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Authors:Rosalind Dixon Abstract: Philosophy & Social Criticism, Ahead of Print. Constitutions serve to legitimate the exercise of public power. Yet their scope is often subject to reasonable disagreement among citizens in a democracy. As Frank Michelman notes, this points to an understanding of democratic constitutions as a framework for contestation, rather than entrenched set of binding legal constraints. This understanding, however, arguably overlooks the difference between ordinary constitutional norms and those that protect the ‘democratic minimum core’. For the latter, there is far less scope for reasonable disagreement, and greater prudential importance to conceptualizing constitutions as entrenched norms authorized strong-form judicial review. The essay thus explores the idea of a ‘tiered’ approach to constitutional design, which combines elements of strong and weak constitutional entrenchment, and judicial review. In doing so, it further considers the role that transnational norms or practices could play in helping delineate these different constitutional tiers. Citation: Philosophy & Social Criticism PubDate: 2024-08-14T04:29:20Z DOI: 10.1177/01914537241263273
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Authors:James E Fleming, Linda C McClain Abstract: Philosophy & Social Criticism, Ahead of Print. In his new book, Constitutional Essentials, Frank Michelman provides a splendid elaboration and defense of ‘the constitutional theory of political liberalism’ implicit in John Rawls’s classic work, Political Liberalism. In this essay, we make some observations about what a difference 30 years makes, comparing the political and constitutional climate in which Rawls wrote and published Political Liberalism in 1993 with the climate in which Michelman wrote and published this exegesis of it. We focus on (1) changes in our circumstances of pluralism, including the accentuation of polarization and unreasonable views, and (2) the simultaneous breakdown of trust in the Supreme Court authoritatively to resolve disputes concerning constitutional essentials. Throughout, we acknowledge and seek to reckon with the possibility that Michelman may have given Rawls’s liberal principle of legitimacy its fullest, most coherent account just at the moment when the possibility of realizing it seems to be passing. Citation: Philosophy & Social Criticism PubDate: 2024-08-09T06:33:24Z DOI: 10.1177/01914537241263266
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Authors:Dennis martin Davis Abstract: Philosophy & Social Criticism, Ahead of Print.
Citation: Philosophy & Social Criticism PubDate: 2024-08-09T05:19:09Z DOI: 10.1177/01914537241263280
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Authors:David Ventura Abstract: Philosophy & Social Criticism, Ahead of Print. The final chapter of Frantz Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth includes several psychiatric case histories that speak to the indelible effects of the deathly atmospherics of colonialism on the psychology of the colonized. Though Fanon reveals that these case histories are drawn from his own clinical practice in Algeria, he almost entirely refuses to contextualize their inclusion in the text, and even warns that his presentation intentionally ‘avoid[s] any semiological, nosological, or therapeutic discussion’. In this article, I read Fanon’s case histories in Wretched in terms of Christina Sharpe’s notion of Black redaction, which she adumbrates in her In the Wake: On Blackness and Being as a critical strategy for ‘imagining otherwise’ that seeks to counter the generalized anti-Black atmosphere that still governs the world in the wake of transatlantic slavery. My argument is that in presenting the case histories of Wretched in refusal of dominant psychiatric discourses, Fanon engages a Black redactive strategy that aims to imagine the psychological effects of colonization otherwise than through the pathologizing colonial frames by which racialized and colonized lives are systematically rendered invisible. Further, I contend that reading Fanon’s case histories in such Black redactive terms enables us to recognize that his clinically inflected political thought is not premised on a valuation of pathology, as has been argued by his Black optimist (Fred Moten) and Afro-pessimist (Jared Sexton) readers alike. In fact, as I conclude by arguing in response to these readings, at play in Fanon’s Black redactive strategy in Wretched is not a valuation of pathology, but the matter of its transvaluation. Citation: Philosophy & Social Criticism PubDate: 2024-08-06T04:20:09Z DOI: 10.1177/01914537241270740
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Authors:Guido Niccolò Barbi Abstract: Philosophy & Social Criticism, Ahead of Print. This article discusses possible ways to account for how solidarity comes to be constituted. Beyond accounts tying solidarity either to identity, or to the adherence to a common normative framework, recent scholarship has underscored the role played by collective action in bringing about solidarity. In this paper, I agree that collective action has been often overlooked as a fundamental element in constituting solidarity but warn against the risk of conceptualizing the source of solidarity exclusively in terms of action. Instead, I propose to understand solidarity as resulting from the continuous interaction between two different dimensions of solidarity: constitutive solidarity that centres on collective action, and constituted solidarity which centres on given identities. My paper begins by distinguishing the two meanings of solidarity – constituted and constitutive. The first referring to an (instituted) set of mutual obligations applying to a given group, the second referring to solidarity as underlying social bond, which establishes the solidarity group in the first place. The paper then goes on to discuss three different accounts of constitutive solidarity: identity-based, obligations-based and action-based. I argue that only the action-based account can conceptualise the coming about of new forms of solidarity and the changing scope of the solidarity group. Yet, such accounts are unable to conceptualise how constitutive solidarity can come to ground constituted forms of solidarity, able to endure through time. On this basis, I propose to interpret constitutive and constituted solidarity as two ‘moments’ of solidarity, one symbolically grounding the other, even if not through linear causation. Rather, constitutive solidarity is constantly evolving and constantly contributes to remap the identities depicting social reality, which ground constituted forms of solidarity. Citation: Philosophy & Social Criticism PubDate: 2024-08-06T02:26:27Z DOI: 10.1177/01914537241265117
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Authors:Oliver Gerstenberg Abstract: Philosophy & Social Criticism, Ahead of Print. A crucial insight in Michelman’s ‘Constitutional Essentials’ is that constitutions may serve a justificatory or proceduralizing aim in modern liberal democracies. Yet the pervasiveness of moral disagreement – all-the-way-up; all-the-way-down – suggests, as I will argue, a democratic-experimentalist turn, which focuses on a non-hierarchical process of stakeholder deliberation and the court’s role in instigating and overseeing that process, ensuring non-domination. I believe that Frank is exactly right in arguing that a liberally justification-worthy political framework-law-in-place is normatively necessary for democratic politics to succeed in divided societies. But I want to suggest that democratic experimentalism can offer further support to this claim. Citation: Philosophy & Social Criticism PubDate: 2024-07-30T04:55:36Z DOI: 10.1177/01914537241263284
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Authors:Steven L Winter Abstract: Philosophy & Social Criticism, Ahead of Print. The claim of liberal constitutionalism is that a text-like object or a ‘diplomatically abstract’ set of principles can work a deflection of disagreements within a pluralist polity. But this project assumes both that pluralism remains amenable to reason and that reason is a capacity independent of the profound differences of meaning, value, and forms of life that shape those disagreements. Neither assumption is correct. Differences in norms, values, and forms of life inevitably undergird and structure differences in meaning, perception, and interpretation. Consequently, a constitution (even when written and accompanied by judicial review) will necessarily unfold in an ongoing process of political cooperation and contestation. Legitimacy can arise only from the practice of democracy itself – that is, self-governance under conditions that realistically accord equal recognition and respect to all participants. Law is not some abstract entity or prior fixation, special and above. It is not, as Michelman once said, ‘an autonomous force’ that provides ‘an external untouchable rule of the game’. It is just another social institution or performative practice that does (or does not) reflect our democratic nomos. To be committed, as a strong democrat, to the rule of law is to be committed to the idea that we make the rules by which we govern ourselves. Equal voice, equal power, and equal law are just self-government. They are internal to – that is, constitutive of – the game. They are not untouchable; indeed, they are being manhandled every day. But they nevertheless describe a democratic constitution that fully legitimates itself in its performance. Citation: Philosophy & Social Criticism PubDate: 2024-07-23T11:06:03Z DOI: 10.1177/01914537241263258
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Authors:Nektarios Kastrinakis Abstract: Philosophy & Social Criticism, Ahead of Print. The dominant view for the relation between Adorno and Nietzsche is that the latter’s influence on the former, in terms of style and content, is primarily to be found in Adorno’s book Minima Moralia. Contrary to the dominant view, this article takes seriously Adorno’s admission that ‘of all the so-called great philosophers I owe [Nietzsche] by far the greatest debt – more even than Hegel’ and investigates the extent of Nietzsche’s influence in the conception of negative dialectics. It is argued that there could be a significant as well as inconspicuous influence that runs through Adorno’s Negative Dialectics to the point where Nietzsche legitimately be proclaimed the originator of Adorno’s negative dialectics. For those who consider negative dialectics to be the paramount achievement of Adorno’s thought, this claim would be equivalent to the claim that Nietzsche’s most significant contribution in Adorno’s thought is to be found in Negative Dialectics rather than in Minima Moralia. Citation: Philosophy & Social Criticism PubDate: 2024-07-22T01:51:21Z DOI: 10.1177/01914537241265116
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Authors:Andrew Koppelman Abstract: Philosophy & Social Criticism, Ahead of Print. What can constitutional law contribute to the justification of political power' Quite a lot, Frank Michelman argues in Constitutional Essentials. It can establish a publicly known framework for addressing the deep disagreements that are inevitable in any free society. Michelman’s analysis has powerful attractions, but he overclaims the clarity with which rights can be defended within the Rawlsian framework he contemplates. The interests that courts must defend will vary from one society to another, depending on what the locals happen to value. They cannot therefore be derived abstractly from the moral powers. In John Rawls’s four-stage sequence, writers of constitutions, legislatures, and courts necessarily consider contestable ideas of the good. Deep disagreement even about political fundamentals is a permanent condition of political life in a free society. Social unity is possible, but it is a more unstable unity than Rawls and Michelman imagine. Citation: Philosophy & Social Criticism PubDate: 2024-07-18T10:48:30Z DOI: 10.1177/01914537241263290
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Authors:Mark Tushnet Abstract: Philosophy & Social Criticism, Ahead of Print. Can a constitution be treated as a recommendation rather than as binding and entrenched law' I argue that the answer to that question is Yes. With respect to the constitution in gross, that is, the total set of general provisions setting out both the structures of governance and the basic rights the constitution protects, the constitution as recommendation can serve as a focal point for ordinary political contestation which, because it unfolds in real time and is conducted by actors with limited time and energy for such contestation, occurs within (largely) settled institutional forms. With respect to the constitution in detail, that is, brought to ground in judicial judgments in contested cases, the answer is more complicated. Ordinarily treating judicial judgments as recommendations is a prescription for instability (and for that reason inconsistent with the idea of institutional settlement). If the target of such a judgment makes a considered judgment that instability is worth it, the target is raising questions about the continuing value of remaining in the particular polity within which the principle of institutional settlement holds sway. Citation: Philosophy & Social Criticism PubDate: 2024-06-24T06:22:11Z DOI: 10.1177/01914537241263289
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Authors:Kenneth Baynes Abstract: Philosophy & Social Criticism, Ahead of Print. Michelman's Constitutional Essentials raises important questions about the idea of political liberalism and related idea of public reason. This essay offers a sympathetic commentary while also exploring the importance of the idea of reciprocity for both Rawls and Michelman. Citation: Philosophy & Social Criticism PubDate: 2024-06-24T05:32:33Z DOI: 10.1177/01914537241263254
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Authors:David M Rasmussen Abstract: Philosophy & Social Criticism, Ahead of Print. This essay raises questions about the role of reciprocity as it pertains to the various formulations of the liberal principle of legitimacy as interpreted by Constitutional Essentials. Citation: Philosophy & Social Criticism PubDate: 2024-06-24T03:48:57Z DOI: 10.1177/01914537241264105
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Authors:Sanford Levinson Abstract: Philosophy & Social Criticism, Ahead of Print. These are difficult times for the project of ‘political liberalism’. Frank Michelman is one of the most distinguished advocates for liberal constitutionalism, and one can only wonder if the time has past – that is, if the ‘owl of Minerva’ has perhaps flown – with regard to a constitutional project identified very much with the mid-20th century. Citation: Philosophy & Social Criticism PubDate: 2024-06-21T07:12:54Z DOI: 10.1177/01914537241263287
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Authors:Silje A Langvatn Abstract: Philosophy & Social Criticism, Ahead of Print. This article assesses Frank I. Michelman’s constitution-centered and proceduralist interpretation of Rawls’ conception of political legitimacy and argues that it merits attention because it highlights the institutional aspects of Rawls’ understanding of political legitimacy for constitutional democracies. However, the article also questions Michelman’s interpretation of Rawls’ ‘liberal principle of legitimacy’ (LPL) and the later ‘idea of political legitimacy based on the criterion of reciprocity’ (ILBR). As Michelman rightly points out, for the exercise of political power to be legitimate in a constitutional democracy, it must be in accordance with a constitution that is itself legitimate or reasonably acceptable to free and equal citizens. Yet, the article argues that Rawls’ two legitimacy formulations are attempts to make an additional point: Namely that when democratic citizens exercise political power in ‘the fundamental political issues’, or in issues that shape the basic justice of society or the essentials of the constitution itself, they must respect the ideal of public reason – or ensure themselves and other citizens that their exercise of political power is in accordance with the underlying basic political-moral ideas of persons and society that make the constitution itself acceptable to them. The LPL and the ILBR are conceptions of political legitimacy, not in the sense of setting up a criterion for when a specific law is legitimate, but in the sense of outlining civic or “office-specific” constraints that citizens and public officials must put on their reasoning and exercise of political power in the fundamental political issues for the practice of a constitutional democracy to be legitimate, or well-ordered, reasonably just, and stable for the right reasons – in the long run. The article also discusses why Rawls saw the need to reformulate the LPL, and how the later ILBR assigns a new significance to citizens’ actual use of public reason and their intersubjective deliberation. Citation: Philosophy & Social Criticism PubDate: 2024-06-20T10:00:13Z DOI: 10.1177/01914537241263324
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Authors:Frank I Michelman Abstract: Philosophy & Social Criticism, Ahead of Print. This response to commentaries composing a symposium on my book ‘Constitutional Essentials: On the Constitutional Theory of Political Liberalism’ (2022) includes restatements of some major themes from the book, as prompted by thoughts from the commentators. Citation: Philosophy & Social Criticism PubDate: 2024-06-20T07:37:41Z DOI: 10.1177/01914537241263262
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Authors:Johan van der Walt Abstract: Philosophy & Social Criticism, Ahead of Print. In January and February 2023, the University of Luxembourg hosted a series of four online seminars on Frank Michelman’s then just recently published book Constitutional Essentials (CE), a book which in Frank’s own words aimed to work out the implications of Rawls' theory of political liberalism for constitutional theory and debates between constitutional lawyers regarding a number of constantly recurring questions of constitutional law. Eleven of the invited contributions to the four seminars (presentations of 15–20 minutes) plus one additional contribution by Silje Langvatn, are now collected in this special issue of Philosophy & Social Criticism, followed by a response by Michelman. This introduction to the discussions between Michelman and his interlocutors begins with a brief synopsis of some of the key lines of argument that Michelman develops in CE and then moves on to survey all the arguments offered in response. The last section takes a briefly look at Michelman’s replies to these responses. Citation: Philosophy & Social Criticism PubDate: 2024-06-20T06:33:14Z DOI: 10.1177/01914537241263275
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Authors:Alessandro Ferrara Abstract: Philosophy & Social Criticism, Ahead of Print. Frank Michelman’s recent book Constitutional Essentials. On the Constitutional Theory of Political Liberalism is discussed from a specific angle, related to how Rawls’s ‘deflection procedure’ – called by Michelman ‘justification by constitution’ – is affected by two recent innovations in the paradigm of political liberalism: first, the extension of reasonable pluralism to a family of liberal political conceptions of justice that coexist in a liberal-democratic society; second, the idea of legitimation based on the criterion of reciprocity, aimed at supplementing the liberal principle of legitimacy. In the attempt to probe Michelman’s assessment of the impact of these two innovations, three critical points are mentioned, for each of them, that suggest a somewhat more sceptical attitude than Michelman’s about the capacity of ‘justification by constitution’ to remain substantially unaltered, once these innovations are in place. Citation: Philosophy & Social Criticism PubDate: 2024-06-18T07:34:40Z DOI: 10.1177/01914537241263267
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Authors:Shijun Tong Abstract: Philosophy & Social Criticism, Ahead of Print. There have been numerous studies on Kant’s concept of the ‘Fact of Reason’, drawing on various intellectual resources, ranging from metaphysics to psychology, from Aristotle to Mencius, from analytic philosophy to phenomenology, and beyond. How should we evaluate these studies' Is it possible that these studies can contribute both to an understanding of Kantian philosophy and to an understanding of Western philosophy as a whole, as well as shed light on the development of philosophy after Kant and on the philosophical questions of our own era' In order to at least partially clarify the above questions, this article will draw on the work of philosohers such as Karl-Otto Apel, Jürgen Habermas, C.I. Lewis, Jin Yuelin and Feng Qi, and discuss how certain presuppositions of communicative action can be both regulative and constitutive, how the same propositions can be both empirical and a priori, how the same concepts can both describe reality and regulate it, and how the ‘Fact of Reason’ can be understood as the ‘Fact of Learning’, in order to offer a new interpretation of Kant’s concept of the ‘Fact of Reason’. Citation: Philosophy & Social Criticism PubDate: 2024-06-11T11:48:22Z DOI: 10.1177/01914537241259293
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Authors:Austin Cottrell Abstract: Philosophy & Social Criticism, Ahead of Print.
Citation: Philosophy & Social Criticism PubDate: 2024-04-15T07:48:38Z DOI: 10.1177/01914537241245739
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Authors:Sarah Bufkin Abstract: Philosophy & Social Criticism, Ahead of Print. Since its 2007 publication, Miranda Fricker’s Epistemic Injustice has sparked a vigorous conversation in analytic philosophy about how social power corrodes individual’s epistemic capacities and distorts collective meaning-making in unjust ways. Yet for all its normative insights into social silencing, I argue that Fricker’s theorization of epistemic dysfunction remains too individualized, cognitivist, and dematerialized to account for racialized imaginaries. Rather than view racisms as normal and normative in racist cultures, Fricker frames identity-driven prejudice as a troubling aberration from otherwise unblemished epistemic and moral norms. This leads her into adopting an overly voluntarist and idealist theory of social change that centres training better knowers rather than unmaking racialized worlds. Ultimately, I contend that we should return to a materialist theory of ideology, following the work of Stuart Hall. Doing so jettisons the narrow focus on individual epistemic failures and instead problematizes how certain social ideas consolidate and reproduce racial hierarchies. Citation: Philosophy & Social Criticism PubDate: 2024-04-12T09:58:00Z DOI: 10.1177/01914537241244824
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Authors:Jan-Werner Müller Abstract: Philosophy & Social Criticism, Ahead of Print. Mass assembly on squares tends to be associated both with democracy and authoritarian as well as populist regimes (where assembly is connected to acclamation). The article elucidates the specific democratic functions of mass assembly, and how they can be facilitated both legally and spatially. In case of the former, it provides a critical analysis of indispensable core components of the right to assemble (which has recently been hollowed out in many jurisdictions); in matters of space, the article proposes characteristics of squares that might facilitate and represent different forms of democratic assembly (without claiming that such characteristics could ever guarantee democratic outcomes). Some recent empirical evidence for how squares have enabled the increasingly important phenomenon of “urban civic revolutions” is also discussed. Citation: Philosophy & Social Criticism PubDate: 2024-04-08T08:44:39Z DOI: 10.1177/01914537241244822
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Authors:Fidèle Ingiyimbere Abstract: Philosophy & Social Criticism, Ahead of Print. Since the publication of his A Theory of Justice (TJ), John Rawls has revolutionized political philosophy in many ways, including the understanding of human rights. His theory of rights in TJ is drawn from a comprehensive liberal doctrine and is limited to the domestic society. However, his account of human rights developed in his last major work, The Law of Peoples, claims to be politically free standing, following the model of his Political Liberalism. For Rawls, human rights are necessary conditions for social cooperation. They are meant to serve as one of the principles of foreign policy of the reasonable liberal peoples, in their relations with non-liberal societies. Rawls believes that his category of human rights cannot be rejected by non-liberal peoples as parochial or particular to the Western tradition, because they are not based on any comprehensive doctrine. On the other hand, however, many African scholars have dismissed the current international human rights regime on the account of being too liberal, and not corresponding to the African communalist worldview. It is in that regard that The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and subsequent African human rights instruments were adopted to dress a list of human rights that take into account African history, civilization, and values. Thus, in three main sections, this article examines whether the Rawlsian account and the African view of human rights can enrich each other, or whether they are completely opposed. Citation: Philosophy & Social Criticism PubDate: 2024-04-08T01:27:05Z DOI: 10.1177/01914537241244823
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Authors:Domonkos Sik Abstract: Philosophy & Social Criticism, Ahead of Print. The article aims at elaborating a non-speculative concept of social pathology. In the first section, various conceptualizations (e.g. Habermas, Honneth) are critically revaluated. It is argued that (a) applying the originally medical concept of ‘pathology’ on social entities has untenable connotations (due to the lacking social equivalent of death); (b) grounding social pathology on the level of ‘social suffering’ is not in accordance with the actors’ horizon shaped by biomedical- and psy-discourses. To avoid these dead-ends, social pathologies are reinterpreted as structural distortions causing diseases or mental disorders. To refine this initial definition, in the second section, Merleau-Ponty’s concept of chiasm is used as an ontological framework translating between medical and social diagnoses. The proposed concept of social pathology refers to those patterns of disrupted pre-intentional, intentional and mediated intertwining, which manifest as ill or psychopathological chiasm. In the third section, two case studies are elaborated: the intersubjective structures of depressed and asthmatic chiasm. Finally, the implications for critical theory and praxis are overviewed. Citation: Philosophy & Social Criticism PubDate: 2024-04-05T10:53:01Z DOI: 10.1177/01914537241244820
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Authors:Joy Gordon Abstract: Philosophy & Social Criticism, Ahead of Print. The notion of economic violence has long been recognized in the work of Johan Galtung and others. The work of Thomas Pogge and the field of global justice have addressed the impact of economic disparities between the Global North and the Global South, and their impact on human well-being, and social and economic development more broadly. Patents, publication in scholarly journals, academic collaborations, access to academic journals, and so forth do not on their face seem to be closely tied to indicators of human well-being. However, disparities in knowledge production, including access to academic resources and publication venues, are tied directly or indirectly to infrastructure, food security, health and mortality rates, employment, and gender equity. Citation: Philosophy & Social Criticism PubDate: 2024-04-02T07:58:30Z DOI: 10.1177/01914537241238368
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Authors:Lillianne John, Kit Rempala Abstract: Philosophy & Social Criticism, Ahead of Print. Given demonstrated global knowledge inequality, this article attempts to draw out the connection between tertiary education and research (TER), economic development and infrastructure, and human development. We first explore the connection between knowledge and economic development by tracing a short history of the emergence of knowledge in economic analysis and by introducing the concept of a ‘knowledge economy’. The World Bank’s ‘Knowledge Assessment Methodology’ (2000) attempted to evaluate such ‘knowledge economies’ through a number of proposed variables. We describe relationships between such TER-variables, economic development, and infrastructure building, especially in the shift towards digital economies. We will show that there is a tangible, negative human impact from disparities in knowledge production, and significant improvement in human welfare when knowledge production capacities improve. Finally, we will illustrate how these relationships play out in two case studies, in Montenegro and Bangladesh. Citation: Philosophy & Social Criticism PubDate: 2024-03-27T07:24:23Z DOI: 10.1177/01914537241239096
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Authors:Sergi Morales-Gálvez Abstract: Philosophy & Social Criticism, Ahead of Print. Linguistic justice is about institutions distributing material and symbolic resources fairly when they are faced with linguistic diversity. However, no theory of linguistic justice has developed a systematic and comprehensive account of the moral dilemmas that take place in interpersonal linguistic relationships, in particular the power dynamics leading to (linguistic) domination. The aim of this article is to start building a general theory of linguistic domination, one that offers new conceptual tools for both empirical and normative analyses of linguistically diverse societies. Using the republican tradition of thought, I argue that there is linguistic domination whenever someone is subject to the uncontrolled capacity for interference over their linguistic uses, ideology and acquisition by another agent. This article tests under what conditions this phenomenon takes place and the parties involved in it (both in terms of individuals and political institutions). Citation: Philosophy & Social Criticism PubDate: 2024-03-26T05:16:09Z DOI: 10.1177/01914537241239093
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Authors:Leonard D’Cruz Abstract: Philosophy & Social Criticism, Ahead of Print. This article offers a novel reconstruction of Foucault’s methodology that emphasises his respect for the natural sciences. Foucault’s work has long been suspected of reducing knowledge to power, and thus collapsing into unconstrained relativism and methodological incoherence. These concerns are predicated on a misunderstanding of Foucault’s overall approach, which takes the form of a historico-critical project rather than a normative epistemology. However, Foucault does sometimes make normative epistemological judgements, especially about the human sciences. Furthermore, there are outstanding questions about what secures the descriptive rigour of the genealogical method. To address these issues, I develop two claims that will significantly enrich our understanding of Foucault’s methodology. The first is that Foucault’s respect for the natural sciences is crucial in making sense of his normative epistemological judgements. The second is that the descriptive rigour of his genealogical method derives from the fact it is modelled on empirical inquiry. Citation: Philosophy & Social Criticism PubDate: 2024-03-16T12:37:12Z DOI: 10.1177/01914537241235571
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Authors:Frederick Harry Pitts Abstract: Philosophy & Social Criticism, Ahead of Print. This article critically examines the transition from Marx to Spinoza within Antonio Negri’s postoperaist thought and explores a potential alternative rooted in Mario Tronti’s concept of the ‘autonomy of the political’. In Negri’s postoperaismo, the embrace of Spinoza reevaluates Marx’s critique of political economy through an optimistic lens, suggesting a tendency beyond capitalism. However, Negri’s embrace of a Spinozian plane of immanence entails a problematic affirmation of what exists. The article argues that Negri’s worldview, despite its beginnings, ends up resembling deterministic historical materialism. While critical theory exposes flaws in Negri’s theory, it falls short in providing a practical alternative. Returning to Negri’s interpretation of Spinoza’s Political Treatise uncovers earlier arguments, rooted in paradoxes inherent to practical politics. However, reliance on the concept of the multitude highlights deeper issues in Negri’s approach. Rather than adhering to postoperaismo or critical theory, the article suggests an alternative in Tronti’s journey from operaismo, particularly in the concept of the ‘autonomy of the political’. Notwithstanding critiques, this attempted liberation from Marxist determinism allows for a clearer confrontation with politics. The article concludes that Hardt and Negri’s recent critical engagement with this concept advances their arguments but does not entirely overcome inherent limitations in their approach. Citation: Philosophy & Social Criticism PubDate: 2024-03-16T04:21:38Z DOI: 10.1177/01914537241240430
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Authors:Alex Cain Abstract: Philosophy & Social Criticism, Ahead of Print. In this article I demonstrate how Hannah Arendt both appropriates and transforms Aristotle’s view of political friendship. I argue that the brief discussion of Aristotelian political friendship in The Human Condition relies on an earlier de-materialization of Aristotle’s work on friendship. This de-materialization of Aristotle’s view of friendship allows Arendt to discuss Aristotelian friendship as a kind of ‘respect’, where ‘respect’ is a philosophical notion unavailable to Aristotle. Ultimately, for Arendt, the experience of friendship opens up a space for human beings to begin to practice a distinct way of seeing one another – a ‘respect’ – that can in turn be practiced in public, making the experience of friendship an important precursor to action. Citation: Philosophy & Social Criticism PubDate: 2024-02-21T06:55:56Z DOI: 10.1177/01914537241232580
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Authors:Timothy Hinton Abstract: Philosophy & Social Criticism, Ahead of Print. This article addresses two explanatory gaps in Althusser’s late work. One has to do with the relation between nominalism and materialism; the other engages the relation between Althusser’s later materialism and a broadly materialist approach to history. In the first part of the article, I develop a response to the problem of nominalism that makes use of Hobbes’s nominalism and Deleuze’s concept of the plane of immanence. In the second part, I address the problem of history by explaining the concept of an aleatory causal chain, and showing how such chains could be at work in human history. I also make use of Hobbes’s materialist account of causation, applying it to social relations, social collectivities, and historical events. Citation: Philosophy & Social Criticism PubDate: 2024-02-20T12:51:58Z DOI: 10.1177/01914537241234692
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Authors:Marjolein de Boer, Annemie Halsema Abstract: Philosophy & Social Criticism, Ahead of Print. This article offers a critical phenomenological analysis of prevailing myths of menopause. By drawing on Simone de Beauvoir's conceptions of myths that essentialize existence, we have analyzed contemporary TV series in which menopause is portrayed. We identified the following myths of menopause: the myth of the liberated woman, the unnesting (s)mother, the old, ugly, and sexless witch, the mild, wise, and uncarnal woman. We first describe these myths and analyze how they may be interpreted as marginalizing in various and sometimes ambiguous ways. Then, we trace out two distinct ways in which some TV shows expose these myths as essentializing myths, which is important for allowing us to take a distance from them, and thereby to resist them. The first one is in line with what Beauvoir herself suggested as a fruitful dealing with myths: replacing mythical thinking with actual experiences. The second way is conceptualized on the basis of Irigaray’s thinking about mimicking myths. Such dealings with myths of menopause, we argue, may open the road to less marginalizing and more pluriform thinking about menopause. Citation: Philosophy & Social Criticism PubDate: 2024-02-20T05:48:32Z DOI: 10.1177/01914537241232586
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Authors:Nathan W Dean Abstract: Philosophy & Social Criticism, Ahead of Print. Richard Rorty does have something ‘to say to [Black Americans]’ and to their racially conscious nonblack allies in the sense that his understanding of liberalism, his prophecies about the future and his urgent appeals to the American Left all paint a picture of a white middle class fully prepared to make life increasingly miserable for Black Americans unless it is ‘protected from catastrophe’. Rorty hopes that this group will undergo a moral transformation that enables it to see past its narrow group interests, but doubts that it will. He, nevertheless, prescribes a politics of hope and appeasement as a hedge against both despair and backsliding. In so doing, he fails to appreciate the availability and the suitability of an alternative ‘racial realist’ (and tragicomic) posture vis-à-vis American liberalism inspired by thinkers like Ralph Ellison, James Baldwin and Derrick Bell. This alternative enables racially conscious Americans to respond to the intransigence of (certain) white Americans with cunning rather than by escaping into fantasies of a ‘dream country’ unmarked by the damage caused by racism and its long-lingering effects. I uncover and explore this alternative through Rorty’s warnings regarding the white middle class, a somewhat surprising consistency between Rorty’s brand of class politics and Bell’s understanding of ‘racial fortuity’, and, finally, through a development of Bell’s ‘racial realist’ posture combined with Baldwin’s ‘uses of the blues’ resulting in a ‘hard-eyed’ tragicomic sensibility sufficient to effectively pair continued struggle with creative consolation and resilience. Citation: Philosophy & Social Criticism PubDate: 2024-02-19T06:30:21Z DOI: 10.1177/01914537241233428
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Authors:Michael Reder, Simon Faets Abstract: Philosophy & Social Criticism, Ahead of Print. Radical theories of democracy deal only marginally with climate impacts. Judith Butler is part of this tradition and has worked on ecological issues in recent years. She might help contribute to beginning to close this gap. In this article, some of her theoretical elements will be explored in order to critically discuss whether and how climate impacts can be understood philosophically within the framework of radical democracy. These reflections include Butler’s interpretation of relationality, vulnerability, critique and resistance. By combining these theoretical elements and applying them to future generations, which Butler only touches on to some extent, we outline how radical democracy may contribute to the philosophical discourse on climate change, thereby significantly broadening the overall philosophical debate. Furthermore, the article puts forward a critique of radical democratic theory for neglecting the issue of future generations thus far and suggests a direction in which it could be developed further. Citation: Philosophy & Social Criticism PubDate: 2024-02-16T01:15:58Z DOI: 10.1177/01914537241232965
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Authors:Paul Weithman Abstract: Philosophy & Social Criticism, Ahead of Print. Though John Rawls's treatment of stability has received less attention than other parts of his work, it promises help in understanding how liberal institutions can reproduce themselves under non-ideal conditions like ours. But stability in Rawls's sense seems to depend ineliminably on society's justice, and Gerald Cohen powerfully criticized the connection Rawls drew between the two. Cohen contends that stability is ‘alien’ to justice rather than conceptually connected to it. It is therefore a consideration that should be studied separately. If we are to draw on Rawls's treatment, it needs to be defended against Cohen's critique. I argue that it can be. The defense depends upon establishing a conclusion that Cohen thought inconsistent with Rawls's theory and that might have discomfited Rawls himself: that the arguments he offered for the stability of a just society were more limited and tentative than he acknowledged. Locating those limits has two valuable payoffs. It sheds light on some of the more obscure and difficult, but neglected parts of Rawls's work. More important for our current political moment, it shows the points at which unjust societies such as our own need to be shored up. Citation: Philosophy & Social Criticism PubDate: 2024-02-03T06:15:17Z DOI: 10.1177/01914537241230343
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Authors:Giorgi Tskhadaia Abstract: Philosophy & Social Criticism, Ahead of Print. Developing a plausible theory of political obligation is crucial for understanding our current political lives or constructing new ones. However, it proved to be hard to arrive at a theory that is universalistic and logically consistent. Without adherence to certain universalistic principles, such as freedom and equality, one might be tempted to justify individuals’ allegiance to authoritarian regimes based on particularistic reasons. Also, one may argue that if a general theory of political obligation cannot be devised, we are justified to resort to anarchism. Despite such high political stakes involved, a contention arose that universalistic approaches to political obligation are logically inconsistent because they run afoul of a particularity requirement. The latter is a demand that any plausible theory of individuals’ obligations toward a political entity should account for the reasons why they should obey the rules and orders of a specific authority. In this article, drawing on Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe’s post-structuralist theory, I demonstrate that the dichotomy of universalism vs. particularism need not have destructive effects for a successful theory of political obligation. Indeed, it is possible to accept a particularity requirement but at the same time, argue that political obligations have a universalistic thrust. Citation: Philosophy & Social Criticism PubDate: 2024-01-27T11:07:48Z DOI: 10.1177/01914537241230013
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Authors:Yutang Jin Abstract: Philosophy & Social Criticism, Ahead of Print. Han Fei was a central figure in Chinese Legalism, which was a leading school of thought in the Warring States period of China, and which left a huge imprint on political culture in imperial China. This article examines the complex duality of public and private interests in Han Fei’s political thought, a crucial aspect of his thinking. I argue that Han Fei adopted a sophisticated statist approach to understanding public and private interests. For Han Fei, public interests are embodied in the state while private ones have dual functions. On the one hand, private interests threaten public ones by inviting corrupt material interests, personal morality, and knowledge, as well as human relationships. On the other hand, self-centered human psychology plays a dialectic role in strengthening the state. Citation: Philosophy & Social Criticism PubDate: 2024-01-25T12:06:51Z DOI: 10.1177/01914537241229052
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Authors:Charles des Portes Abstract: Philosophy & Social Criticism, Ahead of Print. This article offers to outline a direction for a decolonial political theory based on Aimé Césaire’s and Frantz Fanon’s thoughts. In doing so, I will first discuss some work of comparative political theory that could be associated with an attempt to decolonize political theory. Rather than a systematic critique of these works, this article aims to outline some of their limits from a decolonial perspective, such as their embedment in a continental ontology/logic, and their over-emphasis on methodology that can lead to an instrumental account of politics. In contrast, I will argue for a decolonial existential political theory that grounds its investigation in what Frantz Fanon called ‘the zone of nonbeing’ and that takes politics as first philosophy. To make my point, I will discuss Aimé Césaire’s Letter to Maurice Thorez and Frantz Fanon’s Political Theory of the Damnés. Citation: Philosophy & Social Criticism PubDate: 2024-01-20T11:50:25Z DOI: 10.1177/01914537241229055
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Authors:Regina Kreide Abstract: Philosophy & Social Criticism, Ahead of Print. Populism and Civil Society: The Challenge to Democratic Constitutionalism (2022) by Andrew Arato and Jean Cohen is an important book that addresses a widespread and ominous phenomenon around the world: The challenge of populism. This book forms a symposium by renowned authors which gathers commentaries on Arato and Cohen’s book. From different points of view, comments, suggestions and queries are put forward, to which the authors respond. The authors’ illuminating rejoinders not only present some of their arguments in a new light but also arrive at a clarifying interpretation of their approach. Citation: Philosophy & Social Criticism PubDate: 2024-01-09T02:13:39Z DOI: 10.1177/01914537231211822
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