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Abstract: Theoretical accounts of narcissism emphasize the dynamic shifting of self-states in response to social feedback. Status threats are thought to set narcissism’s dynamics in motion. Naturalistic ecological momentary assessment (EMA) studies have characterized dynamics of narcissistic grandiosity and vulnerability in relation to perceptions of the interpersonal environment. Experimental studies have emphasized the behavioral responses of narcissistic individuals to putative threats to status. Naturalistic and experimental studies suffer from opposing limitations, namely, a potential for confounding variables to impact results versus ambiguous generalizability to real-life and longer time scales, respectively. Integrating naturalistic and experimental studies has the potential to provide a comprehensive model of how dynamics within narcissism unfold in response to status threat. The present study examined shifts in grandiosity and vulnerability in both naturalistic EMA and experimentally controlled (rigged tournament game) social interactions (N = 437). Grandiosity decreased and vulnerability increased in response to both naturalistic and experimental status threats. Further, the same people who responded with decreased grandiosity in response to status threat in daily life responded with similar decreases in grandiosity to experimental defeat. Trait narcissistic agency amplified many of the observed links between narcissism and status threat experimentally and naturalistically. Given that warmth (in addition to dominance) emerged as an important predictor of shifts in narcissism, implications for status-threatening environments are discussed. The present study elucidates important differences with respect to expressions of grandiosity and vulnerability across naturalistic and experimental methods. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved) PubDate: Thu, 27 Jun 2024 00:00:00 GMT DOI: 10.1037/pspp0000510
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Abstract: Studies advancing the hypothesis of a “gender-equality paradox” have found that societies with more gender equality demonstrate larger gender differences across a range of phenomena. In doing so, they rely on that practice of predicting an algebraic difference score—calculated from mean scores for men and women across a set of countries—with an index of gender equality or some related concept. We argue that direct difference score predictions of this type are impossible to interpret because very different combinations of constituents—mean scores of men and women and properties of these means—can produce identical direct difference score predictions. We reanalyzed three large cross-cultural data sets with 15 variables from three different domains—attitudes toward science and technology, economic preferences, and personality traits—to showcase our method of deconstructing difference score predictions and to investigate to what extent the rhetoric of the gender-equality paradox describes a real phenomenon. The results were highly heterogeneous. For some characteristics, men’s and women’s country-level means varied identically as a function of country-level gender equality (no paradox). For other characteristics, there were differences in how men’s and women’s means varied. Whether these differences could be described in the rhetoric of the paradox varied. More pertinent is the necessity of deconstructing difference score predictions into their constituent components before attempting to answer questions regarding a paradox. It is in the terminology of these components and their properties that future hypotheses should be tested. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved) PubDate: Thu, 20 Jun 2024 00:00:00 GMT DOI: 10.1037/pspp0000508
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Abstract: Based on the cognitive–ecological approach and on logical–functional principles, in 12 studies (11 preregistered), we examine the novel hypotheses that psychological distance and construal level (CL) are associated in people’s minds with stimulus speed: the psychologically distant/abstract is slow, and the psychologically close/concrete is fast. The findings support our expectations. Study Set I examined the association between psychological distance and speed. Findings show that psychological distance is implicitly and explicitly associated with speed (Study 1), that psychological distance is seen as compatible with slow and proximity with fast (Study 2), that stimulus psychological distance affects its perceived speed (Study 3), and that stimulus speed affects its psychological distance (Study 4). Study Set II examined the association between construal level and speed. Findings show that construal level is explicitly associated with speed (Study 5), that abstract is seen as compatible with slow and concrete with fast (Study 6), that natural language word distribution structures reflect an association between abstractness and speed (Study 7), that construal level affects speed (Study 8), and that speed affects stimulus construal level (Study 9). Study Set III examined implications for communication and person perception. Findings suggest that slow-paced (vs. fast-paced) speech is associated with larger perceived spatial and social distance between speaker and audience and larger audiences (Studies 10a, 10b) and that people infer an expansive (contractive) regulatory scope from slow-paced (fast-paced) spoken messages (Study 11). We elaborate on possible mechanisms and their theoretical and practical implications in domains including decision making and urban design. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved) PubDate: Thu, 09 May 2024 00:00:00 GMT DOI: 10.1037/pspa0000384
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Abstract: White people confuse Black faces more than their own-race faces. This is an example of the other-race effect, commonly measured by the other-race face recognition task. Like this task, the “Who said what'” paradigm uses within-race confusions in memory, but to measure social categorization strength. The former finds a strongly asymmetrical pattern of interrace perception, the other-race effect, yet the latter usually finds symmetrical patterns (equally strong categorization of own-race and other-race faces). In a “Who said what'” meta-analysis, racial categorization and individuation across races were only weakly asymmetrical (Study 1, n = 2,669). We aimed to resolve this empirical misalignment. As tested in other-race face recognition tasks, the weak asymmetry was not due to the limited number of portrait stimuli (Study 2, N = 99) nor to the longer duration of stimulus presentation in the “Who said what'” task (Study 4, n = 358). Pairing portraits with statements reduced the other-race effect (Study 3, n = 126). Showing each portrait repeatedly also reduced the other-race effect (Study 4, n = 358; Study 5, n = 470) but did not decrease infrahumanization of Black portraits (Study 6, n = 487). Consequently, presenting portraits only once in the “Who said what'” paradigm (Study 7, N = 112) resulted in strong interrace categorization and individuation asymmetries. This finding bridges a central conceptual gap between the other-race effect and social categorization strength. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved) PubDate: Thu, 02 May 2024 00:00:00 GMT DOI: 10.1037/pspa0000388
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Abstract: We introduce the test difficulty concept from classical test theory to tackle the issue of low predictive power of implicit association tests (IATs). Following classical test theory, we argue that IATs of moderate difficulty (defined as mean IAT scores of zero) have more predictive power than IATs of extreme difficulties (defined as mean IAT scores deviating strongly from zero). Furthermore, we assume this relationship to be mediated by the true-score variance in IAT scores, with moderate difficulty resulting in more true-score variance. To test our hypotheses, we used nonexperimental (Studies 1 and 2) and experimental designs (Study 3). In Studies 1 and 2, we compared IATs of different test difficulties with regard to their ability to predict direct attitude measures, drawing on the Attitudes, Identities, and Individual Differences study. In Study 1, a subset of 95 attitude IATs (n = 127,259) was analyzed using multilevel structural equation models. As expected, IAT test difficulty strongly moderated the predictive power of IATs, and this effect was mediated by IAT true-score variance. In Study 2, we replicated the results with the same analyses but a different subset of 95 identity IATs (n = 43,745). In Study 3, we experimentally manipulated the IAT test difficulty. In total, three IATs (n = 480) were analyzed using multigroup structural equation models. Again, the IAT closer to moderate difficulty had more true-score variance and predictive power than the IATs of extreme difficulty. Accordingly, for correlational research, we recommend developing moderately difficult IATs to maximize IAT true-score variance and provide suggestions on how to achieve that. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved) PubDate: Thu, 02 May 2024 00:00:00 GMT DOI: 10.1037/pspa0000391
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Abstract: This study investigated the effects and interplay of several core determinants of consensus in person perception: information overlap, information quantity, cross-situational consistency, and shared meaning. Targets (N = 200) were filmed in different standardized situations. Perceivers either watched the same target in different situations (N = 1,395 perceivers) or different targets in the same situation (N = 3,963 perceivers) and then rated the targets’ personalities after each video. Overlap of the observed situations was systematically varied across perceivers. Consensus was higher when perceivers (a) observed a target in more overlapping situations, (b) observed a target in more situations overall, judged characteristics (c) for which between-target differences were more consistent across situations, or (d) for which perceivers had more similar meaning systems. The effect of overlap was more important with low consistency or information quantity, but moderate in size overall. In light of prior research failing to adequately operationalize overlap and consider its interplay with other factors, this study presents the strongest evidence to date on these issues. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved) PubDate: Thu, 21 Mar 2024 00:00:00 GMT DOI: 10.1037/pspp0000494
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Abstract: Moral panics have regularly erupted in society, but they appear almost daily on social media. We propose that social media helps fuel moral panics by combining perceived societal threats with a powerful signal of social amplification—virality. Eight studies with multiple methods test a social amplification model of moral panics in which virality amplifies perceptions of threats posed by deviant behavior and ideas, prompting moral outrage expression. Three naturalistic studies of Twitter (N = 237,230) reveal that virality predicts moral outrage in response to tweets about controversial issues, even when controlling for specific tweet content. Five experiments (N = 1,499) reveal the causal impact of virality on outrage expression and suggest that feelings of danger mediate this effect. This work connects classic ideas about moral panics with ongoing research on social media and provides a perspective on the nature of moral outrage. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved) PubDate: Thu, 29 Feb 2024 00:00:00 GMT DOI: 10.1037/pspa0000379
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Abstract: Whereas grandiose narcissism has generally been found to be related to adaptive affective experiences (i.e., positive affective states), many theoretical conceptualizations have emphasized its associations with characteristics of low affective well-being (i.e., unstable, highly variable affective states). Empirical research on the association of grandiose narcissism with the mean level of and variability in affective states has been inconclusive, as studies have differed considerably in their conceptualizations and measurement of narcissism and affect dynamics and have suffered from methodological limitations. Here, we offer conceptual explanations for previously inconsistent findings, derive diverging hypotheses about different aspects of narcissism and affective well-being, and investigate these hypotheses in two daily diary and three experience-sampling data sets (overall N = 2,125; total measurements = 116,336). As hypothesized, we found diverging associations between agentic and antagonistic aspects of narcissism with affect levels: Whereas narcissistic admiration was related to more pleasant affective states, narcissistic rivalry was related to less pleasant ones. We also obtained some support for diverging effects of admiration and rivalry on affect variability. However, these associations were largely reduced when we corrected for (squared) mean levels of affective valence and arousal. In combination, these findings suggest that only the agentic aspect of grandiose narcissism is conducive to affective well-being, whereas its antagonistic aspect negatively influences affective well-being. Moreover, the assumed associations of grandiose narcissism with volatile affectivity seem to rely heavily on mean-level effects and primarily manifest in experiences of more diverse affective states rather than stronger or more frequent affective fluctuations in general. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved) PubDate: Thu, 15 Feb 2024 00:00:00 GMT DOI: 10.1037/pspp0000495
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Abstract: Time is fundamental to organizing all aspects of human life. When invested in relationships, it has a psychological meaning as it indicates how much individuals value others and their interest in maintaining social relationships. Previous research has identified an intergroup time bias (ITB) in racialized social relations, defined as a discriminatory behavior in which White individuals invest more time in evaluating White than Black individuals. This research proposes an aversive racism explanation for the ITB effect and examines its consequences in the medical context. In four experimental studies (N = 434), we found that White medical trainees invested more time in forming impressions of White (vs. Black) male patients. Study 5 (N = 193) further revealed more time investment in diagnosing, assessing pain, and prescribing opioids for White than Black male patients. This biased time effect mediated the impact of patients’ skin color on health care outcomes, leading to greater diagnostic accuracy and pain perception, and lower opioid prescriptions. A meta-analytical integration of the results (Study 6) confirmed the ITB effect reliability across experiments and that it is stronger in participants with an aversive racist profile (vs. consistently prejudiced or nonprejudiced). These findings provide the first evidence that bias in time investment favoring White (vs. Black) patients is associated with aversive racism and impacts medical health care outcomes. Furthermore, these results offer insights into the sociopsychological meaning of time investment in health care and provide a theoretical explanation for an understudied insidious form of discrimination that is critical to comprehending the persistency of racial health care disparities. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved) PubDate: Thu, 14 Dec 2023 00:00:00 GMT DOI: 10.1037/pspi0000446
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Abstract: Research examining how crowd emotions impact observers usually requires participants to engage in an atypical mental process whereby (static) arrays of individuals are cognitively integrated to represent a crowd. The present work sought to extend our understanding of how crowd emotions may spread to individuals by assessing self-reported emotions, attention and muscle movement in response to emotions of dynamic, virtually modeled crowd stimuli. Self-reported emotions and attention from thirty-six participants were assessed when foreground and background crowd characters exhibited homogeneous (Study 1) or heterogeneous (Study 2) positive, neutral, or negative emotions. Results suggested that affective responses in observers are shaped by crowd emotions even in the absence of direct attention. Thirty-four participants supplied self-report and facial electromyography responses to the same homogeneous (Study 3) or heterogeneous (Study 4) crowd stimuli. Results indicated that positive crowd emotions appeared to exert greater attentional pull and objective responses, while negative crowd emotions also elicited affective responses. Study 5 (n = 67) introduced a control condition (stimuli containing an individual person) to examine if responses are unique to crowds and found that emotional contagion from crowds was more intense than from individuals. These studies present methodological advances in the study of crowd emotional contagion and have implications for our broader understanding of how people process, attend, and affectively respond to crowds. Advancing theory by suggesting that emotional contagion from crowds is distinct from that elicited by individuals, findings may have applications for refining crowd management approaches. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved) PubDate: Thu, 07 Dec 2023 00:00:00 GMT DOI: 10.1037/pspi0000445