Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Abstract: Abstract Many authors have commented on the relative frequency of the present tense—and the relative infrequency of the past tense—in mathematical writing. However, none (to our knowledge) have provided an estimate for the size of this effect or explored how universal it is. In this short note we report an analysis of corpora of mathematical and day-to-day English. We conclude that the present-to-past ratio of tenses is at least 3:1 in mathematical English, compared to approximately 5:7 in day-to-day English. Further, we show that this tendency to favour the present tense is almost universally present in written mathematics. PubDate: 2024-05-08 DOI: 10.1007/s10516-024-09707-4
Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Abstract: Abstract Carl Mitcham has recently pointed out that the current approach to the ethics of technology has failed to solve large-scale socio-ethical challenges in the technological world, such as climate change. He then suggests that, in the face of an iceberg of issues regarding technological development, philosophers should recognize the intellectual heritage of the classical philosophers of technology to better deal with the escalating crises that threaten humankind. While Mitcham’s proposal is inspiring, there are several lacunae in his work. In this paper, we contribute to Mitcham’s idea by developing it and filling the important gaps. Our efforts have led to a new style of holistic thinking about the ethics of technology, according to which it is necessary to focus on the system of technologies as a whole (while not ignoring individual technologies, of course) to understand and address issues related to technology development. PubDate: 2024-04-08 DOI: 10.1007/s10516-024-09706-5
Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Abstract: Abstract One of the general criteria G. H. Hardy identifies and discusses in his famous essay A Mathematician’s Apology, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1940) by which a mathematician’s patterns must be judged is seriousness. This article focuses on one of Hardy’s examples of a non-serious theorem, namely that 8712 and 9801 are the only numbers below 10000 which are integral multiples of their reversals, in the sense that \(8712=4\cdot 2178\) , and \(9801=9\cdot 1089\) . In the context of a discussion of generality, which he considers an essential quality of seriousness, he explains that there is nothing in this example which “appeals much to a mathematician” and that it is “not capable of any significant generalization.” Interestingly, since the publication of the Apology, more than a dozen papers—including one by the renowned mathematician Neil Sloane—have been published that discuss generalizations of Hardy’s example. By identifying the most important aspect of Hardy’s notion of generality, it is argued that, contrary to the views of several researchers, Hardy’s claim regarding the non-capability of any significant generalization is still tenable. Furthermore, this case study is presented and discussed as an example of the multifaceted nature of mathematical interest. PubDate: 2024-02-14 DOI: 10.1007/s10516-023-09705-y
Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Abstract: One of the vividly discussed topics in the contemporary philosophy of science (especially physics) is the opposition between Realism and Anti-Realism. The supporters of the first way of thinking trust in the objective existence of realities studied by science. They consider theories as approximate descriptions of these realities (Psillos 1999, xvii), whereas their opponents do not. However, both sides base their argumentation on simplified notions of scientific theories. In this paper, we present a more general approach, which can be coined as “Theoretical Physics Realism” (TPR). It is based on the detailed reconstruction of the polysystemic nature of physical theories. The consequences of this reconstruction for understanding the genuine relationship between theories and experiments in studying the realities are indicated. The paper distinguishes between abstract (general) and domain-dependent theories and appeals to specific physical theories together with their application domains rather than to general speculations. PubDate: 2023-11-09 DOI: 10.1007/s10516-023-09703-0
Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Abstract: Abstract This paper introduces the Global Philosophy symposium on Giuseppe Primiero’s book On the Foundations of Computing (2020). The collection gathers commentaries and responses of the author with the aim of engaging with some open questions in the philosophy of computer science. Firstly, this paper introduces the central themes addressed in Primiero’s book; secondly, it highlights some of the main critiques from commentators in order to, finally, pinpoint some conceptual challenges indicating future directions for the philosophy of computer science. PubDate: 2023-11-07 DOI: 10.1007/s10516-023-09704-z
Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Abstract: Abstract Topological semantics have proved to be a very fruitful approach in formal epistemology, two noticeable representatives being the interior semantics and topological evidence models. In this paper, we introduce the concept of quasi-factive evidence as a way to account for untruthful evidence in the interior semantics. This allows us to import concepts from topological evidence models, thereby connecting the two frameworks in spite of their apparent disparities. This approach sheds light on the interpretation of belief in the interior semantics, and gives meaning to concepts that used to be essentially technical: the closure-interior semantics can be interpreted as the condition of existence of a quasi-factive justification, while the extremally disconnected spaces are now characterized as those where the available information is always consistent. But our most important result is the equivalence between the interior-closure-interior semantics and what we call the strengthening condition, along with a sound and complete axiomatization. Finally, we build on this strengthening condition to introduce a notion of relative plausibility. PubDate: 2023-10-30 DOI: 10.1007/s10516-023-09698-8
Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Abstract: Abstract The author shows that the conception of epistemological realism as a contemporary variant of epistemological realism continues the realism tradition and at the same time takes into account some constructivist ideas, giving them a new interpretation. Constructive realism can be a fruitful strategy in cognitive studies, as it gives a philosophical interpretation of the current popular approach in cognitive science: so called “4 E approach”: understanding cognition as embodied, enacted. embedded and extended. The problem of Illusion and Reality is analyzed from the position of constructive realism. The relations between different surrounding worlds of different cognitive agents and the common real world is specially investigated in the context of the opposition between Realism and Relativism. PubDate: 2023-10-17 DOI: 10.1007/s10516-023-09700-3
Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Abstract: Abstract Some notable scholars argue that traditional African worldview is a backward-looking belief system that proves to be irreconcilable with mainstream science. The contention is such that unlike the principles of mainstream science which demystifies our understanding of the universe through the search for discoverable laws of nature, traditional African worldview rather mystifies the nature of our universe by rendering explanations based on metaphysical belief systems. Using the method of concept analysis, we argue, however, that the salient advances in mainstream science provide a sufficient ground to challenge what we consider to be a mischaracterization of African worldview. We do so by showing that the sound interpretations of salient developments in mainstream science demonstrate appreciable compatibility with the African worldview. Therefore, because there is no contradiction but diversity emanating from cultural differences, the claim of backwardness relative to African worldview is without merit. PubDate: 2023-10-17 DOI: 10.1007/s10516-023-09702-1
Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Abstract: Abstract The Scientific Realism Debate (SRD) has been accused of going around in circles without reaching a consensus, so that several scholars have advocated its dissolution in favor of reformed projects that are eliminativist towards the distinctively philosophical aims and methods. In this paper, after outlining the project that SRD-participants have been involved in for some time now—which we call the Received View—we discuss two dissolution-proposals: sociological externalism and localism. We argue that these projects are incomplete and that, even when judged in themselves, they cannot flourish without the ‘traditional’ philosophical reflection they wish to get rid of. However, although not substitutes for the Received View, those projects have some insightful features. These are assigned their proper place in the dialectics of SRD, which is shown to be an instance of the method of reflective equilibrium (MRE). Lastly—based on Michael DePaul’s work—we provide a response to the well-known concern that MRE is epistemically circular, by claiming that MRE is the only rational method of inquiry. Overall, our goal is ‘therapeutic’: we try to mitigate the anxiety caused by simultaneously believing that SRD is circular and suspecting that there is a good way out of the circle that we just haven’t found yet. For, having dismissed the suspicion that there might be a good trick to dissolve the circle, one may learn to live in it and be more calm in carrying on with what one has. PubDate: 2023-10-10 DOI: 10.1007/s10516-023-09701-2
Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Abstract: Abstract Perceptual systems that integrate different principles and/or a different architecture at large may produce substantially varied outputs from the same scene. I call this thesis perceptual pluralism and I bring related empirical evidence to bear on the epistemological debate on perception. I argue that perceptual pluralism, coupled with the position that at least some different kinds of perception are equally successful in guiding interaction with the world, serve to undermine the thesis that the typical human perception is uniquely veridical. Last, I consider perspectival realism as the epistemological stance that is prospectively best suited to this state of affairs, and provide a method for evaluating whether this prospect holds up. PubDate: 2023-10-06 DOI: 10.1007/s10516-023-09699-7
Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Abstract: Abstract The objective of this paper is to analyze the convergences and divergences between two conceptions of realism: Markus Gabriel’s “new realism” and Evandro Agazzi’s realism. Firstly, the main theses behind “new realism” will be presented, drawing on Gabriel’s text ‘Why the World Does Not Exist’ (2015), originally published in German as Warum es die Welt nicht gibt in 2013. Secondly, the constitutive aspects of realism developed by Agazzi will be explored, primarily in works such as ‘Temas y problemas de filosofía de la física’ (1978), ‘Filosofia, scienza e verità’, Rusconi, Milano (1989), ‘El bien el mal y la ciencia’ (1996), and ‘Filosofía de la Naturaleza. Ciencia y Cosmología’ (2000), among others. Finally, the convergences and divergences between these two conceptions of realism will be analyzed, allowing for an inference, based on sound reasoning, about the potential novelty of the so-called “new realism”. PubDate: 2023-08-29 DOI: 10.1007/s10516-023-09695-x
Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Abstract: Abstract Scientific realism postulates that science aims for truth in both the domains of the observable and the unobservable, and is capable of achieving this aim, at least approximately. From the realist perspective our current scientific theories are on the right path to their aim, encapsulating a significant degree of theoretical truth. A key argument supporting this viewpoint is the continuity observed between successive scientific theories, interpreted as the preservation of truth. However, we contend that this continuity argument is problematic in significant cases. Features of older theoretical schemes frequently do not persist in subsequent theories but emerge as limiting cases with restricted applicability domains and fine-grained structures that differ from what the older theories deemed possible. The alterations accompanying theory replacement are often more drastic than what is assumed by realist intuition, justifying skepticism about continuity serving as an indicator of theoretical truth preservation. We propose an argument wherein continuity is instead viewed as a consequence of empirical success preservation. PubDate: 2023-08-29 DOI: 10.1007/s10516-023-09696-w
Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Abstract: The type-level abstraction is a formal way to represent molecular structures in biological practice. Graphical representations of molecular structures of biological objects are also used to identify functional processes of things. This paper will reveal that category theory is a formal mathematical language not only to visualize molecular structures of biological objects as type-level abstraction formally but also to understand how to infer biological functions from the molecular structures of biological objects. Category theory is a toolkit to understand biological knowledge at the type-level formally, not individual token-level, as well as typical heuristic strategies in molecular biology. PubDate: 2023-08-17 DOI: 10.1007/s10516-023-09692-0
Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Abstract: Abstract There are two versions of the correspondence theory of truth: the object-based correspondence theory and the fact-based correspondence theory. Some scholars have put forward their objections to my rejection of the concept of a fact and their defence of that concept. But their arguments are not cogent, since they haven’t clarified the relation between facts and propositions, haven’t successfully argued for the necessity and feasibility of introducing the concept of a fact, and haven’t provided an acceptable standard of identity for facts. Under the framework of the fact-based correspondence theory, a “negative fact” is usually introduced to explain the falsehood of an affirmative proposition and the truth of a negative proposition. But, after careful analysis, we find that the positing of negative facts is the result of the concurrence of three factors: the positive states of objects, the expectations of cognitive subjects, and certain kinds of inferences, Thus, negative facts at most have a sort of inferential “existence” without independent ontological status. The positing of negative facts has been criticized for many reasons, such as the ontological inflation of negative facts, the supervenience of negative facts on positive facts, the imperceptibility of negative facts, and the lack of causal force of negative facts. Many replies to these criticisms have been put forward, such as the dilemma argument, the self-defeating argument, and the role-making of negative facts: constitution (e.g. hole-making), causation (event-making), chance-making, and truth-making. However, these replies can also be reasonably rejected. The final conclusion of this article is that, in order to account for the falsehood of an affirmative proposition and the truth of a negative proposition, we can appeal to the object-based correspondence theory of truth without appealing to the concept of a fact, let alone the concept of a “negative fact”. PubDate: 2023-08-13 DOI: 10.1007/s10516-023-09693-z
Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Abstract: Abstract The main goal of this paper is to revisit, synthesize, and critique John R. Searle’s thinking over time concerning social ontology and what it means for something to be a social construction. Primarily, I undertake this task by elucidating and problematizing aspects of John R. Searle’s The Construction of Social Reality (herein, CSR) (1995), though attention is paid to his later and corollary works. Certainly, there are many other philosophers who attend to analyzing the very meaning of social ontology or social constructionism considered as a program and many other philosophers who concern themselves with what it means to say that something is socially constructed. I focus largely on CSR because it remains both immensely influential and because it represents one of the earliest attempts by an analytic philosopher to provide an analysis of the very meaning of what it means to say that “X is a social construction” or what “social ontology/social constructionism” entails. Although much of what follows constitutes a revisitation of the crucial elements of CSR, what is novel about my analysis is that I synthesize and organize the main aspects of Searle’s thinking through time in a single article. I also draw attention to others’ concerns and amendments to his positions and offer my own novel objections and possible improvements to his corpus. This is no small feat: Many details, as well as others’ appraisals, amendments, and so forth must be overlooked for this endeavor to be possible at all. This being so, I do my best to point readers in directions to follow for further exploration or arguments against Searle’s views as I proceed. PubDate: 2023-08-11 DOI: 10.1007/s10516-023-09690-2
Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Abstract: Abstract The article argues that mainstream value-sensitive approaches to design have been based on narrow understandings of personhood and social dynamics, which are biased toward Western Educated Industrialized Rich and Democratic cultures and contradicted by empirical evidence. To respond to this weakness, the article suggests that design may benefit from focusing on user behaviours from the joint perspective of values and norms, especially across cultural contexts. As such, it proposes Norm Sensitive Design as a complement to value-sensitive approaches when designing and implementing new technologies. Versus values, norms serve as more accurate predictors or descriptors of behaviours and can thus support value-sensitive approaches to realize the aspiration of informing user behaviour via design. The article makes two key contributions. On the theoretical side, it promotes the consideration of norms in design. On the practical side, it offers designers and instructors prompts for reflecting on design ethics from the perspective of norms. PubDate: 2023-08-07 DOI: 10.1007/s10516-023-09689-9
Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Abstract: Abstract The paper focuses on the philosophical challenges of governance over trustless ledgers, namely Bitcoin Layer 2 solutions in El Salvador. Blockchain adoption in El Salvador is an example of policy based on a ‘frontier epistemology’ (Nickles 2009), creating a situation where “facts are uncertain, values are in dispute, stakes are high, and decisions are urgent” (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1993). Trustless ledgers play a role of such ‘frontiers’ of knowledge and governance that support a variety of technocratic, heuristic, and experimental policy approaches. They challenge the traditional knowledge frameworks and governance processes responsible for attempts to embed (align) predetermined ideologies (values and stakes) into the technology over standards. Instead, as amalgams of social, political, legal, and economic interventions, ledgers function simultaneously as a contract, a monetary system, a political value commitment, and a governance structure. By integrating facts, values, and stakes into algorithms, they define the frontiers of epistemology and governance in two opposing ways. On the one hand, trustless ledgers embody Augustine’s Civitas Dei (the City of God) as a new design (novum consilium) that promises a future world (futurum saeculum) (Augustine 1968). With a promise of a system, where everyone is ‘free’ to not being able to ‘sin’ (non posse peccare - delet the res non peccare), social agency is reduced to a code of a trustless infrastructure. On the other hand, ledgers support experimental (Sabel and Zeitlin 2012) and heuristic policymaking (Nickles 2009) that saves social agency and cuts ‘through traditional discovery/justification and descriptive/ normative distinctions’ (Nickles 2009). The distributed ledgers as governance experiments then redefine Civitas Terrena’s governance as a challenge of ‘heuristic appraisal’ (Nickles 2009), ‘directly deliberative polyarchy’ (Cohen and Sabel 1997), and ‘experimentalist governance’ (Sabel and Zeitlin 2012). To elaborate on the blockchain governance experiments, we will use two Bitcoin initiatives in El Salvador (Bitcoin City and Bitcoin Beach) and discuss them in the context of a broader adoption of blockchain in South America. PubDate: 2023-08-07 DOI: 10.1007/s10516-023-09694-y
Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Abstract: Abstract Any attempt to conceptualize, categorize and constraint foundational issues in a living science, such as Computing, is bound to show its limitations and leave a number of open issues. Taking stock with some critical reviews of Primiero (On the foundations of computing, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2019) published in this Journal, I overview potential new problems to be investigated by a foundational analysis of the science of computing. PubDate: 2023-07-17 DOI: 10.1007/s10516-023-09688-w
Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Abstract: European prehistoric decorative art abounds in motifs that are not humble decorative elements but seem to be significant signs. Circles, concentric circles with or without a dot in the centre, circles divided into four, six or eight equal segments (sun/star-crosses) and often round decoration complexes filled with different spiral motifs are generally considered sun symbols by archaeologists. It is predominantly accepted that sun cults dominated the belief system of the European Bronze Age. These symbols can be found as a single sign on many artifacts, especially luxury ones like weapons, jewels and fine pottery. Although they were widespread in Europe in the Bronze Age the Carpathian Basin has an outstanding collection of such archaeological material. A detailed comparative study of atmospheric optic phenomena and Bronze Age symbols revealed similarities between many abstract symbols and manifestations of atmospheric phenomena in the sky. The investigation resulted in the assumption of the significance of such symbols in Bronze Age visual culture. The study attempts to identify, present and reveal the role of simple as well as the more complex celestial symbols in the relationship between prehistoric people and their environment based on this argument. PubDate: 2023-06-24 DOI: 10.1007/s10516-023-09687-x
Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles)
