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  Subjects -> SOCIAL SERVICES AND WELFARE (Total: 224 journals)
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Social Choice and Welfare
Journal Prestige (SJR): 0.644
Citation Impact (citeScore): 1
Number of Followers: 12  
 
  Hybrid Journal Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles)
ISSN (Print) 1432-217X - ISSN (Online) 0176-1714
Published by Springer-Verlag Homepage  [2467 journals]
  • On the political economy of economic integration

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      Abstract: Abstract We consider a general equilibrium model with vertical preferences for one good and two identical countries each with one firm initially. Citizens in each country vote either for economic integration (or openness) or for autarky. A decision for free trade is effective only when bilateral. Each citizen in each country is potentially a consumer, a worker and a shareholder in the domestic firm. Citizens differ with respect to their preference for quality and labor ability. Free trade always lowers (increases) social welfare in the low (high)-quality country, with a positive overall effect. The vote outcome however depends on the majority vote in the low-quality country, as the high-quality country always votes for openness. The outcome thus depends in a complex way on the degree of concentration of the ownership structure in the low quality country and the relative dispersion of the citizens with respect to their preference for quality and labor ability. The decentralized decision through voting yields a complex outcome, suggesting an explanation for the observed diversity of views on the merits of free trade.
      PubDate: 2022-11-30
       
  • Special Issue in Honour of John A. Weymark

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      PubDate: 2022-11-29
       
  • Two new classes of methods to share the cost of cleaning up a polluted
           river

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      Abstract: Abstract Consider a group of agents located along a polluted river where every agent must pay a certain cost for cleaning up the polluted river. Following the model of Ni and Wang (2007), we propose weaker versions of some of their axioms, and introduce two classes of cost sharing methods. We first show that the upstream equal sharing method (for short, UES method) is characterized by relaxing independence of upstream costs and no blind cost appearing in Ni and Wang (2007). After that, we propose the classes of equal upstream responsibility methods (for short, EUR methods) and weighted upstream sharing methods (for short, WUS methods), which generalizes the local responsibility sharing method (for short, LRS method) and the UES method. We provide two axiomatizations of the class of EUR methods by replacing upstream symmetry for the UES method with weak upstream symmetry. Meanwhile, we also provide two axiomatizations of the class of WUS methods by introducing two other weak versions of upstream symmetry. Finally, we define a pollution cost-sharing game, and show that each of the EUR methods and WUS methods is obtained as a Harsanyi solution for these pollution cost-sharing games. Moreover, we also show that the average of the LRS method and UES method, referred to as the compromise method, coincides with the Shapley value of this game.
      PubDate: 2022-11-28
       
  • Where should your daughter go to college' An axiomatic analysis

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      Abstract: Abstract We consider the problem of choosing a location in an interval so as to best take into account the preferences of two agents who will use this location. One has single-peaked preferences and the other single-dipped preferences. The most preferred location for the agent with single-peaked preferences is known and it is the least preferred location for the agent with single-dipped preferences. We show that the only efficient and strategy-proof rules are dictatorial.
      PubDate: 2022-11-18
       
  • The possibility of generalized social choice functions and Nash’s
           independence of irrelevant alternatives

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      Abstract: Abstract Social choice functions are generalized to handle Nash’s independence of irrelevant alternatives. Possibility and impossibility results are established.
      PubDate: 2022-11-09
       
  • Preference aggregation for couples

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      Abstract: Abstract We study the aggregation of a couple’s preferences over their respective jobs when the couple enters a centralized labor market jointly, such as the market for hospital residencies. In such markets couples usually need to submit a joint preference ordering over pairs of jobs and thus we are interested in preference aggregation rules which start with two individual preference orderings over single jobs and produce a preference ordering of pairs of jobs. We first study the Lexicographic and the Rank-Based Leximin aggregation rules, as well as a large class of preference aggregation rules which contains these two rules. Then we propose a smaller family of parametric aggregation rules, the k-Lexi-Pairing rules, which call for a systematic way of compromising between the two partners. The parameter k indicates the degree to which one partner is prioritized, with the most equitable Rank-Based Leximin rule at one extreme and the least equitable Lexicographic rule at the other extreme. Since couples care about geographic proximity, a parametric family of preference aggregation rules which build on the k-Lexi-Pairing rules and express the couple’s preference for togetherness is also identified. We provide axiomatic characterizations of the proposed preference aggregation rules.
      PubDate: 2022-11-01
       
  • Self-implementation of social choice correspondences in Nash equilibrium

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      Abstract: Abstract A social choice correspondence is Nash self-implementable if it can be implemented in Nash equilibrium by a social choice function that selects from it as the game form. We provide a complete characterization of all unanimous and anonymous Nash self-implementable social choice correspondences when there are two agents or two alternatives. For the case of three agents and three alternatives, only the top correspondence is Nash self-implementable. In all other cases, every Nash self-implementable social choice correspondence contains the top correspondence and is contained in the Pareto correspondence. In particular, when the number of alternatives is at least four, every social choice correspondence containing the top correspondence plus the intersection of the Pareto correspondence with a fixed set of alternatives, is self-implementable.
      PubDate: 2022-11-01
       
  • Obvious manipulations in cake-cutting

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      Abstract: Abstract In the classical cake-cutting problem, strategy-proofness is a very costly requirement in terms of fairness: for \(n=2\) it implies a dictatorial allocation, whereas for \(n\ge 3\) it implies that one agent receives no cake. We show that a weaker version of this property recently suggested by Troyan and Morril (J Econ Theory 185:104970, 2019) is compatible with the fairness property of proportionality, which guarantees that each agent receives 1/n of the cake. Both properties are satisfied by the leftmost-leaves mechanism, an adaptation of the Dubins–Spanier moving knife procedure. Most other classical proportional mechanisms in the literature are obviously manipulable, including the original moving knife mechanism and some other variants of it.
      PubDate: 2022-11-01
       
  • The average-of-awards rule for claims problems

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      Abstract: Abstract Given a claims problem, the average-of-awards rule ( \({\text {AA}}\) ) selects the expected value of the uniform distribution over the set of awards vectors. The \({\text {AA}}\) rule is the center of gravity of the core of the coalitional game associated with a claims problem, so it corresponds to the core-center. We show that this rule satisfies a good number of properties so as to be included in the inventory of division rules. We also provide several representations of the \({\text {AA}}\) rule and a procedure to compute it in terms of the parameters that define the problem.
      PubDate: 2022-11-01
       
  • Effects of majority-vote reward mechanism on cooperation: a public good
           experimental study

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      Abstract: Abstract This paper conducts a laboratory experiment to examine the effectiveness of majority-vote reward mechanism on cooperation, and to compare its effects with that of peer reward and no reward in the voluntary contribution mechanism. According to the experimental result, it shows that whether individuals have homogeneous or heterogeneous marginal per capita return of the public good, the majority-vote reward mechanism is significantly effective in facilitating cooperation.
      PubDate: 2022-11-01
       
  • Marginalism, egalitarianism and efficiency in multi-choice games

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      Abstract: Abstract The search for a compromise between marginalism and egalitarianism has given rise to many discussions. In the context of cooperative games, this compromise can be understood as a trade-off between the Shapley value and the Equal division value. We investigate this compromise in the context of multi-choice games in which players have several activity levels. To do so, we propose new extensions of the Shapley value and of the Equal division value to multi-choice games. Contrary to the existing solution concepts for multi-choice games, each one of these values satisfies a Core condition introduced by Grabisch and Xie (Math Methods Oper Res 66(3):491–512, 2007), namely Multi-Efficiency. We compromise between marginalism and egalitarianism by introducing the multi-choice Egalitarian Shapley values, computed as the convex combination of our extensions. To conduct this study, we introduce new axioms for multi-choice games. This allows us to provide an axiomatic foundation for each of these values.
      PubDate: 2022-11-01
       
  • Need, equity, and accountability

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      Abstract: Abstract We report the results of a vignette study with an online sample of the German adult population in which we analyze the interplay between need, equity, and accountability in third-party distribution decisions. We asked participants to divide firewood between two hypothetical persons who either differ in their need for heat or in their productivity in terms of their ability to chop wood. The study systematically varies the persons’ accountability for their neediness as well as for their productivity. We find that participants distribute significantly fewer logs of wood to persons who are held accountable for their disadvantage. Independently of being held accountable or not, the needier person is partially compensated with a share of logs that exceeds her contribution, while the person who contributes less is given a share of logs smaller than her need share. Moreover, there is a domain effect in terms of participants being more sensitive to lower contributions than to greater need.
      PubDate: 2022-11-01
       
  • Inequality, poverty and the composition of redistribution

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      Abstract: Abstract We study the use of social expenditures and regulation for redistribution. When regulated goods are essential in the consumption bundle of the poor, a high poverty rate creates incentives to increase redistribution through regulation. By contrast, inequality directs redistribution towards social expenditures. We propose a theoretical model that captures the trade-off between these two redistributive policies and test the model implications with a novel municipality dataset on income and local government policies. Theory predicts and empirical evidence supports that failing to account for poverty biases the effect of inequality on redistribution. Our evidence also reflects the positive connection between poverty and the use of regulation for redistribution.
      PubDate: 2022-11-01
       
  • Optimality of the coordinate-wise median mechanism for strategyproof
           facility location in two dimensions

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      Abstract: Abstract We consider the facility location problem in two dimensions. In particular, we consider a setting where agents have Euclidean preferences, defined by their ideal points, for a facility to be located in \(\mathbb {R}^2\) . We show that for the p-norm ( \(p \ge 1\) ) objective, the coordinate-wise median mechanism (CM) has the lowest worst-case approximation ratio in the class of deterministic, anonymous, and strategyproof mechanisms. For the minisum objective and an odd number of agents n, we show that CM has a worst-case approximation ratio (AR) of \(\sqrt{2}\frac{\sqrt{n^2+1}}{n+1}\) . For the p-norm social cost objective ( \(p\ge 2\) ), we find that the AR for CM is bounded above by \(2^{\frac{3}{2}-\frac{2}{p}}\) . We conjecture that the AR of CM actually equals the lower bound \(2^{1-\frac{1}{p}}\) (as is the case for \(p=2\) and \(p=\infty\) ) for any \(p\ge 2\) .
      PubDate: 2022-10-25
       
  • A topological characterization of generalized stable sets

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      Abstract: Abstract The purpose of this note is to provide a topological characterization for the existence of the generalized stable set introduced by Van Deemen (Soc Choice Welf 8:255–260, 1991) as a generalization of the Von Neumann–Morgenstern stable set.
      PubDate: 2022-10-17
       
  • Binary mechanism for the allocation problem with single-dipped preferences

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      Abstract: Abstract In this study, we consider the problem of fairly allocating a fixed amount of a perfectly divisible resource among agents with single-dipped preferences. It is known that any efficient and strategy-proof rule violates several fairness requirements. We alternatively propose a simple and natural mechanism, in which each agent announces only whether he or she demands a resource and the resource is divided equally among the agents who demand it. We show that any Nash equilibrium allocation of our mechanism belongs to the equal-division core. In addition, we show that our mechanism is Cournot stable. In other words, from any message profile, any path of better-replies converges to a Nash equilibrium.
      PubDate: 2022-10-11
       
  • Does allowing private communication lead to less prosocial collective
           choice'

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      Abstract: Abstract To investigate the effects of private communication on support for prosocial collective choices, we conduct a laboratory experiment in a public goods setting with a majority vote, manipulating whether participants can have private conversations before a public discussion. When private conversations are allowed, majority tyranny outcomes are more common and prosocial collective choices less common. In both communication treatments, participants start out proposing and voting for prosocial allocations and increase their support for majority tyranny allocations as the experiment progresses. Private communication therefore increases the prevalence of majority tyranny (but is not strictly necessary for it). The results demonstrate that the effects of private communication in multilateral bargaining extend to public goods settings, despite the contrasting finding in the latter that democratic institutions enhance prosocial outcomes.
      PubDate: 2022-10-04
       
  • Habit formation and the pareto-efficient provision of public goods

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      Abstract: Abstract This paper examines the implications of habit formation in private and public goods consumption for the Pareto-efficient provision of public goods, based on a two-period model with nonlinear taxation. Under weak leisure separability, and if the public good is a flow-variable such that the government directly decides on the level of the public good in each period, habit formation leads to a modification of the policy rule for public good provision if, and only if, the degrees of habituation differ for private and public good consumption. By contrast, if the public good supply is time-invariant, the presence of habit formation generally alters the policy rule for public good provision.
      PubDate: 2022-10-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s00355-022-01401-x
       
  • Electoral Institutions with impressionable voters

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      Abstract: Abstract We use a model of impressionable voters to study multi-candidate elections under different electoral rules. Instead of maximizing expected utility, voters cast their ballots based on impressions. We show that, under each rule, there is a monotone relationship between voter preferences and vote measures. The nature of this relationship, however, varies by electoral rule. Vote measures are biased upwards for socially preferred candidates under plurality rule, but biased downwards under negative plurality. There is no such bias under approval voting or Borda count. Voters always elect the socially preferred candidate in two-way races for any electoral rule. In multi-candidate elections, however, the ability to elect a Condorcet winner varies by rule. The results show that multi-candidate elections can perform well even if voters follow simple behavioral rules. The relative performance of specific electoral institutions, however, depends on the assumed behavioral model of voting.
      PubDate: 2022-10-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s00355-022-01406-6
       
  • The Burning Coalition Bargaining Model

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      Abstract: Abstract The paper presents a coalitional bargaining model, the Burning Coalition Bargaining Model, having a peculiar type of partial breakdown. In fact, in this model, the rejection of a proposal causes the possibility of the proposed coalition to vanish, rather than triggering the end of all negotiations or the exclusion of some players from the game, as already proposed in the literature. Under this type of partial breakdown and adopting a standard rejecter-proposes protocol, 0-normalized, 3-players games are examined for extreme values of the breakdown probability. When such probability is equal to one, efficiency is more difficult to obtain than in models adopting discounting and the first mover advantage is strongly diminished. Furthermore, when an efficient outcome is attained, the final distribution of payoffs reflects the strength of players in the game, with strength being represented by belonging to more valuable coalitions. The same feature is retained when considering a probability of breakdown approaching zero.
      PubDate: 2022-10-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s00355-022-01409-3
       
 
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