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Authors:Aidin Keikhaee Abstract: Philosophy & Social Criticism, Ahead of Print. This essay revisits the question of alterations in Marx’s view of method from the 1857 “Introduction” to Capital. In the wake of the belated upsurge of interest in Marx’s notebooks of 1857–8, posthumously published as the Grundrisse, a dominant interpretation has been developed in Marx scholarship which characterizes the method of the “Introduction” as an ascent from the (transhistorical) abstract to the (historical) concrete and, upon such characterization, stresses the mature Marx’s departure from it. Rereading the 1857 “Introduction” with an emphasis on the theoretical import of its examples, I argue, against this interpretation, that although this text does not provide a fully worked-out account of method, it nevertheless offers invaluable insights into some of the central methodological problems with which Marx was concerned and in response to which his dialectical method was developed. In particular, I highlight what could be called Marx’s critical historicist approach to the categories and argue that this approach, together with his specific understanding of the process of the reproduction of the concrete in thought, constitute the lasting pillars of Marx’s dialectical method, in the 1857 “Introduction” as well as in Capital. Finally, in a concluding section, I re-examine the methodological status of the commodity and argue that the post-1857 emergence of the commodity as Marx’s favourite starting point does not represent a fundamental change, or a reversal, in his view of method. Citation: Philosophy & Social Criticism PubDate: 2021-09-29T12:16:19Z DOI: 10.1177/01914537211040567
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Authors:Jason Dockstader, Rojîn Mûkrîyan Abstract: Philosophy & Social Criticism, Ahead of Print. Most politically minded Kurds agree that their people need liberty. Moreover, they agree they need liberation from the domination they suffer from the four states that divide them: Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran. What is less certain is the precise nature of this liberty. A key debate that characterizes Kurdish political discourse is over whether the liberty they seek requires the existence of an independent Kurdish nation-state. Abdullah Öcalan, the jailed intellectual leader of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), has argued that Kurdish liberty can only be achieved through liberation from the nation-state model itself. Instead of founding an independent Kurdistan, Öcalan proposes regional autonomy for the Kurds through a strictly egalitarian and directly democratic confederalism reminiscent of Murray Bookchin’s anarchist-inspired libertarian municipalism. We argue, in response to Öcalan’s approach, that employing an anarchist rejection of the state is largely mistaken. We diagnose certain historical and conceptual problems with the anarchist understanding of the state and develop the admission made in passing by certain anarchists, including Öcalan, that anarchist liberty could only be achieved after a long period of statist existence. Mostly counter to the anarchist model of non-domination, we propose a republican model of liberty and liberation, also as non-domination, that necessitates the formation of an independent state, at least in this historical period, for Kurds and hence any dominated people to count as truly free. We conclude by attempting to combine certain elements of the anarchist and republican conceptions and offer a synthetic communitarian view that could serve as a better foundation for Kurdish aspirations for liberty. Citation: Philosophy & Social Criticism PubDate: 2021-09-26T12:14:30Z DOI: 10.1177/01914537211040250
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Authors:William E. Scheuerman Abstract: Philosophy & Social Criticism, Ahead of Print. Climate activists have recently engaged in widely publicized acts of politically motivated lawbreaking. This article identifies and critically analyzes two seemingly overlapping but in fact diverging approaches among present-day activists. Though their illegal acts (e.g., blockades, occupations, and selective property damage) sometimes appear equivalent, the rival approaches place them in contrasting lights; the resulting differences are normatively and politically consequential. The first and now predominant approach favors nonviolent civil disobedience, understood in conventional terms as civil, conscientious, nonviolent, public lawbreaking. Though this approach exhibits many strengths, its proponents sometimes rely on problematic usages of recent political science scholarship that cannot withstand critical scrutiny. The second approach views nonviolent civil disobedience as insufficiently militant and instead aims primarily to block and disrupt our fossil fuel-driven political economy. Its preferred mode of political illegality is sabotage. Less concerned than the first approach with altering public opinion, it generally writes off the prospect of meaningful political reform. Though both approaches rely on the idea of a “climate emergency” to justify their activities, the second approach provides a vivid warning of its possible dangers. Although the momentous threats posed by global warming are undeniable, the idea of a climate emergency risks opening the door to political avant-gardism and, potentially, authoritarianism. Citation: Philosophy & Social Criticism PubDate: 2021-09-26T12:04:51Z DOI: 10.1177/01914537211040566
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Authors:Cass R. Sunstein Abstract: Philosophy & Social Criticism, Ahead of Print. Why are lies wrong' The Kantian answer sees lies as a close cousin to coercion; they are a violation of individual autonomy and a demonstration of contempt. By contrast, the utilitarian answer is that lies are likely to lead to terrible consequences, sometimes because they obliterate trust, sometime because they substitute the liar’s will for that of the chooser, who has much better information about the chooser’s welfare than does the liar. The utilitarian objection to paternalistic lies is akin to the utilitarian embrace of Mill’s Harm Principle. It is possible to see the Kantian view as a kind of moral heuristic, welcome on utilitarian grounds. The Kantian and utilitarian objections to lying have implications for the family, the workplace, advertising, commerce, and politics, and also for constitutional law. Citation: Philosophy & Social Criticism PubDate: 2021-09-26T07:45:46Z DOI: 10.1177/01914537211040252
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Authors:Stefan Bird-Pollan Abstract: Philosophy & Social Criticism, Ahead of Print. In this paper, I argue for two claims. The first is that all social and political thinking lies along a continuum and that the structure of each thought along the continuum is that of a basic desire for self-determination. Self-determination, I argued, occurs in a variety of ways including, importantly, at a variety of levels of intention. On the one hand, there are the relatively unreflective ways of understanding oneself as autonomous. I attributed this way of thinking of the Neo-Aristotelian conception of practical reason which is characteristic of conservatism. On the other side of the continuum, there is a rigoristic version of Kantian moral philosophy in which, to be autonomous, one must act exclusively from duty or from purely economic motivation. The second claims is that populism can be understood as a clash between different practical conceptions of autonomy which are brought into conflict as a result of the process of modern rationalization. This clash can, I argued, be clarified and also alleviated by appreciating that what the values which stand opposed in the “us vs. them” of populism and liberalism are based on a fundamentally similar conception of the value of autonomy but have come into conflict by sometime contingent historical processes which can be undone or steered in a different direction. Citation: Philosophy & Social Criticism PubDate: 2021-09-25T04:22:19Z DOI: 10.1177/01914537211040570
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Authors:Justas Patkauskas Abstract: Philosophy & Social Criticism, Ahead of Print. Over the last 20 years, biopolitics has become an established research field within the humanities and the social sciences. However, scholars agree that the academic status of biopolitics remains problematic due to the latter’s conceptual fuzziness, unmanageable scope and weak foundations. To address these issues, biopolitics theorists have engaged in reflexive efforts to convert biopolitics into a respectable discipline with a clear definition, research agenda and canon. In this article, I examine the reflexive biopolitics scholarship that has emerged in the last decade and conclude that while biopolitics may not satisfy the criteria for achieving disciplinary respectability due to the chief aporia that both underpins and undermines the academic biopolitics project – namely, its seemingly infinite reach – the structure of biopolitics matches that of experimental knowledge, also known as counterscience, the university without condition and nomad science. Citation: Philosophy & Social Criticism PubDate: 2021-09-24T03:06:18Z DOI: 10.1177/01914537211040251
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Authors:Benedetta Giovanola, Roberta Sala Abstract: Philosophy & Social Criticism, Ahead of Print. In this study, we claim that political liberalism, despite harsh criticism, is still the best option available for providing a just and stable society. However, we maintain that political liberalism needs to be revised so as to be justifiable from the perspective of not only the “reasonable” in a Rawlsian sense (that we define as “fully” reasonable) but also the ones whom Rawls labels as “unreasonable.” To support our claim, going beyond Rawls’s original account, we unpack the concept of unreasonableness and identify three different subsets that we label as the “partially reasonable,” the “non-reasonable,” and the “unreasonable.” We argue that both the “fully” reasonable and the “partially reasonable” would be included into the constituency of public justification; more specifically, we claim that the latter would support liberal institutions out of their reasons: we define these reasons as mutually intelligible reasons and claim that they allow to acknowledge the importance of a convergence approach to public justification. As for the “non-reasonable” and “unreasonable,” we claim that they cannot be included in the constituency of public justification, but they nonetheless could be compliant with liberal institutions if political liberalism offers them some reasons to comply: here, we claim that political liberalism should include them through engagement and propose reasoning from conjecture as an effecting way of offering reasons for compliance. In particular, we claim that through reasoning from conjecture, the “non-reasonable” could find conciliatory reasons to comply with liberal institutions on a stable base. With regard to the “unreasonable” in the strict sense, we claim that through reasoning from conjecture, their unreasonableness could be contained and they could find reasons—even if just self-interested—for complying with liberal institutions rather than defying them. In our discussion, we consider the different subsets not as “frozen” but as dynamic and open to change, and we aim to propose a more complex and multilayered approach to inclusion that would be able to include a wider set of people. To strengthen our argument, we show that the need for a wider public justification and for broader inclusion in liberal societies is grounded in respect for persons both as equal persons and as particular individuals. In particular, we claim that individuals’ values, ends, commitments, and affiliations activate demands of respect and can strengthen the commitment to the liberal–democratic order. Through a reformulation of the role of respect in liberal societies, we also show a kind of social and communitarian dimension that, we claim, is fully compatible with political liberalism and opens it up to “civic friendship” and “social solidarity,” which are constitutive elements for the development of a sense of justice and for the realization of a just and stable society. Citation: Philosophy & Social Criticism PubDate: 2021-09-18T01:50:48Z DOI: 10.1177/01914537211040568
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Authors:Christiaan Boonen Abstract: Philosophy & Social Criticism, Ahead of Print. In this article, I reconstruct Étienne Balibar’s work against the background of the debate on modern universal citizenship. I argue that universal citizenship is neither fundamentally emancipatory nor fundamentally oppressive but is rather both. In order to defend this position, I build on Balibar’s concept of the “citizen subject.” First, I parse this concept, showing how it allows us to think about the contradictions of modern universal citizenship. In the second section, I elucidate its temporal logic and show how it undermines the telos of modern universal citizenship. In sections three to five, I show how citizenship’s universalism clarifies both its oppressive and its emancipatory thrust. The dialectic of universal citizenship, I argue, unfolds as a conflict between and within political universals. In the conclusion, I will tie up these different strands and end with some reflections on the conditions of possibility of this dialectic. Citation: Philosophy & Social Criticism PubDate: 2021-09-16T01:42:17Z DOI: 10.1177/01914537211042611
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Authors:Alessandro Ferrara Abstract: Philosophy & Social Criticism, Ahead of Print. This article discusses Jürgen Habermas’s latest book Auch eine Geschichte der Philosophie from the specific angle of what the section on Rawls indicates about the overall philosophical project pursued by Habermas. This tiny element within the imposing architecture reveals a structural problem that affects Habermas’s program for a detranscendentalization of reason. After a general premise, Habermas’s appraisal of Rawls’s work is reconstructed and critically examined (Section 1). Then, in the guise of a Rawlsian rejoinder, a problematic understanding of pluralism is shown to undergird Habermas’s overlooking of the ground-breaking potential of the normativity of ‘the reasonable’ and ‘the most reasonable’ (Section 2). Finally, this neglect is argued to be indicative of a deeper lacuna: namely, a missing confrontation with Wittgenstein’s rival path to a postmetaphysical, intersubjective, detranscentendalized reason (Section 3). That lacuna, finally, invites a closer scrutiny of the overall genealogical picture and its central opposition between two pathways (related to Kant and Hume) to the postmetaphysicization of reason. Citation: Philosophy & Social Criticism PubDate: 2021-08-06T10:06:22Z DOI: 10.1177/01914537211034907
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Authors:Rahel Süß Abstract: Philosophy & Social Criticism, Ahead of Print. Major debates on democratic renewal suggest two ways of eliciting social change: either by strengthening vertical practices of representation or by expanding horizontal forms of participation. The article develops an argument for why there is a need to rethink democratic resistance beyond the vertical–horizontal divide. If contemporary forms of resistance encompass a strategic interplay between vertical and horizontal practices, then an alternative framework is required to capture this logic. Filling this gap, the article introduces the concept of ‘horizontal experimentalism’. Such an idea comprehends an understanding of political means and ends as a continuum and as adjusting each other in an ongoing process of experimental inquiry. Citation: Philosophy & Social Criticism PubDate: 2021-08-03T09:26:39Z DOI: 10.1177/01914537211033016
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Authors:Sandro Chignola Abstract: Philosophy & Social Criticism, Ahead of Print. This article addresses the modern concept of sovereignty as a multivocal and conflictual semantic field, arguing for the necessity to trace its genealogy based on the structural tensions that haunt its logical framework – as well as its representations – rather than on a linear historiographic reconstruction. In particular, the scrutiny I propose aims to examine a series of exchanges that have been characterizing this concept since the beginning: the global and the European, the maritime and the territorial, the colony and the state, the imperial and the proprietary. The problematic balance between ‘imperium’ and ‘dominium’ is indeed assumed here as the turning point of the rise of a sovereign power that appears to be originally rooted in the very production and governance of the global space, thus giving up all possible Eurocentric narratives of modernity. To illustrate my argument, I focus on the frontispieces to three of Thomas Hobbes’s most important books, that is, his translation of Thucydides’ Peloponnesian Wars, De Cive and Leviathan. A thorough analysis of these images enables us to understand how these lines of force traverse the very heart of modern European political concepts, along with the mirroring effects that constantly bounce their normative construction of subjectivity back and forth from the periphery to the centre and, ultimately, from the market to the state. Citation: Philosophy & Social Criticism PubDate: 2021-07-30T09:33:43Z DOI: 10.1177/01914537211033021
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Authors:Patricio Espinosa, Gonzalo Bustamante-Kuschel Abstract: Philosophy & Social Criticism, Ahead of Print. Indigenous conservation through patrimonialization is the product of political and legal decisions made by a non-indigenous agent: the liberal state, using the law to retain a form of bios. We propose that patrimonialization is the device by which liberal states have processed and integrated indigenous claims into a form of bios ultimately designed to safeguard state legal structures. We argue that, to uphold the rule of law in contexts of struggle and resistance that challenge the very understanding of the law, states respond by wielding the law in the form of the rule by law, that is, pushing the law to the limit to give normative content to the criteria by which the state conducts its affairs, without straying from the individual rights framework. We hold that the rule by law is an operation that defines the patrimonialization of indigenous peoples. It increases their visibility while imposing limits on political action to keep them from becoming sui juris subjects capable of breaching the distinction between zoe and bios. In this article, we try to understand the political–ideological intent of these decisions, the intentions beyond the letter of the law of patrimonialized peoples. Citation: Philosophy & Social Criticism PubDate: 2021-07-30T09:32:46Z DOI: 10.1177/01914537211033008
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Authors:Caroline Alphin, François Debrix Abstract: Philosophy & Social Criticism, Ahead of Print. This article explores German Korean philosopher Byung-Chul Han’s notion of psychopolitics and his concept of the neoliberal subject. For Han, mental processes are now the primary target of power. This means that, according to Han, biopower must give way to what he calls psychopower since perspectives that critically seek to understand neoliberalism through a biopolitical lens are no longer adequate to contemporary regimes of neoliberal achievement. This article examines and evaluates Han’s argument that Foucauldian biopolitics is obsolete in today’s neoliberal age because of biopolitics’ primary focus on the body over mental processes. We suggest that, instead of emphasizing the need to move beyond biopolitics, Han’s theorization of psychopolitics could benefit from paying closer attention to some of Foucault’s insights on biopower and from identifying key connections between biopolitics and psychopolitics. By highlighting some important continuities between Foucault’s biopolitics and Han’s psychopolitics (instead of emphasizing the discontinuities between both theorists’ perspectives, as Han tends to privilege), this article seeks to move towards improved theorizations of concepts like achievement, subjectivity, otherness or optimization, concepts that are key to Han’s understanding of contemporary neoliberal practices. Citation: Philosophy & Social Criticism PubDate: 2021-07-22T09:50:46Z DOI: 10.1177/01914537211033011
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Authors:Steven L. Winter Abstract: Philosophy & Social Criticism, Ahead of Print. The standard account of the relation between democracy and the rule of law focuses on law’s liberty-enhancing role in constraining official action. This is a faint echo of the complex, constitutive relation between the two. The Greeks used one word – isonomia – to describe both. If democracy is the system in which people have an equal say in determining the rules that govern social life, then the rule of law is simultaneously before, after, concurrent and synonymous with democracy: It contributes to the formation of citizens with the capacity for self-governance, serves as the instrument through which democratic decisions are implemented, functions as one of the central social practices that constitute citizens as equals and addresses the question of how to ensure that government by the people operates for the people. The rule of law has many independently valuable qualities, including impartiality and predictability. But, to valorise the rule of law for its own sake is to fetishize authority. The fundamental values of the rule of law are as the instrument of democratic self-governance and the expression of the equal dignity of all persons. Democracy thus entails the rule of law, but both implicate the yet more comprehensive ideal of equality. Core rule-of-law values require political norms and conditions of equality, generality and comprehensiveness. In a modern, differentiated society, however, the constitutive relation between democracy and the rule of law is fractured and law becomes the agent of authority. Courts in the modern constitutional state have contributed to the decline of rule-of-law values, supporting role specialization through judge-made immunity doctrines that protect officials at all levels. The crisis of police violence against minorities is a symptom of this breakdown. Greater accountability can ameliorate the problem. But an effective solution requires the fair and equal distribution of political power. Citation: Philosophy & Social Criticism PubDate: 2021-06-29T09:07:23Z DOI: 10.1177/01914537211021148
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Authors:Eric Ritter Abstract: Philosophy & Social Criticism, Ahead of Print. This article aims to rewrite Emerson’s moral perfectionism – his anti-foundationalist pursuit of an always more perfect state of self and society – onto his moral and intellectual participation in the abolitionist movement. I argue that Cavell artificially separated Emerson’s moral perfectionism from his extensive, decades-long abolitionism. The source of Cavell’s oversight is his participation in the long-standing norm of dichotomizing Emerson’s work into the theoretical ‘essays’ and the ‘anti-slavery writings’ or the philosophical and the polemical. Recent scholars of Emerson have questioned and even dismissed this dichotomy, however, while recentring Emerson’s politics in his oeuvre as a whole. They find much to praise, and also plenty to criticize, in Emerson’s abolitionist writings. I follow and extend that scholarly trend here and introduce what I call Emerson’s abolitionist perfectionism as an expansion of Cavell’s influential work on moral perfectionism. Citation: Philosophy & Social Criticism PubDate: 2021-06-24T09:55:14Z DOI: 10.1177/01914537211017575
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Authors:Svenja Ahlhaus Abstract: Philosophy & Social Criticism, Ahead of Print. In this article, I argue that Habermas’s method of rational reconstruction faces limitations when it comes to analysing newly emerging and contested political practices. As rational reconstruction aims to criticize existing practices by determining their normative meaning as reflected in the participants’ idealizing presuppositions, it reaches its limits where emerging and contested practices make it impossible to identify a shared self-understanding and a single participants’ perspective. Using the example of membership politics, I argue that this is often the case where nationally constituted forms of politics become controversial or are fundamentally questioned. Building on the work of Benhabib and Fraser, I develop an alternative reconstructive method of plural reconstruction, which modifies the basic premises of rational reconstruction, adjusting it to emerging and contested political contexts. Citation: Philosophy & Social Criticism PubDate: 2021-06-07T09:38:10Z DOI: 10.1177/01914537211017570
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Authors:Betty Jean Stoneman Abstract: Philosophy & Social Criticism, Ahead of Print. Jean-Paul Sartre’s failures in Black Orpheus have been widely and rightly explicated by a number of theorists, most notably Frantz Fanon and Aimé Césaire. Sartre has rightly been criticized for imposing a white gaze onto his reading of colonized African poetry. It would seem that his work offers us no tools for anti-racist work today. For this article, I read his failures in the text alongside his work in The Imaginary and Being and Nothingness to argue that we can learn from his failures and that his failures do offer us conceptual tools for anti-racist work today. I argue that Sartre’s main contribution ought to be understood as a provocation to white people. He is provoking white people to confront how whiteness works in their imaginary. The imaginary is nothing but what one puts into it, and what one puts into it is imbued with the historical, social and cultural. The image is imbued with the individual’s experiences within a historical, social and cultural situation. If this is the case, then the confrontation with and critique of the image is a political act. In confronting and critiquing the image, one is confronting and critiquing the situation in which the image emerges. The hope is that in doing so, white people could transcend the facticity of their whiteness in particular situations for the better, which in turn would have positive consequences for the larger sociopolitical situation. Citation: Philosophy & Social Criticism PubDate: 2021-06-02T09:37:21Z DOI: 10.1177/01914537211017582
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Authors:Berend van Wijk Abstract: Philosophy & Social Criticism, Ahead of Print. Michel Foucault’s The Birth of Biopolitics is generally acknowledged as a pioneering study of neoliberalism, presenting it not merely as an economic theory but also as a mode of government. There is much debate, however, on Foucault’s intentions in analysing neoliberalism and the place of the genealogy in his broader critical project. The Birth of Biopolitics itself lacks both an explicit judgement of neoliberalism and an explicit ethical program. In this article, I maintain that Foucault’s genealogical work on neoliberalism is complementary to his notions of agency. From this perspective, Foucault’s genealogy is not a judgement of neoliberalism in terms of right or wrong but rather serves as a breeding ground for ethical conduct. The notion of the critical attitude in particular shows that Foucault’s genealogical work stands in the service of the subject’s autonomy. However, Foucault is reluctant to fill in his ethical program too much because it should gain substance only in local struggles and through the subject’s own considerations. Citation: Philosophy & Social Criticism PubDate: 2021-06-01T09:35:41Z DOI: 10.1177/01914537211017589
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Authors:Marc Pauly Abstract: Philosophy & Social Criticism, Ahead of Print. Societal polarization has given rise to opposing groups that fight each other as enemies and that have very different ideas about what should be done and about what is the case. This article investigates what tools there are in the philosophy of Martin Buber to address this societal polarization. Buber’s notion of community, the relationship between means and ends, his opposition to the political principle, the notion of an I-Thou dialogue and his conception of truth are presented as relevant for overcoming societal polarization. The article also presents the case of Daryl Davis as manifesting some of these Buberian principles. Citation: Philosophy & Social Criticism PubDate: 2021-06-01T09:35:25Z DOI: 10.1177/01914537211017571
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Authors:Hilkje C Hänel Abstract: Philosophy & Social Criticism, Ahead of Print. Two decades ago, Tarana Burke started using the phrase ‘me too’ to release victims of sexual abuse and rape from their shame and to empower girls from minority communities. In 2017, actress Alyssa Milano made the hashtag #MeToo go viral. This article’s concern is with the role of testimonial practices in the context of sexual violence. While many feminists have claimed that the word of those who claim to being sexually violated by others (should) have political and/or epistemic priority, others have failed to recognize the harm and injury of instances of sexual violence that are not yet acknowledged as such and failed to listen to victims from marginalized social groups. In fact, some feminists have attacked #MeToo for mingling accounts of ‘proper’ sexual violence and accounts that are not ‘proper’ experiences of sexual violence. My aim in this article is to show why this critique is problematic and find a philosophically fruitful way to understand the #MeToo-movement as a movement that strives for moral and conceptual progress. Citation: Philosophy & Social Criticism PubDate: 2021-05-31T08:59:29Z DOI: 10.1177/01914537211017578
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Authors:Greg M. Nielsen Abstract: Philosophy & Social Criticism, Ahead of Print.
Citation: Philosophy & Social Criticism PubDate: 2021-05-24T09:53:16Z DOI: 10.1177/01914537211017607
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Authors:Zhichao Tong Abstract: Philosophy & Social Criticism, Ahead of Print. Drawing on Bernard Williams's Truth and Truthfulness and Miranda Fricker's Epistemic Justice, this article presents an epistemic argument for democracy on the basis of its ability to incentivize more people to display the virtues of truth required for the social production and aggregation of knowledge. In particular, the article compares democracy respectively with autocracy and epistocracy, showing that it is likely to be, within the context of a modern pluralistic society, an epistemically superior regime in the sense that it creates more favourable conditions for the pooling of epistemic resources. The article concludes with a multi-dimensional framework of democratic legitimacy, where democracy's epistemic value is directly tied with both the safeguard against elite domination and the development of citizens' ethical and intellectual capabilities. In this regard, the article also helps to bridge the gap between epistemic and non-epistemic approaches in democratic theory and unite what might be called the wisdom, power, and virtue of the multitude. Citation: Philosophy & Social Criticism PubDate: 2021-05-24T09:52:36Z DOI: 10.1177/01914537211017573
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Authors:Michael Hearn Abstract: Philosophy & Social Criticism, Ahead of Print. To the extent that philosophy deals with the blush, it is almost always as the pink blush of shame. Such is philosophy’s seeming obsession with the latter, there remains the risk of something important being lost in translation when it comes to those examples in the literature that mention the blush. I intend to focus on one such example, a scene from Robert Antelme’s The Human Race, the story of the student from Bologna, in which Antelme describes the student’s blushing response to being randomly selected by an SS soldier from a bedraggled line of prisoners for a roadside execution. I will turn to Lisa Guenther and Giorgio Agamben for their reading of Antelme’s account, not, I should stress, to evaluate their respective analyses of shame, but that which may have been overlooked as a result, namely confusion. I will turn also to Jean-Paul Sartre, again, not in relation to shame, rather for his brief, but no less important, phenomenological account of blushing. I will refer to recent social psychology research suggesting that confusion is a knowledge emotion – something like embarrassment (as aporia). All this in support of the argument, that when Antelme writes of the student – ‘Il a l’air confus’ (‘He seems confused’), we are bound to take them both, the student and Antelme, the blusher and the beholder, at their word – to maintain our distance so that the scene might speak for itself and in so doing reveal signs of life. Citation: Philosophy & Social Criticism PubDate: 2021-05-24T09:51:56Z DOI: 10.1177/01914537211017594
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Authors:Maxim van Asseldonk Abstract: Philosophy & Social Criticism, Ahead of Print. Modern thinking about democracy is largely governed by the concept of constituent power. Some versions of the concept of constituent power, however, remain haunted by the spectre of totalitarianism. In this article, I outline an alternative view of the identity of the people whose constituent power generates democratic authority. Broadly speaking, constituent power signifies the idea that all political authority, including that of the constitution, must find its source in some idea of ‘the people’, whose authority is never exhausted by constituted power. The deficiency I seek to address is that of asking who the people is to whom any claim of authority refers, while avoiding the pitfalls of totalitarianism. I show the most famous totalitarian view of constituent power – advanced by Carl Schmitt – to be not only politically unsavoury but also ontologically unjustified. To outline my alternative view, I draw on Jacques Derrida’s concept of just decisions to argue that the undecidable inaugurates collective responsibility by demanding a response. This suggests a view of ‘the people’ as a doing rather than a being. I conclude by showing how this avoids totalitarian views of popular sovereignty by demonstrating its congruency with Claude Lefort’s democratic theory as opposed to totalitarianism. Citation: Philosophy & Social Criticism PubDate: 2021-05-24T09:51:19Z DOI: 10.1177/01914537211017581
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Authors:Robert Grimwade Abstract: Philosophy & Social Criticism, Ahead of Print. This article explores the complexities of Marcuse’s philosophical anthropology in light of Foucault’s criticisms of Marcuse and the Frankfurt School. While Marcuse’s theory of human nature is grounded upon a dialectical conception of essential human potentialities striving for realization, it secretes a radically plastic conception of life that undermines all anthropological essentialism. This fundamental tension between essentialist and plastic conceptions of human nature has significant implications for rethinking Marcuse’s project and legacy. Citation: Philosophy & Social Criticism PubDate: 2021-05-12T10:06:53Z DOI: 10.1177/0191453721999689
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Authors:Rudmer Bijlsma Abstract: Philosophy & Social Criticism, Ahead of Print. This article undertakes a comparative study of the conjectural histories of Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Adam Ferguson, focusing on the convergences in the moral and political ideals expressed and grounded in these histories. In comparison with Scots like Adam Smith and John Millar, the conjectural histories of Ferguson and Rousseau follow a similar historical trajectory as regards the development and progress of commercial, political and cultural arts. However, their assessment of the moral progress of humanity does not, or in a much more limited way than in Smith and Millar, correlate with this trajectory. Rousseau and Ferguson see a candour and vigour in savage and barbarian societies that is much less easily supported by the complex socio-economic framework of modern, commercial societies. It is argued that the convergences in their conjectural histories arise from a similar fusion of these histories with Stoic and republican perspectives. While Rousseau and Ferguson do not see history as cyclical, they think that the forces that push towards moral decline are strong and can, on the political level, only be countered by firm republican policies. Furthermore, their shared Stoic ideal of the life lived according to nature informs their solutions for modern societies. Citation: Philosophy & Social Criticism PubDate: 2021-04-30T07:58:18Z DOI: 10.1177/0191453721990704
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Authors:Charles Olney Abstract: Philosophy & Social Criticism, Ahead of Print. This article explores the role of practical political theory in the Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement. I argue that BLM represents a multifaceted engagement with the complicated politics of redemption that lies at the heart of American democracy. In one sense, BLM stands for the integration of black life into the framework of political value, and thus for a redemption of the promise of ‘justice for all’. In another, it is a challenge to the principles themselves, viewing justice as a threat to be managed, rather than as a principle to be redeemed. Exploring the praxis of this movement, organized both against and within the possibility of redemption, will enable us to more effectively characterize the limitations of a politics grounded in the theorization of justice and generate a richer understanding of the possibility for practical political theory to simultaneously employ and critique the politics of redemption. Citation: Philosophy & Social Criticism PubDate: 2021-04-20T07:12:06Z DOI: 10.1177/01914537211009573
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Authors:Helge Schwiertz Abstract: Philosophy & Social Criticism, Ahead of Print. In dominant discourses, migrants are mostly perceived as either victims or villains but rarely as political subjects and democratic constituents. Challenging this view, the aim of the article is to rethink democracy with respect to migration struggles. I argue that movements of migration are not only consistent with democracy but also provide a decisive impetus for actualizing democratic principles in the context of debates about the crisis of representation and post-democracy. Drawing on the work of Jacques Rancière, Étienne Balibar and Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, I develop a theory of radical democracy as practice, which, starting from the proposed notion of ‘democratic difference’, goes beyond the fixation on democratic regimes and focuses on contentious practices of enacting democratic principles. I articulate these theoretical concepts by analysing how refugees in Germany have managed to break out of a marginalized position and have challenged their denial of rights through a protest march. Citation: Philosophy & Social Criticism PubDate: 2021-04-13T06:48:17Z DOI: 10.1177/0191453721996398
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Authors:Farshid Baghai Abstract: Philosophy & Social Criticism, Ahead of Print. Kant’s writings on political philosophy do not clearly and conclusively determine its place and significance in his critical philosophy. To address this issue, most accounts of Kant’s political philosophy concentrate on his explicitly political texts that cluster around the second and third Critiques. Although many of these interpretations illuminate different aspects of Kant’s political philosophy, they are silent with regard to a concept of publicness that is implied in the first Critique. This article suggests that Kant’s critical method of metaphysics implies a disciplinary conception of publicness, which is foundational for his political philosophy. It demonstrates how this conception of publicness can be found in the Doctrine of Method of the first Critique, more specifically, in Kant’s argument that all acts of reason must be subjected to the discipline of pure reason. Citation: Philosophy & Social Criticism PubDate: 2021-03-29T09:35:42Z DOI: 10.1177/01914537211000105
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Authors:Jason R Fisette Abstract: Philosophy & Social Criticism, Ahead of Print. Arguments for slavery reparations have fallen out of favour even as reparations for other forms of racial injustice are taken more seriously. This retreat is unsurprising, as arguments for slavery reparations often rely on two normatively irregular claims: that reparations are owed to the dead (as opposed to, say, their living heirs) and that the present generation inherits an as yet unrequited guilt from past generations. Outside of some strands of Black thought and activism on slavery reparations, these claims are widely rejected. I develop an argument for slavery reparations around those foundational claims by adopting the normative framework of Immanuel Kant. On what I call the Basic Argument for slavery reparations, the application of Kant’s retributivist theory of punishment to slavery justifies reparations as a kind of proportional punishment for slavery. I also show that Kant’s philosophy offers reparations theorists resources to overcome several contemporary objections to slavery reparations. Citation: Philosophy & Social Criticism PubDate: 2021-03-23T09:42:36Z DOI: 10.1177/01914537211001916
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Authors:Luis Cordeiro-Rodrigues Abstract: Philosophy & Social Criticism, Ahead of Print. Some philosophers and activists have been sceptical about the relevance of pursuing animal justice to progress racial justice. Routinely, these sceptics have argued that allying animal and racial justice struggles is politically unfeasible, counterproductive, distractive and disruptive for the achievement of racial justice. The conclusion of these sceptics is that animal justice is either a barrier or irrelevant to racial justice and, as such, activists should not ally both struggles. In this article, I wish to contest the arguments that forward the idea that these struggles should not be addressed together, especially in the case of addressing anti-Black racial injustices. I offer a negative argumentative strategy to forward my thesis; namely, I offer reasons to reject the arguments that are sceptical about the relevance of addressing animal justice to achieve progress in racial justice. I contend that racial injustice is partly fuelled by the capacity contract. The capacity contract, in turn, is intertwined with the way humans treat animals. Owing to the fact that speciesism fuels the contract that incites racism, then addressing speciesism is instrumentally relevant for overcoming racial injustices. Moreover, I demonstrate in this article that not only are there various ways that anti-racist and anti-speciesist struggles are interconnected, but also that the project of addressing them together is politically feasible and desirable. Citation: Philosophy & Social Criticism PubDate: 2021-03-18T09:31:58Z DOI: 10.1177/0191453721999693
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Authors:Fred Dallmayr, Abbas Manoochehri Abstract: Philosophy & Social Criticism, Ahead of Print. The crisis of pandemics such as Covid-19 reveals the reality of a crisis-ridden world fraught by devastation of nature and distortion of human life simultaneously. This article tries to bring to light that pandemics actually move from one ‘region’ of human Lifeworld to another. The phenomenological notion of ‘Lifeworld’ can enable one to see ‘natural life’ and ‘civil life’ as two different but related ‘regions of life’ related to each other in the context of an ontological unity. As such, the ‘coming’ of pandemic viruses into human life-sphere is seen as one step in a process which had already begun with the disruptive human interference in the natural environment. These are in fact practical implications of the mastery of the modern ‘ego cogito’ and its use of technological warfare. Citation: Philosophy & Social Criticism PubDate: 2021-03-03T10:22:54Z DOI: 10.1177/0191453721991400
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Authors:Lorenzo Rustighi Abstract: Philosophy & Social Criticism, Ahead of Print. In this article, I engage with what relevant literature addresses as the ‘paradox of democracy’ and trace it back to the dialectic between authorization and representation established by social contract theories. To make my argument, I take Rousseau’s Social Contract as a paradigmatic example of the paradox and analyse it in light of Hegel’s critical response. My aim is to show that, although Rousseau rejects the idea of representing the popular will, representation resurfaces in his Republic from top to bottom and engenders a structural opposition between citizens and rulers: drawing on the Hegelian scrutiny of contractarianism, I focus on three key moments in Rousseau’s theory, namely the Lawgiver, the majority rule and the executive power. After illustrating how the social contract undermines democratic participation in deliberative processes, I suggest that Hegel’s philosophy of right overcomes the paradox by positively assuming it as a dialectical contradiction that requires a specific constitutional approach to democracy. In this sense, I argue, the Hegelian perspective on democratic deliberation helps us to better frame Rousseau’s ambition to conceive the Republic as a free community of equals and urges us to elaborate a more coherent understanding of participation in a pluralistic society. Citation: Philosophy & Social Criticism PubDate: 2021-02-12T09:54:28Z DOI: 10.1177/0191453721990700
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Authors:Gregory M. Collins Abstract: Philosophy & Social Criticism, Ahead of Print. In light of a growing body of scholarship that has cast doubt on the analytic import of spontaneous order, the purpose of my article is to rethink the intellectual relationship between Edmund Burke and Friedrich Hayek by suggesting that reading spontaneous order into Burke’s thought introduces greater tensions between the two thinkers than prior scholars have suggested. One crucial tension, I suggest, is that Hayek believed that contractual arrangements, competitive markets and the rule of law could sustain the growth of social order, while Burke maintained that particular social institutions and practices should remain protected from the full power of voluntary contracts and exchange relations. I conclude by suggesting that the tensions between Hayek and Burke could serve as complementary instruments, rather than as foes, in strengthening the liberal project in modernity. Citation: Philosophy & Social Criticism PubDate: 2021-02-11T09:53:10Z DOI: 10.1177/0191453721990683
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Authors:Umut Parmaksız Abstract: Philosophy & Social Criticism, Ahead of Print. In this article, I examine the relation of religious language and public debate within the context of postsecularism and defend a falsificationist model. I argue that the postsecular public sphere ought to problematize four characteristics of modern thinking; the exclusion of truth and religious language, the asymmetry between religious and secular language, the essentialization of the secular and the religious and, lastly, the exclusivity and exhaustiveness of the secular and religious as categories. Based on these four problematizations, I defend a falsificationist model for the admission of religious language in the public sphere and argue that we ought to allow citizens the right to use the language of their choice in the public sphere, provided that they also provide in their preferred language ‘conditions of falsifiability’, that is, those circumstances upon which the speaking party would accept their argumentation as void. Citation: Philosophy & Social Criticism PubDate: 2021-02-02T09:47:46Z DOI: 10.1177/0191453720972743
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Authors:Matthias Lievens Abstract: Philosophy & Social Criticism, Ahead of Print. The plural, impure or discordant nature of time has become an important theme in recent critical social and political theory. Against Althusser’s dismissal of Sartre’s presumedly Hegelian understanding of time and history, this article establishes Jean-Paul Sartre as a key figure in this debate on the plurality of temporalities. Especially in the Critique of Dialectical Reason, Sartre understands history and the social in terms of a multiplicity of uneven and non-synchronous temporalisations, rejecting an notion of time as a universal container within which events take place. The originality of Sartre’s approach is that it establishes a link between the notion of the plurality of temporalities and the problem of freedom and domination. His mature social and political theory allows us to understand temporalisation as a strategy for domination, and objective social temporality (e.g. the time of the economy or of machine systems) as key to a form of anonymous or structural domination. A reconstruction of this highly complex and sophisticated approach to thinking domination through time can also shed an original light on the temporal dimension of democracy and totalitarianism. Citation: Philosophy & Social Criticism PubDate: 2021-01-27T10:14:54Z DOI: 10.1177/0191453720987870
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Authors:Magnus Hörnqvist Abstract: Philosophy & Social Criticism, Ahead of Print. In response to an impasse, articulated in the late 1980s, the cognitive capacities of ordinary people assumed central place in contemporary critical social theory. The participants’ perspective gained precedence over scientific standards branded as external. The notion of cognition, however, went unchallenged. This article continues the move away from external standards, and discusses two models of critique, which differ based on their underlying notions of cognition. The representational model builds on cognitive content, misrecognition and normativity; three features which are illustrated with positions adopted by prominent exponents of critical social theory. An alternative understanding relies on action-oriented disclosure and the participants’ basic familiarity with the social world. On this reading, what clashes with unequal structures is skilful coping, rather than representations and normative standards. The action-oriented approach may overcome the dilemma of understanding both the impact and the possible transcendence of unequal structures, although it cannot ultimately replace representational critique. Citation: Philosophy & Social Criticism PubDate: 2021-01-27T10:14:15Z DOI: 10.1177/0191453720987864
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Authors:Tamara Caraus Abstract: Philosophy & Social Criticism, Ahead of Print. The ancient Cynic Diogenes was the first to declare ‘I am a citizen of the world (kosmopolitês)’ and the other Cynics followed him. In The Courage of the Truth, Michel Foucault analyses the Cynic mode of parrhēsia and living in truth, however, his text expands the cosmopolitical amplitude of Cynics since the Cynics’ true life contains an inherent cosmopolitan logic. Identifying the core of the Cynic true life in the care for the self that leads to the care for the others within the horizon of the possibility of another life and another world, Foucault shows how the Cynic establishes ‘an intense bond with the whole of humankind’, cares ‘for all mankind’ and for the whole world as a ‘functionary of humanity’ and, as ‘the scout of humanity’, the Cynic prefigures the future and exercises the ‘government of the universe’. This article argues that Foucault’s account on Cynics maps the very first moments of becoming cosmopolitan and offers an insightful perspective on the process of achieving a cosmopolitan subjectivity, a process displayed by different expressions of cosmopolitanism, and especially the ‘insurgent cosmopolitanism’ from the bottom up. Citation: Philosophy & Social Criticism PubDate: 2021-01-21T09:55:19Z DOI: 10.1177/0191453720987867
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Authors:Nunzio Alì, Luigi Caranti First page: 769 Abstract: Philosophy & Social Criticism, Ahead of Print. The article argues that the possibility of an unlimited gap in income and wealth between the top and bottom segments of society is incompatible with a democratic commitment to political equality. The first section outlines why current distributive and relational approaches are unable to adequately address this problem. The second and third sections introduce the notion of material domination and argue that the only remedy against it is the containment of economic inequality within a certain proportion, expressed in terms of ratios between the material resources of the best-off and the worst-off. The fourth section spells out the constraints that any definition of these ratios should satisfy and shows, through a case study based on the contemporary United States, that an approximate, yet non-arbitrary definition is within reach. The fifth and final section rebuts some predictable objections to this approach. Citation: Philosophy & Social Criticism PubDate: 2021-02-01T10:30:02Z DOI: 10.1177/0191453720987865
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Authors:Joseph Tanke First page: 879 Abstract: Philosophy & Social Criticism, Ahead of Print. This special issue of Philosophy and Social Criticism is dedicated to James Bernauer, S.J. on the occasion of his retirement from full-time teaching. It contains original essays from Bernauer’s students, friends, and fellow travelers that were commissioned for the purpose of commemorating this occasion. These essays provide readers with an opportunity to reflect upon Bernauer’s contributions to fields of academic inquiry as diverse as Arendt and Foucault studies, the philosophy of religion, and Holocaust studies. Since our purpose was to honor the life and work of James Bernauer, and not simply comment on it, the contributors to this volume have each attempted to develop and extend, rather than simply rehash and recapitulate, the concerns they find articulated in Bernauer’s publications. Citation: Philosophy & Social Criticism PubDate: 2021-09-23T11:36:44Z DOI: 10.1177/01914537211042620
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Authors:Agustín Colombo First page: 894 Abstract: Philosophy & Social Criticism, Ahead of Print. Michel Foucault’s first research on discipline—one of his main concepts for defining the modern account of power—suggests that the Benedictine Rule played a central role in the formation of discipline. This article investigates this hypothesis, which has remained otherwise unexplored, by examining the role that the Benedictine Rule could have played in the formation of Foucault’s concept of discipline and pays particular attention to the disciplinary norm. Could the mechanisms of regulation and standardization of conduct that characterize the monastic rule be conceived as a point of formation of the disciplinary norm' Through such line of analysis, the article aims to provide a new insight into the role of Christianity in Foucault’s reflection on power. Citation: Philosophy & Social Criticism PubDate: 2021-09-16T09:44:52Z DOI: 10.1177/01914537211042607
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Authors:Ladelle McWhorter First page: 907 Abstract: Philosophy & Social Criticism, Ahead of Print. Does Foucault’s work on sexuality open toward the possibility of a genealogy of sex understood as binary anatomical and genetic sexual difference' I believe that it does. I argue that, if we take seriously work by Mark Jordan, Ann Laura Stoler, and Sylvia Federici, coupled with Foucault’s own statement at the end of HS1 that sex is not an anchor for sexuality but, rather, “a complex idea that was formed inside the deployment of sexuality” (152), the possibility of a time before sex or an elsewhere apart from sex becomes quite thinkable. Constructing such a genealogy would likely require careful research into ways in which Europeans imposed binary sex upon those they terrorized and colonized around the globe. Examples gestured toward here include the Yorùbá in Africa as well as a number of peoples of the Americas. Citation: Philosophy & Social Criticism PubDate: 2021-09-23T10:51:32Z DOI: 10.1177/01914537211042615
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Authors:Joseph Tanke First page: 921 Abstract: Philosophy & Social Criticism, Ahead of Print. This essay attempts to reconfigure our understanding of the relationship between Michel Foucault and the French photographer and writer Hervé Guibert. It contends that this relationship has been misunderstood inasmuch as it has been described in terms of a dynamic of confession and betrayal. In place of this familiar understanding, developed largely by James Miller, this essay seeks to create the grounds for a Foucaultian appreciation of Guibert’s work as both photographer and writer. On the basis of Guibert’s Ghost Image, as well as several clues scattered throughout Foucault’s corpus, this essay argues that Guibert’s work issues in an anti-realist aesthetics that allows for desire to be articulated outside of the deployment of sexuality. In the final section of the essay, I use these concepts in order to suggest a reading of some of Guibert’s most famous images, including the portrait of Foucault contained in Guibert’s 1990 novel, To the Friend Who Did Not Save My Life. In general, I aim to show that Guibert’s different works enact the Foucaultian notion of a friendship of between men, wherein the aim is to invent new ways of giving each other pleasure. Citation: Philosophy & Social Criticism PubDate: 2021-09-23T11:45:25Z DOI: 10.1177/01914537211042612
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Authors:Gary Shapiro First page: 933 Abstract: Philosophy & Social Criticism, Ahead of Print. Carl Schmitt privately acknowledged that his late theory of Erd-Herrschaft (hegemony of the Earth) converged with some of Nietzsche’s thought, yet remained silent on this in his book The Nomos of the Earth. This essay reconstructs an implicit Nietzsche–Schmitt dialog, focusing on their related but distinct geopolitical and phenomenological concepts of Earth, the role of binary divisions in ethics and politics, and the nature of hegemony. Nietzsche and Schmitt both derive from a tradition of political theology that relies on the antitheses of state sovereignty and the Antichrist, but they draw opposed conclusions from this duality. Citation: Philosophy & Social Criticism PubDate: 2021-09-16T10:03:46Z DOI: 10.1177/01914537211042622
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Authors:Corey McCall First page: 947 Abstract: Philosophy & Social Criticism, Ahead of Print. This essay reconstructs James Bernauer’s reading of Foucault’s critique of psychoanalysis in his essay “Oedipus, Freud, Foucault” in order to assess the role that Foucault’s critique of psychoanalysis and his reading of Oedipus play in Bernauer’s account of Foucault’s ethics. Along the way, it traces a shift in Foucault’s reading of Oedipus in terms of power and knowledge in Lectures on the Will to Know to rituals of truth or alethurgy in On the Government of the Living. Finally, based on this reading it argues that this shift is relevant for understanding Foucault’s turn toward ethics and practices of the self in his final writings. Citation: Philosophy & Social Criticism PubDate: 2021-09-26T12:19:50Z DOI: 10.1177/01914537211042610
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Authors:Dianna Taylor First page: 960 Abstract: Philosophy & Social Criticism, Ahead of Print. Throughout his contributions to an expanding body of scholarship on the work of Hannah Arendt, James Bernauer has maintained that the concept of amor mundi, or love of the world, is foundational in Arendt’s thinking. He sees the centrality of amor mundi stemming from Arendt’s ongoing efforts to respond to and subsequently navigate the crisis in meaning produced by totalitarianism. This essay concurs with Bernauer’s perspective that throughout the course of her life Arendt was concerned with delineating the nature of, analyzing, and responding to the crisis that characterized the post-totalitarian West. At the same time, the essay interprets the effects of the crisis, and therefore how to proceed in its wake, differently. Whereas Bernauer considers amor mundi to be a redemptive project of “recovery” or world-rebuilding, this essay posits that the crisis in meaning denies the possibility of recovery. It therefore approaches amor mundi as a critical, creative, situational, ongoing process simply of world-building. The essay brings its critical version of amor mundi to bear through analyzing the world-threatening events that unfolded in the United States after the 2020 presidential election. Citation: Philosophy & Social Criticism PubDate: 2021-09-16T01:56:18Z DOI: 10.1177/01914537211042609
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Authors:Alexander Means First page: 974 Abstract: Philosophy & Social Criticism, Ahead of Print. Michel Foucault was one of the 20th century’s great practitioners of study. Time in the archives and library, teaching, reading, thinking, and writing were all integrated aspects of his tireless labor to find lines of escape out of the confines of Western humanism and totalizing approaches to power and history. Drawing on Foucault’s lectures at the Collège de France and the work of James Bernauer, this article discusses Foucault’s mode of study as a practice of freedom. It then mobilizes Foucault’s analyses of biopolitics and neoliberal reason to address new enclosures of academic labor that push against study within the university. The article argues that Foucault was not able to anticipate how the biopolitical horizon would become ever-more dependent on extraction, including from the value generated by academic labor. It then draws on ideas of fugitivity and undercommons to supplement Foucault’s study as a mode of resistance. Citation: Philosophy & Social Criticism PubDate: 2021-09-16T09:39:18Z DOI: 10.1177/01914537211042614
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Authors:Edward McGushin First page: 987 Abstract: Philosophy & Social Criticism, Ahead of Print. For the later Foucault, as for the early Foucault, the dream represents a privileged disclosure of the ethics of the self, and the relation to truth. What, then, is the function of the dream in the ethics of the self' This article brings together Foucault’s early work on the dream and his late work on the care of the self to answer this question. Foucault’s archeologies and genealogies of power and discourse show how the modern disciplinary, bio-political, neo-liberal individual is constituted simultaneously as self-sovereign and as subject to governmental management. The dream awakens when the self-sovereign subject of modern power goes to sleep. The dream, then, problematizes and displaces the sovereign subject and opens the door to disruptive forms of experience, counter to modern power’s demand that we be always awake, productive, and in control of our thoughts and feelings. Citation: Philosophy & Social Criticism PubDate: 2021-09-17T03:15:06Z DOI: 10.1177/01914537211042619
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Authors:Francis X. Clooney First page: 1001 Abstract: Philosophy & Social Criticism, Ahead of Print. This essay explores James Bernauer’s Jesuit Kaddish as an extended reflection on the centuries-long troubled relationship between Jesuits and Jews, with attention to egregious instances of moral failure on the part of Jesuits. It investigates too Bernauer’s highlighting of instances of Jesuit spiritual resistance both to evil and to the undue prudence of cautious institutions. Forthright in weaving his own intellectual journey into the book, Bernauer movingly renders himself a theme for reflection, a scholar’s life-long interrogation of his own religious community, as gratitude, loyalty, and critical distance stand side by side. The concluding statement of Jesuit Repentance perfectly marks the transition from understanding to a performative expression of responsibility for the personal and systemic failures to which we are heirs. Citation: Philosophy & Social Criticism PubDate: 2021-09-17T10:42:24Z DOI: 10.1177/01914537211042617
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Authors:Thomas W Laqueur First page: 1013 Abstract: Philosophy & Social Criticism, Ahead of Print. James Bernauer’s Jesuit Kaddish about Jews and Jesuits in the shadow of the Holocaust is not a work of ordinary secular history. It is grounded in two distinctly Jesuit spiritual practices. This essay grapples with how to translate so avowedly Jesuit an account into a more universal one. It uses this work to think about how one might use its insights to think in more secular terms about the great wrong that haunts America: the legacy of racism. Finally, it understands Bernauer’s book as insisting that we reflect on broader questions: of complicity, of obligations to repair the wounds of the past, of responsibility. A book devoted to Jesuit versions of these sorts of issues invites a more general consideration. The contrast between a more secular and a Jesuit account of all these matters is refracted in part through the author’s personal relationship to the Holocaust. Citation: Philosophy & Social Criticism PubDate: 2021-07-28T10:11:01Z DOI: 10.1177/01914537211034344
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