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  Subjects -> PHILOSOPHY (Total: 762 journals)
Showing 1 - 135 of 135 Journals sorted by number of followers
Philosophical Review     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 72)
Ethics     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 69)
European Journal of Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 68)
Journal of Political Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 65)
Mind     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 64)
Australasian Journal of Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 58)
Philosophy & Public Affairs     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 57)
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 52)
Contemporary Political Theory     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 52)
Nous     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 52)
Journal of the History of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 48)
Philosophical Quarterly     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 47)
British Journal for the History of Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 43)
Journal of Applied Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 43)
American Journal of Theology & Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 42)
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 40)
Journal of Moral Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 37)
Analysis     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 37)
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 36)
Philosophy of Science     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 33)
Journal of Medical Ethics     Partially Free   (Followers: 32)
Erkenntnis     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 31)
Philosophy and Literature     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 31)
Continental Philosophy Review     Partially Free   (Followers: 28)
Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 28)
Journal of Social Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 27)
Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 27)
Constellations     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 27)
Canadian Journal of Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 25)
Social Philosophy and Policy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 25)
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 24)
British Journal of Aesthetics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 23)
Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 23)
Philosophy & Social Criticism     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 22)
Philosophical Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 22)
Linguistics and Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 22)
Philosophy and Rhetoric     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 21)
The Heythrop Journal     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 21)
Philosophy Compass     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 19)
BMC Medical Ethics     Open Access   (Followers: 19)
Biology and Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 18)
Journal of Medical Ethics and History of Medicine     Open Access   (Followers: 18)
Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 17)
Philosophers' Imprint     Open Access   (Followers: 17)
Jurisprudence     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 17)
Assuming Gender     Open Access   (Followers: 16)
Mouseion: Journal of the Classical Association of Canada     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 16)
Journal of the Philosophy of History     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 16)
Pragmatics & Cognition     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 16)
Philosophy East and West     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 15)
International Studies in the Philosophy of Science     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 15)
Bioethics Research Notes     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 15)
Midwest Studies In Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 14)
Journal of Media Ethics : Exploring Questions of Media Morality     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 14)
Episteme     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 14)
Phronesis : A journal for Ancient Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 13)
Social Epistemology: A Journal of Knowledge, Culture and Policy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 13)
Philosophy & Technology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 13)
Review of Philosophy and Psychology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 13)
Pragmatics and Society     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 12)
Reformed Theological Review, The     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 12)
Ethical Perspectives     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 12)
Journal of Indian Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 12)
Journal of Global Ethics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 12)
Journal of Chinese Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 12)
Philosophy of Photography     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 11)
Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 11)
Open Journal of Philosophy     Open Access   (Followers: 11)
Utilitas     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 11)
Estudos Bíblicos     Open Access   (Followers: 11)
Dao : A Journal of Comparative Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 11)
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 10)
Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 10)
Metaphor and Symbol     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 10)
Polis : The Journal of the Society for Greek Political Thought     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 10)
HTS Theological Studies     Open Access   (Followers: 9)
Journal of Philosophical Logic     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9)
Film-Philosophy Journal     Open Access   (Followers: 9)
Journal of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 9)
Research in Phenomenology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9)
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 9)
Philosophical Books     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8)
Philosophia     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8)
Diogenes     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8)
Philosophical Perspectives     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8)
Myth & Symbol     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8)
Nordic Journal of Aesthetics     Open Access   (Followers: 7)
Journal of Speculative Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 7)
Metaphilosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7)
African Journal of Business Ethics     Open Access   (Followers: 7)
Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7)
SubStance     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 7)
Contagion : Journal of Violence, Mimesis, and Culture     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 7)
Philosophical Issues     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7)
Contributions to the History of Concepts     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 7)
International Journal of Philosophical Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7)
The Southern Journal of Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6)
Philosophical Explorations: An International Journal for the Philosophy of Mind and Action     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6)
Axiomathes     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6)
Philosophical Investigations     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6)
Contemporary Chinese Thought     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 6)
Dialogue Canadian Philosophical Review/Revue canadienne de philosophie     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 6)
History and Philosophy of Logic     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6)
Think     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 6)
Philosophical Magazine Letters     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6)
Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 6)
Journal of Critical Realism     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5)
Journal of Empirical Research on Human Research Ethics     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5)
Endeavour     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5)
Australasian Catholic Record, The     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5)
Journal of Nietzsche Studies     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5)
Critical Horizons     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5)
Aisthesis     Open Access   (Followers: 5)
Philosophical Papers     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5)
Review of Contemporary Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5)
International Journal of the Platonic Tradition     Open Access   (Followers: 5)
Zeitschrift für Religions- und Geistesgeschichte     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5)
Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
Journal of Theoretical & Philosophical Psychology     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
The Philosophical Forum     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
Church Heritage     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
Franciscan Studies     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
South African Journal of Philosophy = Suid-Afrikaanse Tydskrif vir Wysbegeerte     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Hume Studies     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
Philosophy in Review     Open Access   (Followers: 4)
Australian Humanist, The     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Journal of Religion and Business Ethics     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
Studia Logica     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
The Pluralist     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Russell : the Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Studies in Philology     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
CR : The New Centennial Review     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Utopian Studies     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Kantian Review     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Bulletin de Philosophie Medievale     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Topoi     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Bijdragen     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
International Journal for the Study of Skepticism     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
International Journal of Žižek Studies     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Empedocles : European Journal for the Philosophy of Communication     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Horizonte : Revista de Estudos de Teologia e Ciências da Religião     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Cultura : International Journal of Philosophy of Culture and Axiology     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Erasmus Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Socioaffective Neuroscience and Psychology     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Between the Species     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Journal of Friends of Lutheran Archives     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Journal of Scottish Philosophy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Poiesis & Praxis : International Journal of Technology Assessment and Ethics of Science     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Journal of Aesthetic Education     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Sartre Studies International     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Quaestio     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Grazer Philosophische Studien     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Philosophy & Theory in Biology     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Australian Journal of Parapsychology     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Éthique publique     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Noesis     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Philosophia Scientiæ     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Revue Philosophique de Louvain     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Nóema     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
International Journal of Social Quality     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofía     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
PAN: Philosophy Activism Nature     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Temporalités     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Le Portique     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Ethische Perspectieven     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Journal of Humanistic Mathematics     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Laval théologique et philosophique     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Revue d’études benthamiennes     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Eleutheria     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Husserl Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Veritas : Revista de Filosofí­a y Teología     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Hobbes Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Collingwood and British Idealism Studies     Full-text available via subscription  
Grotiana     Hybrid Journal  
Signos Filosóficos     Open Access  
Eidos     Open Access  
Cinta de Moebio     Open Access  
Cuyo Anuario de Filosofía Argentina y Americana     Open Access  
Tópicos. Revista de Filosofía de Santa Fe     Open Access  
Rhuthmos     Open Access  
Philosophiques     Open Access  
Ramon Llull Journal of Applied Ethics     Open Access  
Studia Philosophica Estonica     Open Access  
Synthesis (La Plata)     Open Access  
Revista de Filosofia     Open Access  
Alpha (Osorno)     Open Access  
Circe de clásicos y modernos     Open Access  
Estudios de Filosofía Práctica e Historia de las Ideas     Open Access  
Doctor virtualis     Open Access  
Humanidades Médicas     Open Access  
Methodos     Open Access  
Labyrinthe     Open Access  
Astérion     Open Access  
Trans/Form/Ação - Revista de Filosofia     Open Access  
Russian Studies in Philosophy     Full-text available via subscription  

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Philosophical Studies
Journal Prestige (SJR): 1.929
Citation Impact (citeScore): 1
Number of Followers: 22  
 
  Hybrid Journal Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles)
ISSN (Print) 1573-0883 - ISSN (Online) 0031-8116
Published by Springer-Verlag Homepage  [2467 journals]
  • Valuable ignorance: delayed epistemic gratification

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      Abstract: Abstract A long line of epistemologists including Sosa (Epistemic explanations: a theory of telic normativity, and what it explains. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2021), Feldman (The ethics of belief. Philos and Phenomenol Res 60:667–695, 2002), and Chisholm (Theory of knowledge, 2nd edn. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 2007) have argued that, at least for a certain class of questions that we take up, we should (or should aim to) close inquiry iff by closing inquiry we would meet a unique epistemic standard. I argue that no epistemic norm of this general form is true: there is not a single epistemic standard that demarcates the boundary between inquiries we are forbidden and obligated to close. In short, such norms are false because they are insensitive to the potentially ambitious epistemic goals that agents may permissibly bring to bear on an inquiry. Focusing particularly on knowledge-oriented versions of the norm, I argue that beliefless ignorance has a positive role to play in epistemic life by licensing prolonged inquiry into questions that we especially care about.
      PubDate: 2022-12-04
       
  • Political etiquette

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      Abstract: Abstract Social norms forbidding rape jokes, blackface, and flag-burning exemplify a peculiar form of etiquette, which I call political etiquette. Just as compliance with ordinary etiquette expresses respect for the other individuals involved in a social encounter, compliance with political etiquette expresses respect for social groups. In this paper, I propose that we understand political etiquette as a system of conventions whereby we indicate our commitment to treating vulnerable social groups in accordance with their rightful status. Because we have a standing obligation to assure all members of our community that their rightful social status will be respected, we have a powerful moral reason to conform with all existing political etiquette norms whose target social groups lack such assurance, even when compliance with these norms is not antecedently morally valuable. Alongside our moral reasons to comply with some existing political etiquette norms, we also have moral reasons to fortify good political etiquette norms and to reform or erode bad ones.
      PubDate: 2022-12-03
       
  • Reasons for action: making a difference to the security of outcomes

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      Abstract: Abstract In this paper, we present a new account of teleological reasons, i.e. reasons to perform a particular action because of the outcomes it promotes. Our account gives the desired verdict in a number of difficult cases, including cases of overdetermination and non-threshold cases like Parfit’s famous Drops of water. The key to our account is to look more closely at the metaphysics of causation. According to Touborg (The dual nature of causation, 2018), it is a necessary condition for causation that a cause increases the security of its effect. Building on this idea, we suggest, roughly, that you have a teleological reason to act in a certain way when doing so increases the security of some good outcome. This represents a middle way between the proposal that you have a reason to act in a certain way just in case this would cause a good outcome and the proposal that you have a reason to act in a certain way just in case this could cause a good outcome.
      PubDate: 2022-12-03
       
  • Correction to: An acquaintance alternative to self-representationalism

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      PubDate: 2022-12-01
       
  • Knowledge, individualised evidence and luck

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      Abstract: Abstract The notion of individualised evidence holds the key to solve the puzzle of statistical evidence, but there’s still no consensus on how exactly to define it. To make progress on the problem, epistemologists have proposed various accounts of individualised evidence in terms of causal or modal anti-luck conditions on knowledge like appropriate causation (Thomson 1986), sensitivity (Enoch et al. 2012) and safety (Pritchard 2018). In this paper, I show that each of these fails as satisfactory anti-luck condition, and that such failure lends abductive support to the following conclusion: once the familiar anti-luck intuition on knowledge is extended to individualised evidence, no single causal or modal anti-luck condition on knowledge can succeed as the right anti-luck condition on individualised evidence. This conclusion casts serious doubts on the fruitfulness of the move from anti-luck conditions on knowledge to anti-luck conditions on individualised evidence. I expand on these doubts and point out further aspects where epistemology and the law come apart: epistemic anti- luck conditions on knowledge do not adequately characterise the legal notion of individualised evidence.
      PubDate: 2022-12-01
       
  • Constitutivism and cognitivism

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      Abstract: Abstract Constitutivism holds that an account of what a thing is yields those normative standards to which that thing is by nature subject. We articulate a minimal form of constitutivism that we call formal, non-epistemological constitutivism which diverges from orthodox versions of constitutivism in two main respects. First: whereas orthodox versions of constitutivism hold that those ethical norms to which people are by nature subject are sui generis because of their special capacity to motivate action and legitimate criticism, we argue that these features are compatible with treating these norms as of a piece with those ‘formal’ natural-historical norms which can be used to assess living things. Second: unlike orthodox versions of constitutivism, our version does not seek to use a non-normative account of that kind of being which we are as a means of identifying those normative claims to which we are are by nature subject. We then indicate how our position can afford us the resources to address some of the familiar difficulties that face cognitivism in ethics.
      PubDate: 2022-12-01
       
  • The medical model, with a human face

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      Abstract: Abstract In this paper, I defend a version of the medical model of disability, which defines disability as an enduring biological dysfunction that causes its bearer a significant degree of impairment. We should accept the medical model, I argue, because it succeeds in capturing our judgments about what conditions do and do not qualify as disabilities, because it offers a compelling explanation for what makes a condition count as a disability, and because it justifies why the federal government should spend hundreds of billions of dollars, annually, on aid and accommodations for disabled people. After responding to a pair of objections Elizabeth Barnes has raised against the medical model, I contrast it with Guy Kahane and Julian Savulescu's welfarist account of disability, and with Barnes's own mere-difference view. Both of these accounts face serious challenges, although elements of Barnes's view can—and, in my opinion, should—be adopted by proponents of the medical model.
      PubDate: 2022-12-01
       
  • Can we outsource all the reasons'

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      Abstract: Abstract Where does normativity come from' Or alternatively, in virtue of what do facts about what an agent has reason to do obtain' On one class of views, reason facts obtain in virtue of agents’ motivations. It might seem like a truism that at least some of our reasons depend on what we desire or care about. However, some philosophers, notably Derek Parfit, have convincingly argued that no reasons are grounded in this way. Typically, this latter, externalist view of reasons has been thought to enjoy the advantage of extensional adequacy—that is, the ability to account for all the reasons we intuitively think people have. This paper provides a novel argument against this assumption by considering a type of case wherein the relative strengths of the agent’s reasons can only be adequately explained by reference to what she cares about. Adding some further assumptions yields that there are at least some internally sourced reasons.
      PubDate: 2022-12-01
       
  • Agentive Duality reconsidered

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      Abstract: Abstract A growing consensus in the literature on agentive modals has it that ability modals like ‘can’ or ‘able to’ have a dual, i.e. interpretations of ‘must’ or ‘cannot but’ which stand to necessity as ability stands to possibility. We argue that this thesis (which we call ‘Agentive Duality’) is much more controversial than meets the eye. While Agentive Duality follows from the orthodox possibility analysis of ability given natural assumptions, it sits uneasily with a wide range of alternative proposals which are unified by the idea that ability requires control. In particular, we show that against the background of a control requirement on ability, Agentive Duality can be used to derive absurd predictions featuring this dual. Far from being a purely definitional thesis, Agentive Duality thus affords a new lens through which to assess the long-standing debate between possibility analyses of ability and their discontents.
      PubDate: 2022-12-01
       
  • What do we see in pictures' The sensory individuals of picture
           perception

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      Abstract: Abstract When I am looking at an apple, I perceptually attribute certain properties to certain entities. Two questions arise: what are these entities (what is it that I perceptually represent as having properties) and what are these properties (what properties I perceive this entity as having)' This paper is about the former, less widely explored, question: what does our perceptual system attribute properties to' In other words, what are these ‘sensory individuals’. There have been important debates in philosophy of perception about what sensory individuals would be the most plausible candidates for which sense modalities. The aim of this paper is to ask a related question about picture perception: what is the sensory individual of picture perception' When we look at a picture and see an apple depicted in it, what kind of entity do we see' What do we perceptually attribute properties to' I argue that the most straightforward candidates (ordinary objects, sui generis sensory individuals, no sensory individuals) are all problematic and that the most plausible candidate for the sensory individuals of picture perception are spatiotemporal regions.
      PubDate: 2022-12-01
       
  • No Grounds for Fictionalism

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      Abstract: Abstract I argue that fictionalism about grounding is unmotivated, focusing on Naomi Thompson’s (2022) recent proposal on which the utility of the grounding fiction lies in its facilitating communication about what metaphysically explains what. I show that, despite its apparent dialectical kinship with other metaphysical debates in which fictionalism has a healthy tradition, the grounding debate is different in two key respects. Firstly, grounding talk is not indispensable, nor even particularly convenient as a means of communicating about metaphysical explanation. This undermines the revolutionary proposal. Secondly, talk of grounding primarily occurs within metaphysics, which means the usual options for motivating a non-literal interpretation are ineffective. This undermines the hermeneutic proposal.
      PubDate: 2022-12-01
       
  • Fittingness first': Reasons to withhold belief

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      Abstract: Abstract Recent years have seen the rise of fittingness-first views, which take fittingness to be the most basic normative feature, in terms of which other normative features can be explained. This paper poses a serious difficulty for the fittingness-first approach by showing that existing fittingness-first accounts cannot plausibly accommodate an important class of reasons: reasons not to believe a proposition. There are two kinds of reasons not to believe a proposition: considerations that are counterevidence; and considerations that count against believing the proposition without indicating that it is false. I will argue that the fittingness-first accounts have trouble accommodating reasons of the latter kind.
      PubDate: 2022-12-01
       
  • Malleable character: organizational behavior meets virtue ethics and
           situationism

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      Abstract: Abstract This paper introduces a body of research on Organizational Behavior and Industrial/Organizational Psychology (OB/IO) that expands the range of empirical evidence relevant to the ongoing character-situation debate. This body of research, mostly neglected by moral philosophers, provides important insights to move the debate forward. First, the OB/IO scholarship provides empirical evidence to show that social environments like organizations have significant power to shape the character traits of their members. This scholarship also describes some of the mechanisms through which this process of reshaping character takes place. Second, the character-situation debate has narrowly focused on situational influences that affect behavior episodically and haphazardly. The OB/IO research, however, highlights the importance of distinguishing such situational influences from influences that, like organizational influences, shape our character traits because they are continuous and coordinated. Third, the OB/IO literature suggests that most individuals display character traits that, while local to the organization, can be consistent across situations. This puts pressure on the accounts of character proposed by traditional virtue ethics and situationism and provides empirical support to interactionist models based on cognitive-affective processing system theories of personality (CAPS). Finally, the OB/IO literature raises important challenges to the possibility of achieving virtue, provides valuable and untapped resources to cultivate character, and suggests new avenues of normative and empirical research.
      PubDate: 2022-12-01
       
  • The Nonconsequentialist Argument from Evil

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      Abstract: Abstract Stringent non-consequentialist constraints on permitting horrendous evils pose a formidable challenge to the project of theodicy by limiting the ways in which it is permissible for God to do or allow evil for the sake of bringing about a greater good. I formulate a general and potent argument against all greater-good theodicies (which includes most theodicies) from the existence of robust side constraints on permitting evil. Then I contend that the argument fails. I begin by distinguishing between side constraints on doing evil and side constraints on allowing evil, and then I draw on the work of David Lewis and Fiona Woollard to argue that, because of the unique ways that God is related to the world, it is plausible that God can both create and sustain our universe, despite all of its evils, without violating any of these constraints.
      PubDate: 2022-12-01
       
  • Panpsychism and ensemble explanations

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      Abstract: Abstract Panpsychism claims that the vast majority of conscious subjects in our world are inanimate and physical. Ensemble explanations account for striking phenomena by placing them within an ensemble of outcomes, most of which are not striking. This paper develops an explanatory problem for panpsychism: panpsychism renders two appealing ensemble explanations unsatisfactory. Specifically, we argue that panpsychism renders unsatisfactory the multiverse explanation of why a universe supports life and the many-planets explanation of why a planet supports life.
      PubDate: 2022-12-01
       
  • Veritism and ways of deriving epistemic value

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      Abstract: Abstract Veritists hold that only truth has fundamental epistemic value. They are committed to explaining all other instances of epistemic goodness as somehow deriving their value through a relation to truth, and in order to do so they arguably need a non-instrumental relation of epistemic value derivation. As is currently common in epistemology, many veritists assume that the epistemic is an insulated evaluative domain: claims about what has epistemic value are independent of claims about what has value simpliciter. This paper argues that the insulation approach to epistemic value is incompatible with non-instrumental epistemic value derivation. Veritsts who want to avail themselves of this important explanatory resource should therefore abandon the insulation approach.
      PubDate: 2022-12-01
       
  • Coherence in Science: A Social Approach

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      Abstract: Abstract Among epistemologists, it is common to assume that insofar as coherence bears on the justification of belief, the only relevant coherence relations are those within an individual subject’s web of beliefs. After clarifying this view and exploring some plausible motivations for it, we argue that this individualistic account of the epistemic relevance of coherence fails to account for central facets of scientific practice. In its place we propose a social account of coherence. According to the view we propose, a scientist S’s belief that p is prima facie unjustified if this belief negatively coheres with justified scientific claims in her scientific community. This account of coherence yields an epistemology for scientific belief which, we argue, has all of the benefits and none of the liabilities of its more individualistic predecessor.
      PubDate: 2022-12-01
       
  • An Acquaintance alternative to Self-Representationalism

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      Abstract: Abstract The primary goal of this paper is to provide substantial motivation for exploring an Acquaintance account of phenomenal consciousness, on which what fundamentally explains phenomenal consciousness is the relation of acquaintance. Its secondary goal is to take a few steps towards such an account. Roughly, my argument proceeds as follows. Motivated by prioritizing naturalization, the debate about the nature of phenomenal consciousness has been almost monopolized by representational theories (first-order and meta-representational). Among them, Self-Representationalism is by far the most antecedently promising (or so I argue). However, on thorough inspection, Self-Representationalism turns out not explanatorily or theoretically better than the Acquaintance account. Indeed, the latter seems to be superior in at least some important respects. Therefore, at the very least, there are good reasons to take the Acquaintance account into serious consideration as an alternative to representational theories. The positive contribution of this paper is a sketch of an account of consciousness on which phenomenal consciousness is explained partly in representationalist terms, but where a crucial role is played by the relation of acquaintance.
      PubDate: 2022-12-01
       
  • Consistency, possibility, and Gödel: a reply to Pruss

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      Abstract: Abstract Alexander Pruss has given a quick argument against the claim that consistency is possibility using Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem. The argument does not distinguish metalanguage claims of consistency from object-language ones, rendering it unsound.
      PubDate: 2022-12-01
       
  • Reply to ‘attempts’: a non-davidsonian account of trying
           sentences

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      Abstract: Abstract In various of my writings, both in Philosophical Studies and elsewhere, I have argued that an account of trying sentences is available that does not require quantification over alleged attempts or tryings. In particular, adverbial modification in such sentences can be dealt with, without quantification over any such particulars. In ‘Attempts’, Jonathan D. Payton (Payton, 2021) has sought to dispute my claim. In this paper, I consider his claims and reply to them. I believe that my account withstands such scrutiny. In what follows, I refer to my book as ‘MA’, in giving page numbers to guide the reader. ‘Payton’ always refers to ‘Payton 2021’.
      PubDate: 2022-12-01
       
 
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