Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Abstract: Background Anti-Muslim and anti-Islam attitudes are widespread in contemporary western societies. A grassroots movement of mosques tries to reduce prejudice by organizing guided mosque tours for non-Muslims. While this is an opportunity for intergroup contact in a social psychological sense, contact occurs under sometimes difficult conditions. As yet, its effects have not been investigated empirically. Objective We examine (a) whether visits have an immediate and medium-term effect on prejudice toward Islam and (b) how they change the visitors’ subjective images of Muslims. Methods (a) We survey N = 324 secondary school students in a three-wave panel study in 6 guided mosque tours in different parts of Germany, including a control sample. The tour programme was in line with common practice in the mosques. Standardized measurements were taken immediately before and after the tour and again several months later. (b) We asked about subjective images of Muslims and had subjects report their spontaneous associations with the term Muslim. Results (a) Most, but not all, mosque visits significantly alleviate anti-Islam prejudice in the short term. The effects fall off after several months. (b) After the visit, the image of Muslims possessed more concrete religious content, while negative and menacing associations, such as oppression of women, threat, or so-called Islamic State have decreased. Conclusions Outgroup contact in a mosque works as predicted by the intergroup contact research, even under less than optimal conditions. However, there is potential for improvement of the setup of tours in the interest of a more sustainable impact. PubDate: 2023-07-24
Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Abstract: Zusammenfassung Der Beitrag analysiert die mehrdimensionalen Wirkungen evangelischer Religiosität auf das Politikvertrauen in Deutschland auf empirisch-quantitativer Grundlage. Die Untersuchung entwirft grundsätzliche Perspektiven zu den erklärenden Mikroprozessen im Zusammenspiel von religiöser Emotionalität, Weltdeutung und Vergemeinschaftung. Eine religiöse Emotionalität der verminderten Empfindung von negativen Emotionen, die in religiösen Überzeugungen und Praktiken der Situationsdeutung und der Emotionsregulation wurzelt, unterstützt das Politikvertrauen. Denn die emotionsbezogene Kontingenzbewältigung verbessert die empfundene Leistung der politischen Institutionen und ihrer Akteur:innen. Ein inklusiver Stil evangelischer Weltdeutung versteht die Gesellschaft als Ort des Engagements und der Kooperation, stärkt das Sozialvertrauen und fördert so indirekt das Politikvertrauen. Ein exklusiver Stil evangelikal-freikirchlicher Weltdeutung akzentuiert die Kooperation innerhalb der religiösen Gruppe, aber hemmt das generalisierte Sozial- und Politikvertrauen. Evangelische Gottesdienste politisieren, ohne das Vertrauen in das politische System zu stärken. Die in ihrer mehrheitlichen Ausprägung positiven Wirkungen evangelischer Religiosität auf das Politikvertrauen werden als erklärender Faktor für den positiven Zusammenhang zwischen christlicher Religiosität, Demokratieunterstützung und Populismusprävention eingeführt. PubDate: 2023-07-11 DOI: 10.1007/s41682-023-00160-5
Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Abstract: Abstract Both inside and outside the academy, identifications of Islam as a terrorist threat have gained traction during the on-going War on Terror. William Cavanaugh’s conceptualization and critique of what he calls “the myth of religious violence” claims to offer a critique of these identifications. This critique has been influential across a variety of disciplines. In this article, I assess both his more philosophical-critical and his more theological-constructive accounts of religion to argue that Cavanaugh’s myth is, essentially, apologetics. Cavanaugh’s apologetics for the church camouflages the differential treatment of religions during the War on Terror. If it has been about a myth at all, then the War on Terror has been about the myth of Muslim violence. Christianity past and present has condoned and contributed to this very myth. What is needed, then, is a conception and a critique of “religion” that, in contrast to Cavanaugh’s analysis, can account for the significance of Christianity for the differential treatment of religions in the public square, both descriptively and prescriptively. PubDate: 2023-06-12 DOI: 10.1007/s41682-023-00158-z
Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Abstract: Abstract This article argues that the Christian ambivalence towards the Jews throughout history lies at the heart of the difficulties liberal societies are having today in accommodating religious diversity, but also more broadly, in discussing issues pertaining to religion and secularity in a nuanced way. After a brief summary of the characteristics of Christian supersessionism, the article first explores the modern concept of religion as a product of Protestant Christianity and thus as a category that inherently privileges a Christian perspective. Although the specific associations to Christians versus Jews have become less pronounced, the inherited dichotomies (archaic/enlightened, material/spiritual, particular/universal, etc.) live on and continue to shape attitudes towards what is perceived as more and less desirable forms of religion in contemporary Western societies – as mirrored in the widespread political rhetoric claiming that Islam is not ‘compatible’ with Western culture. However, to understand the full dimensions of the mechanisms guiding the public discourse on religion post-9/11, it is important also to recognize the extent to which not only the modern concept of religion but also of secularity is based on a supersessionary logic. Hence the second part of the article explores how the religious and the secular today jointly serve to uphold a hierarchical cultural order, where certain practices and values gain the upper hand by being associated with terms such as ‘rational’, ‘progressive’ or ‘Human Rights’, while other practices and values are framed as incompatible with these terms. PubDate: 2023-06-05 DOI: 10.1007/s41682-023-00156-1
Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Abstract: Abstract Studies on 9/11 could fill a library. In this short introduction, the editor explains the reason for overcoming the hesitation to add more studies to this library by contextualizing and charting the key concerns and the key concepts of the following contributions. These contributions suggest that 9/11 is not necessarily the watershed between a pre- and a post-9/11 order that politicians and pundits continue to write about. Instead, the attacks have served as a catalyst for trends and trajectories in the global governance of religion that continue to have a significant impact today. Returning to 9/11, then, the contributions take stock of these trends and trajectories in order to chart new ways of engaging with religion in the public square. PubDate: 2023-05-31 DOI: 10.1007/s41682-022-00145-w
Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Abstract: Abstract A focus on interfaith dialogue, while in itself not a bad thing, often is weaponized as an ahistorical maneuver detracting from root causes, historical injustices, material conditions, and concrete grievances. The violence of 9/11 and its aftermath is not a function of religious illiteracy or intolerance (though these do not help), but colonial, orientalist, neocolonial, and opportunistic geopolitics (as well as religious illiteracy). This obscuring generates wrong policies, which only function to further securitize and racialize (religious) communities without redressing root causes of grievances and without taking responsibility. My argument is that under the guise of more religion, the mechanisms of the global engagement with religion actually contribute to less religious literacy, to hermeneutically uncritical accounts of religiosity, and to the propping up of generic (and unelected) religious authorities, including technocrats who specialize in “religious engagement.” This argument is based on my empirical research in Kenya, the Philippines, and Bosnia, where I examined various sites of “engagement with religion.” Focusing here primarily on the case of Bosnia as it relates to the global post 9/11 industry of “engagement with religion,” I ask how and why the practices of religion and peacebuilding/development both reinforce and exceed global structural, neocolonial, and epistemic forms of violence. What I call the “harmony business” (or the business of engaging with “good” religion) focuses much more on function or doing religion/being religious as a matter of communal boundaries rather than on content or knowing religious traditions as living and contested sites of interpretation and reimagining. PubDate: 2023-05-17 DOI: 10.1007/s41682-023-00153-4
Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Abstract: Abstract This article begins with a discussion of the notion of ‘Islam’ as used in the post-9/11 era. Rather than assuming that there is one specific notion of religion, the author problematizes the relationship between religion and politics in the aftermath of 9/11. From the perspectives of Islamophobia studies and international relations studies, the article looks specifically at how Islam was given an agency of its own, which also created a fertile ground for reframing the religion of Islam as being not a religion, but a political ideology, thus operating, unlike other religions, primarily in the field of politics. The article discusses the theory of the clash of civilizations as presented by political scientist Samuel P. Huntington against the backdrop of succeeding policies, such as the proclamations of the War on Terror by President George Bush related to the ideological void that was left after the fall of the Soviet Union, which ultimately marked the entrance into a new era in the making of global politics. The author argues that the increasing debates about Islam following the violent attacks on 9/11 led to a religionizing of political events that subsequently dereligionized religion and depoliticized the notion of politics. PubDate: 2023-05-05 DOI: 10.1007/s41682-023-00154-3
Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Abstract: Abstract What is striking in the twenty years since 9/11 is not only the renewed attention to religion in the Western public sphere but the forms this attention has taken. Suspicion towards Islam has intensified. Narratives in which the West and Islam are conflicting and clashing entities have become entrenched. In Europe, anti-Muslim rhetoric has reached fever-pitch in far-right movements. What has gone largely unnoticed, however, is the Bible-use that can be found in the programmes, protests and proclamations of far-right groups and actors. The British far-right organisation Britain First fosters one example in recent years of such Bible-use. Far from accidental or negligible, I argue that contemporary far-right Bible-use may look banal and even benign, but it masks toxic and violent attitudes to Islam. This Bible-use demonstrates the way references to religion have come to replace overt references to race in the Islamophobic discourse of the far right. In a post-9/11 context, I contend, where forms of Islamophobia take extreme and mainstream form, it is crucial that biblical scholars identify the function the Bible has in stoking divisions and drawing distinctions between a Christian West and an Islamic other. PubDate: 2023-05-04 DOI: 10.1007/s41682-023-00148-1
Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Abstract: Abstract The article investigates the phenomenon of ultra-Orthodox nationalists (Hardalim) in the modern State of Israel. Hardalim emerged out of ideological transformations in the ideological settlement movement during the 1980s and 1990s, combining aspects of the two major religious milieus in the country, national-religious Judaism and ultra-Orthodoxy. Such a fusion is cause for great concern among those, who fear a fundamentalist assault on the democratic state. Based on the definition of the editors of this volume, the article asks how far the classification of Hardalim as fundamentalists helps us to grasp the specifics of their group. I argue that the concept is useful insofar as it highlights some of the movement’s core characteristics that distinguish it from traditionalist Judaism and other forms of religious activism and lifestyle, but that at the same time a strict focus on the fundamentalist features of the Hardalim runs the risk of ignoring the group’s intimate ties and dynamics with other groups in Israeli society. PubDate: 2023-05-01 DOI: 10.1007/s41682-022-00132-1
Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Abstract: Abstract Since the last socialist years and especially the end of the Soviet Union, the importance of Orthodox Christianity has greatly increased in contemporary Russia. Religion is once again an integral part of public life, plays a major role for identity issues and is entangled with the political sphere in a variety of ways. In addition, it is important to underline that within Orthodox Christianity the fundamentalist circles are gaining ground and have a growing influence on society as a whole. Here a specific feature of Orthodox Christianity is visible, which emphasizes continuity with the early Christian Church. This is a very orthodox content of fundamentalism which is called rigorism and indicates that Orthodox Christianity perceives itself as the only legitimate heir of the Apostolic Church. For this reason, special emphasis is laid on preserving this tradition. Specifically, this is illustrated in this article, which is based on two ethnographic field studies in the Russian Federation, by describing the conflict of a company with a monastery and by referring to so-called “traditional moral values” and their relation to family issues. Traditional moral values are becoming increasingly important in the area of the family. Although there are convergences with other conservative religious communities outside the Russian Federation, joint efforts remained problematic and are rejected until today, especially by fundamentalist groups within the Russian Orthodox Church. As a result, a number of goals and aims could not be implemented despite ideological convergences and the rejection of the dominant liberal model. PubDate: 2023-05-01 DOI: 10.1007/s41682-022-00128-x
Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Abstract: Zusammenfassung Die politische und gesellschaftliche Entwicklung der Republik China (1912–1949) ist untrennbar verbunden mit der Geschichte der „Nationalen Volkspartei Chinas“ (KMT bzw. Kuomintang). Die KMT definierte sich, trotz prominenter christlicher und anderer religiöser Mitglieder, stets als säkulare Bewegung und setzte es sich zum Ziel, ein auf Wissenschaft und Rationalität ausgerichtetes „neues China“ zu schaffen. Besonders in den Jahren 1927–1937 kam es somit zu umfangreichen Kampagnen gegen Aberglauben, von denen auch die buddhistische Gemeinschaft betroffen war. Die Diskurspositionen innerhalb der Kuomintang zur Frage, welche Rolle dem Buddhismus beim nationalen Aufbau zugedacht werden soll, sind jedoch wesentlich differenzierter. Dies soll anhand zweier bedeutender Theoretiker der KMT, Wu Zhihui (1865–1953) und Dai Jitao (1891–1949), analysiert werden. Sie beide eint ihre Zugehörigkeit zum sogenannten „rechten Flügel“ der Partei, welcher sich gegen eine Zusammenarbeit mit der Kommunistischen Partei Chinas engagierte. Auf intellektuell-weltanschaulicher Ebene waren beide Vertreter aber höchst unterschiedlich: Wu Zhihui gilt allgemein als stark vom Szientismus geprägter, religionskritischer Gelehrter, wohingegen Dai Jitao in seinen späteren Lebensjahren eine starke Affinität zum Buddhismus zeigte. Aufgrund der unterschiedlichen ideologischen Akzentsetzung lassen sich beide spezifischen Parteiungen innerhalb des rechten Parteiflügels zuordnen. Insgesamt vertritt dieser Artikel die These, dass sich die KMT mit dem Begriff der „Volkspartei“ beschreiben lässt, welche die Existenz verschiedener, weltanschaulicher Parteiungen durchaus toleriert hat, solange sich diese an die Vorgaben über „anerkannte Religion(en)“ hielten. Diese Vorgänge sind nur zu verstehen in Hinblick auf die komplexen Transfer- und Adaptionsprozesse von Strukturen der westlichen Moderne. Dies betrifft insbesondere die Genese von politischen Institutionen, aber auch die konzeptuelle Ausdeutung von Neologismen wie „Religion“, „Aberglauben“, „Wissenschaft“ und „Partei“. PubDate: 2023-05-01 DOI: 10.1007/s41682-021-00080-2
Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Abstract: Abstract Is Islam a religion that promotes patriarchy' In the academic debate, there are different assessments. On the one hand, there is the thesis of an elective affinity between Islam and patriarchal values. In Muslim-majority countries and among Muslims, support for patriarchal values is most pronounced. On the other hand, there is the antithesis of Islamic feminism, which shows that a significant proportion of devout Muslims support gender equality. It is therefore wrong to describe Islam as a misogynistic religion. What matters is whether the religion is interpreted in an emancipatory manner. This contribution offers a synthesis and argues that religious fundamentalism provides a more valid explanation for patriarchal values than simplistic references to Islam. The 6th and 7th waves of the World Values Survey were analyzed to test this research-guiding hypothesis. Multilevel analyses show that value differences between Muslims and non-Muslims and between Muslim-majority societies and societies with another majority religion turn out to be small or even insignificant when controlling for religious fundamentalism. Fundamentalism is the central driver of patriarchal values and generates uniform effects. At the individual-level, fundamentalism makes both Muslims and non-Muslims more susceptible to patriarchal values. Moreover, Muslims and non-Muslims adapt to the conformity pressures of their societies, resulting in egalitarian as well as patriarchal values, depending on the prevalence of fundamentalism. The high support for patriarchal values in Muslim-majority countries has a simple reason: Religious fundamentalism is by no means a marginal phenomenon in these societies, but rather the norm. PubDate: 2023-05-01 DOI: 10.1007/s41682-022-00130-3
Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Abstract: Zusammenfassung In den letzten Jahren wurden in der Türkei verschiedene empirische qualitative Studien zu Aleviten durchgeführt. In diesen Studien haben Angehörige alevitischer Glaubensgemeinschaften verschiedene alevitische Erzählungen über Gott und die Schöpfung sowie die Weitergabe von gerechter Ordnung und Normen dargelegt. Auf der Grundlage dieser Erzählungen versucht dieser Artikel, die Ursprungsmythen des alevitischen Rechts und Autorität darzustellen und zu analysieren. Ebenso versucht dieser Artikel, das alevitische Verständnis von Recht und Autorität mit Blick auf den deutschen demokratisch-freiheitlichen Verfassungsstaates zu analysieren. PubDate: 2023-05-01 DOI: 10.1007/s41682-022-00133-0
Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Abstract: Abstract Central Europe is often seen as the “exceptional case” in the sociology of religion with a high degree of secularization, traditional religions in a process of decline, and fundamentalist movements small in numbers. However, this may not have always been the case. This article elaborates the analytical advantages to conceive late 19th century Catholicism and early 20th century National Socialism as two distinctive fundamentalist formations in Germany. Seen in this light, in between 1850 and 1945, fundamentalist movements were able to attract large strata of the population in Germany. This article includes four parts. First, I outline what I mean by the term “fundamentalism”. Second, I will describe 19th century German Catholicism, and thirdly, early 20th century National Socialism as a fundamentalist movement. In the conclusion I will discuss if their labelling as fundamentalist formations may be justified. PubDate: 2023-05-01 DOI: 10.1007/s41682-022-00131-2
Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Abstract: Abstract The article investigates the phenomenon of ultra-Orthodox nationalists (Hardalim) in the modern State of Israel. Hardalim emerged out of ideological transformations in the ideological settlement movement during the 1980s and 1990s, combining aspects of the two major religious milieus in the country, national-religious Judaism and ultra-Orthodoxy. Such a fusion is cause for great concern among those, who fear a fundamentalist assault on the democratic state. Based on the definition of the editors of this volume, the article asks how far the classification of Hardalim as fundamentalists helps us to grasp the specifics of their group. I argue that the concept is useful insofar as it highlights some of the movement’s core characteristics that distinguish it from traditionalist Judaism and other forms of religious activism and lifestyle, but that at the same time a strict focus on the fundamentalist features of the Hardalim runs the risk of ignoring the group’s intimate ties and dynamics with other groups in Israeli society. PubDate: 2023-05-01 DOI: 10.1007/s41682-022-00122-3
Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Abstract: Abstract The purpose of this article is to investigate trends and variations of fundamentalism in the Orthodox Church of Greece. In order to achieve this, the article analyses discourses and practices of the Orthodox Church of Greece since the restoration of democracy in 1974. The main argument is that the church, as an institution, produces public discourses and adopts practices with regard to modernity, more specifically on social, political, moral and scientific issues, using both modernity and tradition in order to strengthen its place in Greek society. The church, also, tries to establish an official response to the gradual marginalisation of religion both at the political and social levels, through moral dualism and strict behavioural requirements; perceiving sacred texts in an absolute and inerrant way; and creating sharp boundaries between Greek Orthodoxy and other religious communities, non-religious groups and the West, leading this way to the establishment of an elect membership through superiority. The main outcome is that the Orthodox Church of Greece is primarily a traditionalist institution, but it also meets a great number of the fundamentalist characteristics responding this way to the privatisation and marginalisation of religion in Greek society. PubDate: 2023-05-01 DOI: 10.1007/s41682-022-00110-7
Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Abstract: Zusammenfassung Die religionswissenschaftlichen Debatten zu den Interdependenzen zwischen Religion und Politik haben einen Punkt bislang interessanterweise weitgehend vernachlässigt, obwohl seine Diskussionen in der Geschichts- und Politikwissenschaft auf eine lange Tradition zurückblicken: die Beschäftigung mit politischen und religiösen Parteien bzw. Parteiungen und deren Interdependenzen. Die Autoren schlagen vor, für jegliche Formen von Gruppenbildungen in Meinungs- und Machtbildungsprozessen den Begriff der „Parteiung“ als Grundbegriff (Keyterm) in die Religionswissenschaft aufzunehmen und mit einem solchen Begriff auch Gruppen- und Meinungsbildungsprozesse in vormodernen und außerwestlichen Kontexten zu analysieren PubDate: 2023-04-30 DOI: 10.1007/s41682-023-00155-2
Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Abstract: Zusammenfassung Ausgangspunkt der vorliegenden Arbeit ist ein Überblick über politiktheoretische Betrachtungen der Frage nach der Reichweite der Einbeziehung von religiös argumentierenden Bürgerinnen und Bürger in die Öffentlichkeit liberaldemokratischer Verfassungsstaaten. Vor diesem Hintergrund wird auf zwei Herausforderungen näher eingegangen, die mit gegenwärtig dominanten Politisierungsformen der Religion in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland in Verbindung stehen, und zwar einerseits die leitkulturelle und andererseits „identitäre Politisierung der Religion“. Abschließend wird aufgezeigt, warum und wie das Verhältnis zwischen Politik und Religion zum Aufgabenfeld der politischen Bildung resp. zum Inhaltsfeld der außerschulischen und insbesondere auch der schulischen politischen Bildung im Sinn des Demokratie-Lernens, das lt. Gerhard Himmelmann Demokratie als Gesellschafts‑, Herrschafts- und als Lebensform umfasst, gehören kann bzw. soll. PubDate: 2023-04-04 DOI: 10.1007/s41682-023-00152-5
Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Abstract: Abstract Since 2015, power in Poland has been exercised by the right-wing populist coalition, led by the socially conservative Law and Justice (PiS) party. The deconfliction mark of these governments became the “unholy alliance” with Christianity, which was a movement that used populist manipulation based on exacerbating social dichotomy, campaigning against the LGBT community, nationalism, xenophobia, attitudes of rejection, anti-pluralism and anti-establishment. In this context, the aim of this article is to theoretically analyse the ideological and religious frames between right-wing populism and Christianity in Poland. The considerations begin with the presentation of the theoretical background, that is, the relationship that exists between the populist “thin-core ideology” and Christianity within the framework of ideological appropriation of religion by populists. Furthermore, the author will make an attempt to decipher mutual influences and seek answers to the question: How did PiS “hijack” the Catholic Church in Poland' The next step will present a comparative identification of convergent and divergent frameworks between right-wing populists and the Catholic Church in Poland. Finally, the article will outline indications for the socio-pastoral prevention of populism and a summary of the main results. PubDate: 2023-02-08 DOI: 10.1007/s41682-023-00146-3
Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles)
