I propose, therefore, to rename genetic programs to biomolecular programs. Biomolecular and/or genetic programs, and the cellular computers than run them, are to be understood not as von Neumann computers, but as Post–Newell production systems. PubDate: 2024-03-11 DOI: 10.1007/s10539-024-09943-3
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Abstract: Abstract Humans are extremely prosocial and there are many possible explanations for how we came to be this way. Some have suggested that commitments explain the evolution of human prosociality. Commitments can serve to secure mutually beneficial interaction in the face of short-term incentives to cheat. In this paper, I have two aims. First, I argue that commitment not only applies to familiar practices such as promising but also explains small-scale collaboration among humans as early as two million years ago. In particular, it explains the stability of group hunting. In doing so, I provide a precisification of the concept of commitment. Second, I argue that earlier, non-linguistic forms of commitment can act as an evolutionary scaffold for more complex forms. As such, I will demonstrate how commitment can be understood to have coevolved with human cooperation. The coevolution of commitment and cooperation over our evolutionary history is, I suggest, a crucial part of the explanation of modern human prosociality. PubDate: 2024-02-14 DOI: 10.1007/s10539-024-09940-6
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Abstract: Foraging is a central competence of all mobile organisms. Models and concepts from foraging theory have been applied widely throughout biology to the search for many kinds of external resources, including food, sexual encounters, minerals, water, and the like. In cognitive science and neuroscience, the tools of foraging theory are increasingly applied to a wide range of other types of search, including for abstract resources like information or for internal resources like memories, concepts, and strategies for problem solving. Despite its importance in ecology and increasing relevance for the study of cognition, the concept of foraging is rarely analyzed. Here, I aim to rectify this situation. I outline three desiderata: first, an analysis should differentiate foraging from search and decision making more generally; second, an analysis should unify different types of foraging; and third, an analysis should help ground predictions. I present an analysis of foraging as the serial search for general resources in accept-or-reject, exclusive, persistent decision contexts. Not all search is serial and not all decision making is exclusive, differentiating foraging from search and decision making generally. With the aid of Markov decision processes and directed cyclical models, I show how the analysis implies a cyclical graph. This cyclical graph is embedded in the description of many types of foraging, unifying the different instances. Finally, I argue that the cyclical graph is also embedded in representations of novel task contexts that have not previously been viewed as foraging. I illustrate this novel application of the concept of foraging by arguing that reasoning is a type of foraging. PubDate: 2024-02-12 DOI: 10.1007/s10539-024-09939-z
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Abstract: Ecological neutral theory has been controversial as an alternative to niche theory for explaining community structure. Neutral theory, which explains community structure in terms of ecological drift, is frequently charged with being unrealistic, but commentators have usually not provided an account of theory or model realism. In this paper, I propose a framework for comparing the “realism” or accuracy of alternative theories within a domain with respect to the extent to which the theories abstract and idealize. Using this framework I argue, contrary to most previous commentators, that neutral and niche theories are similarly realistic. Realism cannot provide a basis for accepting or rejecting either type of theory; instead, community ecologists should continue working with a plurality of models. While theoretical unification may become possible, we should treat a plurality of complementary, partial models as the expected situation within community ecology. PubDate: 2024-02-12 DOI: 10.1007/s10539-024-09941-5
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Abstract: Abstract Philosophers examining mechanistic explanations in biology have identified heuristic strategies scientists use in discovering mechanisms. This paper examines the heuristic strategy of investigating phylogenetically distant model organisms, using research on sleep in fruit flies as an example. At the time sleep was discovered in flies in 2000 next to nothing was known about mechanisms regulating sleep in flies and what they could reveal about those in us. One relatively straightforward line of research focused on homologous genes in flies and humans, using those in flies to understand what roles their homologs played in controlling sleep in us. But other research focused on a higher level of organization—the neural networks involved in homeostatic and circadian control of sleep. This raises a puzzle—given that fly and vertebrate brains are organized very differently, how could sleep regulation in flies serve as an informative model of vertebrate sleep' I argue that the basic design of mechanisms such as those regulating sleep can be conserved even as the composition of the mechanism changes and that researchers can hope to use the designs deciphered in flies as heuristic models for understanding sleep in humans. PubDate: 2023-12-29 DOI: 10.1007/s10539-023-09938-6
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Abstract: Abstract This paper presents explication on how paleontologists reconstruct the past using fossils when good modern analogues are not available. I call these pastist methods to differentiate them from presentist methods in which such analogues are available. I do so by presenting two fossil cases: the problematica and graphoglyptids. I describe a forgotten heuristic, “analogue chaining,” that involves jumping from fossil anomaly to fossil anomaly using one to make sense of the other in successive fashion, using the relations between fossils to guide reconstruction. I relate this to the philosophy of historical sciences in four ways. First, that methods like analogue chaining have a “linearity” meaning that there are limited ways in which to learn about specimens using analogues. Second, that they are intrinsically difficult to notice, i.e. invisible. Third, that linearity and invisibility put pressure on some accounts of optimism about historical sciences. Fourth, our cases provide novel forms of optimism based on epistemic enhancement: the phenomena that some questions regarding an event are better answered millions of years after its occurrence. PubDate: 2023-12-19 DOI: 10.1007/s10539-023-09937-7
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Abstract: Abstract Cultural group selection theorists propose that humans evolved prosocial preferences. These claims revolve largely around the centrality of punishment in cultural groups, which helped to eliminate free riders. The purpose of this paper is to explore whether distinguishing between free-riding as an action, and free riders as entities, undermines or supports this view. I develop three individual-based models of the Prisoner’s Dilemma. The first model shows that strong reciprocity removes overt freeriders from a population, and maintains a high rate of cooperation. In the second, I introduce individuals that mimic cooperative preferences, but who defect when they trick opponents into cooperating. I show that strong reciprocity is robust against this strategy, but not because individuals are replaced by strong reciprocators. Finally, I introduce a third strategy, covert mimicry, where some mimics may defect without detection. I draw attention to the problem highlighted in these models, which is that cooperation may be maintained in populations only because freeriders are not presented with the opportunity to defect. I discuss this problem in the context of cultural group selection and the human capacity for innovation, and suggest that hypotheses relying on prosocial preferences for maintaining cooperation require some revision. PubDate: 2023-11-07 DOI: 10.1007/s10539-023-09936-8
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Abstract: Abstract Work on cultural evolution, especially that of Boyd, Richerson, and Henrich, has said little about the role of reinforcement in cultural learning. This is surprising, for reinforcement is an old system, it is found across a diverse array of organisms, and it is a successful concept in various scientific disciplines. The main claim of this paper is that social forms of reinforcement play a role in cultural evolution. More specifically, I argue that starting early in human history, social approval and disapproval of behavior function as reinforcers and punishers; approval and disapproval thereby start a process whereby norms are transmitted. After giving arguments for these claims, I discuss work on social learning strategies—cultural rules specifying who to learn from and how to learn from them (Heyes in Philos Trans R Soc 371(1693):1–8, 2016. https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2015.0369). I suggest that the account I develop here can help explain the connection between these learning rules and cultural evolution. I illustrate this point with recent work on divination practices (Hong and Henrich in Hum Nat 32:622–651, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12110-021-09408-6). My account proposes that forms of social reinforcement can explain the spread and persistence of divination practices. Besides addressing the central question (a role for reinforcement in cultural evolution), my account indirectly touches on developing themes in cultural evolution, namely, normative psychology (Heyes in Perspect Psychol Sci, 2023; Birch Biol Philos 36:4, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10539-020-09777-9). PubDate: 2023-10-24 DOI: 10.1007/s10539-023-09934-w
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