A  B  C  D  E  F  G  H  I  J  K  L  M  N  O  P  Q  R  S  T  U  V  W  X  Y  Z  

  Subjects -> PHILOSOPHY (Total: 762 journals)
The end of the list has been reached or no journals were found for your choice.
Similar Journals
Journal Cover
Topoi
Journal Prestige (SJR): 0.374
Citation Impact (citeScore): 1
Number of Followers: 3  
 
  Hybrid Journal Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles)
ISSN (Print) 1572-8749 - ISSN (Online) 0167-7411
Published by Springer-Verlag Homepage  [2468 journals]
  • What is Political Moralism'

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      PubDate: 2024-07-13
       
  • Pragma-dialectics and the problem of agreement

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      Abstract: Abstract Pragma-Dialectics (PD) is an approach to argumentation that can be described as disagreement-centric. On PD, disagreement is the condition which defines argument, it is the practical problem to be solved by it, and disagreement’s management is the ultimate source of argument’s normativity. On PD, arguing in the context of agreement is taken to be “incorrect” and arguments where agreement already reigns are “pointless.” Even the PD account of fallacies is disagreement-centered: a fallacy is something that impedes resolution of a dispute. We argue here that the disagreement-focus of PD yields procedural errors of application in cases of arguments given explicitly for agreement-management, that there are explanations of fallacies better understood as agreement-focused (straw man and ad hominem in particular), and that there are unique meta-argumentative errors emergent in instances of agreement.
      PubDate: 2024-07-11
       
  • Truthmaker Semantics, Ground, and Generality

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      Abstract: Abstract Our aim in this paper is to extend the semantics for the kind of logic of ground developed in deRosset and Fine (2023). In that paper, the authors very briefly suggested a way of treating universal and existential quantification over a fixed domain of objects. Here we explore some options for extending the treatment to allow for a variable domain of individuals.
      PubDate: 2024-07-03
       
  • The Role of Moral Norms in Political Theory

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      Abstract: Abstract In the recent debate on political normativity in political philosophy, two positions have emerged among so-called political realists. On the first ‘non-moral’ view, political normativity is understood as orthogonal to moral normativity. On the second ‘filter view’, moral norms and prescriptions may be ‘filtered through’ the realities of politics such that they are altered by politics’ constitutive features. While the former has been severely criticized, the latter has remained underdeveloped and vague. To take the debate on political normativity forward, the aim in this paper is to explore what it could reasonably mean to claim that moral norms are filtered through politics and are aligned with its constitutive features. More specifically, we explore the role of moral norms in political theory. We take our starting-point in Larmore’s work and make two claims. First, we argue against Larmore’s claim – following political realists – that because political philosophy is concerned with the regulation of basic institutions and legal-political orders, it should primarily focus on political legitimacy rather than justice and always focus on legitimacy before justice. In our view, nothing in the constitutive features of politics supports such a conclusion. Second, we argue that any reasonable political theory relies on at least one moral premise, constituted by foundational principles (or values), which are independent of a society or polity. These are more basic than political principles in the sense that they put up the normative boundary conditions for such principles.
      PubDate: 2024-07-02
       
  • Nonexistent Objects and Their Semantic and Ontological Dependence on
           Referential Acts

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      Abstract: This paper argues for a distinction between fictional characters, as parts of intentionally created abstract artifacts, and intentional objects, as nonexistent objects generated by referential acts that fail to refer. It argues that intentional objects as the nonexistent objects of imagination and other objectual attitudes are well-reflected in natural language, though in a highly restricted way, reflecting their ontological dependence on referential acts. The paper elaborates how that ontological dependence can be understood.
      PubDate: 2024-07-01
       
  • Whence Correctness'

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      Abstract: Abstract We know that lots of things are correct. (Helping people in need is correct. Moving the bishop diagonally when playing chess is correct. Adding 7 to 5 to make 12 is correct.) But where does this correctness come from' I argue that correctness is best seen as something we humans created in the process of forming our societies. This, admittedly, is speculative; but aside of this, there are facts that are more than speculations. In particular, I argue that our correctness is based on normative attitudes, though these often determine only the criteria of correctness, letting the criteria to then determine what is correct independently of our will. Thus it holds both that correctness is wholly our creation and that it is independent of us in the sense that things may be correct even if we do not know that they are (or, indeed, think them incorrect).
      PubDate: 2024-06-19
       
  • Correction: Digital Slot Machines: Social Media Platforms as Attentional
           Scaffolds

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      PubDate: 2024-06-10
       
  • Naturalised Inferentialism and the Incompleteness Problem

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      Abstract: Abstract The paper argues that the naturalised version of semantic inferentialism advanced by Jaroslav Peregrin faces a problem which, following Michael Devitt, I call the incompleteness problem. The main issue has to do with how, according to inferentialism, language is connected to the world. My main claim is that Peregrin’s Protagorean account of correctness is in tension with the idea, made also by Robert Brandom, that language is embodied in the world analogically to how physical objects are embodied in games like football. Against this, I show the two are in fact importantly disanalogical. To solve the incompleteness problem, I argue that naturalised inferentialism should learn the central lessons of semantic externalism, namely that the connection between language and the world must be fundamentally external to the mind, or in Peregrin’s case, to the society of normative attitudes.
      PubDate: 2024-05-31
       
  • The Crisis of Romantic Knowledge: The Role of Information and Ignorance in
           Times of Romantic Abundance

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      Abstract: Abstract Most crises of knowledge stem from lack of information. The current crisis of romantic knowledge stems from the opposite reason: too much information. The abundance of romantic information is the main reason for this crisis, making the romantic realm more complex, diverse and flexible than ever. In recent times, there has become a significantly greater emphasis on romantic ignorance. Romantic abundance facilitates finding a romantic (and sexual) partner, but is an obstacle for initiating and maintaining enduring, profound romantic relationships. A major optimal tool for overcoming these difficulties is a combination of intuition and deliberate thinking. The abundance of romantic information does not make adequate knowledge easy to obtain, and conversely has created a far more complex minefield to navigate. Nevertheless, our contemporary society has enabled the most flourishing romantic environment in the history of love.
      PubDate: 2024-05-31
       
  • Introduction: Affectivity and Technology - Philosophical Explorations

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      PubDate: 2024-05-24
       
  • Are Works of Art Affective Artifacts' If Not, What Sort of Artifacts
           Are They'

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      Abstract: Abstract Works of art are usually meant to elicit psychological effects from their audiences whereas paradigmatic technical artifacts such as hammers or cars are rather meant to produce physical effects when used. This suggests that works of art and technical artifacts are sharply different entities. However, recent developments in the cognitive sciences and the philosophy of technology have individuated special artifacts, namely cognitive and affective artifacts, which also generate psychological effects. In particular, affective artifacts, which have the capacity to alter the affective condition of agents, seem to share crucial features with works of art. Can we subsume works of art under that kind' I will argue that we cannot. Still, comparing art with affective artifacts will help us to clarify the relationship between art and technology, and to introduce a new category, namely the experiential artifact, which can properly encompass works of art.
      PubDate: 2024-05-15
       
  • Introduction: New Perspectives on Joint Attention

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      PubDate: 2024-05-01
       
  • Psychology, Equality, and the Forgetting of Motivations

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      Abstract: Abstract I hope to demonstrate the value of a close reading Williams’s ‘Internal and External Reasons’, and to provide a theory of error regarding the substantial body of work which seeks to, in various ways, defang the essay. I do this by providing some historical context for the paper, and sketching where, historically, internalism and certain sorts of moral realism became separated. It will likely not surprise the reader when I suggest that the modern scientific worldview has an important place in the discussion of the notion of external reasons. As mind, motivation, and perception have become less opaque to us, certain avenues for explaining our reasons have come closer to relying on hypotheses which may turn out to be falsifiable, and have thus been abandoned. What may come as more of a surprise is my suggestion that modern egalitarianism is an important factor as well. I suggest that impersonal reason has been used as an (implausible, but perhaps well-intentioned) alternative to the practice of some inflicting their reasons on others.
      PubDate: 2024-05-01
       
  • Moral Obligation as a Conclusive Reason: On Bernard Williams’
           Critique of the Morality System

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      Abstract: Abstract Bernard Williams’ critique of the morality system, as illustrated in his reading of Aeschylus’ Agamemnon, is intended to show both that real moral conflicts can arise, and that a moral obligation is merely one reason among others and can be defeated by the thick concepts of a shared ethical life. In response, I want to advance two lines of argument. First, when Williams argues that a moral obligation can be the locus of moral conflict, a further step is required to explain why one should feel regret for not acting on a defeated reason. Second, Williams presupposes that, when a conflict is resolved, the conclusive reason will be a thick ethical concept, but there is no compelling justification for that assumption.
      PubDate: 2024-05-01
       
  • Agent-Regret, Finitude, and the Irrevocability of the Past

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      Abstract: Abstract In ‘Moral Luck,’ Bernard Williams famously argued that “there is a particularly important species of regret, which I shall call ‘agent-regret,’ which a person can feel only towards his past actions.” Much subsequent commentary has focused on Williams’s claim that agent-regret is not necessarily restricted to voluntary actions, and questioned whether such an attitude could be rationally justified. This focus, however, obscures a more fundamental set of questions raised by Williams’s discussion: what is the role in our moral psychology of evaluative attitudes that relate essentially to past exercises of our agency—occurrences which, by their very nature, cannot be repeated' On a standard conception, regret is directed principally towards actions that resulted from suboptimal deliberation. On this view, the main point of regret is to guide us away from similar poor decisions in the future. But Williams’s key insight in ‘Moral Luck,’ I argue, is that there is a mode of evaluation of one’s past actions and decisions that does not track considerations one could and should have been responsive to at the time, and is for this reason essentially retrospective. From this perspective, the full significance of regret cannot be captured in terms of a disposition to deliberate better in the future. Rather, the particular kind of painful of consciousness of the past embodied in regret amounts to a reflective, and essentially backward-looking, insight into the contingency and finitude of our own agency—that I am a particular person leading a particular life, and that the possibility of leading a different life is now gone forever. I end by making some speculative comments about the intractable question whether it is ultimately good or desirable to be disposed to regret one’s past mistakes.
      PubDate: 2024-05-01
       
  • Integrity as Incentive-Insensitivity: Moral Incapacity Means One
           can’t be Bought

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      Abstract: Abstract This paper develops Bernard Williams’s claim that moral incapacity – i.e., one’s inability to consider an action as one that could be performed intentionally – ‘is proof against reward’. It argues that we should re-construe the notion of moral incapacity in terms of self-identification with a project, commitment, value, etc. in a way that renders this project constitutive of one’s self-identity. This consists in one’s being insensitive to incentives to reconsider or get oneself to change one’s identification with this project. More precisely, self-identification with a project implies that no state-given reason can justify for oneself reconsidering, or getting oneself to revise, or abandon one’s identification with that project. This view ties together integrity and self-identification, and avoids problems common to competing views: it avoids regress problems faced by hierarchical theories of identification; it demonstrates that integrationist views of identification overlook the fact that a deep, well-integrated attitude may fail to be incentive-insensitive; and it helps explain what’s wrong with ‘perverse’ cases, where one values acting in a way that one does not all things consider value. It also improves on Williams’s own view, by construing moral incapacity not merely in terms of one’s incapacity to perform an action (that undermines one’s project and thus violates one’s integrity), but also in terms of one’s incapacity to reconsider one’s commitment (to said project).
      PubDate: 2024-05-01
       
  • Williams’ Relativism and the Moral Point of View: A Challenge by
           Cora Diamond

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      Abstract: Abstract There are similarities between Bernard Williams and Cora Diamond as moral philosophers: both their moral philosophies are marked by an engagement with the question of what it is like to be a human being, and both are engaged with experience more than theory. Still, such similarities rest on very different philosophical grounds. In this article, I consider whether a Nietzschean (Williams) and a Wittgensteinian (Diamond) could ever converge on a characterization of the ‘moral point of view’ as this involves views on life, thought, and language. I argue that divergences between Williams and Diamond persist, a very important one concerning relativism: whereas Diamond adumbrates a Wittgensteinian way out of relativism, it remains a last word for Williams.
      PubDate: 2024-05-01
       
  • Beyond the Ancient and the Modern: Thinking the Tragic with Williams and
           Kitto

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      Abstract: Abstract The philosophy of Bernard Williams, recognised as a prominent expression of ethical thought, presents an intense dialogue with ancient Greek tragic culture. Combining erudition and elegance, Williams evokes Greek tragedies to discuss modern ethical ideas and conceptions. Our article intends to consider Williams’ thought from a cultural point of view: we propose analysing Williams’ cultural methodology, which may be described as a way of thinking beyond the traditional dichotomies between the ancient and the modern, especially concerning the notion of the tragic. Accordingly, we shall examine the affinities between ancient and modern tragic cultures by identifying common narrative and poetical elements. To do so, we shall consider the interpretation of Hamlet, developed by the classicist scholar H.D.F. Kitto. In Form and Meaning in Drama: A Study of Six Greek Plays and of “Hamlet” (1956), Kitto proposes reading Hamlet in close alliance with Oedipus Tyrannus. Kitto maintains that both tragedies are poetical expressions of a shared tragic element: miasma, or “pollution”, a concept thoroughly treated by Williams in the third chapter of Shame and Necessity. Our article aims to combine Williams’ cultural methodology—we may call it the deconstruction of the repeated theoretical frameworks regarding the differences between the ancient and the modern—and Kitto’s reading of Hamlet in line with Oedipus Tyrannus, which may be understood as an illustration of the persistence of common tragic elements beyond time and the historical separation of cultural periods. Our perspective shall be both cultural and aesthetical.
      PubDate: 2024-05-01
       
  • Bernard Williams and Alasdair MacIntyre on Authenticity

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      Abstract: Abstract The formation of the moral point of view in Bernard Williams’ work might be understood as taking place between two central concepts: the individual and the community. It is through the tension between these two poles that some form of knowledge is acquired. In Williams’ work, the individual virtue takes the name of authenticity, and the communitarian knowledge is, importantly, ethical confidence. A philosophical peer of Williams, Alasdair MacIntyre, has dealt with the same question, although in very different ways. They are usually taken to be philosophical rivals in many respects, especially regarding their political views, their views on religion and their thoughts on Aristotle. But if we look deeper into their claims, we should discover that not only do they have similar ethical concerns, as their responses to those concerns are not, in essence, as different as they seem. My purpose with this paper, however, is not to deny the important differences between the two philosophers, but rather to make conspicuous Williams’ demanding ideas on the formation of the moral point of view by (1) connecting significant portions of his work and (2) contrasting his ideas with that of a philosophical “rival,” namely by interpreting MacIntyre’s own declarations on Williams’ work. It will stand out that both philosophers’ motivation to do ethics is to grant an equilibrium between the individual conscience and the moral knowledge that is acquired within a community.
      PubDate: 2024-04-20
      DOI: 10.1007/s11245-024-10049-4
       
  • Is There Such a Thing as Joint Attention to the Past'

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      Abstract: Abstract Joint attention is recognised by many philosophers and psychologists as a fundamental cornerstone of our engagement with one another and the world around us. The most familiar paradigm of joint attention is joint perceptual—specifically visual—attention to an object in the present environment. However, some recent discussions have focused on a potentially different form of joint attention: namely, ‘joint reminiscing’ conversations in which two or more people discuss something in the past which they both remember. These exchanges are in some ways comparable to joint perceptual attention to something present, and have been characterised by some as a form of joint attention to the past. In this paper, I will assess the prospects for characterising joint reminiscing as a genuine form of joint attention to the past, as understood on the model of joint perceptual attention to something present. My conclusions will be tentative, and my primary aim will be to explore how different commitments regarding the nature of both joint attention and episodic memory give rise to different possibilities for characterising joint reminiscing as a distinctive form of collective engagement with the past. I will suggest that joint reminiscing is unlike ordinary joint attention at least insofar as joint reminiscing trades on the participants’ mutual recognition of one another as having been present at an earlier experience. This is connected with joint reminiscing’s social function, and its role in facilitating the special kind of relationship conveyed by the idea of knowing a person.
      PubDate: 2024-04-09
      DOI: 10.1007/s11245-024-10023-0
       
 
JournalTOCs
School of Mathematical and Computer Sciences
Heriot-Watt University
Edinburgh, EH14 4AS, UK
Email: journaltocs@hw.ac.uk
Tel: +00 44 (0)131 4513762
 


Your IP address: 3.92.91.54
 
Home (Search)
API
About JournalTOCs
News (blog, publications)
JournalTOCs on Twitter   JournalTOCs on Facebook

JournalTOCs © 2009-
JournalTOCs
 
 

 A  B  C  D  E  F  G  H  I  J  K  L  M  N  O  P  Q  R  S  T  U  V  W  X  Y  Z  

  Subjects -> PHILOSOPHY (Total: 762 journals)
The end of the list has been reached or no journals were found for your choice.
Similar Journals
Similar Journals
HOME > Browse the 73 Subjects covered by JournalTOCs  
SubjectTotal Journals
 
 
JournalTOCs
School of Mathematical and Computer Sciences
Heriot-Watt University
Edinburgh, EH14 4AS, UK
Email: journaltocs@hw.ac.uk
Tel: +00 44 (0)131 4513762
 


Your IP address: 3.92.91.54
 
Home (Search)
API
About JournalTOCs
News (blog, publications)
JournalTOCs on Twitter   JournalTOCs on Facebook

JournalTOCs © 2009-