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Abstract: Nominalism is the view that there are no universals but particulars. Trope Nominalism is a type of Nominalism. According to Trope Nominalism, there are tropes in the world– a trope is a particular nature. A type of Trope Nominalism is Campbellian Trope Nominalism, according to which both a trope’s resemblance relation and numerical distinctness relation to another trope are determined by these two tropes themselves. These two relations are internal relations. Douglas Ehring rejects Campbellian Trope Nominalism. Ehring argues that if both the resemblance relation and the numerical distinctness relation are internal relations, then each trope will have two intrinsic aspects. Since Ehring insists that an entity is not simple if it has more than one intrinsic aspect, all Campbellian tropes are not simple. Since Ehring insists that there must be simple entities, Campbellian Trope Nominalism is not a viable ontology if it contains no simple entities. In this paper, I will defend Campbellian Trope Nominalism by arguing that if we accept Ehring’s argument, there will be no simple entities at all. Since this contradicts Ehring’s assumption that there must be simple entities and if we insist on this assumption, Ehring’s argument is rejected and Campbellian Trope Nominalism is defended. PubDate: 2025-04-15
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Abstract: Some philosophers argue that animals shouldn’t be given less moral consideration simply on the basis of their species membership. These “anti-speciesists” argue that many common practices involving animals are morally objectionable, animal agriculture being one of their most common targets. However, it is questionable whether the same objections apply to those who farm animals in extreme poverty. Anti-speciesists tend to accept such a practice, arguing that it is permissible because it may be necessary for meeting the basic needs of those who engage in it. I argue that, despite the argument’s intuitiveness, it may be problematic for those who think humans and animals deserve similar levels of moral consideration. In particular, it forces the anti-speciesist into a trilemma: they can either accept the permissibility of farming animals in extreme poverty while also conceding that it would be permissible to farm and kill humans in certain circumstances, reject the permissibility of farming animals in extreme poverty, or abandon the anti-speciesist position. I argue that the first two options are not as problematic for the anti-speciesist as they might first appear. For this reason, I argue, farming animals in extreme poverty does not present a (major) problem for anti-speciesists. PubDate: 2025-04-14
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Abstract: The core of Van Leeuwen’s thesis is that the prescientific word ‘belief’ is multiply ambiguous between distinct cognitive kinds, just as the prescientific word ‘star’ can refer to a ball of gas or a planet. This book examines two of these cognitive kinds: factual belief and religious credence. After briefly discussing Van Leeuwen’s method, I examine the putative kindhood of factual belief and religious credence, arguing that the distinction between the two is not as clear-cut as Van Leeuwen makes it out to be. The distinction may consist in a continuum rather than discreet kinds. PubDate: 2025-04-08
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Abstract: The book Philosophy of Lyric Voice explores the value of lyric poetry by examining its use of voice as a central aesthetic feature.Voice is understood as expressive of a perspective—a distinctive way of seeing, thinking, and feeling—and thus lyric poetry is inherently perspectival. Moving beyond traditional literary conceptions of voice, which often limit it to modes of expression like point of view, the book considers voice more literally, connecting it to the ontology and aesthetics of the spoken voice. Through examples from contemporary page poetry and performed poetry, it emphasizes the role of the embodied voice—of the performer, reader, and poet—in shaping the expression of perspective. This embodied voice, tied to a specific body and shaped by its indexicality, offers a richer understanding of perspective in poetry.The book also examines multi-vocal poetry, such as collaborative works or bilingual poetry, as potential counterexamples to the singular perspective typically associated with lyric poetry. These works are shown to express shared perspectives, emerging from negotiations betweenviewpoints. By engaging with multi-vocal poetry, readers can explore the forging of connections between perspectives, enriching their understanding of meaning, communication, and the cultivation of intellectual humility. Together, these insights deepen appreciation for lyric poetry's value. PubDate: 2025-04-08
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Abstract: We normally think of the past as being fixed and unalterable. Many philosophers have held the same view about the future. Our actions may be able to influence the future by bringing about certain events, but we do not change the future since it will always have been the case that the relevant events were going to be brought about in that way. This is the standard view. The standard view has been challenged by a number of philosophers—most notably, Peter Geach. Geach’s view has seen renewed attention in recent years, but I will argue that the original impetus for the view is mistaken. Geach’s argument for the mutability of the future fails, and this failure has important things to teach us about the nature of prevention, the requirements for change, and the semantics of past-tense progressives. PubDate: 2025-04-04
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Abstract: John Doris’s work has been extremely influential over the past twenty years in shaping philosophical discussions about the empirical adequacy of virtue. Now, twenty years later, it is a welcome development to see many of Doris’s papers collected in one place in Character Trouble: Undisciplined Essays on Moral Agency and Personality. In my comments, I engage with three topics Doris raises pertaining to character. PubDate: 2025-04-03
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Abstract: Recently, Leidenhag (2021) has argued that the panpsychist should extend their belief to theism. She argues that if the panpsychist wants to tackle emergence, then they must be committed to two explanatory metaphysical principles, either the Causal Principle or the Principle of Sufficient Reason. That is one reason for the panpsychist to be a theist, since these principles favour theism over non-theism. Another reason Leidenhag illustrates is the problem of locating ‘bruteness’, which tries to show that theism is better equipped to tackle this over panpsychism. In this paper, I have three aims. First, I attempt to show that the panpsychist need not accept any of those explanatory principles. Secondly, I attempt to argue that even if they must accept at least one of the principles, neither of them being true favours theism over non-theism and does not forward the dialectic from metaphysics of consciousness for support to a theological view. Third, I attempt to reject the claim that the problem of locating bruteness is any evidence for theism. PubDate: 2025-03-31
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Abstract: There is the difficult question in metaphysics about the possibility of modal knowledge, that is, the possibility of knowing that some facts are necessary or that some facts are contingent. The question is especially demanding when one agrees, as I will, that there are worldly modal facts, but that modality cannot be learnt by empirical means and it must be given a priori. Here I propose an answer that calls in rational intuition for help. In a line, the claim is that metaphysical modal knowledge can be acquired a priori, by intuition into the categorial structure of empirical facts. This form of rational intuition I call categorial intuition. I will also examine causal knowledge as an exemplary case of metaphysical modal knowledge by categorial intuition. PubDate: 2025-03-24
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Abstract: In a recent paper, Bender (European Journal of Political Theory 1–20, 2024) argues that we should reject the notion of climate refugeehood because the existing defenses of climate refugeehood cannot be squared with political realism, according to which refugees fulfill a specific function and possess a specific value for admitting states. On this view, refugees serve admitting states’ self-interest by allowing admitting states to undermine rival regimes whose illegitimate practices render their citizens refugees, thus enhancing admitting states’ domestic and international perceptions of legitimacy. This article argues that the political autonomy account of refugeehood, an account Bender never examines, can accommodate climate refugees in a way that satisfies Bender’s political realist concerns. The broader implications of this argument are threefold: (1) such an account of refugeehood would limit the number of people who would count as climate refugees substantially more than most accounts that admit of the possibility of climate refugees; and (2) the fact that such an account of refugeehood can simultaneously accommodate the possibility of climate refugees while not being subject to Bender’s criticisms renders the political autonomy account especially plausible as a theory of refugeehood, whether one is a political realist or not. PubDate: 2025-03-24
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Abstract: Many of the world’s great wisdom traditions hold that human flourishing requires avoiding negative emotions such as anger, envy, spite, and jealousy. Thomason (2023) boldly challenges this received view. Whereas other negative emotion apologists advocate using reason to rein in our “bad feelings,” Thomason urges us to accept them just as they are. Her unqualified defense comprises two key arguments. The first draws on the idea that negative emotions are a necessary feature of healthy self-love—ceasing to feel them is tantamount to no longer caring about one’s life. The second argument points to an “emotion double standard” in which anger, envy, and other bad feelings are disparaged, while emotions such as joy and gratitude are praised, even though the same objections apply in both cases. Drawing on insights from social psychology and ancient philosophy, I aim to show that neither argument succeeds. One major weakness of these arguments is that they overlook features of negative emotions that seem intrinsically disvaluable such as hostility and self-centeredness. A second issue is that Thomason’s narrow conception of self-love gives a misleading impression regarding the necessity of bad feelings for a happy and healthy life. These criticisms notwithstanding, I conclude with a qualified endorsement of Thomason’s practical advice for living well with our emotions—an issue of perennial importance. PubDate: 2025-03-21
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Abstract: This short paper sheds light on the nature of concessions in compromise. Central to my analysis is Chiara Lepora’s (2012) taxonomy of three compromise types that are defined by the distinct kinds of concessions that they entail. These compromise types are conjunction, intersection, and substitution compromise. While Lepora’s taxonomy pertains to inter-personal compromise, this paper examines how the different concession types apply to intra-personal compromise. Aside from one notable exception (Räikkä, 2024), the extant literature on compromise has not yet specified concessions for intra-personal compromise and the first part of this paper aims to fill this gap. The second part refines our understanding of concessions in compromise by refuting Lepora’s claim that full concessions amount to capitulation. PubDate: 2025-03-20
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Abstract: This paper argues that objective list accounts of well-being cannot account for the fact that not all knowledge, an item typically on such lists, is good for people independently of their attitudes toward it. The most obvious way to distinguish that knowledge that is intrinsically valuable is precisely in terms of subjective attitudes and aims. Tennis is a source of well-being for me. It is not simply instrumentally valuable to me as a means to any usual member of objective lists. Since it is plausible to say that I play simply for the enjoyment, pleasure or enjoyment is the most likely member of objective lists under which to subsume tennis for me. But an analysis of the different types of pleasure shows that it is not what makes tennis valuable for me. It is intrinsically valuable to me in light of its intrinsic properties that attract me to it, although it is not valuable to many others. The objective list proponent cannot add new members, such as competition, play, or exercise of skill, to her list to which tennis is merely a means. Since it is not a means or instance to something that is good for all, it cannot be captured on any objective list. PubDate: 2025-03-19
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Abstract: This paper examines the contemporary relevance of dynamic non-dualism, providing a comprehensive view of consciousness and complexity through a process-oriented ontology that incorporates insights from non-Western philosophical traditions. By challenging the dominant mechanistic models in complexity science, this work supports a more nuanced perspective that synthesizes concepts from animism and non-dual philosophies, particularly influenced by Kashmir Shaivism. Unlike static interpretations of non-dualism, this process-oriented ontology highlights the interplay between unity and differentiation, focusing on the relational aspects of complexity from a cognitive-phenomenological dimension rather than merely through the lens of survival and fitness maximization. From this viewpoint, complexity is redefined, framing experiential diversity in processual terms and positioning cognition and materiality as interdependent elements within a non-dual continuum. The paper seeks to lay the groundwork for further exploration of the phenomenological, cognitive, and ontological aspects of complexity while offering a framework that transcends traditional dualistic separations between sentience and the material world. PubDate: 2025-03-15
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Abstract: This is a précis of my book Normative species. The point of departure of the book is inferentialism – the doctrine foreshadowed by Sellars and brought to full fruition by Robert Brandom, according to which language, but also other specifically human amenities, presuppose rules or are directly decomposable into various complexes of rules. It seems, indeed, that rules have managed to erect spaces within which we humans assumed our “unnatural” forms of life and which differentiate us so much from other animals. From this viewpoint, rules and complexes of rules start to look as something like the true key to our peculiar nature. PubDate: 2025-03-05
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Abstract: What does it mean to say that a poem is expressive, even self-expressive' How can listeners be said to self-identify with the expressive content of a lyric' What is the relevant notion of ‘self’ here, and how does it help explain the communicative dimension of the lyric arts' Might the answer to these questions tell us something about the social and cognitive value of the lyric arts' This paper uses a discussion of Karen Simecek’s superb The Philosophy of Lyric Voice to explore these issues. PubDate: 2025-03-01
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Abstract: In his recent book, Free Will’s Value: Criminal Justice, Pride, and Love, John Lemos defends an event-causal libertarian account of free will and argues that the belief in such free will plays an important, if not essential, role in supporting certain vital values. This paper examines Lemos’ account, critically evaluating his event-causal libertarianism and his pragmatic justification of belief in such free will. It begins by examining the libertarian account of Robert Kane, since Lemos defends a modified version of it, and then moves on to Lemos’ own indeterministic weightings view. In the second half of the paper, I then critically examine Lemos’ pragmatic defense of libertarian free will. I argue that the libertarian accounts of Kane and Lemos both face insurmountable difficulties, and Lemos’ pragmatic defense of libertarianism is unconvincing. PubDate: 2025-02-24
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Abstract: Karen Simecek’s Philosophy of Lyric Voice aims to explore certain complexities in our ideas about the ‘lyric I’ in lyric poetry, and the relation of the lyric I to notions including expression, perspective, and voice. I discuss some of the connections Simecek draws between these notions, and how she seems to understand them. I also express some doubt or hesitation about certain elements of her position: in particular, her apparent assumption that a perspective, in the relevant sense, must be unified, and hence that lyric poems must also be unified in a certain sense. These topics are connected with the fact that one of the things lyric poetry does is to focus our attention on language itself. I ask just what this might mean, and suggest that it is part of an attempt to undermine a common but naïve view of language that sees language as transparent and, in its essential nature, disembodied. PubDate: 2025-02-24
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Abstract: The paper highlights and reflects on two central themes in Simecek’s book: the role of voice in lyric poetry and the nature of any cognitive value that might arise from the lyric. The paper questions whether too much emphasis is given to the literal spoken voice in the case of page poetry (while acknowledging its centrality in performance poetry). Is perhaps too much weight given to the spoken rendering of a poem by any arbitrary reader' A rather different conception of poetic voice, typical of Modernist poetics, gives priority to rhetorical and linguistic qualities of the language itself in a poem—tone, diction, form, subject, and theme—which, taken across a poet’s oeuvre, can identify a distinctive character in the writing, readily described as the poet’s “voice” but not centred on spoken sounds. On cognitive values, it is useful to emphasise differences in performance and page poetry. The immediacy of the former is more likely to foster solidarity, community, and empathy, in contrast to the more distanced effects possible from reading poems on the page. The idea that reading poems can allow us to encounter perspectives different from our own is clearly right but the view in the book that ultimately this is somehow impossible, given a clash of perspectives, seems unduly pessimistic; but that opens up difficult questions about what exactly these perspectives are. PubDate: 2025-02-24
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Abstract: In recent work, Benjamin Ferguson and Sebastian Köhler take interest in the claim that permissible acts are always morally better than impermissible acts (bop). They argue that bop is both commonsensical and supported by powerful theoretical considerations. They then present a series of cases in which common moral claims appear to conflict with bop. In this paper, I first show that some of the conflicts Ferguson and Köhler identify are merely apparent, as they arise only given theoretical commitments regarding the value of actions that supporters of the relevant claims can and do reject. In the second half of the paper, I address two other cases Ferguson and Köhler discuss. I argue that the conflicts with bop in these cases are genuine, but also to be expected, because these cases involve supererogation, and our best theories of supererogation are in tension with Ferguson and Köhler’s case for bop. PubDate: 2025-02-21
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Abstract: Voltolini (J Aesthetics Art Criticisim, 79(3):315–327, 2021) has recently claimed that mirrors are bona fide pictures, for they are grasped via what he identifies as the defining characteristic of a picture: a certain seeing-in experience. Voltolini refines the somewhat elusive concept of seeing-in, originally described by Wollheim, and then demonstrates its applicability to mirror experience. However, in this paper, I contend that Voltolini’s improved version of seeing-in does not aptly describe the experience of viewing mirrors. In fact, according to the first aspect of Voltolini’s reconceived seeing-in, the configurational fold of a seeing-in experience must be an enriched perception of the picture’s vehicle that grasps how the vehicle’s elements are perceptually arranged. But, contra Voltolini, I argue that this does not hold true for the experience of looking at mirrors. Indeed, when looking at mirrors, we don’t perceive the configuration as an organizational structure; our visual system does not represent, even unconsciously, the properties of the mirror’s configuration as such. Mirror experience does not include an enriched perception of the picture’s vehicle; it does not grasp how the vehicle’s elements are perceptually arranged. My argument proceeds in two directions: firstly, through a phenomenological analysis of mirror experience and secondly, by corroborating these phenomenological observations with evidence from perceptual psychology. Thus, I conclude that if mirrors are to be considered bona fide pictures, it is not because they elicit a (reconceived) seeing-in experience. PubDate: 2025-02-21
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