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Abstract: Abstract If we take the indexical, “I”, to be epistemologically identical across different contexts, as in, for example, it is the same “I” that at one moment observes, “I see a puddle of water on the floor”, and then, subsequently, exclaims, “I detect a leaking tap”, and, furthermore, we attribute not only self reference but self awareness in the use of the indexical, “I”, then a question arises as to how the “I” finds itself to be in reference to the speaker in one context and not another. We cannot look to the ingredients of the context that the “I” inhabits for the answer because, based upon the above assumptions, the identity, or character, of the “I” stands independently of the context of the speaker. The answer, I argue, requires both the admission of the unreality of space and time, as well as an explanation as to why we have a sense of the here and now despite space and time being unreal. To this end, I turn to the juxtaposition of Kant’s a priori forms of inner sense and outer sense to explain how the cognitive faculty arrives at a sense of time and place despite the declared unreality of time and space. To sustain this explanation in the face of the problem of localisation, I draw on the full implications of Kant’s transcendental idealism in which the properties of time and space are not only withdrawn from things as they exist externally to the mind but also from mental representations insofar as mental representations can be said to exist in themselves. PubDate: 2022-05-12
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Abstract: Abstract There are many variants of deflationism about truth, but one of them, Paul Horwich’s minimalism, stands out because it accepts as axiomatic practical variants of the equivalence schema: 〈p〉 is true if and only if p. The equivalence schema is epistemologically fundamental. In this paper, I call upon empirical studies to show that practical variants of the equivalence schema are widely accepted by non-philosophers. While in the empirical data there is variation in how non-philosophers and philosophers talk about truth and how they judge that a proposition is true, a significant amount of data collected over the years reveal that the ordinary or folk view of truth is compatible with the epistemological fundamentality of alethic minimalism. This, I take it, suggests that people share in the same intuitions that form the bedrock of Horwich’s minimalism. PubDate: 2022-05-02
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Abstract: Abstract The paper proposes a solution to the problem of counterfactuals, building on both Rescher’s epistemic and Tichý’s semantic approaches. The core of the proposed solution is the thesis that when expressing a true counterfactual, the speaker assumes a set of background indicative premises as an implicit parameter. When added tacitly to an unreal antecedent, these premises entail the consequent logically or analytically. We draw a distinction between a potentially unreal and an absolutely unreal condition expressed in the antecedent. We view counterfactuals with a positive time vector and an absolute unreal condition as abbreviated deductive retrodictions. Similarly, we consider counterfactuals with a potentially unreal condition to be abbreviated deductive predictions. In a similar manner, we also explain the truth (falsity) of vacuously true counterpossibles or counterpossible conditionals. In the second part, we discuss the enigmatic backtracking counterfactuals. We propose that their negative time direction is due to their being abductive retrodictions, i.e., explanations of unreal effects based on possible causes in which the conditions remain tacit or unexpressed. The backtracking temporal direction of counterfactual abductive retrodictions is in accordance with the thesis on the positive temporal direction from cause to effect. Thus, we demonstrate that in order to explain backtracking counterfactuals, there is no need to assume violations of laws of nature or a special logic. What we need to do is to take into account the third parameter, i.e., a set of tacit or unexpressed additional propositions, as well as the principle of ceteris paribus as the background. PubDate: 2022-04-16
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Abstract: Abstract I focus on the commonly shared view that Hume’s monetary theory is inconsistent. I review several attempts to solve the alleged inconsistency in Hume’s monetary theory, including the consensus interpretation according to which Hume was committed to the neutrality of money only in the long run, while he conceded that money can be non-neutral in the short run. Then, building on a monetary version of the logical fallacy of monotonic counterfactuals in the essay Of the Balance of Trade, I argue for the consistency of Hume’s theory of money by ascribing to Hume a distinction between money as collectively neutral and distributively non-neutral. PubDate: 2022-04-15
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Abstract: Abstract One of the reasons for relativistic attitudes toward science is the impossibility of justifying scientists’ decisions in the face of alternative theories. According to this paper, an alternative theory can challenge scientific rationality only if the conditions of “methodological shortcomings of scientists” and the “existence of alternative theories” are met at a specific time. A commonly used technique to counter relativism is to try to supplement and equip scientists’ methodologies when confronted with alternative theories. However, this paper focuses on evaluating the possibility of “existence an alternative theory.” To this end, by referring to the different definitions of being alternative, we try to show that only “after the decision” and “the conversion of the scientific community” can a theory be considered justifiably “alternative.” Therefore, the relativistic claim is inconsistent because relativists must first accept the validity of scientists’ decisions to attribute being alternative to a theory. In this work, we provide evidence for our claim using a historical example. We also defend conservatism as a corollary of our discussion. PubDate: 2022-04-01
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Abstract: Abstract This work draws an analogical defence of strong emotionism—the metaethical claim that moral properties and concepts consist in the propensity of actions to elicit emotional responses from divergent emotional perspectives. I offer a theory that is in line with that of Prinz (The emotional construction of morals. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007). I build an analogy between moral properties and what I call emotion-dispositional properties. These properties are picked out by predicates such as ‘annoying’, ‘frightening’ or ‘deplorable’ and appear to be uncontroversial and frequent cases of attribution error—the attributing of subjective emotional states as mind-independent properties. I present a linguistic analysis supporting the claim that moral properties and their related concepts are reducible to a subset of emotion-dispositional properties and concepts. This is grounded in the observation that utterances featuring moral predicates function linguistically and conceptually in analogous ways to emotion-dispositional predicates. It follows from this view that asserted moral utterances are truth-apt relative to ethical communities, but that speakers misconceive the extensions of predicates. I show how the framework of Cognitive Linguistics allows us to explain this error. Further analysis of moral and non-moral utterances exposes the deeper conceptual schemas structuring language through cognitive construal processes. An understanding of these processes, coupled with an emotionist elucidation of moral properties and concepts, makes the attribution error an expected upshot of the emotionist thesis, rather than an uncomfortable consequence. PubDate: 2022-04-01
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Abstract: Abstract The significance of Max Black’s indistinguishable spheres for the nature of particles in quantum mechanics is discussed, focusing in particular on the use of the idea of weak indiscernibility. It is argued that there can be four such Black spheres but that five are impossible. It follows from this that Black’s example cannot serve as a model for indistinguishability in physics. But Black’s discussion of his spheres gave rise to the idea of weak discernibility and it is argued that such predicates are unsatisfiable in the way intended. The underlying problem with weak discernibility spreads out to also undermine the whole notion that indistinguishability rests on a notion of the permutation invariance of particles. A better foundation is indicated. PubDate: 2022-04-01
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Abstract: Abstract How can we acquire knowledge of metaphysical modality' How can someone come to know that he could have been elsewhere right now, or an accountant rather than a philosophy teacher, but could not have been a turnip' Jago proposes an account of a route to knowledge of the way things could have been and must be. He argues that we can move to knowledge of metaphysical modality from knowledge about essence. Curtis rejects Jago’s explanation. It cannot, he argues, explain our knowledge of de re necessity. We agree. But there is more to be said. To give an account of our knowledge of metaphysical necessity is part of the task Jago set himself. But another part is to give an account of the knowledge of the (non-actual) possibilities accorded to particular objects. And prior to both what is needed, and something Jago attempts to supply, is an account of how ordinary knowers can come to have knowledge of an individual’s essential properties. We argue that Jago’s accounts of both these additional matters are also unsatisfactory. This is important because the thought that our knowledge of metaphysical modality has its source in our knowledge of essence is currently an attractive one and Jago has set out very clearly what must be done to justify the thought. The flaws in his proposal thus indicate the work needed if the attractive thought is to be accepted. PubDate: 2022-04-01
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Abstract: Abstract It has been argued that Humean Supervenience (HS) is threatened by the existence of quantum entanglement relations. The most conservative strategy for defending HS is to add the problematic entanglement relations to the supervenience basis, alongside spatiotemporal relations. In this paper, I’m going to argue against this strategy by showing how certain particular cases of tripartite entanglement states – i.e. GHZ states – posit some crucial problems for this amended version of HS. Moreover, I will show that the principle of free recombination – which is strictly linked to HS – is severely undermined if we add entanglement relations to the supervenience basis. I conclude that the conservative move is very unappealing, and therefore the defender of HS should pursue other, more controversial, strategies (e.g. committing to the nomological interpretation of the wave function). PubDate: 2022-04-01
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Abstract: Abstract According to the mixed lexicographic/additive account of ‘better than’ and similar aggregative value comparatives like ‘healthier than’, values are multidimensional and different aspects of a value are aggregated into an overall assessment in a lexicographic way, based on an ordering of value aspects. It is argued that this theory can account for an acceptable definition of Chang’s notion of parity and that it also offers a solution to Temkin’s and Rachels’s Spectrum Cases without giving up the transitivity of overall betterness. Formal details and proofs are provided in an “Appendix”. PubDate: 2022-04-01
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Abstract: Abstract Seungbae Park argues that Bas van Fraassen’s rejection of inference to the best explanation (IBE) is problematic for his contextual theory of explanation because van Fraassen uses IBE to support the contextual theory. This paper provides a defense of van Fraassen’s views Park’s objections. I point out three weaknesses of Park’s objection against van Fraassen. First, van Fraassen may be perfectly content to accept the implications that Park claims to follow from his views. Second, even if van Fraassen rejects IBE he may still endorse particular arguments that instantiate IBE. Third, van Fraassen does not, in fact, use IBE to support his contextual theory. PubDate: 2022-04-01
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Abstract: Abstract Charles Sanders Peirce is best known as the founder of pragmatism, but the name that he preferred for his overall system of thought was “synechism” because the principle of continuity was its central thesis. He considered time to be the paradigmatic example and often wrote about its various aspects while discussing other topics. This essay draws from many of those widely scattered texts to formulate a distinctively Peircean philosophy of time, incorporating extensive quotations into a comprehensive and coherent synthesis. Time is not an existential subject with past, present, and future as its incompatible predicates, but rather a real law enabling things to possess contrary qualities at its different determinations, and Peirce identifies four classes of such states based on when and how they are realized. Because time is continuous, it is not composed of instants, and even the present is an indefinite lapse during which we are directly aware of constant change. The accomplished past is perpetually growing as the possibilities and conditional necessities of the future are actualized at the present, and the entire universe evolves from being utterly indeterminate toward being absolutely determinate. Nevertheless, time must return into itself even if events are limited to only a portion of it, a paradox that is resolved with the aid of projective geometry. Temporal synechism thus touches on a broad spectrum of philosophical issues including mathematics, phenomenology, logic, and metaphysics. PubDate: 2022-04-01
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Abstract: Abstract There is a robust tendency within the contemporary feminist mainstream to argue against and ultimately reject the so-called ‘dualising or dualist philosophy’ (associated historically with the thoughts of Plato and Descartes, though from different perspectives) since it is the supportive paradigm background for any gender discrimination originated from (and it also admits of) the hegemonic sovereignty of masculinity over femininity. In this paper, having dived deeper into the feminist critical depiction of the logical binarist foundation on which the dualising philosophy is said to be well-grounded, I will proceed to portray and examine a sequence of doctrines that feminist philosophers have developed to shed light on the fact that the hegemonic sovereignty of masculinity over femininity has been theoretically initiated from the logical disjunction 'p or not p' (p v ~ p) to masculinity essentialism. Finally, I will end by pointing to a tension between underlying assumptions of the feminist sequentialist approach and what feminists themselves claim to adhere to as the highest ideal: non-naturalising gender differences. PubDate: 2022-04-01
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Abstract: Abstract A debated issue in the mathematical foundations in at least the last two decades is whether one can plausibly argue for the merits of treating undecidable questions of mathematics, e.g., the Continuum Hypothesis (CH), by relying on the existence of a plurality of set-theoretical universes except for a single one, i.e., the well-known set-theoretical universe V associated with the cumulative hierarchy of sets. The multiverse approach has some varying versions of the general concept of multiverse yet my intention is to primarily address ontological multiversism as advocated, for instance, by Hamkins or Väätänen, precisely for the reason that they proclaim, to the one or the other extent, ontological preoccupations for the introduction of respective multiverse theories. Taking also into account Woodin’s and Steel’s multiverse versions, I take up an argumentation against multiversism, and in a certain sense against platonism in mathematical foundations, mainly on subjectively founded grounds, while keeping an eye on Clarke-Doane’s concern with Benacerraf’s challenge. I note that even though the paper is rather technically constructed in arguing against multiversism, the non-negligible philosophical part is influenced to a certain extent by a phenomenologically motivated view of the matter. PubDate: 2022-04-01
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Abstract: Abstract Strict finitism is a minority view in the philosophy of mathematics. In this paper, we develop a strict finite axiomatic system for geometric constructions in which only constructions that are executable by simple tools in a small number of steps are permitted. We aim to demonstrate that as far as the applications of synthetic geometry to real-world constructions are concerned, there are viable strict finite alternatives to classical geometry where by one can prove analogs to fundamental results in classical geometry. We consider this as one of many early steps investigating the extent to which strict finite foundations can be developed for the application of mathematics to the real-world. PubDate: 2022-02-07 DOI: 10.1007/s10516-022-09616-4
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Abstract: Abstract This paper is an attempt to construct a bridge between dialectics and mathematics, to interpret main dialectical laws in terms of the theory of dynamical systems. Negation is interpreted as a discrete shift along the dynamical system trajectory. For conservative systems, double negation law is trivial as in formal logic; for non-conservative systems, this law means slow evolution of the system under consideration. There are also mathematical interpretations for the transition from quantity to quality and interconnection between opposites. PubDate: 2022-02-03 DOI: 10.1007/s10516-021-09615-x
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Abstract: Abstract Two opposing uses of the term ‘Scientific Ontology’ reflect attitudes towards the relation between (empirical) science and philosophical ontology. On the one side we can try to understand the broader picture by looking at the empirical details. On the other side we can try to find overarching principles that explain our observations. I am deeply aware of the history of this subject but—as we all know—history repeats itself. Perhaps it is time now for, actually, deduction to take more place in science. Perhaps—which of course is my own belief—we have reached the end of the road of so much depending on empirical observations. The natural sciences have reached beyond what is possible to empirically detect. My own research is an attempt to redefine our ontological starting point and to really test if the world only is physical. In this Reply I put Tambassi’s reply in the explicit context of my definition of scientific ontology. The outcome is that scientific ontology cannot settle the debate in the geographical sciences as to whether the geographical world is mind-dependent or not, but that the geographical universe, in that case, as a universe, belongs to the domain of scientific ontology. PubDate: 2022-02-01 DOI: 10.1007/s10516-020-09515-6
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Abstract: Abstract The supporters of Indeterminate Futurism Theory [IFT] suggest three different reasons for preferring their view over Growing Block Theory [GBT]. If compared to GBT, IFT offers a better account for the open future problem, our cognitive attitudes towards future contingents, and how open the future is. Michael Tze-Sung Longenecker disagrees with them, stating that the advantages suggested by IFT's supporters are not advantages at all and/or can be accommodated by GBT. This means that, if he is right, there is no reason to prefer IFT over GBT. However, if we prove the feasibility of (at least) one of the supposed advantages of IFT, Longenecker should admit that the game between IFT and GBT could still be open. Here, we focus on our cognitive attitudes towards future, with the aim of showing that the explanation of such attitudes may be a string to IFT's bow, as Ross Cameron suggests. PubDate: 2022-02-01 DOI: 10.1007/s10516-020-09518-3
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Abstract: Abstract The Minimal Theory of Causation, presented in Graßhoff and May, 2001, aspires to be a version of a regularity analysis of causation able to correctly predict our causal intuitions. In my article, I will argue that it is unsuccessful in this respect. The second aim of the paper will be to defend Hitchcock’s proposal concerning divisions of causal relations (presented in Hitchcock, 2001) against criticism made, in Jakob, 2006 on the basis of the Minimal Theory of Causation. PubDate: 2022-02-01 DOI: 10.1007/s10516-021-09548-5
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Abstract: Abstract It is a common opinion that chance events cannot be understood in causal terms. Conversely, according to a causal view of chance, intersections between independent causal chains originate accidental events, called “coincidences.” The present paper takes into proper consideration this causal conception of chance and tries to shed new light on it. More precisely, starting from Hart and Honoré’s view of coincidental events (Hart and Honoré in Causation in the Law. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1959), this paper furnishes a more detailed account on the nature of coincidences, according to which coincidental events are hybrids constituted by ontic (physical) components, that is the intersections between independent causal chains, plus epistemic aspects; where by “epistemic” we mean what is related, in some sense, to knowledge: for example, access to information, but also expectations, relevance, significance, that is psychological aspects. In particular, this paper investigates the role of the epistemic aspects in our understanding of what coincidences are. In fact, although the independence between the causal lines involved plays a crucial role in understanding coincidental events, that condition results to be insufficient to give a satisfactory definition of coincidences. The main target of the present work is to show that the epistemic aspects of coincidences are, together with the independence between the intersecting causal chains, a constitutive part of coincidental phenomena. Many examples are offered throughout this paper to enforce this idea. This conception, despite—for example—Antoine Augustine Cournot and Jacques Monod’s view, entails that a pure objectivist view about coincidences is not tenable. PubDate: 2022-02-01 DOI: 10.1007/s10516-020-09517-4