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Abstract: Abstract Population axiology concerns how to rank populations by the relation “is socially preferred to”. So far, population ethicists have (with important exceptions) focused less on the question of how to rank population prospects, that is, alternatives that contain uncertainty as to which population they will bring about. Most public policy choices, however, are decisions under uncertainty, including policy choices that affect the size of a population (such as climate policy choices). Here, we shall address the question of how to rank population prospects by the relation “is socially preferred to”. We start by illustrating how well-known population axiologies can be extended to population prospect axiologies. And we show that new problems arise when extending population axiologies to prospects. In particular, traditional population axiologies lead to prospect-versions of the problems that they are praised for avoiding in the risk-free settings. Moreover, we show how the axiom of State-Wise Dominance allow us to extend any impossibility theorem in population axiology to impossibility theorems for non-trivial population prospects, that is, prospects that confer probabilities strictly between zero and one on different populations. Finally, we formulate impossibility results that only involve probabilistic axioms. PubDate: 2023-03-18
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Abstract: Abstract Animal agriculture encompasses global markets with large externalities from animal welfare and greenhouse gas emissions. We formally study these social costs by embedding an animal inclusive social welfare function into a climate-economy model that includes an agricultural sector. The total external costs are found to be large under the baseline parameterization. These results are driven by animal welfare costs, which themselves are due to an assumption that animal lives are worse than nonexistence. Though untestable—and perhaps controversial—we find support for this qualitative assumption and demonstrate that our results are robust to a wide range of its quantitative interpretations. Surprisingly, the environmental costs play a comparatively small role, even in sensitivity analyses that depart substantially from our baseline case. For the model to find that beef, a climate-intensive product, has a larger total externality than poultry, an animal-intensive product, we must simultaneously reduce the animal welfare externality to 1% of its baseline level and increase climate damages roughly 35-fold. Correspondingly, the model implies both that the animal agriculture sector is much larger than its optimal level and that considerations across products ought to be dominated by animal welfare, rather than climate, effects. PubDate: 2023-03-16
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Abstract: Abstract In an endogenous growth model, we characterize the conditions under which positional preferences for consumption and wealth do not cause inefficiency and derive an optimal tax policy response in cases where these conditions are not satisfied. The concerns for relative consumption and relative wealth partly emanate from social comparisons with people in other countries. We distinguish between a (conventional) welfarist government and a non-welfarist government that does not attach any social value to relative concerns. We also compare the outcome of Nash-competition among local/national governments with the resource allocation implied by a global social optimum both under welfarism and non-welfarism. PubDate: 2023-02-14
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Abstract: Abstract In this work we pursue the study of manipulability of social choice functions through “liftings”, that is, mappings which extend orderings over points to orderings over subsets of points. We discover a very weak notion of monotony which is closely related to independence of irrelevant alternatives. This allows us to establish an interesting and general theorem on manipulability. We show that this theorem is indeed equivalent to Arrow-Sen Theorem in the class of nonmanipulable social choice functions. As a consequence of this general theorem we obtain a manipulation theorem for linear profiles in the style of Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem but for social choice functions instead of voting schemes. We introduce the notion of nominator, which is a natural generalization of the notion of pairwise nominator introduced by Kelly. Then, we establish that, in the presence of rational properties over liftings, a social choice function is either manipulable, or it admits a nominator. In addition, we do a comparative study on different types of powerful voters (dictators, nominators, pairwise nominators and weak-dictators) present in the literature. Although, in general, they are non-equivalent notions, we show that under some natural conditions, modulo nonmanipulability, the last three are equivalent or even all the notions are equivalent. PubDate: 2023-02-06
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Abstract: Abstract We consider a setting in which additional parameters that determine preference characteristics are unknown. The mechanism designer specifies a model for possible type distributions and utility functions. We consider mechanisms that are uniformly incentive compatible with respect to a domain of possible utility functions. We identify conditions on the utility domain in which mechanisms always prescribe the same distribution over outcomes. These conditions have implications for optimal mechanism design with max-min objectives, and may be interpreted as capturing different forms of preference heterogeneity. PubDate: 2023-01-27
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Abstract: Abstract We investigate a specific type of group manipulation in two-tier elections, which involves pairs of voters agreeing to exchange their votes. Two-tier elections are modeled as a two-stage choice procedure. In the first stage, voters are distributed into districts, and district preferences result from aggregating voters’ preferences district-wise through some aggregation rule. Final outcomes are obtained in the second stage by applying a social choice function that outputs one or several alternatives from the profile of district preferences. Combining an aggregation rule and a social choice function defines a constitution. Voter preferences, defined as linear orders, are extended to complete binary relations by means of some extension rule. A constitution is swap-proof w.r.t. a given extension rule if one cannot find pairs of voters who, by exchanging their preferences get better off (w.r.t. their extended preference over sets). We consider four specific extension rules: Nehring, Kelly, Fishburn, and Gärdenfors. We establish sufficient conditions for the swap-proofness of a constitution w.r.t. each extension rule. Special attention is paid to majority constitutions, where both the aggregation rule and the social choice function are based on simple majority voting. We show that swap-proofness for majority constitutions pertains to a specific weakening of group strategy-proofness. Moreover, we characterize swap-proof majority constitutions w.r.t. each extension rule. Finally, we show that no constitution based on scoring methods is swap-proof. PubDate: 2023-01-25
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Abstract: Abstract We propose a new method, that we call an allocation perturbation, to derive the optimal nonlinear income tax schedules with multidimensional individual characteristics on which taxes cannot be conditioned. It is well established that, when individuals differ in terms of preferences on top of their skills, optimal marginal tax rates can be negative. In contrast, we show that with heterogeneous behavioral responses and skills, one has optimal positive marginal tax rates, under utilitarian preferences and maximin. PubDate: 2023-01-01
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Abstract: Abstract A generalization of the well-known Vickrey auctions are lottery qualification auctions–where the m highest bidders win the good with uniform probability, and pay the \(m+1\) st highest bid upon winning. A random lottery qualification mechanism decides the integer m randomly. We characterize the class of mechanisms which are payoff equivalent to the random lottery qualification auctions. The key property characterizing this class of mechanisms is one which states that only the ordinal comparison of willingness-to-pay across individuals is relevant in determining the allocation. The mechanisms can be seen as compromising between ex-post utility efficiency and monetary efficiency. PubDate: 2023-01-01
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Abstract: Abstract This paper rigorously demonstrates that for any unequal income distribution, the well-known Gini index of inequality is bounded above by the recently revived Bonferroni inequality index. The bound is exactly attained if and only if out of n incomes in the society, n − 1 poor incomes are identical. The boundedness theorem is shown to possess a duality-type inequality implication. These two inequality metrics, two popular members of a general class of inequality indices generated by Aaberge’s (J Econ Inequal 5:305–322, 2007) ‘scaled conditional mean curve’, may lead to different directional rankings of alternative income distributions because of some important differences between them. We then explicitly examine their sensitivity to Weymark’s (Math Soc Sci 1:409–430, 1981) ‘comonotonic additivity’ postulate. PubDate: 2023-01-01
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Abstract: Abstract We consider the collective decision problem of a society choosing among three alternatives on a strict preference domain in which one preference ordering over alternatives is not admissible. We propose the family of Sequential Pareto Undominated Rules and characterize one of them as the unique full range, anonymous, tops-only, and strategy-proof voting rule. PubDate: 2023-01-01
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Abstract: Abstract We explore the design of impartial tax schemes in a simple setup where agents’ incomes are completely determined by their inborn talents. Building on Harsanyi’s veil-of-ignorance approach, we conceptualize an impartial observer who chooses a tax scheme without knowing her own preferences and the distribution of talents, and whose vNM preferences behind the veil obey Harsanyi’s principle of acceptance and are independent, in terms of utility-scale, of the distribution of talents. Our results in the resulting framework provide three main messages: (i) the veil of ignorance implies anonymity of tax schemes; (ii) the veil of ignorance generically rejects utilitarian tax schemes; (iii) the veil of ignorance endorses the (Rawlsian) leveling tax scheme. PubDate: 2023-01-01
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Abstract: Abstract For sequencing problems, we identify the set of all mechanisms satisfying queue efficiency, strategy-proofness and budget balance. Such mechanisms are balanced VCG (or B-VCG) mechanisms up to an agent specific function that does not depend on the waiting cost of a concerned agent and for each problem these agent specific constants must add up to zero. The B-VCG mechanism is a generalization of the symmetrically balanced VCG mechanism analyzed in the queueing context. However, unlike its queueing counterpart, it fails to satisfy even the basic fairness requirement of equal treatment of equals. PubDate: 2023-01-01
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Abstract: Abstract We study majority voting over selfishly optimal nonlinear income tax schedules proposed by a continuum of workers who can migrate between two competing jurisdictions. Both skill level and migration cost are the private information of each worker who will propose an allocation schedule that maximizes the utility of her own type. We identify reasonable scenarios in which the first-order approach applies and hence the second-order sufficient condition for incentive compatibility is fulfilled; otherwise, we need to apply the ironing surgery developed by Brett and Weymark (Games Econ Behav 101:172–188, 2017). Under quasilinear-in-consumption preferences, we show that the tax schedule proposed by the median skill type is the Condorcet winner, and provide a complete characterization of this tax schedule. While this schedule features negative marginal tax rates for low-skilled workers, it features positive rates for high-skilled workers with small migration elasticities; the marginal tax rates at the bottom and top skill levels cannot be unambiguously signed. Moreover, we detail the conditions under which migration induces uniformly higher or lower equilibrium marginal tax rates facing both low- and high-skilled workers than their counterparts in autarky, which leads us to conclude that geographic mobility does not always limit the government’s ability to redistribute incomes via tax-transfer systems. PubDate: 2023-01-01
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Abstract: Abstract We consider the multi-object allocation problem with monetary transfers where each agent obtains at most one object (unit-demand). We focus on allocation mechanisms satisfying individual rationality, non-wastefulness, equal treatment of equals, and strategy-proofness. Extending the result of Kazumura et al. (J Econ Theory 188:105036, 2020b), we show that for an arbitrary number of agents and objects, the minimum price Walrasian is the unique ex-post revenue maximizing mechanism among the mechanisms satisfying no subsidy in addition to the four properties, and that no subsidy in this result can be replaced by no bankruptcy on the positive income effect domain. PubDate: 2023-01-01
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Abstract: Abstract Many popular internet platforms use so-called collaborative filtering systems to give personalized recommendations to their users, based on other users who provided similar ratings for some items. We propose a novel approach to such recommendation systems by viewing a recommendation as a way to extend an agent’s expressed preferences, which are typically incomplete, through some aggregate of other agents’ expressed preferences. These extension and aggregation requirements are expressed by an Acceptance and a Pareto principle, respectively. We characterize the recommendation systems satisfying these two principles and contrast them with collaborative filtering systems, which typically violate the Pareto principle. PubDate: 2023-01-01
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Abstract: Abstract The Boston mechanism (BOS) is widely used for the assignment of students to schools. Yet, BOS is highly manipulable and, therefore, may lead to Pareto inferior assignments. We propose a new indirect matching mechanism ( \({{ NBOS }}\) ) that is a slight variant of BOS. \({{ NBOS }}\) is less manipulable than BOS in two important ways: (i) students always have a best reply featuring truthful reported preference, (ii) rational students avoid particular re-rankings that are typical in BOS. Most importantly, the lower manipulability of \({{ NBOS }}\) helps reaching more efficient assignments than those reached by BOS. We show that each equilibrium of BOS is associated to a set of equilibria of \({{ NBOS }}\) , all of which are Pareto superior. \({{ NBOS }}\) generalizes to a class of mechanisms whose members are even less manipulable than \({{ NBOS }}\) . PubDate: 2023-01-01
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Abstract: Abstract In college admission, financial aid plays an important role in students’ enrollment decision as well as their preparation for college application. We analyze how different types of financial aid affect these decisions and admission outcomes. We consider two financial aid regimes—need-based and merit-based—in a simple college admission model and characterize respective equilibria. We find that a more competitive college has a higher admission cutoff under a need-based regime than under a merit-based regime. A less competitive college, on the other hand, benefits from a merit-based regime as it admits students with a higher average ability than it does under no aid. We next allow colleges to choose their own financial aid system so as to account for a stylized fact in the US college admissions. We show that when one college is ranked above the other, it is a dominant strategy for the higher-ranked college to offer need-based aid and for the lower-ranked college to offer merit-based aid. PubDate: 2023-01-01
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Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Abstract: Abstract We consider the problem of choosing a location in an interval so as to best take into account the preferences of two agents who will use this location. One has single-peaked preferences and the other single-dipped preferences. The most preferred location for the agent with single-peaked preferences is known and it is the least preferred location for the agent with single-dipped preferences. We show that the only efficient and strategy-proof rules are dictatorial. PubDate: 2022-11-18 DOI: 10.1007/s00355-022-01438-y
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Abstract: Abstract Social choice functions are generalized to handle Nash’s independence of irrelevant alternatives. Possibility and impossibility results are established. PubDate: 2022-11-09 DOI: 10.1007/s00355-022-01437-z
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