Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Authors:Schmidtz; David Pages: 273 - 282 Abstract: Sometimes, we see crises coming. Sometimes, we can muster the resources we need to respond effectively. Sometimes, we can acquire the information we need to respond effectively. PubDate: 2024-05-14 DOI: 10.1017/S0265052524000062
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Authors:Buchanan; Allen Pages: 283 - 305 Abstract: My aim in this essay is to argue for a better moral-conceptual framework and for institutional innovation in preparation for the next pandemic. My main conclusions are as follows. (1) The primary moral principle that should guide responses to the next pandemic is the duty to prevent and mitigate serious harms. (2) A proper understanding of the moral foundations and scope of the duty to prevent and mitigate serious harms requires rejecting both Extreme Nationalism and Extreme Cosmopolitanism. (3) A better response to the next pandemic requires transforming the moral landscape through institutional innovation by developing an international institution that can perfect indeterminate duties (i) by identifying duty-bearers, (ii) by specifying their duties to provide medical resources and other forms of aid, (iii) by allocating the specified duties to various public and private entities in such a way as to ensure effective coordination and that the costs of providing aid are fairly distributed, and (iv) by providing effective mechanisms for compliance with the specified duties. (4) Institutional innovation is morally required, regardless of whether the harm prevention and mitigation duties of the better-off are duties of justice or of beneficence, because without institutionalization, some duties of justice, including those requiring the prevention and mitigation of serious harms, suffer some of the same indeterminacies that are present in duties of beneficence. PubDate: 2024-05-14 DOI: 10.1017/S0265052524000074
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Authors:Schüklenk; Udo Pages: 306 - 328 Abstract: The COVID-19 pandemic brought about at least two normative challenges on unprecedented scale for liberal democracies. One concerned prioritization decisions when health care resources were constrained. The other, which arguably led to lasting damage to social cohesion and citizens’ trust in government and government public health institutions, concerned policies introduced with the aim of reducing the spread of SARS-CoV2, some of which turned out to be mistaken. I discuss in this essay a few examples of misguided, liberty-limiting public health policies and describe how public health and public health ethics principlism provided cover for such policies. Citizens had reasons to be concerned about the duration of such liberty-infringing policies, the absence of predictable government policies, and the absence of transparent justifications for the policies that were implemented. PubDate: 2024-05-14 DOI: 10.1017/S0265052524000086
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Authors:Persad; Govind Pages: 329 - 350 Abstract: In response to a crisis, policymakers face the decision of whether to enumerate specific actions the public must do or, instead, to aim at an overall outcome while leaving room open for choice. This essay evaluates the merits and demerits of crisis response that leaves room open for choice, with a particular focus on pandemic response. I evaluate two approaches: trades and offsets. Trades allow individuals or groups to exchange protection against harm or entitlement to engage in risky activity. Offsets allow the same actors to pay to mitigate the effects of decisions that increase risk for others. Choice-friendly approaches can free people to better align their actions with their values, harness local knowledge for better social outcomes, and act as natural experiments. However, they also are subject to objections, including negative externalities, agency problems, exploitation, and exacerbating inequality. PubDate: 2024-05-14 DOI: 10.1017/S0265052524000098
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Authors:Cowen; Tyler Pages: 351 - 371 Abstract: The complexity of supply chains means that it is difficult to tell where national security arguments begin and end. That may weaken some of the traditional arguments for free trade for the same reasons that we accept the difficulty of rational economic calculation in a socialist society. National security arguments for protectionism may not remain restricted to very small and manageable segments of the economy. Liberals and cosmopolitans will need to pay greater heed to these problems. This essay also considers why complex supply chains may create problems for a carbon tax and for the notion of corporate social responsibility. PubDate: 2024-05-14 DOI: 10.1017/S0265052524000104
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Authors:Culp; Julian Pages: 372 - 386 Abstract: This essay revisits the metanormative version of the motivational critique of contemporary conceptions of cosmopolitan justice. I distinguish two ways of understanding this critique as leveling the charge of infeasibility against cosmopolitanism. Cosmopolitan motivation can be understood to be infeasible because it is impossible or because it is not reasonably likely to be achieved if tried. The possibilistic understanding is not persuasive, given that examples show that cosmopolitan motivation is possible. The conditional probabilistic understanding is more compelling, by contrast, because under certain social conditions it may not be reasonably likely that cosmopolitan motivation is achieved if tried. I argue, however, that whether cosmopolitan motivation is infeasible in the conditional probabilistic sense depends on malleable social conditions, given that, according to a plastic account of the human moral mind developed by Allen Buchanan, social conditions can undermine or favor the formation of cosmopolitan motivation. I illustrate this plastic account by showing how it can explain recent anticosmopolitan orientations as “tribalistic” reflexes to global crises, like the COVID-19 pandemic, which involved competition for survival resources and (existential) threats. I conclude that cosmopolitan motivation is not infeasible under all social conditions and that cosmopolitanism therefore requires bringing about and maintaining those social conditions under which cosmopolitan motivation is feasible. PubDate: 2024-05-14 DOI: 10.1017/S0265052524000116
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Authors:Sreenivasan; Gopal Pages: 387 - 407 Abstract: John Locke affirms a right to revolt against tyranny, but he denies that a minority of citizens is at liberty to exercise it unless a majority of their fellow citizens concurs in their judgment that the government is a tyranny. In a recent article, Massimo Renzo takes an equivalent position, on which a revolutionary vanguard requires the consent of the domestic majority before being permitted to revolt. Against Locke and Renzo, I argue that a minority of citizens can have a liberty to revolt, whatever the domestic majority may hold. My argument concentrates on the moral force of majority rule, which turns out to presuppose the satisfaction of a number of background conditions. When any of these conditions fails to obtain, no domestic majority can justifiably block a minority’s liberty to revolt against tyranny. For the purposes of the theory of revolution, this minority has to be large enough to have a reasonable prospect of (military) success. Without that prospect, the minority will be anyhow forbidden to revolt, on grounds familiar from just war theory. However, for the purposes of the theory of political legitimacy, prospects of success are irrelevant. All that matters are the conditions under which any citizen is released from their ordinary duty not to overthrow the government. PubDate: 2024-05-14 DOI: 10.1017/S0265052524000128
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Authors:Nili; Shmuel Pages: 408 - 430 Abstract: This essay aims to advance the general discussion of hypocrisy in moral and political philosophy as well as normative policy debates regarding democratic sanctions against autocracies that often trigger charges of hypocrisy. In the process of making sense of these charges, I articulate and tackle three general puzzles regarding hypocrisy complaints. The first—the inaction puzzle—asks why a charge of hypocrisy should have any effect on the moral assessment of an agent’s actions, as distinct from the agent’s character or attitudes. The second—the ambivalence puzzle—asks why we often react to hypocrisy charges with seemingly paradoxical ambivalence, recognizing such charges for the transparent deflections they often are, but also granting their normative force. The third—the preemption puzzle—asks why hypocrisy charges do not entirely lose their force when their targets openly concede that they too have suffered from the same flaws that they highlight in others. I argue that sustained reflection on each of these puzzles can enrich—and be enriched by—normative analysis of democratic sanctions. PubDate: 2024-05-14 DOI: 10.1017/S026505252400013X
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Authors:Fabre; Cécile Pages: 431 - 454 Abstract: Suppose that state A attacks state D without warrant. The ensuing military conflict threatens international peace and security. State D (I assume) has a justification for defending itself by means of military force. Do third parties have a justification for intervening in that conflict by such means' To international public lawyers, the well-rehearsed and obvious answer is “yes.” Threats to international peace and security provide one of two exceptions to the legal and moral prohibition (as set out in Article 2[4] of the UN Charter) on using force as a means for resolving interstate disputes. Just war theorists are not as verdictive. Compared to the ethics of humanitarian intervention and the ethics of national self-defense, the ethics of third-party military involvement in interstate conflicts remains underdeveloped in contemporary just war theory. This essay begins to fill that gap. I argue that to defend such interventions is tantamount to defending preventive military force, deterrent military force, and the resort to force in more cases than standardly thought. I then provide an account and limited defense of the deterrence argument. I show that deterrence is morally justified in relatively few cases and examine two problems with the argument: deterrence failures and the level of uncertainty under which leaders who use deterrent force operate. I conclude that we should take seriously the possibility that nonintervention, construed as the rejection of the direct use of military force, is the morally correct response to the most serious threats to international peace and security. PubDate: 2024-05-14 DOI: 10.1017/S0265052524000141
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Authors:Davies; Stephen Pages: 455 - 481 Abstract: Crises, defined as a period of acute stress on social systems of all kinds, are a recurrent feature of history. As such, they are best approached and understood from a comparative historical perspective. We can distinguish between those caused or precipitated by an exogenous shock and those that derive from an endogenous process that culminates in the crisis. Crises can be of short or long duration and range from local to global. The most severe are ones that lead to a civilizational collapse or radical simplification process. Historically, severe crises have been localized to specific parts of the planet, even when several occur simultaneously because of global natural phenomena, but in the modern world we have truly global crises. Evidence suggests that such a global crisis is imminent or has already commenced. This raises practical and normative pressing issues. PubDate: 2024-05-14 DOI: 10.1017/S0265052524000153
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Authors:Moore; Margaret Pages: 482 - 502 Abstract: This essay argues that we have a duty to protect biodiversity hotspots, rooted in an argument about the wrongful imposition of risk and intergenerational justice. State authority over territory and resources is not unlimited; the state has a duty to protect these areas. The essay argues that although biodiversity loss is a global problem, it can be tackled at the domestic level through clear rules. The argument thus challenges the usual view of state sovereignty, which holds that authority over territory, resources, and migration (all of which are connected to the protection of biodiversity hotspots) is unlimited. PubDate: 2024-05-14 DOI: 10.1017/S0265052524000165
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Authors:Rosenberg; Alexander Pages: 503 - 523 Abstract: It is argued that the natural and human vicissitudes of the Northern Hemisphere—or at least western European history between 1315 and 1648—provide a preview of the sort of consequences for humanity and its demography that will result from the serious if not catastrophic climate change that is now anticipated by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Game theory suggests that at least some nation-state players in the strategic problem that climate change raises will not choose Nash equilibria that mitigate the problem. The only feasible solution will be the discovery or invention of some non-greenhouse-gas-emitting energy source so cheap that its owner will be indifferent to free-riding by all other users of energy. Recent efforts to develop fusion reactors do not provide much hope for this eventuality. PubDate: 2024-05-14 DOI: 10.1017/S0265052524000177
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Authors:Anomaly; Jonathan, Nobre Faria, Filipe Pages: 524 - 543 Abstract: Liberal political institutions have been an enormous boon for humanity. The free market aspect of liberalism has led to an explosion of innovation, ranging from new kinds of technology and novel forms of entertainment to advances in science and medicine. The emphasis on individual rights at the core of liberalism has increased our ability to explore new ways of living and to construct an identity of our own choosing. But liberal political institutions around the world are facing two crises: low fertility and declining social trust. In particular, liberalism’s focus on individual liberty rather than group cohesion can increase economic productivity by encouraging the free movement of people and capital, but this movement is associated with declines in social cohesion and fertility. In this essay, we highlight some challenges to the long-term evolutionary stability of liberalism. In other words, we raise the question: Can liberalism last' PubDate: 2024-05-14 DOI: 10.1017/S0265052524000189
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