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  Subjects -> PHILOSOPHY (Total: 762 journals)
Showing 601 - 135 of 135 Journals sorted by number of followers
Analítica     Open Access   (Followers: 6)
Journal of East Asian Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Journal of Modern Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
International Journal of Philosophy and Theology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Journal of the Sociology and Theory of Religion     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Food Ethics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Whiteness and Education     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Agora     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Cuadernos de pensamiento     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Aesthetic Investigations     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Culture and Dialogue     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Journal of Spiritual Formation and Soul Care     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Ajatus : Suomen Filosofisen Yhdistyksen vuosikirja     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Zeszyty Naukowe Centrum Badań im. Edyty Stein     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Laisvalaikio Tyrimai     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
International Journal of Ethics Education     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Universitas : Revista de Filosofía, Derecho y Política     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Zeitschrift für Ethik und Moralphilosophie : Journal for Ethics and Moral Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Problema Anuario de Filosofía y Teoría del Derecho     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Journal of Islamic Ethics     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Agora: papeles de Filosofía     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
ANFUSINA : Journal of Psychology     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Bioethica     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
TheoLogica : An International Journal for Philosophy of Religion and Philosophical Theology     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Philosophia : Revista de Filosofía     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Gnosis : Journal of Gnostic Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Islamic Sciences     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
International Journal of Divination and Prognostication     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Journal of Applied Animal Ethics Research     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Clotho     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
An-Nisbah : Jurnal Ekonomi Syariah     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
The Biblical Annals     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Al-Fikra     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Journal of Islamic Education     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Scientonomy : Journal for the Science of Science     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
International Journal of Innovation Studies     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Estudios Nietzsche     Open Access  
Bergsoniana     Open Access  
Histoire Épistémologie Langage     Open Access  
Ancient Philosophy Today     Hybrid Journal  
Endowment Studies     Hybrid Journal  
Danish Yearbook of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription  
Journal for Continental Philosophy of Religion     Full-text available via subscription  
Simone de Beauvoir Studies     Full-text available via subscription  
Journal of Urdu Studies     Hybrid Journal  
Journal of Responsible Technology     Open Access  
Journal of Values Education / Değerler Eğitimi Dergisi     Open Access  
Conciencia     Open Access  
Correspondences : Journal for the Study of Esotericism     Open Access  
Resonancias : Revista de Filosofía     Open Access  
Res Humanitariae     Open Access  
Humanidades em diálogo     Open Access  
Discurso     Open Access  
Cadernos de Filosofia Alemã : Crítica e Modernidade     Open Access  
Cadernos de Ética e Filosofia Política     Open Access  
Cadernos Espinosanos     Open Access  
Studies in Christian-Jewish Relations     Open Access  
Dianoia     Open Access  
Saberes y Prácticas : Revista de Filosofía y Educación     Open Access  
Ciência & Trópico     Open Access  
Філософія та політологія в контексті сучасної культури (Philosophy and Political Science in the Context of Modern Culture)     Open Access  
Etcétera : Revista del Área de Ciencias Sociales del CIFFyH     Open Access  
Jurnal Konseling Gusjigang     Open Access  
Science et Esprit     Open Access  
Canadian Journal of Bioethics     Open Access  
Journal of Educational Thought / Revue de la Pensée Educative     Full-text available via subscription  
Auslegung : A Journal of Philosophy     Open Access  
PhaenEx     Open Access  
International Journal of Philosophy & Social Values     Open Access  
Convivium : Revista de Filosophia     Open Access  
Aurora : papeles del Seminario María Zambrano     Open Access  
Astrolabio     Open Access  
IJIBE (International Journal of Islamic Business Ethics)     Open Access  
International Gramsci Journal     Open Access  
Andrews University Seminary Student Journal     Open Access  
SPICE : Student Perspectives on Institutions, Choices & Ethic     Open Access  
Patristica et Mediævalia     Open Access  
Cuadernos de Filosofía     Open Access  
RUDN Journal of Philosophy     Open Access  
Revista Fragmentos de Cultura : Revista Interdisciplinar de Ciências Humanas     Open Access  
Temporal : Prática e Pensamento Contemporâneos     Open Access  
Revista Brasileira de Filosofia da Religião     Open Access  
Revista Brasileira de Bioética     Open Access  
Ítaca     Open Access  
Analytica : Revista de Filosofia     Open Access  
Anais de Filosofia Clássica     Open Access  
AL-Qadissiya Magzine for Human Sciences     Open Access  
Oksident     Open Access  
Diferencia(s)     Open Access  
Philosophical Inquiry in Education     Open Access  
Τέλος : Revista Iberoamericana de Estudios Utilitaristas     Open Access  
Frónesis     Open Access  
Sapientia     Open Access  
Discusiones Filosóficas     Open Access  
Universidad de La Habana     Open Access  
Anais Eletrônicos do Congresso Epistemologias do Sul     Open Access  
Revista SURES     Open Access  
Revista Eletrônica Ludus Scientiae     Open Access  
Revista Epistemologias do Sul     Open Access  
Cracow Indological Studies     Open Access  
Australasian Philosophical Review     Full-text available via subscription  
Jus Cogens : A Critical Journal of Philosophy of Law and Politics     Hybrid Journal  
Journal of Dharma Studies     Hybrid Journal  
Humanistic Management Journal     Hybrid Journal  
Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte     Hybrid Journal  
Via Spiritus : Revista de História da Espiritualidade e do Sentimento Religioso     Open Access  
Filosofia. Revista da Faculdade de Letras da Universidade do Porto     Open Access  
Civitas Augustiniana     Open Access  
Revista Binacional Brasil - Argentina: Diálogo entre as ciências     Open Access  
Revista de Estudios Kantianos     Open Access  
Journal of Graduate Studies Review     Open Access  
HiN : Alexander von Humboldt im Netz. Internationale Zeitschrift für Humboldt-Studien     Open Access  
Dios y el Hombre     Open Access  
Bulletin of Yaroslav Mudryi NLU : Series : Philosophy, philosophy of law, political science, sociology     Open Access  
Sincronía     Open Access  
Isonomía. Revista de Teoría y Filosofía del Derecho     Open Access  
Journal of Analytic Divinity     Open Access  
Cahiers de Philosophie de l’Université de Caen     Open Access  
Heroism Science     Open Access  
FOKUS : Jurnal Kajian Keislaman dan Kemasyarakatan     Open Access  
BELAJEA : Jurnal Pendidikan Islam     Open Access  
AJIS : Academic Journal of Islamic Studies     Open Access  
The Islamic Culture     Open Access  
Teologia i Moralność     Open Access  
Studia z Kognitywistyki i Filozofii Umysłu     Open Access  
Filozofia Publiczna i Edukacja Demokratyczna     Open Access  
Bohemistyka     Open Access  
Ethics in Progress     Open Access  
Cuadernos de Filosofía Latinoamericana     Open Access  
Norsk filosofisk tidsskrift     Open Access  
Kirke og Kultur     Full-text available via subscription  
Problemos     Open Access  
Global Forum on Arts and Christian Faith     Open Access  
Gogoa     Open Access  
Lato Sensu : Revue de la Société de philosophie des sciences     Open Access  
Mutatis Mutandis : Revista Internacional de Filosofía     Open Access  
Ruch Filozoficzny     Open Access  
O Que Nos Faz Pensar : Cadernos do Departamento de Filosofia da PUC-Rio     Open Access  
Les Cahiers philosophiques de Strasbourg     Open Access  
Philosophie antique : Problèmes, Renaissances, Usages     Full-text available via subscription  
Studi di Estetica     Open Access  
Hic Rhodus : Crisis capitalista, polémica y controversias     Open Access  
El Banquete de los Dioses     Open Access  
Psocial : Revista de Investigación en Psicología Social     Open Access  
Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice / Recueil annuel de Windsor d'accès à la justice     Open Access  
Éthique en éducation et en formation : Les Dossiers du GREE     Open Access  
Mizar : Costellazione di pensieri     Open Access  
Revista Poiesis     Open Access  
HONAI : International Journal for Educational, Social, Political & Cultural Studies     Open Access  
INSANCITA : Journal of Islamic Studies in Indonesia and Southeast Asia     Open Access  
Marwah : Jurnal Perempuan, Agama dan Jender     Open Access  
FALAH : Jurnal Ekonomi Syariah     Open Access  
Mises : Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy, Law and Economics     Open Access  
ULUM : Journal of Religious Inquiries     Open Access  
Voluntaristics Review     Open Access  
Scrinium : Journal of Patrology and Critical Hagiography     Open Access  
Idéias     Open Access  
Diakrisis Yearbook of Theology and Philosophy     Open Access  
Jurnal Living Hadis     Open Access  
Epistemología e Historia de la Ciencia     Open Access  
Kader     Open Access  
Metaphysics     Open Access  
Griot : Revista de Filosofia     Open Access  
Kontemplasi : Jurnal Ilmu-Ilmu Ushuluddin     Open Access  
Jurnal Dinamika Penelitian : Media Komunikasi Penelitian Sosial Keagamaan     Open Access  

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Similar Journals
Journal Cover
Topoi
Journal Prestige (SJR): 0.374
Citation Impact (citeScore): 1
Number of Followers: 3  
 
  Hybrid Journal Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles)
ISSN (Print) 1572-8749 - ISSN (Online) 0167-7411
Published by Springer-Verlag Homepage  [2467 journals]
  • A Comfortable Sureness: Knowledge, Animality and Conceptual
           Investigations in Wittgenstein’s On Certainty

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      Abstract: Abstract This essay analyses some remarks of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty in which Wittgenstein compares human behaviour to that of animals and says he wants to consider man as an animal. The essay’s main purpose is to show that these remarks are essentially understood as part and parcel of what Wittgenstein calls “conceptual investigations” and that, consequently, they give little support to On Certainty’s naturalistic interpretations. A second purpose of the essay is to show that Wittgenstein does not intend to combat the use of “I know” in contexts such as those evoked by Moore; rather he wants to draw attention to the different ways in which we say or can say “I know.”
      PubDate: 2022-11-28
       
  • Degrees of Objectivity' Mathemata and Social Objects

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      Abstract: A down-to-earth admission of abstract objects can be based on detailed explanation of where the objectivity of mathematics comes from, and how a ‘thin’ notion of object emerges from objective mathematical discourse or practices. We offer a sketch of arguments concerning both points, as a basis for critical scrutiny of the idea that mathematical and social objects are essentially of the same kind—which is criticized. Some authors have proposed that mathematical entities are indeed institutional objects, a product of our collective imposition of function onto reality (the phrase comes from Searle) and of surrogation or hypostasis. Yet there are significant disanalogies between the typical social objects and mathemata, on which basis I argue that one should make a clear distinction between both. The comparison of mathematical with social objects helps understanding how non-physical objects can figure prominently in our explanations of reality. Yet mathematical objects have a different kind of cognitive grounding, and the more elementary of them emerge under relatively very simple sociocultural conditions. The differences are also reflected in the wide scope of use of mathematical concepts, and the much higher degree of variation found among social objects. On the basis of all of these features, I defend the thesis that one can significantly distinguish degrees of objectivity, and I use the distinction to articulate a graded ontology where one can locate the different kinds of mathematical and social objects.
      PubDate: 2022-11-24
       
  • Must Skepticism Remain Refuted' Inheriting Skepticism with Cavell and
           Levinas

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      Abstract: Abstract This article defends Cavell and Levinas’ view that anti-skeptical arguments cannot attain universal assent. In the first half of the article, I argue that Conant’s reading of Cavell is mistaken in two respects: he ignores Cavell’s inheritance of Kant as well as the differences Cavell emphasizes between external world and other minds skepticism. In the second half of the paper, I examine affinities between Cavell and Levinas’ thought, viz., acknowledging the facticity of the other and their remarks on skepticism. I close the paper by noting three metaphysical and ethical truths that arise from Cavell’s way with skepticism.
      PubDate: 2022-11-22
       
  • Introduction: Groundless Grounds and Hinges. Wittgenstein's On
           Certainty within the Philosophical Tradition

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      PubDate: 2022-11-22
       
  • Wittgenstein on Dreaming and Skepticism

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      Abstract: Abstract In this paper I aim to elucidate Wittgenstein’s claim that the so-called dream argument is senseless. Unlike other interpreters, who understand the sentence “I am dreaming” as contradictory or self-defeating, I intend to elucidate in what sense one should understand it as senseless or, more precisely, as nonsensical. In this sense, I propose to understand the above-mentioned claim in light of Wittgenstein’s criticism of skepticism from the Tractatus logico-philosophicus to his last writings. I intend to show that the words “I am dreaming” are nonsensical in the same sense as the alleged proposition “There are physical objects” or the expression of doubt about the existence of external objects.
      PubDate: 2022-11-21
       
  • On Certainty, Change, and “Mathematical Hinges”

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      Abstract: Abstract Annalisa Coliva (Int J Study Skept 10(3–4):346–366, 2020) asks, “Are there mathematical hinges'” I argue here, against Coliva’s own conclusion, that there are. I further claim that this affirmative answer allows a case to be made for taking the concept of a hinge to be a useful and general-purpose tool for studying mathematical practice in its real complexity. Seeing how Wittgenstein can, and why he would, countenance mathematical hinges additionally gives us a deeper understanding of some of his latest thoughts on mathematics. For example, a view of how mathematical hinges relate to Wittgenstein’s well-known river-bed analogy enables us to see how his way of thinking about mathematics can account nicely for a “dynamics of change” within mathematical research—something his philosophy of mathematics has been accused of missing (e.g., by Robert Ackermann (Wittgenstein’s city, The University of Massachusetts Press, Amherst, 1988) and Mark Wilson (Wandering significance: an essay on conceptual behavior, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006). Finally, the perspective on mathematical hinges ultimately arrived at will be seen to provide us with illuminating examples of how our conceptual choices and theories can be ungrounded but nevertheless the right ones (in a sense to be explained).
      PubDate: 2022-11-18
       
  • Wittgenstein, Quasi-fideism, and Scepticism

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      Abstract: Abstract In the discussion of certainties, or ‘hinges’, in Wittgenstein’s On Certainty some of the examples that Wittgenstein uses are religious ones. He remarks on how a child might be raised so that they ‘swallow down’ belief in God (§107) and in discussing the role of persuasion in disagreements he asks us to think of the case of missionaries converting natives (§612). In the past decade Duncan Pritchard has made a case for an account of the rationality of religious belief inspired by On Certainty which he calls ‘quasi-fideism’. Pritchard argues that religious beliefs are just like ordinary non-religious beliefs in presupposing fundamental arational commitments. However, Modesto Gómez-Alonso has recently argued that there are significant differences between the kinds of ‘hinges’ discussed in Wittgenstein’s On Certainty and religious beliefs such that we should expect an account of rationality in religion to be quite different to the account of rational practices and their foundations that we find in Wittgenstein’s work. Fundamental religious commitments are, as Wittgenstein said, in the foreground of the religious believer’s life whereas hinge commitments are said to be in the background. People are passionately committed to their religious beliefs but it is not at all clear that people are passionately committed to hinges such as that ‘I have two hands’. I argue here that although there are differences between religious beliefs and many of the hinge-commitments discussed in On Certainty religious beliefs are nonetheless hinge-like. Gómez-Alonso’s criticisms of Pritchard mischaracterise his views and something like Pritchard’s quasi-fideism is the correct account of the rationality of religious belief.
      PubDate: 2022-11-14
       
  • Lunacy and Scepticism: Notes on the Logic of Doubt Concerning the
           Existence of an External World

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      Abstract: Abstract This article develops a logical (or semantic) response to scepticism about the existence of an external world. Specifically, it is argued that any doubt about the existence of an external world can be proved to be false, but whatever appears to be doubt about the existence of an external world that cannot be proved to be false is nonsense, insofar as it must rely on the assertion of something that is logically impossible. The article further suggests that both G. E. Moore and Ludwig Wittgenstein worked towards the same solution but left their work unfinished.
      PubDate: 2022-11-08
       
  • Caught in the Language-Game

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      Abstract: Abstract In this paper, I first introduce the main motivations for the internalism/externalism dichotomy in epistemology and explore different accounts of epistemic justification, mostly externalist, arising from Dretske’s relevant alternatives theory of knowledge, namely the reliabilism of Goldman and Nozick, the contextualism of Cohen and DeRose, which is governed by fallibilist standards, and Lewis’ version of contextualism, to which infallibilist standards apply. I then argue that Wittgenstein critically anticipates many of these strategies and tries to avoid such a dichotomy by assuming a form of infallibilism which is neither internal nor external. After introducing the idea of a Wittgensteinian hinge epistemology and how it responds to the problem of epistemic justification and to the particular challenge posed by radical scepticism, I defend the view that infallibility is logically unavoidable when we realize that we are always trapped in one language-game or another, even if we constantly switch between language-games.
      PubDate: 2022-11-08
       
  • Correction: Are Wittgenstein’s Hinges Rational World-Pictures' The
           Groundlessness Theory Reconsidered

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      PubDate: 2022-11-04
       
  • The Systematicity of Davidson’s Anti-skeptical Arguments

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      Abstract: Abstract Donald Davidson contributed more deeply to our understanding of language, thought, and reality than perhaps any other recent philosopher. His discussions of skepticism are sometimes seen as peripheral to those contributions. As I read him, Davidson argued against three skeptical worries. First, beliefs are true or false relative to a conceptual scheme. Second, beliefs generally are false. Third, other minds and an external world do not exist. Call those worries ‘conceptual relativism’, ‘falsidicalism’, and ‘solipsism’, respectively. I investigate how Davidson’s arguments are connected. I then show that those connections are so systematic that Davidson ultimately offers a single, master argument with two premises. Premise one is that I think. Premise two is an application of his account of radical interpretation. Focusing on the systematicity of Davidson’s anti-skeptical arguments demonstrates that discussions of skepticism were more central to his views than often appreciated and shines fresh light on his project overall.
      PubDate: 2022-11-03
       
  • Stop Doubting with Descartes

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      Abstract: Abstract Did Descartes manage to overcome the skeptics' If we understand “overcome” in the sense of “refute,” the answer is no, since his hyperbolic doubt harbors several blind spots and is, therefore, not as radical as is commonly argued. In this way, the victory of the cogito is perhaps less decisive and fruitful than it is claimed. If we understand “overcome” in the sense of “remove” or “move beyond,” the answer is yes. Descartes has overcome skepticism, but at the cost of a decision, a sort of bet made in favor of reason based on a confidence in the human mind that is never really subverted. This faith in reason, truth, and specific epistemological principles in Descartes’ philosophy constitute what Wittgenstein calls “hinges,” which are indispensable for doubting and searching for truth. In this sense, Descartes’ anti-skepticism is more a confidence in reason in order to save the possibility of science than the result of a logical refutation.
      PubDate: 2022-11-03
       
  • Introduction: The Role of Emotions in Epistemic Practices and Communities

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      PubDate: 2022-10-29
       
  • Religious Hinges: Some Historical Precursors

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      Abstract: Abstract Recently, hinge epistemologists have applied Wittgenstein’s metaphor of hinges to religious belief. The most prominent proposal in this context is Pritchard’s “quasi-fideism”. This paper examines some historical precursors of the notion of religious hinges, with the aim of shedding more light on it. After outlining the framework of hinge epistemology and its application to religious belief, I briefly examine the views of Thomas Reid and John Henry Newman as acknowledged forerunners of this framework (or cognate views). Next, I turn to two hitherto unacknowledged forerunners, the pragmatists William James and Charles S. Peirce. I then focus on some insights that the pragmatists offer. On this basis, I conclude that religious beliefs are a special class of hinges. As such, while they can be defended through hinge epistemology, they cannot constitute a model through which we can interpret the nature of hinges in general.
      PubDate: 2022-10-29
       
  • Are Wittgenstein’s Hinges Rational World-Pictures' The
           Groundlessness Theory Reconsidered

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      Abstract: Abstract Some philosophers have argued that Wittgenstein’s hinges, the centrepiece of his book On Certainty, are the “ungrounded ground” on which knowledge rests. It is usually understood by this that hinges provide a foundation for knowledge without being themselves epistemically warranted. In fact, Wittgenstein articulates that hinges lack any truth-value and are neither justified nor unjustified. This inevitably places them wholly outside the categorial framework of JTB epistemology. What I call the “groundlessness interpretation”, inspired by OC 166, understands the fundamental pieces of our cognitive scaffolding this way. The view has been largely successful. I argue that this interpretation is incomplete for two basic reasons: first, it is not based on undisputed evidence; second, by assuming that hinges are committed to reality by epistemic fiat, it looks as if Wittgenstein is asking us to blindly trust them regardless of their actual content. Contrary to this, I argue that Wittgenstein describes hinges as illuminating world-pictures that reflect reality and are answerable to facts in a derivate way. As the book shows, hinges originate in our engagement with reality and, while considered unquestionable, could be challenged, reassessed, and replaced by new ones. This indicates that hinges are both the result of knowledge-acquisition and somewhat continuous with one’s set of beliefs. It follows that hinges are ultimately rational, and so, apt instruments to confront scepticism.
      PubDate: 2022-10-20
       
  • Correction: Introduction: What’s so Special About Faces' Visages at
           the Crossroad Between Philosophy, Semiotics and Cognition

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      PubDate: 2022-10-17
       
  • Wittgenstein and the Duty to Believe

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      Abstract: It is generally assumed that hinge-commitments are deprived of an epistemically normative structure, and yet, that although groundless, the acceptance of Wittgensteinian certainties is still rational. The problem comes from the intellectualist view of hinge-approvals which many recent proposals advance—one that falls short of the necessities and impossibilities pertaining to what would be the right description of how it is like to approve of hinges. I will raise the Newman-inspired worry as how to cash the abstract acceptance of principles of enquiry into real assent, as well as the question about how to extend normativity all the way back to foundations. It is my aim here to argue that ethical normativity is the only kind of normativity capable to ground the rationality of hinges. In defence of this, I will draw some consequences from Ernest Sosa’s claim that hinges about the external world are logically related to the cogito.
      PubDate: 2022-09-13
      DOI: 10.1007/s11245-022-09828-8
       
  • Introduction: What’s so Special About Faces' Visages at the
           Crossroad Between Philosophy, Semiotics and Cognition

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      PubDate: 2022-09-08
      DOI: 10.1007/s11245-022-09825-x
       
  • Looking into Death: Trauma, Memory and Human Face

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      Abstract: Abstract This article analyses the relationship of human faces with trauma and death, in particular focalizing on the use of snap shot and ID kinds of photos in site of memory, memorials an public art.
      PubDate: 2022-09-05
      DOI: 10.1007/s11245-022-09818-w
       
  • Emotional Environments: Selective Permeability, Political Affordances and
           Normative Settings

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      Abstract: Abstract I begin this article with an increasingly accepted claim: that emotions lend differential weight to states of affairs, helping us conceptually carve the world and make rational decisions. I then develop a more controversial assertion: that environments have non-subjective emotional qualities, which organize behavior and help us make sense of the world. I defend this from ecological and related embodied standpoints that take properties to be interrelational outcomes. I also build on conceptions of experience as a cultural phenomenon, one that coheres around shared environmental contours and public emotional concerns, introducing normative constraints (or what might be called “world grammars”). Endorsing this outlook suggests an argument for the view that cultural spaces have affectively charged, non-subjective, normative openings and closures. These openings and closures engender selectively permeable barriers which cordon space without physically preventing entry, as seen with decorative half walls and elevation changes. An area with such barriers may look emotionally hostile to, say, the dispirited homeless who are in fact less welcome there. Outcomes like these might be thought of as “political affordances.” These affordances can be regarded as normative openings and closures that implicitly filter, and hence segregate, according to various social divisions. Although registering political affordances requires more than the detection of ambient arrays, the notion retains core Gibsonian ideas: that affordances are values, that these values are linked with how a space can be used, and that the existence and nature of such affordances is not a subjective matter.
      PubDate: 2022-09-02
      DOI: 10.1007/s11245-022-09812-2
       
 
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