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Abstract: Abstract Drawing on past work, we introduce a new approach to the New Riddle of Induction, showing that the inductive projection of gruesome properties is unreliable under particular ideal conditions that are sufficient for the reliable inductive projection of non-gruesome properties. As an auxiliary to our account, we introduce rules for resolving conflicts between background information and the conclusions of otherwise reliable inductive inferences. Our approach to the New Riddle of Induction is quite permissive in the range of properties it recognizes as suitable for inductive projection, allowing for the inductive projection of highly gerrymandered non-natural properties. However, as an addendum to our discussion of the New Riddle, we show that natural properties do form a more reliable basis for inductive projection in cases where one’s sample is small. PubDate: 2024-08-22
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Abstract: Abstract Anyone who raises questions about a well-entrenched practice can expect at least some of the practitioners to offer rebuttals. I am grateful to those who view my critique of current analytic philosophy as flawed for taking time to endeavor to correct me. They will surely not be surprised to find me recalcitrant. But I hope they will conclude, as I do, that the present airing of disagreements is profitable. PubDate: 2024-08-21
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Abstract: Abstract This paper argues that polygamous marriage should be decriminalized only if certain conditions are met: (1) every party involved is able to enter and exit the marriage at all times, (2) governments promote social norms that respect equality of every sex, and (3) children’s well-being is protected. Four objections against the legalization of polygamy are examined and criticized. First, the structural inequality objection – polygamy should be illegal because the structure of polygamous marriage is inherently inegalitarian. Second, the bargaining inequality objection – polygamy should be illegal because, in inegalitarian liberal societies, it is more likely that those who choose to be the peripheral spouse in polygamous marriage would decide from unequal bargaining positions. Third, the male-dominated norms objection – polygamy should be illegal because, in social contexts where polygyny is much more popular than polyandry, legalizing polygamy would boost inequality between males and females. Fourth, the children’s well-being objection – polygamy should be illegal because it would likely inflict harm on children. I argue that these four objections fail to justify the criminalization of polygamy. Instead, polygamy should be legal under certain conditions that are not as demanding as polygamy’s critics propose. PubDate: 2024-08-19
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Abstract: Abstract This paper provides and justifies a broader definition of a ‘law-breaking event’ than that adopted by D. Lewis who identifies this concept with the notion of an event that falsifies the laws of nature in his sense of ‘falsification’. It is pointed out that the broader definition is the key to answering C. Ginet’s objection against local miracle compatibilism. It also allows a neutral reconstruction of one of the disagreements underlying the compatibilism debate about the ability to do otherwise, i.e., the disagreement over nomological possibility of alternative action in a deterministic world. Under this reconstruction, neither the incompatibilist nor the compatibilist can take advantage of the concept of a law-breaking event to show that their opponent’s view is false. PubDate: 2024-08-09
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Abstract: Abstract This paper contains a new argument for evidentialism as an ethical rather than an epistemic doctrine. The argument relies on new developments in consequentialist thinking. The insights of the proponents of the moral encroachment thesis are used to show that we need higher standards of evidence, and to develop the concept of ethically sufficient evidence. It is demonstrated that prospectivism (subjective consequentialism) supports the contentions that we should not believe without ethically sufficient evidence, that we are permitted to believe when we have it, and that we are obligated to investigate to acquire it. It is argued that we do not have any obligations to believe. The ethical evidentialism argued for here is distinguishable from Clifford’s ethics of belief. Developing the doctrine clarifies some of our moral obligations, makes a positive contribution to prospectivism, and shows that evidentialism is better construed as an ethical doctrine. PubDate: 2024-08-09
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Abstract: Abstract In his book Normative Reasons (Logins A in Normative reasons: between reasoning and explanation. Cambridge University Press, 2022), Artürs Logins accepts that a normative reason to do A is always an answer to a ‘Why A'’ question, but rejects the unifying explanationist theory which identifies reasons always as explanations. On his Erotetic Theory, ‘Why A'’ questions sometimes seek an explanation (in No-Challenge contexts) but sometimes seek rather an argument (in Challenge contexts). This article defends a unifying, end-relational explanationist theory by interpreting ‘Why A'’ as being elliptical for different questions, with different explananda. I also respond inter alia to Logins’ claim that end-relational explanationism is extensionally inadequate because it fails to account for normative reasons for attitudes. Finally, I consider the objection that explanationism fails to account for normative reasons’ characteristic functional role of settling deliberation, introducing a “chicken or egg” dilemma over the order of discovery of reasons and options, resolved by suggesting that in open-ended deliberation reasons guide us to options without being represented under the guise of “reasons”. PubDate: 2024-08-05
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Abstract: Abstract In this paper, I will counter Hodgson’s critique of Hanks’ assertion that neutral predication is incoherent, which is premised on the belief that asking is a neutral act. My defense of Hanks will be two-pronged. Firstly, I will provide textual proof that Hanks is, or should be, of the opinion that asking is not neutral, but rather a committal act. Secondly, I will illustrate how Hanks’ model can accommodate the committal aspect of asking. PubDate: 2024-08-03
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Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Abstract: Abstract In Normative Reasons: Between Reasoning and Explanation (2022), Arturs Logins provides a novel reductivist account of normative reasons, what he calls the Erotetic View of Reasons. In this paper, I provide three challenges to this view. The first two concern the extensional adequacy of the Erotetic View. The view may fail to count as normative reasons all and only considerations that are such. In particular, the view seems to both overgenerate and undergenerate reasons. My third concern is that the view may fail to capture the essential, practice-independent nature of reasons, as well as reasons’ constitutive and grounding role with respect to other normative properties. PubDate: 2024-07-27
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Abstract: Abstract Optimistic beliefs have been criticized by philosophers as being irrational or epistemically deficient. This paper argues for the possibility of a rational optimism. We propose a novel four-fold taxonomy of optimistic beliefs and argue that people may hold optimistic beliefs rationally for at least two of the four types (resourced optimism and agentive optimism). These forms of rational optimism are grounded in facts about one’s resources and agency and may be epistemically justified under certain conditions. We argue that the fourth type of optimism in our taxonomy (perspectival optimism) is not subject to epistemic scrutiny in the same way. It is better evaluated on practical and moral grounds. This paper advances the discussion of optimism within both the philosophical and psychological literatures by providing a compelling and philosophically rich taxonomy of optimism that clarifies the sometimes-competing forms of optimism identified by psychologists. This advances the field by putting forward cases of epistemically justified optimism, in contrast with unrealistic optimism, that is sometimes justified for its instrumental or adaptive characteristics, and also by highlighting a form of optimism, perspectival optimism, that is not being considered in the mainstream optimism literature in psychology. The paper concludes by suggesting several avenues for future empirical and philosophical research. PubDate: 2024-07-25
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Abstract: Abstract Nelson Goodman observed that we use only certain ‘good’ (viz. projectible) predicates during reasoning, with no obvious demarcation criterion in sight to distinguish them from the bad and gruesome ones. This apparent arbitrariness undermines the justifiability of our reasoning practices. Inspired by Quine’s 1969 paper on Natural Kinds, Peter Gärdenfors proposes a cognitive criterion based on his theory of Conceptual Spaces (CS). He argues the good predicates are those referring to natural concepts, and that we can capture naturalness in terms of similarity. In contrast to Quine, he does not primarily rely on logic, but geometry. He frames his account as a descriptive project, however, and it is not obvious how it addresses the normative dimension of Goodman’s Riddle. This paper develops a charitable reconstruction of his argument, based on the idea that the instrumental success of our projectible concepts is grounded in their cognitive-pragmatic naturalness. It then explores three lines of reasoning against the argument: Evolutionarily motivated skepticism, the miracles argument, and the relation between instrumental and pragmatic success. I conclude that in its current form, the CS account fails to provide any justification of reasoning beyond appealing to its instrumental success, and that a metaphysically robust notion of naturalness helps to achieve the desired goal. PubDate: 2024-07-23
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Abstract: This paper explores a unified approach to linguistic reference and the nature of objects, addressing both abstract and concrete entities. We propose a method of redefining ultra-thin objects through a modified abstraction principle, which involves two distinct computations: subsemantic computation processes direct physical input, while semantic computation derives the semantic values of a sentence from the meanings of its constituents. These computations take different inputs—one physical and one semantic—but yield identical outputs. Among these, the subsemantic computation is more accessible. This approach facilitates a consistent treatment across various types of objects, including mathematical, concrete, social, and mental entities, thereby eliminating the need for domain-specific justifications. We advocate for this innovative perspective and address potential objections related to idealism and the utility of introducing objects. Our proposal advances the discourse of the nature of objects and linguistic reference, providing a comprehensive framework for understanding the existence and reference of objects across diverse discourse domains. PubDate: 2024-07-22
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Abstract: Abstract Taking stock of standard philosophical analyses of the concept, it is proposed that the domain of morality be defined by reference to seven characteristics: normativity, informality, importance, universality, categoricalness, overridingness, and a reference to beneficence and justice as the basic contents of its rules. These features establish a rather sharp distinction between moral and conventional rules. Recent literature in evolutionary morality and moral psychology, however, challenged the existence of a neat distinction between the moral and the conventional domains. The paper discusses three prominent objections to the proposed analysis that can be found in the empirical literature on morality: one centering on the relevance of moral sentiments, one based on the phenomenon of “harmless wrongdoing”, and one on the rejection of the universality and independence from authority of the moral domain. It is shown that the proposed analysis can be defended in light of the empirical findings. PubDate: 2024-07-19
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Abstract: Abstract Le Poidevin’s ‘new agnosticism’ concerns partaking in religious life while being uncertain whether religious discourse is fictional or not. Le Poidevin has offered two distinct versions of the new agnosticism, ‘semantic agnosticism’ and ‘meta-linguistic agnosticism’. I suggest that the first, ‘semantic agnosticism’, should be rejected, mainly because it involves a highly questionable view of truth and fails to properly distinguish fictional existence from real existence. The second, ‘meta-linguistic agnosticism’ seems acceptable as a view of religious discourse but not as a foundation for a religious life. A meta-linguistic agnostic will not be able to take the proper attitude towards religious propositions, since what is the proper attitude varies greatly between realism and fictionalism. Even more importantly, she will not know when it is rationally permissible to perform religious actions, because she will not know whether real-life concerns should take precedence or not. Le Poidevin’s meta-linguistic agnostic is also a truth-agnostic, and I conclude that adding meta-linguistic agnosticism to truth-agnosticism only complicates matters without offering any benefits. PubDate: 2024-07-18
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Abstract: Abstract It has recently been argued that metal’s ‘heaviness’ is conceptually inarticulable. I argue, on the contrary, that ‘heaviness’ is a matter of inaccessibility—the ‘something more’ that makes metal ‘heavy’ is actually something less: less auditory processing fluency. Like profound literature, metal resists, but also invites and rewards, interpretation. I argue that understanding ‘heaviness’ in terms of auditory processing fluency allows us to make sense of a number of otherwise puzzling features of the music, and to articulate a unifying gestalt for the genre. PubDate: 2024-07-13
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Abstract: The concepts to be considered in this chapter are those that occur in everyday common human thought and language – the “natural history” of concepts in use. While many may appear to be constituted by similarity relations, which make them suitable for modelling in conceptual spaces for example, other concepts in everyday use may be differently constituted. These concepts include abstract concepts, essentialist kinds, natural kinds, and logical or mathematical concepts. I discuss the different sources, uses and epistemological bases of these different forms of concept, and propose a three-level hierarchy of concepts based on their sources of validation. PubDate: 2024-07-11
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Abstract: Abstract If responsibility for character requires (among other things) having knowledge of the quality of one’s character, and this knowledge requires having at least some good aspects of character, we seem to come to startling conclusions. First, as Neil Levy argues, the worse one is morally speaking, the less one is responsible for being morally bad. Second, the truly bad are excused for their bad characters. I present several arguments against Levy’s view. First, I argue that the initial conclusion does not follow. It is not the case that the worse a person is, the less responsible she is for her character. A person may still have other aspects of character that enable her to fulfill this part of the epistemic condition. Further, both Aristotle and empirical research on character indicate that most people have such aspects. Second, I consider the truly morally bad. I show that most people voluntarily develop their characters and so – aside from rare cases of abuse, neglect, or congenital disorders – the vicious become so voluntarily. In this vein, I thirdly show that partial moral understanding is sufficient to meet the epistemic condition for character responsibility and most people have this. PubDate: 2024-07-08
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Abstract: Abstract Despite the moral underpinnings of Karl Popper’s philosophy, he has not presented a well-established moral theory for critical rationalism (CR). This paper addresses the ontological status of moral agents as part of a research program for developing a moral theory for CR. It argues that moral agents are selves who have achieved the cognitive capacity of personhood through an evolutionary scenario and interaction with the environment. This proposal draws on Popper’s theory of the self and his theory of three worlds, which offer both epistemological and ontological insights into the emergence and evolution of moral agents. The paper also discusses some of the consequences of this proposal for the objectivity and criticizability of moral judgments and the moral agency of artificial intelligence. It concludes by suggesting some directions for future research on the epistemological and ontological problems of ethics in CR. PubDate: 2024-06-24
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Abstract: Abstract In this paper, we want to maintain that the puzzle of imaginative resistance is basically a pragmatic issue due to the failure of participative imagination, as involving a pre-semantic level relating to a wide context (the overall situation of discourse). Since the linguistic meanings of the relevant fiction-involving sentences violate some of our basic norms, what such sentences (fictionally) say cannot be participatively imagined. That failure leads one to refrain from ascribing such sentences the fictional truth-conditions they would have in narrow fictional contexts (sets of fixed parameters) as determined by those meanings in those contexts. Yet one could still make that ascription, for one can cognitively imagine what such sentences would say in those contexts. As is proved by the fact that if one either adopts an alternative view on such norms or, for some reason, brackets them, one can again perform that ascription. PubDate: 2024-06-18 DOI: 10.1007/s11406-024-00753-1