Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles) ISSN (Print) 0007-0904 - ISSN (Online) 1468-2842 Published by Oxford University Press[419 journals]
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Authors:Abell C. Pages: 163 - 172 Abstract: In their engaging and valuable contributions to the philosophy of fiction and literature, Jonathan Gilmore and Gregory Currie address overlapping issues concerning the extent to which our responses to fictions inform or mirror our responses to events in real life. In what follows, however, I discuss each separately, because I wish to discuss different strands of argument in each. PubDate: Sat, 04 Jun 2022 00:00:00 GMT DOI: 10.1093/aesthj/ayab035 Issue No:Vol. 62, No. 2 (2022)
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Authors:Gilmore J. Pages: 173 - 183 Abstract: AbstractEach of these books offers a richly developed and nuanced account of the nature of fiction. And each poses major challenges to a view about which there is a near-consensus. Catharine Abell draws on a theory of the institutions of fiction to advance a systematic re-envisioning of the metaphysics and epistemology of the contents of stories. Gregory Currie argues that fiction’s relationship to the imagination, and the way stories communicate their contents to readers, seriously undermine fiction’s cognitive values. PubDate: Sat, 04 Jun 2022 00:00:00 GMT DOI: 10.1093/aesthj/ayab026 Issue No:Vol. 62, No. 2 (2022)
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Authors:Currie G. Pages: 185 - 194 Abstract: These two excellent books ask what it is for an audience to engage appropriately with a work of fiction. Catharine Abell argues a radical rethink of foundational questions about the nature of fictive communication. Our views are rather different and in what follows I argue, predictably, that the intentionalist approach I and others adopt is in good shape. I don’t recognzse so basic a dispute with Jonathan Gilmore, who wants to understand the norms of imagining by comparing them with the norms that govern our responses to real things. My question will be whether imagination has been aligned with these other states in the right ways. PubDate: Sat, 04 Jun 2022 00:00:00 GMT DOI: 10.1093/aesthj/ayab036 Issue No:Vol. 62, No. 2 (2022)
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Authors:Abell C. Pages: 195 - 204 Abstract: The metaphysical question of what determines the contents of fictive utterances is closely related to the epistemological question of how audiences identify their contents. To work out whether a fictive utterance has a certain content, audiences need to ascertain that it meets whichever conditions are responsible for its having that content. Consequently, any adequate account of the determinants of fictive utterance content must meet the following epistemological constraint: PubDate: Sat, 04 Jun 2022 00:00:00 GMT DOI: 10.1093/aesthj/ayab038 Issue No:Vol. 62, No. 2 (2022)
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Authors:Gilmore J. Pages: 205 - 214 Abstract: I am grateful to Catharine Abell and Gregory Currie for their incisive and productive commentaries on Apt Imaginings. In what follows, I will try to respond to their criticisms and identify where our points of agreement and disagreement lie. PubDate: Sat, 04 Jun 2022 00:00:00 GMT DOI: 10.1093/aesthj/ayab073 Issue No:Vol. 62, No. 2 (2022)
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Authors:Currie G. Pages: 215 - 222 Abstract: I am grateful to Catharine Abell and Jonathan Gilmore for their comments and for the opportunity to think again about some important questions. Before I respond, I’ll say something about the approach I took in Imagining and Knowing (2020), and how that might seem to make critical discussion difficult. In the book I never tired, apparently, of hedging my bets: insisting on not denying that we learn from fiction, insisting that my anti-learning arguments are no more than helpful contributions to a balanced discussion. That seems to leave me with a vast capacity to gracefully welcome criticism and congratulate myself for having prompted a useful debate. Tempting though this line is, I won’t adopt it. It is true, I think, that all parties to the debate over the cognitive value of fiction agree (or should) that we do sometimes learn from fiction and sometimes fail to learn, acquiring instead ignorance and error. But to emphasize this agreement ignores something important about the kind of broadly scientific debate I hope we are contributing to: that what divides us is not a single claim or theory but a research programme. A research programme is not just a big theory, it is an orientation to a problem, characterized by techniques and policies that help us move from one specific version of the programme to another, responding to counterarguments and recalcitrant evidence along the way (Lakatos, 1970). The programme I’m currently employed on is marked by the injunction ‘look for arguments and evidence that undermine claims that we learn from fiction’. I agree that there are ways we learn from fiction—it’s just not my role in this debate to find any. PubDate: Sat, 04 Jun 2022 00:00:00 GMT DOI: 10.1093/aesthj/ayab047 Issue No:Vol. 62, No. 2 (2022)
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Authors:Predelli S. Pages: 231 - 240 Abstract: In Fictional Discourse, I proposed an analysis of what I call ‘fictional discourse’, first and foremost as it appears in an author’s fictional creation (what Tatjana von Solodkoff calls ‘Making’; von Solodkoff, 2021, p. 1) and in a reader’s meta-fictional reports (‘Reports’ in von Solodkoff's jargon). PubDate: Sat, 04 Jun 2022 00:00:00 GMT DOI: 10.1093/aesthj/ayab025 Issue No:Vol. 62, No. 2 (2022)
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Authors:Friend S. Pages: 257 - 271 Abstract: AbstractIn this paper, I review developments in discussions of fiction and emotion over the last decade concerning both the descriptive question of how to classify fiction-directed emotions and the normative question of how to evaluate those emotions. Although many advances have been made on these topics, a mistaken assumption is still common: that we must hold either that fiction-directed emotions are (empirically or normatively) the same as other emotions, or that they are different. I argue that we should reject this dichotomy. PubDate: Sat, 04 Jun 2022 00:00:00 GMT DOI: 10.1093/aesthj/ayab060 Issue No:Vol. 62, No. 2 (2022)
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Authors:Green M. Pages: 273 - 289 Abstract: AbstractWe critically survey prominent recent scholarship on the question of whether fiction can be a source of epistemic value for those who engage with it fully and appropriately. Such epistemic value might take the form of knowledge (for ‘cognitivists’) or understanding (for ‘neo-cognitivists’). Both camps may be sorted according to a further distinction between views explaining fiction’s epistemic value either in terms of the author’s engaging in a form of telling, or instead via their showing some state of affairs to obtain, a special case of which is the provision of self-knowledge. Fictional works that show rather than tell often employ thought experiments. The epistemic value of some fictional works is indicated by their enabling of empathy, itself illuminated via the psychological process of experience-taking. Whether a fictional work offers epistemic value by telling or showing, there is, in principle, no bar to its being able to deliver on what it offers, and consumers of fiction who exercise epistemic vigilance may gain either knowledge or some degree of understanding from their engagement with it. PubDate: Sat, 04 Jun 2022 00:00:00 GMT DOI: 10.1093/aesthj/ayac005 Issue No:Vol. 62, No. 2 (2022)
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Authors:Voltolini A. Pages: 291 - 305 Abstract: AbstractIn the old days of descriptivism, fictional reference and non-fictional reference with proper names were treated on a par. Descriptivism was not an intuitive theory, but it meritoriously provided a unitary semantic account of names, whether referentially full or empty. Then the revolution of the new theory of reference occurred. This new theory is definitely more intuitive than descriptivism, yet it comes with a drawback: the referentially full use and the referentially empty use, notably the fictional use, of names are semantically no longer on the same footing. How the use of names from fiction is referentially empty has even been seen as a symptom of its not being a use at all. In this paper, I ask the following question: can one keep the merits of the new theory of reference and still provide a unitary account of both fictional and non-fictional reference with names' My answer is positive, provided that one conceives proper names as a special kind of indexicals. PubDate: Sat, 04 Jun 2022 00:00:00 GMT DOI: 10.1093/aesthj/ayab052 Issue No:Vol. 62, No. 2 (2022)
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Authors:García-Carpintero M. Pages: 307 - 324 Abstract: AbstractThe paper surveys recent appraisals of David Lewis’s seminal paper on truth in fiction. It examines variations on standard criticisms of Lewis’s account, aiming to show that, if developed as Lewis suggests in his 1983 Postscript A, his proposals on the topic are—as Hanley puts it—‘as good as it gets’. Thus elaborated, Lewis’s account can resist the objections, and it offers a better picture of fictional discourse than recent resurrections of other classic works of the 1970s by Kripke, van Inwagen and Searle. The turn that Lewis suggests and the paper recommends draws on the remaining outstanding contribution from that time: Walton’s. PubDate: Sat, 04 Jun 2022 00:00:00 GMT DOI: 10.1093/aesthj/ayab066 Issue No:Vol. 62, No. 2 (2022)
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Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles)
