Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles) ISSN (Print) 0031-8094 - ISSN (Online) 1467-9213 Published by Oxford University Press[425 journals]
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Pages: 754 - 762 Abstract: AbstractBenjamin Matheson has recently argued that blameworthiness is terminable: in at least some cases, one's blameworthiness for a given offense can be diminished or even eliminated. Although Matheson presents a forceful challenge to those who deny this view—interminability theorists, he calls them—he misconstrues their position and fails to come to grips with several considerations that favor it. This paper aims to clarify key aspects of the debate and defend the claim that blameworthiness is interminable. PubDate: Wed, 29 Jan 2025 00:00:00 GMT DOI: 10.1093/pq/pqaf001 Issue No:Vol. 75, No. 2 (2025)
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Pages: 763 - 774 Abstract: AbstractThe Curry–Howard correspondence, according to which propositions are types, suggests that every paradox formulable in natural deduction has a type-theoretical counterpart. I will give a purely type-theoretical formulation of Curry’s paradox. On the basis of the definition of a type $\Gamma (A)$, Curry’s reasoning can be adapted to show the existence of an object of the arbitrary type A. This is paradoxical for several reasons, among others that A might be an empty type. The solution to the paradox consists in seeing that $\Gamma (A)$ is not a well-defined type. PubDate: Wed, 05 Mar 2025 00:00:00 GMT DOI: 10.1093/pq/pqaf019 Issue No:Vol. 75, No. 2 (2025)
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Pages: 351 - 372 Abstract: AbstractThis paper studies Francisco Suárez's defence of the possibility of causal overdetermination. I show that, according to Suárez, the main arguments against the possibility of causal overdetermination rely on (i) a flawed conception of causal dependence and (ii) a flawed ontology of action. I argue that his objections to (i) and (ii) amount to a significant challenge to his opponents’ case against the possibility of causal overdetermination. PubDate: Tue, 13 Feb 2024 00:00:00 GMT DOI: 10.1093/pq/pqae012 Issue No:Vol. 75, No. 2 (2024)
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Pages: 373 - 395 Abstract: AbstractOppressive ideology regularly misrepresents features of structural injustice as normal or appropriate. I argue that resisting such injustice therefore requires critical examination of the evaluative judgments encoded in shared concepts. I diagnose a mechanism of ideological misevaluation, which I call hermeneutical misfit. Hermeneutical misfit occurs when thick concepts, or concepts which both describe and evaluate, mobilise ideologically warped evaluative judgments which do not fit the facts (e.g. slutty). These ill-fitted thick concepts in turn are regularly deployed as if they merely describe (hence ‘just the facts’). I argue that, via this descriptive masquerade, ill-fitted thick concepts smuggle in warped evaluative judgments alongside apparently value-neutral ‘mere facts’, a process which both reinforces those judgments and increases the difficulty of critique. I suggest that, to resist this process, we should develop collective consciousness and articulate ‘meta-hermeneutical resources,’ or thick concepts which encode critique of other, ill-fitted concepts (e.g. slut-shaming). PubDate: Fri, 16 Feb 2024 00:00:00 GMT DOI: 10.1093/pq/pqae018 Issue No:Vol. 75, No. 2 (2024)
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Pages: 396 - 406 Abstract: AbstractThis paper examines Bird's account of restricted compositionality in terms of compression of information. Additionally, this paper proposes an alternative perspective (to Bird's) that links compositionality to the Free Energy Principle and the minimisation of collective entropy. Emphasising functional integration, this criterion provides a more focused and relatively more objective (patternist) account of composition. PubDate: Thu, 22 Feb 2024 00:00:00 GMT DOI: 10.1093/pq/pqae019 Issue No:Vol. 75, No. 2 (2024)
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Pages: 407 - 427 Abstract: AbstractPerceptual Confidence is the thesis that perceptual experiences can be probabilistic. This thesis has been defended and criticised based on a variety of phenomenological, epistemological, and explanatory arguments. One gap in these arguments is that they neglect the question of whether perceptual experiences satisfy the formal conditions that define the notion of probability to which Perceptual Confidence is committed. Here, we focus on this underexplored question and argue that perceptual experiences do not satisfy such conditions. But if they do not, then ascriptions of perceptual confidence are undefined; and so, Perceptual Confidence cannot be true. PubDate: Thu, 15 Feb 2024 00:00:00 GMT DOI: 10.1093/pq/pqae014 Issue No:Vol. 75, No. 2 (2024)
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Pages: 428 - 449 Abstract: AbstractUpon introspection, we judge that suffering feels bad. I argue there is no appearance-reality gap when it comes to introspective judgments about simple, intrinsic, nonrepresentational phenomenal states like itches, tingling, and suffering's feeling bad. On constitutivism about phenomenal introspection, there is no appearance-reality gap here because these judgments are literally constituted by the phenomenal states they are about. As a result, we are directly acquainted with the intrinsic properties of experience in having these judgments. Reflecting on our direct acquaintance with intrinsic badness, we can know that our suffering instantiates this judgment-independent evaluative property. PubDate: Fri, 12 Apr 2024 00:00:00 GMT DOI: 10.1093/pq/pqae029 Issue No:Vol. 75, No. 2 (2024)
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Pages: 450 - 472 Abstract: AbstractWhich artificial intelligence (AI) systems are agents' To answer this question, I propose a multidimensional account of agency. According to this account, a system's agency profile is jointly determined by its level of goal-directedness and autonomy as well as is abilities for directly impacting the surrounding world, long-term planning and acting for reasons. Rooted in extant theories of agency, this account enables fine-grained, nuanced comparative characterizations of artificial agency. I show that this account has multiple important virtues and is more informative than alternatives. More speculatively, it may help to illuminate two important emerging questions in AI ethics: 1. Can agency contribute to the moral status of non-human beings, and how' 2. When and why might AI systems exhibit power-seeking behaviour and does this pose an existential risk to humanity' PubDate: Mon, 05 Feb 2024 00:00:00 GMT DOI: 10.1093/pq/pqae010 Issue No:Vol. 75, No. 2 (2024)
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Pages: 473 - 492 Abstract: AbstractIn this paper, I argue that it is not a necessary condition of intentional agency that agents act on intentions with antecedently clear content. That is, some actions proceed on the basis of intentions which do not initially provide necessary conditions for performing those actions, and instead involve discovering at least some of these conditions in the course of performing them. To do this, I develop an account of problem-oriented agency, according to which agents may act in relation to problems which at first resist adequate representation. This pushes us to recognize a dimension of open-ended inquiry in agency often neglected in rationalist accounts. Lastly, I argue that paradigmatically rational actions on determinate intentions which are not sensitive to potentially transformative feedback in the course of their execution can fall short of full agency in important ways. PubDate: Tue, 13 Feb 2024 00:00:00 GMT DOI: 10.1093/pq/pqae013 Issue No:Vol. 75, No. 2 (2024)
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Pages: 493 - 516 Abstract: AbstractThe problem of supererogation has attracted significant attention from contemporary moral philosophers. In this paper, we show that this problem was outlined in different terms in the work of the 11th century Persian philosopher Abū Alī Miskawayh. As well as identifying this problem, Miskawayh also developed a unique solution cashed out in terms of virtue ethics that has not yet been considered in the contemporary literature. We will argue that this solution, which is in its general form independent of virtue ethics, provides a plausible explanation of what makes some acts supererogatory and faces two important advantages over the most popular response to the problem of supererogation, The Sacrifice View. Unlike The Sacrifice View, The Cautionary Account can class acts of benevolence that advance the agent's own interests as supererogatory and easily explain why certain acts of sacrifice are neither permissible nor praiseworthy. PubDate: Fri, 16 Feb 2024 00:00:00 GMT DOI: 10.1093/pq/pqae017 Issue No:Vol. 75, No. 2 (2024)
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Pages: 517 - 538 Abstract: AbstractIn this paper, I develop an argument against a type of Non-Analytic Normative Naturalism. This argument, the Normative Property Dualism Argument, suggests that if Non-Analytic Normative Naturalists posit that normative properties are identical to natural properties and that such identities are a posteriori, they will be forced to posit that these properties that are both normative and natural have higher-order normative properties of their own. PubDate: Wed, 24 Apr 2024 00:00:00 GMT DOI: 10.1093/pq/pqae028 Issue No:Vol. 75, No. 2 (2024)
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Pages: 539 - 559 Abstract: AbstractWhat role does audience uptake play in determining whether a speaker refuses or consents to sex' Proponents of constitution theories of uptake argue that which speech act a speaker performs is largely determined by their addressee's uptake. However, this appears to entail a troubling result: a speaker might be made to perform a speech act of consent against her will. In response, we develop a Social Constitution Theory of uptake. We argue that addressee uptake can constitute a speaker's utterance of ‘no’ as a speech act of consent under some conditions, but that this does not prevent us from judging that an addressee committed rape. Second, we claim that addressee uptake is not the only form of uptake that matters—the uptake of other members of the discursive community matters too, and can override the addressee's uptake, constituting the speaker's utterance as the speech act it was intended to be. PubDate: Mon, 22 Jan 2024 00:00:00 GMT DOI: 10.1093/pq/pqae003 Issue No:Vol. 75, No. 2 (2024)
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Pages: 560 - 578 Abstract: AbstractI defend against a salient objection the thesis that practical rationality requires us to perform intentional actions. The objection is that if rationality requires the performance of intentional actions, then agents are irrational for failing to succeed in what they intend to do. I reply to this objection by hewing closely to the principle that the rational ‘ought’ implies ‘can’. We are rationally required not to successfully realize the content of our intentions but to exercise the fallible abilities in our possession. Taking this line permits us to agree that we are not irrational for failing to succeed, while also endorsing the anti-Internalist claim that practical rationality embraces intentional actions themselves, rather than merely the beliefs and intentions that prompt and sustain them. PubDate: Tue, 09 Apr 2024 00:00:00 GMT DOI: 10.1093/pq/pqae024 Issue No:Vol. 75, No. 2 (2024)
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Pages: 579 - 597 Abstract: AbstractTimothy Williamson has recently argued that the applicability of classical mathematics in the natural and social sciences raises a problem for the endorsement, in non-mathematical domains, of a wide range of non-classical logics. We first reconstruct his argument and present its restriction to the case of quantum logic (QL). Then we show that there is no problematic tension between the applicability of classical mathematical models to quantum phenomena and the endorsement of QL in the reasoning about the latter. Once we identify the premise in Williamson’s argument that turns out to be false when restricted to QL, we argue that the same premise fails for a wider variety of non-classical logics. In the end, we use our discussion to draw some general lessons concerning the relationship between applied logic and applied mathematics. PubDate: Fri, 05 Jan 2024 00:00:00 GMT DOI: 10.1093/pq/pqad125 Issue No:Vol. 75, No. 2 (2024)
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Pages: 598 - 631 Abstract: AbstractPhilosophical orthodoxy has it that intentional action consists in one's intention appropriately causing a motion of one's body, placing the latter (conceptually and/or metaphysically) prior to the former. Here, I argue that this standard schema should be reversed: acting intentionally is at least conceptually prior to intending. The argument is modelled on a Williamsonian argument for the priority of knowledge developed by Jenifer Nagel. She argues that children acquire the concept KNOWS before they acquire BELIEVES, building on this alleged developmental priority of knowledge to establish its conceptual priority. I start by taking a closer look at Nagel's argument, canvassing extant objections todo both with the empirical adequacy of her claims and their philosophical implications. Doing so allows me, in the second part of the paper, to draw lessons that inform the construction of a revamped parallel argument for the priority of ACTS INTENTIONALLY. PubDate: Sat, 11 May 2024 00:00:00 GMT DOI: 10.1093/pq/pqae023 Issue No:Vol. 75, No. 2 (2024)
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Pages: 632 - 651 Abstract: AbstractPluralistic theories of well-being might appear unable to accommodate just how important pleasure and pain are to well-being. Intuitively, there is a finite limit to how well your life can go for you if it goes badly enough hedonically (e.g. because you never feel any pleasure and you spend two years in unrelenting agony). But if there is some basic good distinct from pleasure, as any pluralistic theory must claim, then it seems that you could be made arbitrarily well off by being given enough of that good even if your life is hedonically terrible. My aim is to defend pluralistic theories against this objection. After replying to the simplest version of it, I will answer a more sophisticated version of it that has recently been leveled by Theron Pummer. PubDate: Wed, 07 Feb 2024 00:00:00 GMT DOI: 10.1093/pq/pqae007 Issue No:Vol. 75, No. 2 (2024)
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Pages: 652 - 670 Abstract: AbstractIn this paper, we outline and defend a view on which in olfactory experience we can, and often do, smell ordinary things of various kinds—for instance, cookies, coffee, and cake burnings—and the olfactory properties they have. A challenge to this view are cases of smelling in the absence of the source of a smell, such as when a fishy smell lingers after the fish is gone. Such cases, many philosophers argue, show that what we perceive in olfactory experience are odour objects, and not ordinary things. On behalf of our opponent, we articulate a screening-off argument based on cases of lingering smells for the thesis that we do not smell ordinary things. We then develop an alternative account of these cases that is consistent with our view. In doing so, we call into question two claims that are typically built into the notion of an odour object. PubDate: Wed, 07 Feb 2024 00:00:00 GMT DOI: 10.1093/pq/pqae009 Issue No:Vol. 75, No. 2 (2024)
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Pages: 671 - 692 Abstract: AbstractA theory of blameworthiness must answer two fundamental questions. First, what makes a person blameworthy when they act' Secondly, what makes a person blameworthy after the time of action' Two main answers have been given to the second question. According to interminability theorists, blameworthiness necessarily doesn't even diminish over time. Terminability theorists deny this. In this paper, I argue against interminability and in favour of terminability. After clarifying the debate about whether blameworthiness is interminable or terminable, I argue there's no positive case for interminability. I then respond to three objections to terminability. In doing so, I clarify the nature of blame, self-blame, and posthumous blame. I also give theoretical reasons in favour of the view that a person's blameworthiness for a minor wrong can not only diminish but also cease completely. PubDate: Thu, 11 Jan 2024 00:00:00 GMT DOI: 10.1093/pq/pqad127 Issue No:Vol. 75, No. 2 (2024)
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Pages: 693 - 717 Abstract: AbstractEvaluativism about unpleasant pains offers one way to think about unpleasant pain experience. However, extant Evaluativist views do not pay enough attention to the affective dimension of pain experience and the complex relations between the affective, evaluative and sensory dimensions. This paper clarifies these relations and provides a view which more closely reflects the phenomenology of unpleasant pains. It argues that the intentional structure of paradigmatic unpleasant pain is as follows: unpleasant pains essentially involve a proprietary intentional mode—what I call affective-interoception—and a distinctive kind of evaluatively qualified sensory content. The resulting view is Affective-Evaluativism. PubDate: Wed, 24 Jan 2024 00:00:00 GMT DOI: 10.1093/pq/pqae002 Issue No:Vol. 75, No. 2 (2024)
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Pages: 718 - 733 Abstract: AbstractThis paper argues that no instances of acquiring knowledge from works of literary fiction are instances of the way we ordinarily learn from the testimony of others. The paper argues that the fictional status of a work is a defeater for the justification of beliefs formed on the basis of statements within that work, which must itself be defeated for such beliefs based on fiction to amount to knowledge. This marks a fundamental difference with learning from testimony, since regardless of one's views on testimony and testimonial knowledge, the fact that your belief that p was based on someone's testimony that p is not in and of itself a defeater for your justification for believing that p. PubDate: Fri, 08 Mar 2024 00:00:00 GMT DOI: 10.1093/pq/pqae020 Issue No:Vol. 75, No. 2 (2024)
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Pages: 734 - 753 Abstract: AbstractI argue that an act can be wrong because it wrongs a particular person. I then show how this thesis serves as a constraint on moral theories, using Kantian ethics as a case study. PubDate: Mon, 22 Jan 2024 00:00:00 GMT DOI: 10.1093/pq/pqae001 Issue No:Vol. 75, No. 2 (2024)
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Pages: 775 - 778 Abstract: The Life and Thought of H. Odera Oruka: Pursuing Justice in Africa. By PresbeyGail M. (London and New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2023. Pp. xiii + 243. Price £15.29.) PubDate: Mon, 23 Sep 2024 00:00:00 GMT DOI: 10.1093/pq/pqae116 Issue No:Vol. 75, No. 2 (2024)
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Pages: 778 - 781 Abstract: In Praise of Ambivalence. By CoatesD. Justin. (New York: OUP, 2023. Pp. x + 206. Price £75.00.) PubDate: Thu, 05 Sep 2024 00:00:00 GMT DOI: 10.1093/pq/pqae112 Issue No:Vol. 75, No. 2 (2024)
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Pages: 781 - 784 Abstract: Property and its Forms in Classical German Philosophy. By JamesDavid. (Cambridge: CUP, 2023. Pp. v + 203. Price Hardcover $99.99.) PubDate: Tue, 24 Sep 2024 00:00:00 GMT DOI: 10.1093/pq/pqae122 Issue No:Vol. 75, No. 2 (2024)
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Pages: 784 - 787 Abstract: Calling for Explanation. By BarasDan. (Oxford: OUP, 2022. Pp. viii + 183. Price $97.00.) PubDate: Thu, 26 Sep 2024 00:00:00 GMT DOI: 10.1093/pq/pqae124 Issue No:Vol. 75, No. 2 (2024)
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Pages: 787 - 790 Abstract: Philosophical Methodology: From Data to Theory. By BengsonJohn, CuneoTerence, and Shafer-LandauRuss. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022. Pp. x + 191. Price $110 hardcover, $24.99 paperback.) PubDate: Fri, 06 Sep 2024 00:00:00 GMT DOI: 10.1093/pq/pqae113 Issue No:Vol. 75, No. 2 (2024)
Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles)
