Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Abstract: Abstract Cultural group selection theorists propose that humans evolved prosocial preferences. These claims revolve largely around the centrality of punishment in cultural groups, which helped to eliminate free riders. The purpose of this paper is to explore whether distinguishing between free-riding as an action, and free riders as entities, undermines or supports this view. I develop three individual-based models of the Prisoner’s Dilemma. The first model shows that strong reciprocity removes overt freeriders from a population, and maintains a high rate of cooperation. In the second, I introduce individuals that mimic cooperative preferences, but who defect when they trick opponents into cooperating. I show that strong reciprocity is robust against this strategy, but not because individuals are replaced by strong reciprocators. Finally, I introduce a third strategy, covert mimicry, where some mimics may defect without detection. I draw attention to the problem highlighted in these models, which is that cooperation may be maintained in populations only because freeriders are not presented with the opportunity to defect. I discuss this problem in the context of cultural group selection and the human capacity for innovation, and suggest that hypotheses relying on prosocial preferences for maintaining cooperation require some revision. PubDate: 2023-11-07
Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Abstract: Abstract Work on cultural evolution, especially that of Boyd, Richerson, and Henrich, has said little about the role of reinforcement in cultural learning. This is surprising, for reinforcement is an old system, it is found across a diverse array of organisms, and it is a successful concept in various scientific disciplines. The main claim of this paper is that social forms of reinforcement play a role in cultural evolution. More specifically, I argue that starting early in human history, social approval and disapproval of behavior function as reinforcers and punishers; approval and disapproval thereby start a process whereby norms are transmitted. After giving arguments for these claims, I discuss work on social learning strategies—cultural rules specifying who to learn from and how to learn from them (Heyes in Philos Trans R Soc 371(1693):1–8, 2016. https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2015.0369). I suggest that the account I develop here can help explain the connection between these learning rules and cultural evolution. I illustrate this point with recent work on divination practices (Hong and Henrich in Hum Nat 32:622–651, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12110-021-09408-6). My account proposes that forms of social reinforcement can explain the spread and persistence of divination practices. Besides addressing the central question (a role for reinforcement in cultural evolution), my account indirectly touches on developing themes in cultural evolution, namely, normative psychology (Heyes in Perspect Psychol Sci, 2023; Birch Biol Philos 36:4, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10539-020-09777-9). PubDate: 2023-10-24
Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Abstract: Abstract Depression is a widespread and debilitating disorder, but developing effective treatments has proven challenging. Despite success in animal models, many treatments fail in human trials. While various factors contribute to this translational failure, standardization practices in animal research are often overlooked. This paper argues that certain standardization choices in behavioral neuroscience research on depression can limit the generalizability of results from rodents to humans. This raises ethical and scientific concerns, including animal waste and a lack of progress in treating human patients. To address these issues, animal ethics committees can establish reasonable expectations for preclinical research and highlight the impact of standardization on generalizability. Such efforts can help improve translation from animal models to human patients and ultimately benefit those suffering from depression. PubDate: 2023-10-17
Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Abstract: Abstract We characterize a type of functional explanation that addresses why a homologous trait originating deep in the evolutionary history of a group remains widespread and largely unchanged across the group’s lineages. We argue that biologists regularly provide this type of explanation when they attribute conserved functions to phenotypic and genetic traits. The concept of conserved function applies broadly to many biological domains, and we illustrate its importance using examples of molecular sequence alignments at the intersection of evolution and cell biology. We use these examples to show how the study of conserved functions can integrate knowledge of a trait’s causal effects on fitness and its history of natural selection without invoking adaptation. We also show how conserved function provides a novel basis for addressing objections against evolutionary functions raised by Robert Cummins. PubDate: 2023-10-11
Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Abstract: Abstract Despite the undeniable epistemic progress of developmental biology from the second half of the twentieth century to the present day, there still is widespread disagreement on defining the biological term of ‘development’. This scientific field epistemologically is neither unsuccessful nor immature, thus the persistent lack of agreement on its most central concept raises some important questions: is there any need for an explicit definition of biological development, and if so, what content should the definition have' My central thesis is twofold. First, that current definitions of biological development are conceptually or empirically inadequate. Second, that an explicit definition of biological development is very much needed (a) for the practical purposes of science textbooks, but more importantly is needed (b) epistemically for exposing or overcoming problematic assumptions and for partially guiding scientific research by coding the appropriate assumptions. To support this thesis, initially I will show the deficiencies of the dominant definitions of biological development; and subsequently I will provide two arguments: an Argument from Practical Purposes and an Argument from Epistemic Purposes. Finally, for accommodating practical and epistemic purposes and as a response to the inadequacy of the available definitions of development, I will propose and defend an operational definition of biological development which is aimed to be broader than the received ones, while being more precise and fruitful to conduct empirical research. PubDate: 2023-10-07
Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Abstract: Abstract This paper presents an account of the nature of stem cells based on the philosophical concept of disposition. It is argued that stem cells can be conceived as dispositional objects, and adopting this attitude allows overcoming some of the controversies surrounding the nature of stemness (most notably, the state vs. entity debate) because it offers a framework that accommodates the lessons from different theories. Additionally, the account is simultaneously useful for interpreting stem cell experiments and guiding potential interventions. The account shows how different levels, both molecular and emergent network-level, play the primary causal role in explaining some empirical results, and hence they suggest that the explanations can be mechanistic or topological, respectively. The realization that any of these levels may play a more prominent causal role than another allows suggesting interventions at the genetic, molecular and population levels. PubDate: 2023-09-29
Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Abstract: Abstract In this paper, we critically consider the analogy between “infodemic” and “pandemic”, i.e. the spread of fake news about COVID-19 as a medial virus and the infection with the biological virus itself from the perspective of cultural evolutionary theory (CET). After confronting three major shortcomings of the ‘infodemic’ concept, we use CET as a background framework to analyze this phenomenon. To do so, we summarize which bi-ases are crucial for transmission in terms of cultural selection and how transmission is restricted by filter bubbles or echo chambers acting as TRIMS (transmission isolating mechanisms) post “infection”, which isolate false from trustworthy scientific information in the context of the Corona pandemic. This is followed by a demonstration of the threat to biological fitness posed by the effects of an infection with fake news, which leads to a reduced willingness to vaccinate and follow health measures. We identify fake news on Covid as pseudoscience, trying to immunize itself from external influences. We then address the question of how to combat the infodemic. Since debunking strategies, such as warnings by fact-checking, have proven relatively ineffective in combating fake news, the inoculation theory from psychology might offer an alternative solution. Through its underlying ‘prebunking strategy’, which educates individuals about the risks and tactics of fake news prior to a potential infection, they could be ‘immunized’ in advance, similar to a virological vaccination. Although we recognize that the pandemic/infodemic analogy is in fact far from perfect, we believe that CET could provide a theoretical underpinning in order to give much more semantic depth to the concept ‘infodemic’. PubDate: 2023-09-28
Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Abstract: Abstract This paper defends global realism about the units of selection, the view that there is always (or nearly always) an objective fact of the matter concerning the level at which natural selection acts. The argument proceeds in two stages. First, it is argued that global conventionalist-pluralism is false. This is established by identifying plausible sufficient conditions for irreducible selection at a particular level, and showing that these conditions are sometimes satisfied in nature. Second, it is argued that local pluralism – the view that while realism is true of some selection regimes, pluralist conventionalism holds for others – should also be rejected. I show that the main arguments for local pluralism are consistent with global realism. I also suggest that local pluralism offers an unacceptably disunified view of the metaphysics of selection. It follows that we should accept global realism. But this leaves open the question of how to classify so called ‘multi-level selection type 1’ (MLS1) processes, such as Wilson’s classic trait-group model for the evolution of altruism: should they be interpreted as particle selection or collective selection' On the assumption of global realism, at most one of these is correct. I argue, against global realists such as Sober, that MLS1 processes should be understood as particle, not collective, selection, due to three features of MLS1: the reducibility of collective fitness, the absence of collective reproduction, and the dispensable role of collectives. PubDate: 2023-09-25
Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Abstract: Abstract Two or more independent species lineages can fuse through an evolutionary transition to form a single lineage, such as in the case of eukaryotic cells, lichens, and coral. The fusion of two or more independent lineages requires intermediary steps of increasing selective interdependence between these lineages. We argue a precursory selective regime of such a transition can be Multilevel Selection 1 (MLS1). We propose that intraspecies MLS1 can be extended to ecological multispecies arrangements. We develop a trait group selection (MLS1) model applicable to multispecies mutualistic interactions. We then explore conditions under which such a model could apply to mutualistic relationships between pollinators and plants. We propose that MLS1 could drive transitions towards higher interdependency between mutualists and stabilise obligate mutualisms in the face of invasion by cheater variants. This represents a radical extension of multilevel selection theory, applying it to the evolution of multispecies populations, and indicating new avenues for researching ecological community evolution. PubDate: 2023-09-24
Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Abstract: Abstract Human interaction with the living world, in science and beyond, always involves classification. While it has been a long-standing scientific goal to produce a single all-purpose taxonomy of life to cater for this need, classificatory practice is often subject to confusion and disagreement, and many philosophers have advocated forms of classificatory pluralism. This entails that multiple classifications should be allowed to coexist, and that whichever classification is best, is context-dependent. In this paper, we discuss some practical consequences of classificatory pluralism, in particular with regard to how one is supposed to find the best classification for a given context. We do so by means of a case study concerning oaks, in particular the pedunculate oak (Quercus robur L.) and the sessile oak (Quercus petraea (Matt.) Liebl.), two important putative species that present several classificatory challenges; and by applying one recent philosophical framework conceptualizing classification, the so-called Grounded Functionality Account (GFA) of (natural) kinds. We show how the GFA elucidates several issues related to oak classification and gives directions to optimize classificatory practices, and discuss some implications for scientific taxonomy. PubDate: 2023-09-23
Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Abstract: Abstract Nature-based solutions (NbS) have in recent years occupied a central position in conservation and climate discussions among both scientists and policy makers. NbS generally identify a set of strategies which use nature, or natural objects, to address societal (human) issues while simultaneously supporting the broader environment. Rather than criticize NbS on the grounds that the concept is too vague to be truly action-guiding (a criticism that is already well-recognized), I instead argue, through an examination of the literature, that the term NbS should be understood as referring to the protection and implementation of “blue/green” areas and infrastructure. I then investigate whether NbS, conceived of in this way, can be justified as a category worthy of our serious consideration. I argue that the environmental impact of artificial analogues, human-made constructions that share certain functional features with natural (non-human-made) structures, gives us reason to doubt that blue/green forms of infrastructure can truly be prioritized over other strategies on biodiversity grounds. Yet rather than reject the category of NbS completely, I suggest that these strategies may nevertheless have an advantage insofar as they play a vital aesthetic role in developing a healthier relationship between humans and the nonhuman world. PubDate: 2023-09-15 DOI: 10.1007/s10539-023-09926-w
Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Abstract: Abstract A recent idea of “ecosystem health” was introduced in the 1970s and 1980s to draws attention to the fact that ecosystems can become ill because of a reduction of properties such as primary productivity, functions and diversity of interactions among system components. Starting from the 1990s, this idea has been deeply criticized by authors who argued that, insofar as ecosystems show many differences with respect to organismic features, these two kinds of systems cannot share a typical organismic property such as health. In recent years, an organisational approach in philosophy of biology and ecology argued that both organisms and ecosystems may share a fundamental characteristic despite their differences, namely, organisational closure. Based on this kind of closure, scholars have also discussed health and malfunctional states in organisms. In this paper, we examine the possibility of expanding such an organisational approach to health and malfunctions to the ecological domain. Firstly, we will see that a malfunction is related to a lower effectiveness in the functional behaviour of some biotic components with respect to other systemic components. We will then show how some introduced species do not satisfactorily interact in an organisational closure with other ecosystem components, thus posing a threat to the self-maintenance of the ecosystem in which they are found. Accordingly, we will argue that an ecosystem can be said to be healthy when it is a vital environment organisationally grounded on its intrinsic capacity to ensure, under favourable conditions, appropriate functional behaviours for ecosystem components and ecosystem self-maintenance. PubDate: 2023-09-14 DOI: 10.1007/s10539-023-09927-9
Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Abstract: Abstract I offer a defense, albeit a qualified one, of machine analogies in biology, focusing on molecular contexts. The defense is rooted in my prior work (Levy in Philosopher’s Imprint 14(6), 2014), which construes the machine machine-likeness of a system as a matter of the extent to which it exhibits an internal division of labor. A concrete aim is to shore up the notion of molecular biological machines, paying special attention to processive molecular motors, such as Kinesin. But I will also try to show how the division of labor account gives us guidance more broadly, both about where and why machine analogies can be expected to prove helpful and about their limitations. PubDate: 2023-09-09 DOI: 10.1007/s10539-023-09915-z
Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Abstract: Abstract Deciphering the neural basis of subjective experience remains one of the great challenges in the natural sciences. The structural complexity and the limitations around invasive experimental manipulations of the human brain have impeded progress towards this goal. While animals cannot directly report first-person subjective experiences, their ability to exhibit flexible behaviours such as motivational trade-offs are generally considered evidence of sentience. The worm Caenorhabditis elegans affords the unique opportunity to describe the circuitry underlying subjective experience at a single cell level as its whole neural connectome is known and moreover, these animals exhibit motivational trade-offs. We started with the premise that these worms were sentient and then sought to understand the neurons that were both necessary and sufficient for a motivational trade-off involving the rewarding experience of food and the negative experience of an aversive odour. A simple hierarchical network consisting of two chemosensory neurons and three interneurons was found to produce an output to motoneurons that enabled worms to respond in a contextually appropriate manner to an aversive odour according to the worm's hunger state. Given that this circuitry is like that found in the human spinal cord, retina, and primary visual cortex, three regions which are neither necessary nor sufficient for subjective experience, we conclude that motivational trade-offs are not a criterion for subjective experience in worms. Furthermore, once the neural substrate for a behaviour is described, we question the explanatory role of subjective experience in behaviour. PubDate: 2023-08-23 DOI: 10.1007/s10539-023-09924-y
Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Abstract: Abstract Explaining the emergence of individuality in the process of evolution remains a challenge; it faces the difficulty of characterizing adequately what ‘emergence’ amounts to. Here, I present a pragmatic account of individuality in which I take up this challenge. Following this account, individuals that emerge from an evolutionary transition in individuality are coarse-grained entities: entities that are summaries of lower-level evolutionary processes. Although this account may prima facie appear to ultimately rely on epistemic considerations, I show that it can be used to vindicate the emergence of individuals in a quasi-ontological sense. To this end, I discuss a recent account of evolutionary transitions in individuality proposed by Godfrey-Smith and Kerr (Brit J Philos Sci 64(1):205–222, 2013) where a transition occurs through several stages, each with an accompanying model. I focus on the final stage where higher-level entities are ascribed a separate fitness parameter, while they were not in the previous stages. In light of my account, I provide some justification for why such a change in parameters is necessary and cannot be dismissed as merely epistemic. PubDate: 2023-08-14 DOI: 10.1007/s10539-023-09917-x
Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Abstract: Abstract This paper assesses the effect of DNA barcoding—the use of informative genetic markers to identify and discriminate between species—on taxonomy. Throughout, we interpret this in terms of varipraxis, a concept we introduce to make sense of the treatment of biological variation by scientists and other practitioners. From its inception, DNA barcoding was criticised for being reductive, in attempting to replace multiple forms of taxonomic evidence with just one: DNA sequence variation in one or a few indicative genes. We show, though, how DNA barcoding has not narrowed or reduced taxonomy in the way it was projected to. We examine the development and implementation of DNA barcoding across three kingdoms of life: animals, plants, and protists. Through this, we demonstrate that for DNA barcoding to work, the range of acceptable intra-specific variation needs to be demarcated from variation deemed to be characteristic of inter-specific differences. Consequently, biological processes responsible for particular patterns of variation need to be investigated and understood. This encourages an integrative disposition towards understanding and explaining the evolutionary processes affecting the rate and nature of change at the nucleotide level. We detail how the impact of DNA barcoding has manifested differently across the three kingdoms we examine, assessing this in terms of the ontological commitments that are held and instantiated in practice. Based on this evaluation, we consider the problem of studying multi-kingdom communities, and assess the consequences of our analysis for understanding classification and taxonomy. PubDate: 2023-08-12 DOI: 10.1007/s10539-023-09916-y
Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Abstract: Abstract A Better Ape covers the evolution of morality from the birth of our ape family through the evolution of human species and all the way up to the development of modern societies. In this summary, we highlight several main elements of this account: the co-evolution of morality with intelligence and complex sociality; the role of social institutions and religious morality in the cultural evolution of behaviorally modern humans in prehistory; the increasing complexity of the moral mind through biological evolution in apes, gene-culture co-evolution in various human species, cultural evolution in Homo sapiens, and rational-cultural evolution in recent centuries; and, finally, a cultural evolutionary model of progressive and regressive moral change on which a key factor driving moral progress is social and democratic integration. PubDate: 2023-08-11 DOI: 10.1007/s10539-023-09922-0
Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Abstract: Abstract Richmond Campbell and Victor Kumar’s A Better Ape is very plausible accout of how the “moral mind” evolved. In my commentary, I raise questions and objections regarding their views on the units of selection, the emotions, the intrinsic motivation of moral norms, and the nature of moral progress. PubDate: 2023-08-07 DOI: 10.1007/s10539-023-09919-9
Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles)
