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  Subjects -> PHILOSOPHY (Total: 762 journals)
Showing 1 - 135 of 135 Journals sorted by number of followers
Philosophical Review     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 72)
Ethics     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 69)
European Journal of Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 68)
Journal of Political Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 65)
Mind     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 64)
Australasian Journal of Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 58)
Philosophy & Public Affairs     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 57)
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 52)
Contemporary Political Theory     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 52)
Nous     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 52)
Journal of the History of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 48)
Philosophical Quarterly     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 47)
British Journal for the History of Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 43)
Journal of Applied Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 43)
American Journal of Theology & Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 42)
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 40)
Journal of Moral Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 37)
Analysis     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 37)
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 36)
Philosophy of Science     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 33)
Journal of Medical Ethics     Partially Free   (Followers: 32)
Erkenntnis     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 31)
Philosophy and Literature     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 31)
Continental Philosophy Review     Partially Free   (Followers: 28)
Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 28)
Journal of Social Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 27)
Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 27)
Constellations     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 27)
Canadian Journal of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 25)
Social Philosophy and Policy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 25)
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 24)
British Journal of Aesthetics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 23)
Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 23)
Philosophy & Social Criticism     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 22)
Philosophical Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 22)
Linguistics and Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 22)
Philosophy and Rhetoric     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 21)
The Heythrop Journal     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 21)
Philosophy Compass     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 19)
BMC Medical Ethics     Open Access   (Followers: 19)
Biology and Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 18)
Journal of Medical Ethics and History of Medicine     Open Access   (Followers: 18)
Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 17)
Philosophers' Imprint     Open Access   (Followers: 17)
Jurisprudence     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 17)
Assuming Gender     Open Access   (Followers: 16)
Mouseion: Journal of the Classical Association of Canada     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 16)
Journal of the Philosophy of History     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 16)
Pragmatics & Cognition     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 16)
Philosophy East and West     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 15)
International Studies in the Philosophy of Science     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 15)
Bioethics Research Notes     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 15)
Midwest Studies In Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 14)
Journal of Media Ethics : Exploring Questions of Media Morality     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 14)
Episteme     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 14)
Phronesis : A journal for Ancient Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 13)
Social Epistemology: A Journal of Knowledge, Culture and Policy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 13)
Philosophy & Technology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 13)
Review of Philosophy and Psychology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 13)
Pragmatics and Society     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 12)
Reformed Theological Review, The     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 12)
Ethical Perspectives     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 12)
Journal of Indian Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 12)
Journal of Global Ethics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 12)
Journal of Chinese Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 12)
Philosophy of Photography     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 11)
Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 11)
Open Journal of Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 11)
Utilitas     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 11)
Estudos Bíblicos     Open Access   (Followers: 11)
Dao : A Journal of Comparative Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 11)
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 10)
Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 10)
Metaphor and Symbol     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 10)
Polis : The Journal of the Society for Greek Political Thought     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 10)
HTS Theological Studies     Open Access   (Followers: 9)
Journal of Philosophical Logic     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9)
Film-Philosophy Journal     Open Access   (Followers: 9)
Journal of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 9)
Research in Phenomenology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9)
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 9)
Philosophical Books     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8)
Philosophia     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8)
Diogenes     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8)
Philosophical Perspectives     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8)
Myth & Symbol     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8)
Nordic Journal of Aesthetics     Open Access   (Followers: 7)
Journal of Speculative Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 7)
Metaphilosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7)
African Journal of Business Ethics     Open Access   (Followers: 7)
Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7)
SubStance     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 7)
Contagion : Journal of Violence, Mimesis, and Culture     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 7)
Philosophical Issues     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7)
Contributions to the History of Concepts     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 7)
International Journal of Philosophical Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7)
The Southern Journal of Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6)
Philosophical Explorations: An International Journal for the Philosophy of Mind and Action     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6)
Axiomathes     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6)
Philosophical Investigations     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6)
Contemporary Chinese Thought     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 6)
Dialogue Canadian Philosophical Review/Revue canadienne de philosophie     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 6)
History and Philosophy of Logic     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6)
Think     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 6)
Philosophical Magazine Letters     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6)
Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 6)
Journal of Critical Realism     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5)
Journal of Empirical Research on Human Research Ethics     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5)
Endeavour     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5)
Australasian Catholic Record, The     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5)
Journal of Nietzsche Studies     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5)
Critical Horizons     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5)
Aisthesis     Open Access   (Followers: 5)
Philosophical Papers     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5)
Review of Contemporary Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5)
International Journal of the Platonic Tradition     Open Access   (Followers: 5)
Zeitschrift für Religions- und Geistesgeschichte     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5)
Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
Journal of Theoretical & Philosophical Psychology     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
The Philosophical Forum     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
Church Heritage     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
Franciscan Studies     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
South African Journal of Philosophy = Suid-Afrikaanse Tydskrif vir Wysbegeerte     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Hume Studies     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
Philosophy in Review     Open Access   (Followers: 4)
Australian Humanist, The     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Journal of Religion and Business Ethics     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
Studia Logica     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
The Pluralist     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Russell : the Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Studies in Philology     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
CR : The New Centennial Review     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Utopian Studies     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Kantian Review     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Bulletin de Philosophie Medievale     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Topoi     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Bijdragen     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
International Journal for the Study of Skepticism     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
International Journal of Žižek Studies     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Empedocles : European Journal for the Philosophy of Communication     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Horizonte : Revista de Estudos de Teologia e Ciências da Religião     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Cultura : International Journal of Philosophy of Culture and Axiology     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Erasmus Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Socioaffective Neuroscience and Psychology     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Between the Species     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Journal of Friends of Lutheran Archives     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Journal of Scottish Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Poiesis & Praxis : International Journal of Technology Assessment and Ethics of Science     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Journal of Aesthetic Education     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Sartre Studies International     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Quaestio     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Grazer Philosophische Studien     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Philosophy & Theory in Biology     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Australian Journal of Parapsychology     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Éthique publique     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Noesis     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Philosophia Scientiæ     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Revue Philosophique de Louvain     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Nóema     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
International Journal of Social Quality     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofía     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
PAN: Philosophy Activism Nature     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Temporalités     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Le Portique     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Ethische Perspectieven     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Journal of Humanistic Mathematics     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Laval théologique et philosophique     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Revue d’études benthamiennes     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Eleutheria     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Husserl Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Veritas : Revista de Filosofí­a y Teología     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Hobbes Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Collingwood and British Idealism Studies     Full-text available via subscription  
Grotiana     Hybrid Journal  
Signos Filosóficos     Open Access  
Eidos     Open Access  
Cinta de Moebio     Open Access  
Cuyo Anuario de Filosofía Argentina y Americana     Open Access  
Tópicos. Revista de Filosofía de Santa Fe     Open Access  
Rhuthmos     Open Access  
Philosophiques     Open Access  
Ramon Llull Journal of Applied Ethics     Open Access  
Studia Philosophica Estonica     Open Access  
Synthesis (La Plata)     Open Access  
Revista de Filosofia     Open Access  
Alpha (Osorno)     Open Access  
Circe de clásicos y modernos     Open Access  
Estudios de Filosofía Práctica e Historia de las Ideas     Open Access  
Doctor virtualis     Open Access  
Humanidades Médicas     Open Access  
Methodos     Open Access  
Labyrinthe     Open Access  
Astérion     Open Access  
Trans/Form/Ação - Revista de Filosofia     Open Access  
Russian Studies in Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription  

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Similar Journals
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Topoi
Journal Prestige (SJR): 0.374
Citation Impact (citeScore): 1
Number of Followers: 3  
 
  Hybrid Journal Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles)
ISSN (Print) 1572-8749 - ISSN (Online) 0167-7411
Published by Springer-Verlag Homepage  [2467 journals]
  • On Certainty on the Foundations of History as a Discipline

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      Abstract: Abstract Wittgenstein had little to say directly on philosophy of history. But some pertinent remarks in On Certainty have received little attention, apart from in Elizabeth Anscombe's short article on Hume and Julius Caesar. That article acknowledges its debt to On Certainty, which responses to Anscombe have failed to recognise. Wittgenstein focuses in On Certainty on apparently empirical propositions that seem to be certainties, but in fact form a rule-like framework for judging. I have called these Moorean propositions, and the present article develops the suggestion that history as a discipline rests on them. The result is a qualification of empiricism in philosophy of history.
      PubDate: 2022-12-03
       
  • Why Naturalism cannot (Merely) be an Attitude

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      Abstract: Abstract Varying forms of ontological and methodological naturalism are among the most popular theses in contemporary philosophy. However, each of these theses faces a different dilemma: ontological naturalism is famously challenged by Hempel’s dilemma, while methodological naturalism faces issues regarding its coherence. Some prominent naturalists (Elpidorou and Dove 2018, Ney 2009, Rea 2002) have suggested to circumvent these respective dilemmas by reconceiving naturalism as an attitude (rather than a thesis). This paper argues that such attitude accounts are unsuccessful: naturalism as an attitude either collapses into a thesis again or is rationally unjustifiable. This paper closes by suggesting two options a naturalist has remaining. Either a naturalist can reasonably choose to revert to defending naturalism as a thesis; given that naturalism receives substantial support, it is not unlikely that a solution to the problems encountered by naturalism qua thesis is forthcoming. Or a naturalist might simply want to embrace an a-rational form of naturalism as a worldview, as suggested by Kim (2003) and Stoljar (2010) (and earlier by thinkers like Dilthey 1960 and Jaspers1925).
      PubDate: 2022-12-03
       
  • A Comfortable Sureness: Knowledge, Animality and Conceptual
           Investigations in Wittgenstein’s On Certainty

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      Abstract: Abstract This essay analyses some remarks of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty in which Wittgenstein compares human behaviour to that of animals and says he wants to consider man as an animal. The essay’s main purpose is to show that these remarks are essentially understood as part and parcel of what Wittgenstein calls “conceptual investigations” and that, consequently, they give little support to On Certainty’s naturalistic interpretations. A second purpose of the essay is to show that Wittgenstein does not intend to combat the use of “I know” in contexts such as those evoked by Moore; rather he wants to draw attention to the different ways in which we say or can say “I know.”
      PubDate: 2022-11-28
       
  • Degrees of Objectivity' Mathemata and Social Objects

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      Abstract: A down-to-earth admission of abstract objects can be based on detailed explanation of where the objectivity of mathematics comes from, and how a ‘thin’ notion of object emerges from objective mathematical discourse or practices. We offer a sketch of arguments concerning both points, as a basis for critical scrutiny of the idea that mathematical and social objects are essentially of the same kind—which is criticized. Some authors have proposed that mathematical entities are indeed institutional objects, a product of our collective imposition of function onto reality (the phrase comes from Searle) and of surrogation or hypostasis. Yet there are significant disanalogies between the typical social objects and mathemata, on which basis I argue that one should make a clear distinction between both. The comparison of mathematical with social objects helps understanding how non-physical objects can figure prominently in our explanations of reality. Yet mathematical objects have a different kind of cognitive grounding, and the more elementary of them emerge under relatively very simple sociocultural conditions. The differences are also reflected in the wide scope of use of mathematical concepts, and the much higher degree of variation found among social objects. On the basis of all of these features, I defend the thesis that one can significantly distinguish degrees of objectivity, and I use the distinction to articulate a graded ontology where one can locate the different kinds of mathematical and social objects.
      PubDate: 2022-11-24
       
  • Must Skepticism Remain Refuted' Inheriting Skepticism with Cavell and
           Levinas

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      Abstract: Abstract This article defends Cavell and Levinas’ view that anti-skeptical arguments cannot attain universal assent. In the first half of the article, I argue that Conant’s reading of Cavell is mistaken in two respects: he ignores Cavell’s inheritance of Kant as well as the differences Cavell emphasizes between external world and other minds skepticism. In the second half of the paper, I examine affinities between Cavell and Levinas’ thought, viz., acknowledging the facticity of the other and their remarks on skepticism. I close the paper by noting three metaphysical and ethical truths that arise from Cavell’s way with skepticism.
      PubDate: 2022-11-22
       
  • Introduction: Groundless Grounds and Hinges. Wittgenstein's On
           Certainty within the Philosophical Tradition

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      PubDate: 2022-11-22
       
  • Wittgenstein on Dreaming and Skepticism

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      Abstract: Abstract In this paper I aim to elucidate Wittgenstein’s claim that the so-called dream argument is senseless. Unlike other interpreters, who understand the sentence “I am dreaming” as contradictory or self-defeating, I intend to elucidate in what sense one should understand it as senseless or, more precisely, as nonsensical. In this sense, I propose to understand the above-mentioned claim in light of Wittgenstein’s criticism of skepticism from the Tractatus logico-philosophicus to his last writings. I intend to show that the words “I am dreaming” are nonsensical in the same sense as the alleged proposition “There are physical objects” or the expression of doubt about the existence of external objects.
      PubDate: 2022-11-21
       
  • On Certainty, Change, and “Mathematical Hinges”

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      Abstract: Abstract Annalisa Coliva (Int J Study Skept 10(3–4):346–366, 2020) asks, “Are there mathematical hinges'” I argue here, against Coliva’s own conclusion, that there are. I further claim that this affirmative answer allows a case to be made for taking the concept of a hinge to be a useful and general-purpose tool for studying mathematical practice in its real complexity. Seeing how Wittgenstein can, and why he would, countenance mathematical hinges additionally gives us a deeper understanding of some of his latest thoughts on mathematics. For example, a view of how mathematical hinges relate to Wittgenstein’s well-known river-bed analogy enables us to see how his way of thinking about mathematics can account nicely for a “dynamics of change” within mathematical research—something his philosophy of mathematics has been accused of missing (e.g., by Robert Ackermann (Wittgenstein’s city, The University of Massachusetts Press, Amherst, 1988) and Mark Wilson (Wandering significance: an essay on conceptual behavior, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006). Finally, the perspective on mathematical hinges ultimately arrived at will be seen to provide us with illuminating examples of how our conceptual choices and theories can be ungrounded but nevertheless the right ones (in a sense to be explained).
      PubDate: 2022-11-18
       
  • Wittgenstein, Quasi-fideism, and Scepticism

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      Abstract: Abstract In the discussion of certainties, or ‘hinges’, in Wittgenstein’s On Certainty some of the examples that Wittgenstein uses are religious ones. He remarks on how a child might be raised so that they ‘swallow down’ belief in God (§107) and in discussing the role of persuasion in disagreements he asks us to think of the case of missionaries converting natives (§612). In the past decade Duncan Pritchard has made a case for an account of the rationality of religious belief inspired by On Certainty which he calls ‘quasi-fideism’. Pritchard argues that religious beliefs are just like ordinary non-religious beliefs in presupposing fundamental arational commitments. However, Modesto Gómez-Alonso has recently argued that there are significant differences between the kinds of ‘hinges’ discussed in Wittgenstein’s On Certainty and religious beliefs such that we should expect an account of rationality in religion to be quite different to the account of rational practices and their foundations that we find in Wittgenstein’s work. Fundamental religious commitments are, as Wittgenstein said, in the foreground of the religious believer’s life whereas hinge commitments are said to be in the background. People are passionately committed to their religious beliefs but it is not at all clear that people are passionately committed to hinges such as that ‘I have two hands’. I argue here that although there are differences between religious beliefs and many of the hinge-commitments discussed in On Certainty religious beliefs are nonetheless hinge-like. Gómez-Alonso’s criticisms of Pritchard mischaracterise his views and something like Pritchard’s quasi-fideism is the correct account of the rationality of religious belief.
      PubDate: 2022-11-14
       
  • Lunacy and Scepticism: Notes on the Logic of Doubt Concerning the
           Existence of an External World

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      Abstract: Abstract This article develops a logical (or semantic) response to scepticism about the existence of an external world. Specifically, it is argued that any doubt about the existence of an external world can be proved to be false, but whatever appears to be doubt about the existence of an external world that cannot be proved to be false is nonsense, insofar as it must rely on the assertion of something that is logically impossible. The article further suggests that both G. E. Moore and Ludwig Wittgenstein worked towards the same solution but left their work unfinished.
      PubDate: 2022-11-08
       
  • Caught in the Language-Game

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      Abstract: Abstract In this paper, I first introduce the main motivations for the internalism/externalism dichotomy in epistemology and explore different accounts of epistemic justification, mostly externalist, arising from Dretske’s relevant alternatives theory of knowledge, namely the reliabilism of Goldman and Nozick, the contextualism of Cohen and DeRose, which is governed by fallibilist standards, and Lewis’ version of contextualism, to which infallibilist standards apply. I then argue that Wittgenstein critically anticipates many of these strategies and tries to avoid such a dichotomy by assuming a form of infallibilism which is neither internal nor external. After introducing the idea of a Wittgensteinian hinge epistemology and how it responds to the problem of epistemic justification and to the particular challenge posed by radical scepticism, I defend the view that infallibility is logically unavoidable when we realize that we are always trapped in one language-game or another, even if we constantly switch between language-games.
      PubDate: 2022-11-08
       
  • Correction: Are Wittgenstein’s Hinges Rational World-Pictures' The
           Groundlessness Theory Reconsidered

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      PubDate: 2022-11-04
       
  • The Systematicity of Davidson’s Anti-skeptical Arguments

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      Abstract: Abstract Donald Davidson contributed more deeply to our understanding of language, thought, and reality than perhaps any other recent philosopher. His discussions of skepticism are sometimes seen as peripheral to those contributions. As I read him, Davidson argued against three skeptical worries. First, beliefs are true or false relative to a conceptual scheme. Second, beliefs generally are false. Third, other minds and an external world do not exist. Call those worries ‘conceptual relativism’, ‘falsidicalism’, and ‘solipsism’, respectively. I investigate how Davidson’s arguments are connected. I then show that those connections are so systematic that Davidson ultimately offers a single, master argument with two premises. Premise one is that I think. Premise two is an application of his account of radical interpretation. Focusing on the systematicity of Davidson’s anti-skeptical arguments demonstrates that discussions of skepticism were more central to his views than often appreciated and shines fresh light on his project overall.
      PubDate: 2022-11-03
       
  • Stop Doubting with Descartes

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      Abstract: Abstract Did Descartes manage to overcome the skeptics' If we understand “overcome” in the sense of “refute,” the answer is no, since his hyperbolic doubt harbors several blind spots and is, therefore, not as radical as is commonly argued. In this way, the victory of the cogito is perhaps less decisive and fruitful than it is claimed. If we understand “overcome” in the sense of “remove” or “move beyond,” the answer is yes. Descartes has overcome skepticism, but at the cost of a decision, a sort of bet made in favor of reason based on a confidence in the human mind that is never really subverted. This faith in reason, truth, and specific epistemological principles in Descartes’ philosophy constitute what Wittgenstein calls “hinges,” which are indispensable for doubting and searching for truth. In this sense, Descartes’ anti-skepticism is more a confidence in reason in order to save the possibility of science than the result of a logical refutation.
      PubDate: 2022-11-03
       
  • Introduction: The Role of Emotions in Epistemic Practices and Communities

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      PubDate: 2022-10-29
       
  • Religious Hinges: Some Historical Precursors

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      Abstract: Abstract Recently, hinge epistemologists have applied Wittgenstein’s metaphor of hinges to religious belief. The most prominent proposal in this context is Pritchard’s “quasi-fideism”. This paper examines some historical precursors of the notion of religious hinges, with the aim of shedding more light on it. After outlining the framework of hinge epistemology and its application to religious belief, I briefly examine the views of Thomas Reid and John Henry Newman as acknowledged forerunners of this framework (or cognate views). Next, I turn to two hitherto unacknowledged forerunners, the pragmatists William James and Charles S. Peirce. I then focus on some insights that the pragmatists offer. On this basis, I conclude that religious beliefs are a special class of hinges. As such, while they can be defended through hinge epistemology, they cannot constitute a model through which we can interpret the nature of hinges in general.
      PubDate: 2022-10-29
       
  • Are Wittgenstein’s Hinges Rational World-Pictures' The
           Groundlessness Theory Reconsidered

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      Abstract: Abstract Some philosophers have argued that Wittgenstein’s hinges, the centrepiece of his book On Certainty, are the “ungrounded ground” on which knowledge rests. It is usually understood by this that hinges provide a foundation for knowledge without being themselves epistemically warranted. In fact, Wittgenstein articulates that hinges lack any truth-value and are neither justified nor unjustified. This inevitably places them wholly outside the categorial framework of JTB epistemology. What I call the “groundlessness interpretation”, inspired by OC 166, understands the fundamental pieces of our cognitive scaffolding this way. The view has been largely successful. I argue that this interpretation is incomplete for two basic reasons: first, it is not based on undisputed evidence; second, by assuming that hinges are committed to reality by epistemic fiat, it looks as if Wittgenstein is asking us to blindly trust them regardless of their actual content. Contrary to this, I argue that Wittgenstein describes hinges as illuminating world-pictures that reflect reality and are answerable to facts in a derivate way. As the book shows, hinges originate in our engagement with reality and, while considered unquestionable, could be challenged, reassessed, and replaced by new ones. This indicates that hinges are both the result of knowledge-acquisition and somewhat continuous with one’s set of beliefs. It follows that hinges are ultimately rational, and so, apt instruments to confront scepticism.
      PubDate: 2022-10-20
       
  • Correction: Introduction: What’s so Special About Faces' Visages at
           the Crossroad Between Philosophy, Semiotics and Cognition

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      PubDate: 2022-10-17
       
  • Wittgenstein and the Duty to Believe

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      Abstract: It is generally assumed that hinge-commitments are deprived of an epistemically normative structure, and yet, that although groundless, the acceptance of Wittgensteinian certainties is still rational. The problem comes from the intellectualist view of hinge-approvals which many recent proposals advance—one that falls short of the necessities and impossibilities pertaining to what would be the right description of how it is like to approve of hinges. I will raise the Newman-inspired worry as how to cash the abstract acceptance of principles of enquiry into real assent, as well as the question about how to extend normativity all the way back to foundations. It is my aim here to argue that ethical normativity is the only kind of normativity capable to ground the rationality of hinges. In defence of this, I will draw some consequences from Ernest Sosa’s claim that hinges about the external world are logically related to the cogito.
      PubDate: 2022-09-13
      DOI: 10.1007/s11245-022-09828-8
       
  • Emotional Environments: Selective Permeability, Political Affordances and
           Normative Settings

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      Abstract: Abstract I begin this article with an increasingly accepted claim: that emotions lend differential weight to states of affairs, helping us conceptually carve the world and make rational decisions. I then develop a more controversial assertion: that environments have non-subjective emotional qualities, which organize behavior and help us make sense of the world. I defend this from ecological and related embodied standpoints that take properties to be interrelational outcomes. I also build on conceptions of experience as a cultural phenomenon, one that coheres around shared environmental contours and public emotional concerns, introducing normative constraints (or what might be called “world grammars”). Endorsing this outlook suggests an argument for the view that cultural spaces have affectively charged, non-subjective, normative openings and closures. These openings and closures engender selectively permeable barriers which cordon space without physically preventing entry, as seen with decorative half walls and elevation changes. An area with such barriers may look emotionally hostile to, say, the dispirited homeless who are in fact less welcome there. Outcomes like these might be thought of as “political affordances.” These affordances can be regarded as normative openings and closures that implicitly filter, and hence segregate, according to various social divisions. Although registering political affordances requires more than the detection of ambient arrays, the notion retains core Gibsonian ideas: that affordances are values, that these values are linked with how a space can be used, and that the existence and nature of such affordances is not a subjective matter.
      PubDate: 2022-09-02
      DOI: 10.1007/s11245-022-09812-2
       
 
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