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  Subjects -> PHILOSOPHY (Total: 762 journals)
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Philosophical Quarterly
Journal Prestige (SJR): 1.692
Citation Impact (citeScore): 1
Number of Followers: 47  
 
  Hybrid Journal Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles)
ISSN (Print) 0031-8094 - ISSN (Online) 1467-9213
Published by Oxford University Press Homepage  [424 journals]
  • Metaphysical Overdetermination

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      Pages: 1 - 23
      Abstract: AbstractIt is widely recognized by proponents of the notion that grounding can be, indeed is, overdetermined. Moreover, it seems safe to suppose that something of a consensus has emerged: grounding is overdetermined and there is nothing about it that we ought to find concerning. Not only is the overdetermination apparently not problematic, metaphysically speaking, but that grounding is overdetermined is not problematic, conceptually speaking, either. From a small sampling of alleged cases, however, no such conclusions can responsibly be drawn. And without an account of when a fact is technically overdetermined, we are unable to reasonably answer questions about the acceptability of that overdetermination either. In this paper, I attempt to understand when a fact is technically metaphysically overdetermined. I argue that such an exploration reveals that nothing as regards the overdetermination of grounding is straightforward, and that the phenomenon is deserving of much more philosophical attention.
      PubDate: Mon, 04 Jul 2022 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/pq/pqac018
      Issue No: Vol. 73, No. 1 (2022)
       
  • I Hear You Feel Confident

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      Pages: 24 - 43
      Abstract: AbstractHere I explore a new line of evidence for belief–credence dualism, the thesis that beliefs and credences are distinct and equally fundamental types of mental states. Despite considerable recent disagreement over this thesis, little attention has been paid in philosophy to differences in how our mindreading systems represent the beliefs and credences of others. Fascinatingly, the systems we rely on to accurately and efficiently track others’ mental states appear to function like belief–credence dualists: Credence is tracked like an emotional state, composed of both representational and affective content, whereas belief is tracked like a bare representational state with no affective component. I argue on a preliminary basis that, in this particular case, the mechanics of mentalizing likely pick out a genuine affective dimension to credence that is absent for belief, further strengthening the converging case for belief–credence dualism.
      PubDate: Tue, 08 Mar 2022 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/pq/pqac007
      Issue No: Vol. 73, No. 1 (2022)
       
  • The Focus Theory of Hope

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      Pages: 44 - 63
      Abstract: AbstractMost elpistologists now agree that hope for a specific outcome involves more than just desire plus the presupposition that the outcome is possible. This paper argues that the additional element of hope is a disposition to focus on the desired outcome in a certain way. I first survey the debate about the nature of hope in the recent literature, offer objections to some important competing accounts, and describe and defend the view that hope involves a kind of focus or attention. I then suggest that this account makes sense of the intuitive thought that there are moral and pragmatic norms on hope that go beyond the norms on desires and modal presuppositions. I conclude by considering some key questions.
      PubDate: Mon, 09 May 2022 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/pq/pqac010
      Issue No: Vol. 73, No. 1 (2022)
       
  • Arguing About Extraterrestrial Intelligence

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      Pages: 64 - 83
      Abstract: AbstractAvi Loeb has defended the hypothesis that the interstellar object, ‘Oumuamua, detected in 2017, is in fact an extraterrestrial artefact. His hypothesis has been widely rejected by the scientific community. On examination however it is not clear why. The puzzle is at the level of argument structure. The scientific community's responses to Loeb's hypothesis appear to point to explanations of ‘Oumuamua's properties that are mere possibilities. Yet this is something that Loeb does not contest. I appeal to broadly philosophical considerations to understand and bolster the response to Loeb. These considerations concern the structure of his argument, the role of prior confidences within it, and the presence of ‘unconceived alternative’ explanations. I then generalise. ‘Oumuamua will surely not be the last object that does not admit of straightforward natural explanation and that is claimed to be evidence of an extraterrestrial artefact. I use the preceding discussion of Loeb's argument and the scientific community's response to make some general remarks for future debate about similar cases.
      PubDate: Sat, 26 Mar 2022 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/pq/pqac009
      Issue No: Vol. 73, No. 1 (2022)
       
  • ‘Rails Invisibly Laid to Infinity’

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      Pages: 84 - 104
      Abstract: AbstractThis paper addresses what I call ‘the constitutive question’ concerning the rules we follow: namely, what determines the standard for a rule's correct application. John McDowell has offered a putative ‘middle position’ between two extreme, unacceptable answers: empirical idealism, which takes the requirements of a rule in any given situation to be constituted by our reaction to the case; and hard platonism, which takes these requirements to be delivered by unvarnished reality as absolutely the simplest or most natural way to carry on. Tellingly, however, McDowell's position is itself unacceptably idealist in his picture of the way in which we are ‘involved’ on the right-hand side of biconditionals such as, ‘“Diamonds are hard” is true if and only if diamonds are hard’.In response to this stultifying state of affairs, I suggest that McDowell has followed the empirical idealist and hard platonist in assuming that the requirements of a rule must be grounded by something else: something external to the rule, which mediates between the rule and the standard for its correct application. This assumption is false. What is more, one application of a metaphor to which Wittgenstein has a somewhat equivocal relation—that of rules as rails invisibly laid to infinity—can help this point to stick.
      PubDate: Mon, 16 May 2022 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/pq/pqac012
      Issue No: Vol. 73, No. 1 (2022)
       
  • Is the Macro Grounded in the Micro'

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      Pages: 105 - 116
      Abstract: AbstractLet a priority micro pluralist be someone who holds that particles or other microscopic objects are fundamental. Rivals to priority micro pluralism include priority monism (the view that the only fundamental concrete object is the entire cosmos) as well as the Aristotelian view that some ordinary macroscopic objects are fundamental. Although priority micro pluralism is popular, I show that it encounters great difficulty in even the most straightforward cases. For example, this tennis ball is spherical; how is this fact to be grounded in facts about the microscopic realm' I consider a number of possible answers to this question. The most promising proposals attempt to exploit the close connection emphasized by Kripke between objects and their original material constituents. I argue that these proposals fail. I conclude that it is worth seriously considering alternatives to this sort of pluralism.
      PubDate: Sat, 14 May 2022 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/pq/pqac013
      Issue No: Vol. 73, No. 1 (2022)
       
  • Outline of a Theory of Reasons

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      Pages: 117 - 142
      Abstract: AbstractThis paper investigates the logic of reasons. Its aim is to provide an analysis of the sentences of the form ‘p is a reason for q’ that yields a coherent account of their logical properties. The idea that we will develop is that ‘p is a reason for q’ is acceptable just in case a suitably defined relation of incompatibility obtains between p and ¬q. As we will suggest, a theory of reasons based on this idea can solve three challenging puzzles that concern, respectively, contraposing reasons, conflicting reasons, and supererogatory reasons, and opens a new perspective on some classical issues concerning non-deductive inferences.
      PubDate: Mon, 04 Jul 2022 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/pq/pqac024
      Issue No: Vol. 73, No. 1 (2022)
       
  • Sharing Burdensome Work

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      Pages: 143 - 163
      Abstract: AbstractIn this paper, I defend the proposal that certain forms of work—specifically forms that are socially necessary but involve the imposition of considerable burdens—be shared between citizens. I argue that sharing burdensome work would achieve several goals, including a more equal distribution of the benefits and burdens of work, a greater appreciation of each other's labour contributions, and an amelioration of problematic inequalities of status. I conclude by considering three objections: that sharing burdensome work would (1) involve morally unacceptable constraints on freedom, (2) be prohibitively inefficient, and (3) forbid mutually advantageous trades. I argue that none of these objections succeed.
      PubDate: Thu, 30 Jun 2022 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/pq/pqac023
      Issue No: Vol. 73, No. 1 (2022)
       
  • Is Perfect Being Theology Informative'

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      Pages: 164 - 183
      Abstract: AbstractJeff Speaks has recently argued that perfect being theology treating God as the greatest possible being—he calls it alethic perfect being theology—cannot deliver new information about God. This argument is central to his critique of all forms of perfect being theology. For as Speaks sees it, other forms of perfect being theology may collapse into alethic perfect being theology, i.e. fail in the end to be a different sort of project. I lay out how he understands alethic perfect being theology and then contest his argument.
      PubDate: Sat, 11 Jun 2022 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/pq/pqac015
      Issue No: Vol. 73, No. 1 (2022)
       
  • Fragmentalism We can Believe in

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      Pages: 184 - 205
      Abstract: AbstractThis paper argues that what is currently the most popular version of temporal Fragmentalism—‘unstructured’ temporal Fragmentalism, as I shall call it—faces a problem of Tensed Belief Explosion. Four possible solutions to this problem are reviewed and shown to be wanting; two more promising ones risk fostering scepticism about the existence of tensed facts—hence, about Fragmentalism itself. The tentative moral is that unstructured versions of Fragmentalism are at best unmotivated and at worst seriously flawed.
      PubDate: Thu, 03 Mar 2022 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/pq/pqac005
      Issue No: Vol. 73, No. 1 (2022)
       
  • Parental Love and Procreation

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      Pages: 206 - 226
      Abstract: AbstractThe main goal of this paper is to explore the forcefulness of the adoption challenge to procreative parenting. After framing the challenge, I consider two of the most developed attempts to respond to it, due to Luara Ferracioli and Elizabeth Brake. I argue that neither strategy is a promising way to vindicate the permissibility of procreative parenting. I then present several reasons to value procreative parenting that are underappreciated in the recent literature. Though these considerations deserve more philosophical attention, I’m agnostic about whether they are strong enough to overcome the adoption challenge. I explain why this agnosticism is reasonable, and the debate about permissibility arguably intractable, in the context of prevailing deontological assumptions structuring discussions of procreation. I conclude by arguing that an independently interesting metaethical thesis, which I call deontic fictionalism, may give us some perspective on this debate and others like it.
      PubDate: Fri, 10 Jun 2022 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/pq/pqac017
      Issue No: Vol. 73, No. 1 (2022)
       
  • Meaning, Rationality, and Guidance

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      Pages: 227 - 247
      Abstract: AbstractIn Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Saul Kripke articulates a form of scepticism about meaning. Even though there is considerable disagreement among critics about the reasoning in which the sceptic engages, there is little doubt that he seeks to offer constraints for an adequate account of the facts that constitute the meaningfulness of expressions. Many of the sceptic's remarks concern the nature of the guidance involved in a speaker's meaningful uses of expressions. I propose that we understand those remarks as seeking to give shape to the idea that to use an expression under the guidance of one's understanding is to have a reason for that use, which one's understanding allows one to discern and act on. Any philosophical elucidation of meaning must adequately capture the rational nature of our linguistic acts.
      PubDate: Thu, 03 Mar 2022 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/pq/pqac004
      Issue No: Vol. 73, No. 1 (2022)
       
  • Death and Decline

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      Pages: 248 - 257
      Abstract: AbstractIn this paper, I investigate backward-looking accounts of death's badness. I begin by reviewing deprivationism—the standard, forward-looking account of death's badness. On deprivationism, death is bad for its victims when it deprives them of a good future. This account famously faces two problems—Lucretius’s symmetry problem and the preemption problem. This motivates turning to backward-looking accounts of death's badness on which death is bad for its victim (in a respect) when it involves a decline from a good life. I distinguish three different backward-looking accounts of death's badness in terms of decline, and I argue for the attractiveness of one in particular. I conclude by considering how the backward-looking consideration of decline might factor into our overall account of death's badness.
      PubDate: Tue, 05 Apr 2022 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/pq/pqac011
      Issue No: Vol. 73, No. 1 (2022)
       
  • Sensorimotor Relationalism and Conscious Vision

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      Pages: 258 - 281
      Abstract: AbstractI argue that the phenomenal properties of conscious visual experiences are properties of the mind-independent objects to which the subject is perceptually related, mediated by the subject's practical understanding of their sensorimotor relation to those properties. This position conjoins two existing strategies for explaining the phenomenal character of perceptual experiences: accounts appealing to perceivers’ limited, non-inferential access to the details of their sensory relation to the environment, and the relationalist conception of phenomenal properties. Bringing these two positions together by emphasizing their sensorimotor common ground allows each one to respond to damaging objections using the resources of the other. The resulting ‘sensorimotor relationalism’ about conscious vision provides a promising schema for explaining phenomenal properties of perceptual states, replacing ‘Hard’ questions with tractable ones about the perceptual relation and its sensorimotor underpinnings.
      PubDate: Sun, 22 May 2022 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/pq/pqac016
      Issue No: Vol. 73, No. 1 (2022)
       
  • Markets With Limits: How the Commodification of Academia Derails Debate

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      Pages: 282 - 284
      Abstract: Markets With Limits: How the Commodification of Academia Derails Debatea. By TaylorJames Stacey. (London: Routledge, 2022. Pp. vii + 220. Price £120.00.)
      PubDate: Thu, 07 Jul 2022 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/pq/pqac028
      Issue No: Vol. 73, No. 1 (2022)
       
  • Plato's Essentialism. Reinterpreting the Theory of Forms

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      Pages: 284 - 287
      Abstract: Plato's Essentialism. Reinterpreting the Theory of Forms. By PolitisVasilis (Cambridge: CUP, 2021. Pp. x + 288. Price £75.00.)
      PubDate: Mon, 18 Jul 2022 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/pq/pqac033
      Issue No: Vol. 73, No. 1 (2022)
       
  • Inquiry, Knowledge, and Understanding

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      Pages: 287 - 289
      Abstract: Inquiry, Knowledge, and Understanding. By KelpChristoph. (Oxford: OUP, 2021. Pp. viii + 212. Price £55.00.)
      PubDate: Mon, 04 Jul 2022 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/pq/pqac030
      Issue No: Vol. 73, No. 1 (2022)
       
  • The Scope of Consent

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      Pages: 290 - 292
      Abstract: The Scope of Consent. By Dougherty  Tom. (Oxford: OUP, 2021. Pp. 195. Price £55.00).
      PubDate: Sat, 02 Jul 2022 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/pq/pqac029
      Issue No: Vol. 73, No. 1 (2022)
       
  • Agents of Change: Political Philosophy in Practice

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      Pages: 292 - 296
      Abstract: Agents of Change: Political Philosophy in Practice. By LaurenceBen. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2021. Pp. 272. Price £28.95.)
      PubDate: Sat, 09 Jul 2022 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/pq/pqac025
      Issue No: Vol. 73, No. 1 (2022)
       
  • Locke on Persons and Personal Identity

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      Pages: 296 - 299
      Abstract: Locke on Persons and Personal Identity. By BoekerRuth. (Oxford: OUP, 2021. Pp. xxi + 336. Price £65.)
      PubDate: Mon, 01 Aug 2022 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/pq/pqac027
      Issue No: Vol. 73, No. 1 (2022)
       
  • Correction to: Coherence and Knowability

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      Pages: 300 - 300
      PubDate: Wed, 07 Sep 2022 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/pq/pqac055
      Issue No: Vol. 73, No. 1 (2022)
       
 
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