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  Subjects -> PHILOSOPHY (Total: 762 journals)
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Utilitas
Journal Prestige (SJR): 0.712
Number of Followers: 11  
 
  Hybrid Journal Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles)
ISSN (Print) 0953-8208 - ISSN (Online) 1741-6183
Published by Cambridge University Press Homepage  [353 journals]
  • Robin Attfield, Applied Ethics: An Introduction (Cambridge, Polity Press,
           2023), pp. vi + 218.

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      Authors: Kelbessa; Workineh
      Pages: 111 - 113
      PubDate: 2024-01-04
      DOI: 10.1017/S0953820823000304
       
  • For the Greater Individual and Social Good: Justifying Age-Differentiated
           Paternalism

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      Authors: Pedersen; Viki Møller Lyngby
      Pages: 1 - 15
      Abstract: What justifies differences in the acceptance of paternalism towards competent minors and older people' I propose two arguments. The first argument draws on the widely accepted view that paternalism is easier to justify the more good it promotes for the paternalizee. It argues that paternalism targeting young people generally promotes more good for the people interfered with than similar paternalism targeting older people. While promoting people's interests or well-being is essential to the justification of paternalism, the first argument has certain unfair implications in that it disfavours paternalism towards the worse off. The second argument caters to such fairness concerns. It argues that priority or inequality aversion supports age-differentiated paternalism because young people, who act imprudently and thereby risk their interests or well-being, are worse off than older people who act in similar ways. I suggest that both arguments are pertinent in evaluating specific paternalistic acts and policies.
      PubDate: 2023-10-25
      DOI: 10.1017/S0953820823000249
       
  • Fit and Well-Being

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      Authors: Bruno-Niño; Teresa
      Pages: 16 - 34
      Abstract: In this paper, I argue for Fit, a prudential version of the claim that attitudes must fit their objects, the claim that there is an extra benefit when one's reactions fit their objects. I argue that Fit has surprising and powerful consequences for theories of well-being. Classic versions of the objective list theory, hedonism, desire views, and loving-the-good theories do not accommodate Fit. Suitable modifications change some of the views substantially. Modified views give reactions a robust role as sources of well-being, and they accept that objects call for some attitudes but not others. I argue that objective list theories and loving-the-good theories require the most minimal changes to accommodate Fit, so we have a pro tanto reason to favor these views over alternatives.
      PubDate: 2023-10-26
      DOI: 10.1017/S0953820823000237
       
  • A Less Bad Theory of the Procreation Asymmetry and the Non-Identity
           Problem

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      Authors: Aaron; Jonas H.
      Pages: 35 - 49
      Abstract: This paper offers a unified explanation for the procreation asymmetry and the non-identity thesis – two of the most intractable puzzles in population ethics. According to the procreation asymmetry, there are moral reasons not to create lives that are not worth living but no moral reasons to create lives that are worth living. I explain the procreation asymmetry by arguing that there are moral reasons to prevent the bad, but no moral reasons to promote the good. Various explanations for the procreation asymmetry have failed to explain the non-identity thesis: if one could create a person with a good life or a different person with a better life, one has a moral reason to create the better life. I argue that reflections on the misfortune of unfulfilled potential allow us to circumvent the non-identity problem.
      PubDate: 2023-11-16
      DOI: 10.1017/S0953820823000250
       
  • Intersubstrate Welfare Comparisons: Important, Difficult, and Potentially
           Tractable

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      Authors: Fischer; Bob, Sebo, Jeff
      Pages: 50 - 63
      Abstract: In the future, when we compare the welfare of a being of one substrate (say, a human) with the welfare of another (say, an artificial intelligence system), we will be making an intersubstrate welfare comparison. In this paper, we argue that intersubstrate welfare comparisons are important, difficult, and potentially tractable. The world might soon contain a vast number of sentient or otherwise significant beings of different substrates, and moral agents will need to be able to compare their welfare levels. However, this work will be difficult, because we lack the same kinds of commonalities across substrates that we have within them. Fortunately, we might be able to make at least some intersubstrate welfare comparisons responsibly in spite of these issues. We make the case for cautious optimism and call for more research.
      PubDate: 2023-11-22
      DOI: 10.1017/S0953820823000286
       
  • Reciprocity, Inequality, and Unsuccessful Rescues

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      Authors: Eskens; Romy
      Pages: 64 - 82
      Abstract: Forced choices between rescuing imperilled persons are subject to a presumption of equality. Unless we can point to a morally relevant difference between these persons' imperilments, each should get an equal chance of rescue. Sometimes, this presumption is overturned. For example, when one imperilled person has wrongfully caused the forced choice, most think that this person (rather than an innocent person) should bear the harm. The converse scenario, in which a forced choice resulted from the supererogatory action of one of the imperilled people, has received little attention in distributive ethics. I argue that, sometimes, we need not offer equal chances in these cases either. When the supererogatory act places the initially imperilled person under a reciprocal duty to bear risks for the supererogatory agent's sake in the forced choice, we may fulfil this duty for them if they are unable to do it themselves, by favouring the supererogatory agent.
      PubDate: 2023-12-21
      DOI: 10.1017/S0953820823000298
       
  • The Good and the Wrong of Hypocritical Blaming

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      Authors: Upadhyaya; Kartik
      Pages: 83 - 101
      Abstract: Provided we blame others accurately, is blaming them morally right even if we are guilty of similar wrongdoing ourselves' On the one hand, hypocrisy seems to render blame morally wrong, and unjustified; but on the other, even hypocritical blaming seems better than silence. I develop an account of the wrongness of hypocritical blaming which resolves this apparent dilemma. When holding others accountable for their moral failings, we ought to be willing to reason, together with them, about our own, similar failings. Hypocrisy undermines this process of mutual deliberation. Thus, even if better than silence, hypocritical blaming is second-best, and that is why it is wrong.
      PubDate: 2023-12-21
      DOI: 10.1017/S0953820823000274
       
  • Must We Always Pursue Economic Growth'

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      Authors: Carroll; Jeffrey
      Pages: 102 - 110
      Abstract: Must we always pursue economic growth' Kogelmann answers yes. Not only should poor countries pursue growth, but rich countries should as well. Kogelmann aims to provide a wealth-insensitive argument – one demonstrating all countries should pursue growth regardless of their wealth. His central argument – the no halting growth (NHG) argument – says no country experiencing growth should stop it, because doing so requires undermining the conditions causing it and those conditions are independently morally desirable, so they should not be undermined. For countries not growing, he may argue that they have an obligation to implement the conditions that cause growth because they are independently morally desirable. Call this the implementation argument. I contend that neither argument is wealth-insensitive as each fails to establish an obligation to pursue growth. I attempt to diagnose how this could be and propose that it is a product of attempting to answer three questions about growth simultaneously.
      PubDate: 2023-11-15
      DOI: 10.1017/S0953820823000262
       
 
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  Subjects -> PHILOSOPHY (Total: 762 journals)
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