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  Subjects -> PHILOSOPHY (Total: 861 journals)
Showing 1 - 135 of 135 Journals sorted alphabetically
'Ilu. Revista de Ciencias de las Religiones     Open Access   (Followers: 10)
Acheronta     Open Access   (Followers: 5)
ACME : Annali della Facoltà di Studi Umanistici dell'Università degli Studi di Milano     Open Access   (Followers: 4)
Acta Philosophica     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Acta Universitatis Carolinae Theologica     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Advances in Medical Ethics     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
African Journal of Business Ethics     Open Access   (Followers: 8)
Agora     Full-text available via subscription  
Agora: papeles de Filosofía     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Ahkam : Jurnal Ilmu Syariah     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Aisthema, International Journal     Open Access  
Aisthesis     Open Access   (Followers: 7)
Aisthesis. Pratiche, linguaggi e saperi dell’estetico     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
Ajatus : Suomen Filosofisen Yhdistyksen vuosikirja     Open Access  
AJIS : Academic Journal of Islamic Studies     Open Access  
Akademos     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
al-Afkar : Journal For Islamic Studies     Open Access  
Al-Banjari : Jurnal Ilmiah Ilmu-Ilmu Keislaman     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Al-Fikra     Open Access  
Al-Jami'ah : Journal of Islamic Studies     Open Access   (Followers: 6)
AL-Qadissiya Magzine for Human Sciences     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
Al-Tijary : Jurnal Ekonomi dan Bisnis Islam     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Al-Ulum     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Albertus Magnus     Open Access  
Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Alpha (Osorno)     Open Access  
Alter : Revue de phénoménologie     Open Access  
American Journal of Semiotics     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 7)
American Journal of Theology & Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 44)
American Society for Aesthetics Graduate E-journal     Open Access   (Followers: 4)
An-Nisbah : Jurnal Ekonomi Syariah     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Anais de Filosofia Clássica     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Anais Eletrônicos do Congresso Epistemologias do Sul     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Analecta Hermeneutica     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Anales de la Cátedra Francisco Suárez     Open Access  
Anales del Seminario de Historia de la Filosofía     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Análisis     Open Access  
Análisis : Revista de investigación filosófica     Open Access  
Analysis     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 25)
Analytic Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 23)
Analytica : Revista de Filosofia     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Ancient Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 13)
Andrews University Seminary Student Journal     Open Access   (Followers: 4)
ANFUSINA : Journal of Psychology     Open Access   (Followers: 6)
Angewandte Philosophie / Applied Philosophy     Hybrid Journal  
Annales Universitatis Mariae Curie-Sklodowska, sectio I – Philosophia-Sociologia     Open Access  
Annali del Dipartimento di Filosofia     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Annals of the University of Bucharest : Philosophy Series     Open Access  
Annuaire du Collège de France     Open Access   (Followers: 6)
Anthropological Measurements of Philosophical Research     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Anuari de la Societat Catalana de Filosofia     Open Access  
Anuario Filosófico     Full-text available via subscription  
Appareil     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Apuntes Filosóficos     Open Access  
Apuntes Universitarios     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Araucaria. Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política y Humanidades     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Archai : revista de estudos sobre as origens do pensamento ocidental     Open Access  
Archiv fuer Rechts- und Sozialphilosphie     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 13)
Areté : Revista de Filosofia     Open Access  
Argos     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Argumentos - Revista de Filosofia     Open Access  
Assuming Gender     Open Access   (Followers: 12)
Astérion     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Astrolabio     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
At-Tabsyir : Jurnal Komunikasi Penyiaran Islam     Open Access  
At-Taqaddum     Open Access  
At-Turats     Open Access  
Attarbiyah : Journal of Islamic Culture and Education     Open Access  
Augustinian Studies     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5)
Augustiniana     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Augustinianum     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Aurora : papeles del Seminario María Zambrano     Open Access   (Followers: 4)
Auslegung : A Journal of Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Australasian Catholic Record, The     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 6)
Australasian Journal of Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 64)
Australasian Philosophical Review     Full-text available via subscription  
Australian Humanist, The     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
Australian Journal of Parapsychology     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Axiomathes     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6)
Bajo Palabra     Open Access  
Balkan Journal of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
BELAJEA : Jurnal Pendidikan Islam     Open Access  
Between the Species     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Beytulhikme An International Journal of Philosophy     Open Access  
Bijdragen     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Binghamton Journal of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription  
Bioethica     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Bioethics Research Notes     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 15)
BioéthiqueOnline     Open Access  
Biology and Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 20)
BMC Medical Ethics     Open Access   (Followers: 22)
Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5)
Bohemistyka     Open Access  
Bollettino Filosofico     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
British Journal for the History of Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 47)
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 42)
British Journal of Aesthetics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 24)
British Journal of Music Therapy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8)
Budhi : A Journal of Ideas and Culture     Full-text available via subscription  
Bulletin d'Analyse Phénoménologique     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Bulletin de Philosophie Medievale     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Bulletin of Symbolic Logic     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Bulletin of Yaroslav Mudryi NLU : Series : Philosophy, philosophy of law, political science, sociology     Open Access  
Business and Professional Ethics Journal     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5)
Business Ethics Quarterly     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 19)
C@hiers du CRHIDI     Open Access  
Cadernos Benjaminianos     Open Access  
Cadernos de Ética e Filosofia Política     Open Access  
Cadernos de Filosofia Alemã : Crítica e Modernidade     Open Access  
Cadernos do PET Filosofia     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Cadernos Espinosanos     Open Access  
Cadernos Nietzsche     Open Access  
Cadernos Zygmunt Bauman     Open Access  
Cahiers de Philosophie de l’Université de Caen     Open Access  
Cahiers Droit, Sciences & Technologies     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Cakrawala : Jurnal Studi Islam     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Canadian Journal of Bioethics     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
Canadian Journal of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 23)
Chiasmi International     Full-text available via subscription  
Childhood & Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 9)
Chisholm Health Ethics Bulletin     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Chôra : Revue d’Études Anciennes et Médiévales - philosophie, théologie, sciences     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
Christian Journal for Global Health     Open Access  
Chromatikon     Full-text available via subscription  
Church Heritage     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5)
Ciência & Trópico     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Cilicia Journal of Philosophy     Open Access  
Cinta de Moebio     Open Access  
Circe de clásicos y modernos     Open Access  
Civitas Augustiniana     Open Access  
Clareira - Revista de Filosofia da Região Amazônica     Open Access  
Claridades : Revista de Filosofía     Open Access  
Clotho     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Cognitio : Revista de Filosofia     Open Access  
Cognitive Semiotics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Collingwood and British Idealism Studies     Full-text available via subscription  
Colombia Forense     Open Access  
Comparative and Continental Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 10)
Comparative Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 14)
Con-Textos Kantianos (International Journal of Philosophy)     Open Access  
Conatus : Journal of Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
CONJECTURA : filosofia e educação     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Constellations     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 22)
Contagion : Journal of Violence, Mimesis, and Culture     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 7)
Contemporary Chinese Thought     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 7)
Contemporary Political Theory     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 48)
Contemporary Pragmatism     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6)
Continental Philosophy Review     Partially Free   (Followers: 25)
Contrastes. Revista Internacional de Filosofía     Open Access  
Contributions to the History of Concepts     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 7)
Controvérsia     Open Access  
Convivium : Revista de Filosophia     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
CoSMo | Comparative Studies in Modernism     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Cosmos and History : The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 8)
CR : The New Centennial Review     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
Cracow Indological Studies     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Creativity Studies     Open Access   (Followers: 5)
Critical Horizons     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Croatian Journal of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Cuadernos de Bioetica     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Cuadernos de Filosofía     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
Cuadernos de Filosofía Latinoamericana     Open Access  
Cuestiones de Filosofía     Open Access  
Cultura : International Journal of Philosophy of Culture and Axiology     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
Cultural-Historical Psychology     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Cuyo Anuario de Filosofía Argentina y Americana     Open Access  
Daimon Revista Internacional de Filosofía     Open Access  
Dalogue and Universalism     Full-text available via subscription  
Dao : A Journal of Comparative Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8)
Décalages : An Althusser Studies Journal     Open Access  
Design Philosophy Papers     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 11)
Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte     Hybrid Journal  
Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 16)
Diagonal : Zeitschrift der Universität Siegen     Hybrid Journal  
Diakrisis Yearbook of Theology and Philosophy     Open Access  
Dialectic : A scholarly journal of thought leadership, education and practice in the discipline of visual communication design     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Dialektiké     Open Access  
Dialogue Canadian Philosophical Review/Revue canadienne de philosophie     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5)
Dianoia     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Diánoia     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Diferencia(s)     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Dimas : Jurnal Pemikiran Agama untuk Pemberdayaan     Open Access  
Diogenes     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8)
Dios y el Hombre     Open Access  
Dirosat : Journal of Islamic Studies     Open Access  
Discurso     Open Access  
Discusiones Filosóficas     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Disputatio     Open Access  
Dissonância : Revista de Teoria Crítica     Open Access  
Doctor virtualis     Open Access  
Doxa : Cuadernos de Filosofía del Derecho     Open Access  
EarthSong Journal: Perspectives in Ecology, Spirituality and Education     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Economica : Jurnal Ekonomi Islam     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Edukasi : Jurnal Pendidikan Islam     Open Access  
Eidos     Open Access  
Ekstasis : Revista de Hermenêutica e Fenomenologia     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
El Banquete de los Dioses     Open Access  
Elenchos     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Eleutheria     Open Access   (Followers: 1)

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Similar Journals
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British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
Journal Prestige (SJR): 2.161
Citation Impact (citeScore): 2
Number of Followers: 42  
 
  Hybrid Journal Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles)
ISSN (Print) 0007-0882 - ISSN (Online) 1464-3537
Published by Oxford University Press Homepage  [412 journals]
  • The Complementarity of Psychometrics and the Representational Theory of
           Measurement
    • Authors: Vessonen E.
      Pages: 415 - 442
      Abstract: AbstractPsychometrics and the representational theory of measurement (RTM) are widely used in social scientific measurement. They are currently pursued largely in isolation from one another. I argue that despite their separation in practice, RTM and psychometrics are complementary approaches, because they can contribute in complementary ways to the establishment of what I argue is a crucial measurement property, namely, representational interpretability. Because RTM and psychometrics are complementary in the establishment of representational interpretability, the current separation of measurement approaches is unfounded. 1Introduction2Two Approaches to Measurement 2.1Representational theory of measurement2.2Psychometrics2.3Representational interpretability3Complementarity, Conceptually 3.1Representational theory of measurement: Conditions of representational interpretability3.2Psychometrics: Evidence of representational interpretability4Complementarity in Action 4.1What is the Rasch model'4.2Rasch and conjoint measurement5Conclusion: Critics and Fruits of Complementarity
      PubDate: Tue, 09 Jul 2019 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/bjps/axy032
      Issue No: Vol. 71, No. 2 (2019)
       
  • The Real Problem with Perturbative Quantum Field Theory
    • Authors: Fraser J.
      Pages: 391 - 413
      Abstract: AbstractThe perturbative approach to quantum field theory (QFT) has long been viewed with suspicion by philosophers of science. This article offers a diagnosis of its conceptual problems. Drawing on Norton’s ([2012]) discussion of the notion of approximation I argue that perturbative QFT ought to be understood as producing approximations without specifying an underlying QFT model. This analysis leads to a reassessment of common worries about perturbative QFT. What ends up being the key issue with the approach on this picture is not mathematical rigour, or the threat of inconsistency, but the need for a physical explanation of its empirical success. 1Three Worries about Perturbative Quantum Field Theory2The Perturbative Formalism 2.1Expanding the S-matrix2.2Perturbative renormalization3Approximations and Models4Perturbative Quantum Field Theory Produces Approximations5The Real Problem
      PubDate: Thu, 28 Jun 2018 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/bjps/axx042
      Issue No: Vol. 71, No. 2 (2018)
       
  • The Sense of Time
    • Authors: Viera G.
      Pages: 443 - 469
      Abstract: AbstractIt’s often claimed in the philosophical and scientific literature on temporal representation that there is no such thing as a genuine sensory system for time. In this article, I argue for the opposite—many animals, including all mammals, possess a genuine sensory system for time based in the circadian system. In arguing for this conclusion, I develop a semantics and meta-semantics for explaining how the endogenous rhythms of the circadian system provide organisms with a direct information link to the temporal structure of their environment. In doing so, I highlight the role of sensory systems in an information processing architecture. 1Introduction2Sensory Systems and Experience3Against the Sense of Time 3.1The non-causality argument3.2The integration argument4Circadian Systems5The Semantics of (Internal) Clocks6An Information-Theoretic Account7Conclusion
      PubDate: Wed, 14 Mar 2018 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/bjps/axy019
      Issue No: Vol. 71, No. 2 (2018)
       
  • Getting Serious about Shared Features
    • Authors: Khosrowi D.
      Pages: 523 - 546
      Abstract: AbstractIn Simulation and Similarity, Michael Weisberg offers a similarity-based account of the model–world relation, which is the relation in virtue of which successful models are successful. Weisberg’s main idea is that models are similar to targets in virtue of sharing features. An important concern about Weisberg’s account is that it remains silent on what it means for models and targets to share features, and consequently on how feature-sharing contributes to models’ epistemic success. I consider three potential ways of concretizing the concept of shared features: as identical, quantitatively sufficiently close, and sufficiently similar features. I argue that each of these concretizations faces significant challenges, leaving unclear how Weisberg’s account substantially contributes to elucidating the relation in virtue of which successful models are successful. Against this background, I outline a pluralistic revision and argue that this revision may not only help Weisberg's account evade several of the problems that I raise, but also offers a novel perspective on the model–world relation more generally. 1Introduction2Weisberg’s Feature-Sharing Account3What Is a Shared Feature' 3.1Identity3.2Sufficient closeness3.3Sufficient similarity4Turning Weisberg’s Account ‘Upside Down’5Conclusion
      PubDate: Thu, 28 Jun 2018 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/bjps/axy029
      Issue No: Vol. 71, No. 2 (2018)
       
  • Asymmetry, Abstraction, and Autonomy: Justifying Coarse-Graining in
           Statistical Mechanics
    • Authors: Robertson K.
      Pages: 547 - 579
      Abstract: While the fundamental laws of physics are time-reversal invariant, most macroscopic processes are irreversible. Given that the fundamental laws are taken to underpin all other processes, how can the fundamental time-symmetry be reconciled with the asymmetry manifest elsewhere' In statistical mechanics (SM), progress can be made with this question. What I dub the ‘Zwanzig–Zeh–Wallace framework’ can be used to construct the irreversible equations of SM from the underlying microdynamics. Yet this framework uses coarse-graining, a procedure that has faced much criticism. I focus on two objections in the literature: claims that coarse-graining makes time-asymmetry (i) ‘illusory’ and (ii) ‘anthropocentric’. I argue that these objections arise from an unsatisfactory justification of coarse-graining prevalent in the literature, rather than from coarse-graining itself. This justification relies on the idea of measurement imprecision. By considering the role that abstraction and autonomy play, I provide an alternative justification and offer replies to the illusory and anthropocentric objections. Finally, I consider the broader consequences of this alternative justification: the connection to debates about inter-theoretic reduction and the implication that the time-asymmetry in SM is weakly emergent. 1Introduction 1.1Prospectus2The Zwanzig–Zeh–Wallace Framework3Why Does This Method Work' 3.1The special conditions account3.2When is a density forwards-compatible'4Anthropocentrism and Illusion: Two Objections 4.1The two objections in more detail4.2Against the justification by measurement imprecision5An Alternative Justification 5.1ion and autonomy5.2An illustration: the Game of Life6Reply to Illusory7Reply to Anthropocentric8The Wider Landscape: Concluding Remarks 8.1Inter-theoretic relations8.2The nature of irreversibility
      PubDate: Tue, 26 Jun 2018 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/bjps/axy020
      Issue No: Vol. 71, No. 2 (2018)
       
  • Mathematical Explanation beyond Explanatory Proof
    • Authors: D’Alessandro W.
      Pages: 581 - 603
      Abstract: AbstractMuch recent work on mathematical explanation has presupposed that the phenomenon involves explanatory proofs in an essential way. I argue that this view, ‘proof chauvinism’, is false. I then look in some detail at the explanation of the solvability of polynomial equations provided by Galois theory, which has often been thought to revolve around an explanatory proof. The article concludes with some general worries about the effects of chauvinism on the theory of mathematical explanation. 1Introduction2Why I Am Not a Proof Chauvinist 2.1Proof chauvinism and mathematical practice2.2Proof chauvinism and philosophy3An Example: Galois Theory and Explanatory Proof4Conclusion
      PubDate: Tue, 16 Jan 2018 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/bjps/axy009
      Issue No: Vol. 71, No. 2 (2018)
       
  • The Principal Principle Does Not Imply the Principle of Indifference
    • Authors: Pettigrew R.
      Pages: 605 - 619
      Abstract: AbstractIn a recent paper in this journal, James Hawthorne, Jürgen Landes, Christian Wallmann, and Jon Williamson (henceforth HLWW) argue that the principal principle entails the principle of indifference. In this article, I argue that it does not. Lewis’s version of the principal principle notoriously depends on a notion of admissibility, which Lewis uses to restrict its application. HLWW base their argument on certain intuitions concerning when one proposition is admissible for another: Conditions 1 and 2. There are two ways of reading their argument, depending on how you understand the status of these conditions. Reading 1: The correct account of admissibility is determined independently of these two principles, and yet these two principles follow from that correct account. Reading 2: The correct account of admissibility is determined in part by these two principles, so that the principles follow from that account but only because the correct account is constrained so that it must satisfy them. HLWW show that given an account of admissibility on which Conditions 1 and 2 hold, the principal principle entails the principle of indifference. I argue that on either reading of the argument, it fails. First, I argue that there is a plausible account of admissibility on which Conditions 1 and 2 are false. That defeats Reading 1. Next, I argue that the intuitions that lead us to assent to Condition 2 also lead us to assent to other very closely related principles that are inconsistent with Condition 2. This, I claim, casts doubt on the reliability of those intuitions, and thus removes our justification for Condition 2. This defeats Reading 2 of the HLWW argument. Thus, the argument fails. 1Introduction2Introducing the Principal Principle3Introducing the Principle of Indifference4The HLWW Argument 4.1Reading 1: Admissibility justifies Conditions 1 and 24.2Reading 2: Conditions 1 and 2 constrain admissibility5Conclusion
      PubDate: Wed, 04 Jul 2018 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/bjps/axx060
      Issue No: Vol. 71, No. 2 (2018)
       
  • The Principal Principle Does Not Imply the Principle of Indifference,
           Because Conditioning on Biconditionals Is Counterintuitive
    • Authors: Titelbaum M; Hart C.
      Pages: 621 - 632
      Abstract: AbstractRoger White ([2010]) argued for a principle of indifference. Hart and Titelbaum ([2015]) showed that White’s argument relied on an intuition about conditioning on biconditionals that, while widely shared, is incorrect. Hawthorne, Landes, Wallmann, and Williamson ([2017]) argue for a principle of indifference. Remarkably, their argument relies on the same faulty intuition. We explain their intuition, explain why it’s faulty, and show how it generates their principle of indifference. 1Introduction2El Caminos and Indifference 2.1Overview2.2Fins and antennas2.3HLWW in the example2.4The restrictiveness of Condition 22.5Summary3The Specifics of HLWW s Argument 3.1Mapping their conditions to our equations3.2HLWW’s responses to objections
      PubDate: Tue, 16 Jan 2018 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/bjps/axy011
      Issue No: Vol. 71, No. 2 (2018)
       
  • Explanatory Abstraction and the Goldilocks Problem: Interventionism Gets
           Things Just Right
    • Authors: Blanchard T.
      Pages: 633 - 663
      Abstract: Theories of explanation need to account for a puzzling feature of our explanatory practices: the fact that we prefer explanations that are relatively abstract but only moderately so. Contra Franklin-Hall ([2016]), I argue that the interventionist account of explanation provides a natural and elegant explanation of this fact. By striking the right balance between specificity and generality, moderately abstract explanations optimally subserve what interventionists regard as the goal of explanation, namely, identifying possible interventions that would have changed the explanandum. 1Introduction2Interventionism, Proportionality, and Franklin-Hall’s Objection3Exhaustivity Reconsidered4Interventionism and the Explanatory Value of Specificity5Conclusion
      PubDate: Sat, 14 Jul 2018 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/bjps/axy030
      Issue No: Vol. 71, No. 2 (2018)
       
  • Why Surplus Structure Is Not Superfluous
    • Authors: Nguyen J; Teh N, Wells L.
      Pages: 665 - 695
      Abstract: AbstractThe idea that gauge theory has ‘surplus’ structure poses a puzzle: in one much discussed sense, this structure is redundant; but on the other hand, it is also widely held to play an essential role in the theory. In this article, we employ category-theoretic tools to illuminate an aspect of this puzzle. We precisify what is meant by surplus structure by means of functorial comparisons with equivalence classes of gauge fields, and then show that such structure is essential for any theory that represents a rich collection of physically relevant fields that are ‘local’ in nature. 1Introduction2Theories as Categories 2.1Relations between models2.2Relations between theories3Gauge Theory as a Category 3.1Gauge theory on contractible manifolds3.2Other candidates for representing U(1) gauge theory3.3Surplus and inter-theoretical comparisons4Gauge Theory as a Functor 4.1Richness and locality4.2Richness and locality imply surplus*5ConclusionAppendix
      PubDate: Wed, 28 Mar 2018 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/bjps/axy026
      Issue No: Vol. 71, No. 2 (2018)
       
  • Constitutive Relevance in Interlevel Experiments
    • Authors: Serban M; Holm S.
      Pages: 697 - 725
      Abstract: AbstractOne reason for the popularity of Craver’s mutual manipulability (MM) account of constitutive relevance is that it seems to make good sense of the experimental practices and constitutive reasoning in the life sciences. Two recent papers (Baumgartner and Gebharter [2016]; Baumgartner and Casini [2017]) propose a theoretical alternative to (MM) in light of several important conceptual objections. Their alternative approach, the no de-coupling (NDC) account, conceives of constitution as a dependence relation that once postulated provides the best explanation of the impossibility of breaking the common cause coupling of a macro-level mechanism and its micro-level components. This entails an abductive view of constitutive inference. Proponents of the NDC or abductive account recognize that their discussion leaves open a big question concerning the practical dimension of the notion of constitutive relevanssssce: Is it possible to faithfully reconstruct constitutional reasoning in science in terms of a failure to de-couple, via interlevel experiments, phenomena from their mechanistic constituents' Focusing on the field of memory and long-term potential (LTP) research, this article argues that the abductive account provides a more adequate description of interlevel experiments in neuroscience. We also suggest that the account highlights some significant practical recommendations of how to interpret the findings of interlevel experiments. 1Introduction2Mutual Manipulability and Constitutive Relevance 2.1Constitutive relevance through an interventionist lens2.2Mutual manipulability: A methodological application3Trouble for the Mutual Manipulability Account4The Abductive Account of Constitution5The Abductive Account: A Methodological Application 5.1Long-term potential (LTP) and memory experiments5.2A comparative summary6Conclusions
      PubDate: Fri, 10 Aug 2018 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/bjps/axy043
      Issue No: Vol. 71, No. 2 (2018)
       
  • Does IBE Require a ‘Model’ of Explanation'
    • Authors: Cabrera F.
      Pages: 727 - 750
      Abstract: AbstractIn this article, I consider an important challenge to the popular theory of scientific inference commonly known as ‘inference to the best explanation’ (IBE), one that has received scant attention.11 The problem is that there exists a wide array of rival models of explanation, thus leaving IBE objectionably indeterminate. First, I briefly introduce IBE. Then, I motivate the problem and offer three potential solutions, the most plausible of which is to adopt a kind of pluralism about the rival models of explanation. However, I argue that (i) how ranking explanations on this pluralistic account of IBE remains obscure and (ii) pluralism leads to contradictory results. In light of these objections, I attempt to dissolve the problem by showing why IBE does not require a ‘model’ of explanation and by giving an account of what explanation consists in within the context of IBE. 1IBE and the Plentitude Problem2Three Potential Solutions 2.1Solution 1: Primitivism2.2Solution 2: Accomodationism2.3Solution 3: Pluralism3Two Problems for Pluralism 3.1Difficulties with ranking explanations3.2The inevitability of conflicting verdicts4Dissolving the Plentitude Problem 4.1The explanatory virtues screen-off the model of explanation4.2The virtue-centric conception of explanation5Concluding Remarks
      PubDate: Fri, 29 Jun 2018 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/bjps/axy010
      Issue No: Vol. 71, No. 2 (2018)
       
  • Generalism and the Metaphysics of Ontic Structural Realism
    • Authors: Glick D.
      Pages: 751 - 772
      Abstract: AbstractOntic structural realism (OSR) claims that all there is to the world is structure. But how can this slogan be turned into a worked-out metaphysics' Here I consider one potential answer: a metaphysical framework known as ‘generalism’ (Dasgupta [2009], [2016]). According to the generalist, the most fundamental description of the world is not given in terms of individuals bearing properties, but rather, general facts about which states of affairs obtain. However, I contend that despite several apparent similarities between the positions, generalism is unable to capture the two main motivations for OSR. I suggest instead that OSR should be construed as a meta-metaphysical position. 1Introduction2Motivations 2.1Theory change2.2Permutation invariance3Metaphysics4Generalism 4.1Quantifier generalism4.2Algebraic generalism5Why Generalism Is Not Ontic Structural Realism6Ontic Structural Realism as Meta-metaphysics7Conclusion
      PubDate: Tue, 16 Jan 2018 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/bjps/axy008
      Issue No: Vol. 71, No. 2 (2018)
       
  • ‘Models of’ and ‘Models for’: On the Relation between Mechanistic
           Models and Experimental Strategies in Molecular Biology
    • Authors: Ratti E.
      Pages: 773 - 797
      Abstract: AbstractMolecular biologists exploit information conveyed by mechanistic models for experimental purposes. In this article, I make sense of this aspect of biological practice by developing Keller’s idea of the distinction between ‘models of’ and ‘models for’. ‘Models of (phenomena)’ should be understood as models representing phenomena and are valuable if they explain phenomena. ‘Models for (manipulating phenomena)’ are new types of material manipulations and are important not because of their explanatory force, but because of the interventionist strategies they afford. This is a distinction between aspects of the same model. In molecular biology, models may be treated either as ‘models of’ or as ‘models for’. By analysing the discovery and characterization of restriction–modification systems and their exploitation for DNA cloning and mapping, I identify the differences between treating a model as a ‘model of’ or as a ‘model for’. These lie in the cognitive disposition of the modeller towards the model: a modeller will look at a model as a ‘model of’ if interested in its explanatory force, or as a ‘model for’ if interested in the material manipulations it can possibly afford. 1Introduction2‘Models of’ and ‘Models for’ in Molecular Biology 2.1‘Models of’ in molecular biology2.2‘Models for’: The case of CRISPR–Cas92.3Importance of ‘models for’2.4‘Models for’ and philosophy of experimentation in biology3‘Models for’ and the Discovery of Restriction–Modification Systems 3.1A tale of three Nobel Laureates3.2Restriction–modification system model as a ‘model of’ and a ‘model for’4Epistemic Disposition and Disposition towards Affordances 4.1Two cognitive dispositions towards models4.2Intentions in philosophy of science and studies of scientific cognition5Virtues of ‘Models for’ 5.1‘Models for’, target systems and portability5.2How-possibly models and schemas6Conclusion
      PubDate: Thu, 15 Mar 2018 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/bjps/axy018
      Issue No: Vol. 71, No. 2 (2018)
       
  • Signalling under Uncertainty: Interpretative Alignment without a Common
           Prior
    • Authors: Brochhagen T.
      Pages: 471 - 496
      Abstract: AbstractCommunication involves a great deal of uncertainty. Prima facie, it is therefore surprising that biological communication systems—from cellular to human—exhibit a high degree of ambiguity and often leave its resolution to contextual cues. This puzzle deepens once we consider that contextual information may diverge between individuals. In the following we lay out a model of ambiguous communication in iterated interactions between subjectively rational agents lacking a common contextual prior. We argue ambiguity’s justification to lie in endowing interlocutors with means to flexibly adapt language use to each other and the context of their interaction to serve their communicative preferences. Linguistic alignment is shown to play an important role in this process; it foments convergence of contextual expectations and thereby leads to agreeing use and interpretation of ambiguous messages. We conclude that ambiguity is ecologically rational when (i) interlocutors’ (beliefs about) contextual expectations are generally in line or (ii) they interact multiple times in an informative context, enabling for the alignment of their expectations. In light of these results meaning multiplicity can be understood as an opportunistic outcome enabled and shaped by linguistic adaptation and contextual information. 1Meaning Multiplicity in Communication2Ambiguous Signalling through Pragmatic Inference 2.1Preliminaries2.2Signalling behaviour2.3Communicative success2.4Iterated interactions3Predictions for Single and Iterated Interactions 3.1Simulations3.2Exploration and past experience3.3Preemptive adaptation4Discussion5ConclusionAppendix
      PubDate: Tue, 28 Nov 2017 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/bjps/axx058
      Issue No: Vol. 71, No. 2 (2017)
       
  • Structuralism in the Idiom of Determination
    • Authors: McKenzie K.
      Pages: 497 - 522
      Abstract: AbstractOntic structural realism (OSR) is a thesis of fundamentality metaphysics: the thesis that structure, not objects, has fundamental status. Claimed as the metaphysic most befitting of modern physics, OSR first emerged as an entreaty to eliminate objects from the metaphysics of fundamental physics. Such elimination was urged by Steven French and James Ladyman on the grounds that only it could resolve the ‘underdetermination of metaphysics by physics’ that they claimed reduced any putative objectual commitment to a merely ‘ersatz’ form of realism. Few, however, have joined French and Ladyman either in acknowledging that such underdetermination exists or in attributing to it such drastic consequences. However, an alternative view that physics does sanction objects, albeit merely as ontologically secondary entities, represents a different and seemingly less extreme route to the same conclusion regarding the fundamentality of structure. But since what it means to be ‘ontologically prior’ is itself a vexed philosophical question, a stance must be taken as to how we are to understand priority before its prospects may be evaluated. In an earlier paper, I outlined how Fine’s notion of ontological dependence might be utilized to defend the priority-based approach to structuralism. Since then, however, I have become convinced that that ontological dependence is not a relation of priority after all. As a result, the arguments outlined in that paper stand in need of reassessment. In this work, I consider the prospects for priority-based structuralism when expressed in the idiom of determination. My conclusion will be that it has yet to be vindicated by our best physical theories, owing to the failure of symmetry structures to determine the world’s inventory of fundamental kinds. Nevertheless, the same symmetry considerations point towards there being renewed prospects for eliminativism—an eliminativism, moreover, of more naturalistic appeal than that hitherto associated with OSR. 1Introduction2Structuralist Strategies3Defining Ontological Priority: Dependence or Determination'4Structuralism in the Idiom of Determination 4.1Determining plurality4.2Determining kind properties5A Reinvigorated Eliminativism
      PubDate: Thu, 07 Dec 2017 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/bjps/axx061
      Issue No: Vol. 71, No. 2 (2017)
       
 
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