A  B  C  D  E  F  G  H  I  J  K  L  M  N  O  P  Q  R  S  T  U  V  W  X  Y  Z  

  Subjects -> PHILOSOPHY (Total: 762 journals)
The end of the list has been reached or no journals were found for your choice.
Similar Journals
Journal Cover
Utilitas
Journal Prestige (SJR): 0.712
Number of Followers: 11  
 
  Hybrid Journal Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles)
ISSN (Print) 0953-8208 - ISSN (Online) 1741-6183
Published by Cambridge University Press Homepage  [352 journals]
  • UTI volume 34 issue 4 Cover and Front matter

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      Pages: 1 - 3
      PubDate: 2022-11-08
      DOI: 10.1017/S0953820822000413
       
  • UTI volume 34 issue 4 Cover and Back matter

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      Pages: 1 - 2
      PubDate: 2022-11-08
      DOI: 10.1017/S0953820822000425
       
  • Ending Print Publication After December 2022 Issue

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      Authors: Eggleston; Ben
      Pages: 367 - 367
      PubDate: 2022-10-11
      DOI: 10.1017/S0953820822000371
       
  • The Definition of Consequentialism: A Survey

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      Authors: Horta; Oscar, O'Brien, Gary David, Teran, Dayron
      Pages: 368 - 385
      Abstract: There are different meanings associated with consequentialism and teleology. This causes confusion, and sometimes results in discussions based on misunderstandings rather than on substantial disagreements. To clarify this, we created a survey on the definitions of ‘consequentialism’ and ‘teleology’, which we sent to specialists in consequentialism. We broke down the different meanings of consequentialism and teleology into four component parts: Outcome-Dependence, Value-Dependence, Maximization, and Agent-Neutrality. Combining these components in different ways we distinguished six definitions, all of which are represented in the philosophical literature. We asked the respondents which definition is best for consequentialism and for teleology. The most popular definition of consequentialism was the one which accepted value-dependence, but not maximization and agent-neutrality. We therefore recommend the use of this meaning to avoid misunderstandings. The results for teleology were more problematic, with several respondents claiming they never use the term, or indicating that it is confusing.
      PubDate: 2022-08-05
      DOI: 10.1017/S0953820822000164
       
  • Bentham's Mugging

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      Authors: Gustafsson; Johan E.
      Pages: 386 - 391
      Abstract: A dialogue, in three parts, on utilitarian vulnerability to exploitation.
      PubDate: 2022-08-22
      DOI: 10.1017/S0953820822000218
       
  • John Stuart Mill's Passage on Pimps and the Limits on Free Speech

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      Authors: Tunick; Mark
      Pages: 392 - 408
      Abstract: Mill didn't resolve this puzzle: if prostitution must be tolerated according to his principle of liberty as it doesn't non-consensually harm others, why punish the accessory – the pimp' Yet in On Liberty's passage on pimps (CW 18:296–7) Mill seriously considers restricting pimps’ speech for reasons other than preventing harm: pimps’ speech undermines decisional autonomy for purposes the state regards as immoral, and in response the state may use coercion to counteract such immoral influences. In light of this, I argue that we need to rethink the standard view that Mill opposes restrictions on speech that does not harm others.
      PubDate: 2022-08-22
      DOI: 10.1017/S0953820822000280
       
  • Bain's Theory of Moral Judgment and the Development of Mill's
           Utilitarianism

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      Authors: Zimmerman; Aaron
      Pages: 409 - 427
      Abstract: In Utilitarianism, Mill defers to Alexander Bain's expertise on the subject of moral judgment to answer common criticisms of the creed. First, we do not blame people or label them immoral when they are less than ideal. Judgments of immorality are commonly reserved for substandard behavior, not suboptimal comportment. Second, we do not commonly insist on full neutrality in benevolence. Indeed, some philosophers argue that we are obliged to exhibit partiality, insofar as it is demanded by our roles as friends, parents, or children. My primary aim in this essay is to explicate Bain's theory of moral judgment and explain how Mill used Bain's psychological doctrines to inform his development of an indirect utilitarian moral philosophy, immune to the criticisms described above.
      PubDate: 2022-08-23
      DOI: 10.1017/S0953820822000188
       
  • Harm, Failing to Benefit, and the Counterfactual Comparative Account

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      Authors: Klocksiem; Justin
      Pages: 428 - 444
      Abstract: In the literature about harm, the counterfactual comparative account has emerged as a main contender. According to it, an event constitutes a harm for someone iff the person is worse off than they would otherwise have been as a result. But the counterfactual comparative account faces significant challenges, one of the most serious of which stems from examples involving non-harmful omitted actions or non-occurring events, which it tends to misclassify as harms: for example, Robin is worse off when Batman does not give him a new set of golf clubs, but Batman has not harmed him. In this article, I will clearly state the counterfactual comparative account; state and explain this objection to the account; canvass several unsatisfactory responses; and attempt to show how the account can overcome the objection. This solution involves distinguishing between principles concerning the existence of harm and principles concerning attributions of responsibility for harm.
      PubDate: 2022-08-30
      DOI: 10.1017/S0953820822000243
       
  • Hidden Desires: A Unified Strategy for Defending the Desire-Satisfaction
           Theory

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      Authors: Yu; Xiang
      Pages: 445 - 460
      Abstract: According to the desire-satisfaction theory of well-being, your life goes well to the extent that your desires are satisfied. This theory faces the problem of prudential neutrality: it apparently cannot avoid saying that, from the point of view of prudence or self-interest, you ought to be neutral between satisfying an existing desire of yours and replacing it with an equally strong desire and satisfying the new desire. It also faces the problem of remote desires: it regards as directly relevant to your well-being even desires whose objects are intuitively too irrelevant to (or ‘remote’ from) your life to affect your welfare. In this article, I argue that desire theorists can answer both objections by appealing to hidden desires – ones that it is psychologically realistic to attribute to the agents in the cases on which the two problems are based, even though they are not mentioned in descriptions of those cases.
      PubDate: 2022-08-31
      DOI: 10.1017/S0953820822000309
       
  • A Thomistic Solution to the Deep Problem for Perfectionism

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      Authors: Shea; Matthew, Kintz, James
      Pages: 461 - 477
      Abstract: Perfectionism is the view that what is intrinsically good is the fulfillment of human nature or the development and exercise of the characteristic human capacities. An important objection to the theory is what Gwen Bradford calls the “Deep Problem”: explaining why nature-fulfillment is good. We argue that situating perfectionism within a Thomistic metaethical framework and adopting Aquinas's account of the metaphysical “convertibility” of being and goodness gives us a solution to the Deep Problem. In short, the fulfillment of human nature consists in the actualization of human potentialities or fullness of human being, and because being is ultimately the same thing as goodness, the fulfillment of human nature is good. We show that Thomistic perfectionism meets the requirements for an answer to the Deep Problem, provides the best explanation possible for the goodness of nature fulfillment, and is a natural foundation for perfectionist theories of value.
      PubDate: 2022-09-16
      DOI: 10.1017/S0953820822000346
       
  • We Must Always Pursue Economic Growth

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      Authors: Kogelmann; Brian
      Pages: 478 - 492
      Abstract: Why pursue economic growth' For poor countries this is an easy question to answer, but it is more difficult for rich ones. Some of the world's greatest philosophers and economists – such as John Stuart Mill, John Maynard Keynes, and John Rawls – thought that, once a certain material standard of well-being has been achieved, economic growth should stop. I argue the opposite in this article. We always have reason to pursue economic growth. My argument is indirect. I shall not argue that economic growth itself is always better. Rather, I shall argue that stopping growth requires morally objectionable actions. Economic growth tends to occur naturally if certain underlying conditions are in place. We have moral reasons to insist on these conditions independent their effect on growth, however. Halting growth requires that we alter these conditions, but we ought not do this.
      PubDate: 2022-10-07
      DOI: 10.1017/S0953820822000358
       
  • Superiority Discounting Implies the Preposterous Conclusion

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      Authors: Barrington; Mitchell
      Pages: 493 - 501
      Abstract: Many population axiologies avoid the Repugnant Conclusion (RC) by endorsing Superiority: some number of great lives is better than any number of mediocre lives. But as Nebel shows, RC follows (given plausible auxiliary assumptions) from the Intrapersonal Repugnant Conclusion (IRC): a guaranteed mediocre life is better than a sufficiently small probability of a great life. This result is concerning because IRC is plausible. Recently, Kosonen has argued that IRC can be true while RC is false if small probabilities are discounted to zero. This article details the unique problems created by combining Superiority with discounting. The resultant view, Superiority Discounting, avoids the Repugnant Conclusion only at the cost of the Preposterous Conclusion: near-certain hell for arbitrarily many people is better than near-certain heaven for arbitrarily many people.
      PubDate: 2022-08-15
      DOI: 10.1017/S095382082200022X
       
  • Michael Quinn, Bentham (Cambridge and Medford: Polity Press, 2022), pp. x
           + 218.

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      Authors: Zhang; Yanxiang
      Pages: 502 - 508
      PubDate: 2022-09-02
      DOI: 10.1017/S0953820822000292
       
 
JournalTOCs
School of Mathematical and Computer Sciences
Heriot-Watt University
Edinburgh, EH14 4AS, UK
Email: journaltocs@hw.ac.uk
Tel: +00 44 (0)131 4513762
 


Your IP address: 44.212.99.248
 
Home (Search)
API
About JournalTOCs
News (blog, publications)
JournalTOCs on Twitter   JournalTOCs on Facebook

JournalTOCs © 2009-