Abstract: Abstract Before Abraham Robinson and Kurt Gödel became familiar with Paul Cohen’s Results, both logicians held a naïve Platonic approach to philosophy. In this paper I demonstrate how Cohen’s results influenced both of them. Robinson declared himself a Formalist, while Gödel basically continued to hold onto the old Platonic approach. Why were the reactions of Gödel and Robinson to Cohen’s results so drastically different in spite of the fact that their initial philosophical positions were remarkably similar' I claim that the key to these different responses stems from the meanings that Gödel and Robinson gave to the concept of intuition, as well as to the relationship between epistemology and ontology. I also illustrate that although it might initially appear that Gödel’s and Robinson’s positions after Cohen’s results were quite different, this was not necessarily the case. PubDate: 2019-03-04
Abstract: Abstract This paper examines Hume’s formulations and uses of the conceivability principle (abbreviated as CP: Whatever is conceivable is possible) and the inconceivability principle (abbreviated as ICP: Whatever is inconceivable is impossible). In Hume’s works, we identify different versions of CP and ICP, including proper CP, proper ICP, the weak versions of CP and ICP, the epistemic versions of CP and ICP, and show that Hume not only expresses ICP, but also really maintains it. Assuming an axiomatic characterization of modalities, we argue that if there is a sharp distinction between levels of modalities, then Hume’s conceivability arguments do not hold. But, in a rather different way, we also argue that if Hume’s conceivability arguments hold, then there should be no distinction between levels of modalities. Finally, we argue that after Hume, there are lots of endeavors in logic and philosophy to distinguish different levels of modalities, and to accept new concepts of necessity other than logical necessity. PubDate: 2019-02-28
Abstract: Abstract Within the context of the debate between ontological monists and pluralists the paper discusses a number of argumentative strategies that the latter can apply to answer the “there can be only one” argument. I show here that the reply to this argument suggested by J. Turner has its disadvantages and suggest a number of adjustments thereof. In particular, I develop a concept of domain-specific quantifiers that allow the pluralist to elaborate his or her ontological position. PubDate: 2019-02-28
Abstract: Abstract On the basis of previous studies in relational biology and the phenomenological calculus, in my contribution I outline the mathematical foundations of biological perception generally, and visual perception specifically. In this approach, the premise is that objects in nature are not directly accessible, and that real manifestations are projections of these invariant objects. The morphology of observables is mathematically entailed by the duality of projections and projectors in a bilinear algebra that is the phenomenological calculus. The relationships between what is not directly accessible (which can be defined as noumena) and phenomena may be explicated in terms of metabolism and repair, whence a geometric theory of the perceived, the visible in particular, may be formulated in the category-theoretic language of relational biology. PubDate: 2019-02-23
Abstract: Abstract In this paper, I respond to Sterpetti’s (Axiomathes, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-018-9392-4) attempt to defend Kyle P. Stanford’s Problem of Unconceived Alternatives and his New Induction over the History of Science (NIS) from my reductio argument outlined in Mizrahi (J Gen Philos Sci 47(1):59–68, 2016a). I discuss what I take to be the ways in which Sterpetti has misconstrued my argument against Stanford’s NIS, in particular, that it is a reductio, not a dilemma, as Sterpetti erroneously thinks. I argue that antirealists who endorse Stanford’s NIS still face an absurd consequence of this argument, namely, that they should not believe their own brand of scientific antirealism. PubDate: 2019-02-23
Abstract: Abstract Every linear perspective image has a center of the perspective construction. Only when observed from that location does a 2D image provide the same stimulus as the original 3D scene. Geometric analyses indicate that observing the image from other vantage points should affect the perceived spatial structure of the scene conveyed by the image, involving transformations such as shear, compression, and dilation. Based on previous research, this paper presents a detailed account of these transformations. The analyses are presented in a uniform manner, illustrated with special 3D diagrams, and embedded in a wider framework of related perspective paradigms. Such analyses provide the potential theoretical basis for empirical work on the effects of changes of observer vantage points on the perception of spatial structure in perspective images. PubDate: 2019-02-20
Abstract: Abstract The paper argues that Brentano was the exponent of a methodological monism, which is based on the requirement that science should be grounded on experience, and not on a speculative-idealistic principle, as in the case of German idealism. In Brentano’s psychological writings, this methodological requirement concretized in two different theses: (T1) The method of psychology is identical with the method of natural science; (T2) The method of psychology is inspired by the method of natural science. The thesis of this study is that an important part of Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint is elaborated in accordance with T1. By contrast, Brentano’s Descriptive Psychology illustrates the subsequent decision to give up this idea. In its place, the aforementioned requirement is elaborated in the spirit of a methodological particularism that recommends the scientist elaborate his methods according to the specificity of the phenomena under investigation and to the difficulties that need to be overcome when approaching them. PubDate: 2019-02-15
Abstract: Abstract The age old conflict between logical analysis and phenomenological study revealed by different philosophical treatments of our experience of temporal passage are discussed in the present paper. Temporal passage is found to be problematic because philosophers entertain conflicting views regarding the status of the passage of time. As logical analyses prove temporal passage as unreal or illusory and phenomenological study of our experience of temporal passage considers it to be a fundamental structure of our life, the conflict regarding the status of the passage of time emerges. In this paper our aim will be to explore gradually different logical analyses of our experience of temporal passage provided by philosophers of both classical India and the West on the one hand and also to discuss some of the phenomenological treatments of our experience of temporal passage provided by some continental philosophers to show the conflict between the results of these two philosophical treatments. Finally, we would like to state that since this conflict culminates into the conflict between reason and experience, it is not possible to resolve the conflict in the present life form in which both these categories have their distinctive roles to play. PubDate: 2019-02-01
Abstract: Abstract The questions what the future will bring and if and how it is possible to anticipate coming events have intrigued human beings since the dawn of time. Over the course of the centuries human beings have found better and more sophisticated ways to calculate and predict certain prospective occurrences, for example earthquakes, thunderstorms et cetera. In the Europe of the nineteenth century this potential of rational (natural) sciences led to the idea that it would once be possible to anticipate everything that will happen in the universe, going as far as that it should even become predictable how human beings will develop and which actions they will choose. The French philosopher Henri Bergson verbally fought against this kind of belief and developed a so-called process ontology, which claims that nothing in the universe is ever fixed. In fact everything that exists is an ongoing and evolutionary process (élan vital) without a fixed goal. And since—according to Bergson—our rational mind is solely capable of understanding and therefore predicting rigid entities but not processes, any belief in the complete predictability of the universe must be abandoned. Instead, we should focus on the possibilities of an open, spontaneous and creative future, which we will only then be able to understand, if we get more in touch with our so-called intuitive faculty, which is able to fathom a process in its processual state. PubDate: 2019-02-01
Abstract: Abstract In this contribution, I will argue for an ontological understanding of time as temporality. This, however, implies that in a certain sense being is temporality, by which I mean that (1) on an ontological level temporality is nothing but the process of change, i.e. the dynamic aspect of being in its becoming, changing, and perishing, and (2) that concrete beings are not merely in time, but they are temporal. This leads to the conclusion that actual time is the process of change that becoming beings are, as well as the conclusion that reality is fundamentally temporal as argued by process metaphysicians like Alfred North Whitehead, Henri Bergson, Martin Heidegger, and Gilles Deleuze. The investigation begins with first establishing the methodological difficulties involved in thinking temporality as an ontological feature. In a second step, dynamic ontologies are introduced as the conceptual background best suited to think ontological temporality and their difference to event-ontologies is explained. Finally, the distinction between temporality and linear time is clarified. This introduction of temporality ends with some arguments for the existence of temporality that are inspired by Aristotle’s famous investigations into the nature of time. After having thus introduced temporality as an ontological feature and argued for the existence and relevance of it, its implications for our understanding of the dimensions of time and especially for anticipation are discussed. PubDate: 2019-02-01
Abstract: Abstract Whitehead’s metaphysics involves an event ontology. Fundamental—that is, in Whitehead’s language: “actual”—entities are events, described as acts of experience. It also involves presentism since past events have perished and future events do not yet exist according to Whitehead. Hence the question alluded to in the title of the present paper: “How are you going to move forward into the future'… If you conceive it under the guise of a temporal transition into the non-existent, you can’t get going.” (See T2 below) I will argue that, to a large extent, Whitehead’s metaphysics is designed to answer that question. PubDate: 2019-02-01
Abstract: Abstract In approaching the future, i.e. in planning projects and decision-making, the role of both affective and non-affective factors is considerable. But given that affectivity is not a homogeneous realm and that it is difficult, if not impossible, to isolate the affective and non-affective elements of a description, anticipation can be hardly described as purely affective, and, on the other, it is necessary to consider what kind or level of the hierarchical realm of affectivity is involved in the anticipation move. In the paper several distinction are made in order to elucidate the role of affectivity in anticipating a person’s approach to the future (e.g. spontaneity vs. calculation, direct vs. indirect anticipation). PubDate: 2019-02-01
Abstract: Abstract Model organisms are a living form of scientific models. Despite the widespread use of model organisms in scientific research, the actual representational relationship between model organisms and their target species is often poorly characterized in the context of cross-species research. Many model organisms do not represent the target species adequately, let alone accurately. This is partly due to the complex and emergent life phenomena in the organism, and partly due to the fact that a model organism is always taken to represent a broad range of diverse organisms. More often than not, model organisms are taken as a reference point for an extrapolation to be made to the unknown characteristics of other species. I propose to view model organisms as analogue simulators which represent the emergent phenomenon in the context of cross-species research. A model organism represents a wide range of species by simulating their molecular microstates which underlie various emergent phenomena. I show that although model organisms represent the target species inadequately at many levels of complexity, they have epistemic values as a simulator in virtue of which the emergent phenomenon can be modeled dynamically, a virtue that is hardly attainable by non-dynamic models. PubDate: 2019-01-24
Abstract: Abstract In this paper I address G. C. Rota’s account of mathematical identity and I attempt to relate it with aspects of Frege as well as Husserl’s views on the issue. After a brief presentation of Rota’s distinction among mathematical facts and mathematical proofs, I highlight the phenomenological background of Rota’s claim that mathematical objects retain their identity through different kinds of axiomatization. In particular, I deal with Rota’s interpretation of the ontological status of mathematical objects in terms of ideality. Then I detect certain similarities among Rota’s views and Frege’s account of the constitution of arithmetical identity on the grounds of 1–1 correspondence. I point out an epistemic as well as an ontological aspect of this issue. In the sequel, I attempt to deal with the problem of “mixed identities” in mathematics stated by Benacerraf (1965) by taking in account Rota’s use of the phenomenological notion “Fundierung”. PubDate: 2019-01-24
Abstract: Abstract Francesco Berto has argued that a primitive concept of material exclusion could be employed to formulate a notion of absolute contradiction that not even dialetheists could accept. The machinery of material exclusion and absolute contradiction could then be employed as a common (non-question-begging) ground by both dialetheists as well as their opponents in debates about negation and truth. In this paper, we first put the idea on a clear basis, and then present some criticism to it. We shall argue that the concepts of material exclusion and absolute contradiction hardly help with a clear basis for the debate on dialetheism; furthermore, the introduction of material exclusion threatens the coherence of dialetheism by allowing one to express the opposition between designated and undesignated values, with unwanted conclusions. PubDate: 2019-01-23
Abstract: Abstract Scientific evidence and scientific values under risk and uncertainty are strictly connected from the point of view of Peirce’s pragmaticism. In addition, economy and statistics play a key role in both choosing and testing hypotheses. Hence we may show also the connection between the methodology of the economy of research and statistical frequentism, both originating from pragmaticism. The connection is drawn by the regulative principles of synechism, tychism and uberty. These principles are values that have both epistemic and non-epistemic dimension. They concern both the decisions to test a hypothesis as well as inductive risk. The validity of this result stems from the values cost–benefit analysis imposes on scientific inquiry. Values associated with the economy of research are important not only in the pre-test phases of generating hypotheses but also when hypotheses are effectively tested. Peirce took these economic considerations to leave room for an interpretation of probability which is not only a frequentist and propensity-theoretic but also a conceptualist one referring to degrees of belief. We show that this leeway nonetheless agrees with the theory of the economy of scientific methods. PubDate: 2019-01-22
Abstract: Abstract The present article offers an introductory vision to the political philosophy of science. The political philosophy of science is a new field of study where the philosophy of science and political philosophy converge. We will see the main contents of this field. We will also note that it depends on the construction of a model of rationality where science and politics can meet each other. Finally, the article tries to outline such a model of rationality. In order to do so, we will review the relationship between Karl Popper’s scientific and political philosophy. I suggest to read Popper’s critical rationalism in terms of a kind of prudential rationality. PubDate: 2018-12-01
Abstract: Abstract In its early development philosophy of science did not allow the possibility of a relativistic approach with regard to explanation of external phenomena. Relativism was seen as justified exclusively with regard to internal phenomena, for example, in the realm of moral and aesthetic judgment. In the realm of moral judgment, external realism functions as a necessary hypothesis, according to which our moral judgment and moral decisions have a real effect in the external world, for which we can be held responsible. A paradigm shift in the theory of science, inaugurated by Th. S. Kuhn, led to the rise of relativism with regard to judgment in the realm of external phenomena and specifically with regard to the validity of scientific theories. Critics of relativism do not take into account that it is not enough to point out the logical inconsistency of relativism. Most arguments for scientific justification of external realism are doomed to failure, because they do not take into account the role of the judgmental subject. In this article I will show that the role of “second nature” is significant not only for the constitution of moral realism, but also for the implementation of scientific naturalism. PubDate: 2018-12-01
Authors:Raimundas Vidunas Abstract: Abstract A notion of delegated causality is introduced here. This subtle kind of causality is dual to interventional causality. Delegated causality elucidates the causal role of dynamical systems at the “edge of chaos”, explicates evident cases of downward causation, and relates emergent phenomena to Gödel’s incompleteness theorem. Apparently rich implications are noticed in biology and Chinese philosophy. The perspective of delegated causality supports cognitive interpretations of self-organization and evolution. PubDate: 2018-05-22 DOI: 10.1007/s10516-018-9377-3
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