A  B  C  D  E  F  G  H  I  J  K  L  M  N  O  P  Q  R  S  T  U  V  W  X  Y  Z  

  Subjects -> SOCIOLOGY (Total: 553 journals)
The end of the list has been reached or no journals were found for your choice.
Similar Journals
Journal Cover
Emotion Review
Journal Prestige (SJR): 1.436
Citation Impact (citeScore): 3
Number of Followers: 20  
 
  Hybrid Journal Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles)
ISSN (Print) 1754-0739 - ISSN (Online) 1754-0747
Published by Sage Publications Homepage  [1174 journals]
  • Call for Nominations

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      Pages: 230 - 230
      Abstract: Emotion Review, Volume 14, Issue 3, Page 230-230, July 2022.

      Citation: Emotion Review
      PubDate: 2022-08-05T04:46:40Z
      DOI: 10.1177/17540739221113618
      Issue No: Vol. 14, No. 3 (2022)
       
  • Apprehending Value, Position-Taking and the Manifest Image of Emotion:
           Responses to Commentators

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      Authors: Jean Moritz Müller
      Abstract: Emotion Review, Ahead of Print.
      This article clarifies and defends my view of emotional feeling in response to the commentaries by Ronnie de Sousa, Rick Furtak, Agnes Moors, Kevin Mulligan, Rainer Reisenzein and Philipp Schmidt. The issues addressed concern my critique of the axiological receptivity view, my proposed alternative, i.e. the position-taking view, as well as my methodological commitments.
      Citation: Emotion Review
      PubDate: 2022-09-21T07:47:21Z
      DOI: 10.1177/17540739221127654
       
  • The Epistemological Dimension of Emotional Feeling and Other Affective
           Phenomena

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      Authors: Philipp Schmidt
      Abstract: Emotion Review, Ahead of Print.
      Müller's position-taking view of emotions takes issue with the widely endorsed philosophical notion that emotional feelings are a form of consciousness in which we become acquainted with the evaluative properties of objects and events. Müller rejects this perceptual theory of emotions and casts doubt on the idea that it is through emotional feeling that we develop an awareness of value. In so doing, his proposal amounts to a denial of any epistemic function of emotional feeling. Challenging such a radical move, in my commentary, I discuss several affective phenomena in which feelings do seem to serve an epistemic function. These cases pose problems for Müller's version of the position-taking view of emotion, at least in its current form.
      Citation: Emotion Review
      PubDate: 2022-09-20T06:33:34Z
      DOI: 10.1177/17540739221125460
       
  • Commentary: Connecting Müller's Philosophical Position-Taking Theory of
           Emotional Feelings to Mechanistic Emotion Theories in Psychology

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      Authors: Agnes Moors
      Abstract: Emotion Review, Ahead of Print.
      Müller proposes a position-taking theory to account for the manifest image of emotional feelings as “feelings towards”. He reduces the process of position-taking to goal-based construal, which is akin to the stimulus-goal comparison process central in appraisal theories. Although this reduction can account for the heat of emotional feelings and the intuition that non-linguistic organisms can also have feelings, it may fail to keep the position-taking aspect on board. Moreover, the image of emotional feelings as active position-takings may itself be questioned and replaced with a passive image. I end by acknowledging that a passive image is still compatible with an active underlying mechanism as is the case in appraisal theories but even more so in the goal-directed theory.
      Citation: Emotion Review
      PubDate: 2022-09-14T05:00:05Z
      DOI: 10.1177/17540739221125464
       
  • Emotions as Affective Position-Takings and as Nonconceptual
           Meta-Representations: A Comparison

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      Authors: Rainer Reisenzein
      Abstract: Emotion Review, Ahead of Print.
      The theory of emotions as affective position-takings (PT) is investigated from the perspective of a computational model of the belief-desire theory of emotions (CBDTE) proposed by the author. Both theories assume that a core subset of typical emotion episodes are the products of an evaluation process in which cognized states of affairs are evaluated for their congruence with the person's desires; and that emotions are, on the conscious level, feelings of pleasure and displeasure. However, according to PT the evaluation is a concern-based construal and emotional feelings are intrinsically object-directed, whereas according to CBDTE, the evaluation is performed by a hardwired mechanism that produces nonintentional feelings. Furthermore, CBDTE suggests that hedonic feelings are simultaneously reactions to the detection of value, and representations of the detected value.
      Citation: Emotion Review
      PubDate: 2022-09-14T04:59:36Z
      DOI: 10.1177/17540739221125459
       
  • Positive Cognitive Reappraisal in Stress Resilience, Mental Health, and
           Well-Being: A Comprehensive Systematic Review

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      Authors: Antje Riepenhausen, Carolin Wackerhagen, Zala C. Reppmann, Hans-Christian Deter, Raffael Kalisch, Ilya M. Veer, Henrik Walter
      Abstract: Emotion Review, Ahead of Print.
      Stress-related psychopathology is on the rise, and there is a pressing need for improved prevention strategies. Positive appraisal style, the tendency to appraise potentially threatening situations in a positive way, has been proposed to act as a key resilience mechanism and therefore offers a potential target for preventive approaches. In this article, we review n  =  99 studies investigating associations of positive cognitive reappraisal, an important sub-facet of positive appraisal style, with outcome-based resilience and relevant other outcomes, which are considered resilience-related. According to the studies reviewed, positive cognitive reappraisal moderates the relation between stressors and negative outcomes and is positively related to several resilience-related outcomes. It also mediates between other resilience factors and resilience, suggesting it is a proximal resilience factor.
      Citation: Emotion Review
      PubDate: 2022-07-22T07:29:42Z
      DOI: 10.1177/17540739221114642
       
  • The Architecture of Happiness

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      Authors: Tim Lomas, Meike Bartels, Margot Van De Weijer, Michael Pluess, Jeffrey Hanson, Tyler J. VanderWeele
      Abstract: Emotion Review, Ahead of Print.
      Happiness is an increasingly prominent topic of interest across academia. However, relatively little attention has been paid to how it is created, especially not in a multidimensional sense. By ‘created’ we do not mean its influencing factors, for which there is extensive research, but how it actually forms in the person. The work that has been done in this arena tends to focus on physiological dynamics, which are certainly part of the puzzle. But they are not the whole picture, with psychological, phenomenological, and socio cultural processes also playing their part. As a result, this paper offers a multidimensional overview of scholarship on the ‘architecture’ of happiness, providing a stimulus for further work into this important topic.
      Citation: Emotion Review
      PubDate: 2022-07-19T04:50:55Z
      DOI: 10.1177/17540739221114109
       
  • Situated Affectivity and Mind Shaping: Lessons from Social Psychology*

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      Authors: Sven Walter, Achim Stephan
      Abstract: Emotion Review, Ahead of Print.
      Proponents of situated affectivity hold that “tools for feeling” are just as characteristic of the human condition as are “tools for thinking” or tools for carpentry. An agent’s affective life, they argue, is dependent upon both physical characteristics of the agent and the agent’s reciprocal relationship to an appropriately structured natural, technological, or social environment. One important achievement has been the distinction between two fundamentally different ways in which affectivity might be intertwined with the environment: the “user-resource-model” and the “mind-invasion-model.” The twofold purpose of this paper is to complement the debate about situated affectivity in general and about “mind invasion” in particular by, firstly, connecting it to situationist research in social psychology and, secondly, broadening the perspective to not only accommodate decidedly detrimental “invasions” but also potentially beneficial forms of “mind shaping” that include the manipulation of an agent’s experiential life and behaviour through the moulding of both the agent’s environment and the agent’s body.
      Citation: Emotion Review
      PubDate: 2022-07-14T06:06:59Z
      DOI: 10.1177/17540739221112419
       
  • The Undoing Effect of Positive Emotions: A Meta-Analytic Review

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      Authors: Maciej Behnke, Magdalena Pietruch, Patrycja Chwiłkowska, Eliza Wessel, Lukasz D. Kaczmarek, Mark Assink, James J. Gross
      Abstract: Emotion Review, Ahead of Print.
      The undoing hypothesis proposes that positive emotions serve to undo sympathetic arousal related to negative emotions and stress. However, a recent qualitative review challenged the undoing effect by presenting conflicting results. To address this issue quantitatively, we conducted a meta-analytic review of 16 studies (N = 1,220; 72 effect sizes) measuring sympathetic recovery during elicited positive emotions and neutral conditions. Findings indicated that in most cases, positive emotions did not speed sympathetic recovery compared to neutral conditions. However, when a composite index of cardiovascular reactivity was used, undoing effects were evident. Our findings suggest the need for further work on the functions of positive emotions.
      Citation: Emotion Review
      PubDate: 2022-06-07T05:13:56Z
      DOI: 10.1177/17540739221104457
       
  • Care, Attachments and Concerns

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      Authors: Kevin Mulligan
      Abstract: Emotion Review, Ahead of Print.
      Müller's account of the way episodic emotions function depends on a contrast between these and what he calls cares, concerns and attachments and the claim that the latter are in several respects prior to the former. The account seems to attribute no normative features to the latter. But this is implausible. If a preference for liberty over social justice is a concern, it is justified if liberty really is more important than social justice.
      Citation: Emotion Review
      PubDate: 2022-03-15T08:38:57Z
      DOI: 10.1177/17540739221086587
       
  • The World-Directedness of Emotional Feeling: Affective Intentionality and
           Position-Taking

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      Authors: Jean Moritz Müller
      Abstract: Emotion Review, Ahead of Print.
      This article is a précis of my 2019 monograph The World-Directedness of Emotional Feeling: On Affect and Intentionality. The book engages with a growing trend of philosophical thinking according to which the felt dimension and the intentionality of emotion are unified. While sympathetic to the general approach, I argue for a reconceptualization of the form of intentionality that emotional feelings are widely thought to possess and, accordingly, of the kind of role they play in our mental lives. More specifically, I argue that the way we feel in having an emotion is not a perception-like awareness of evaluative properties of its object, but instead constitutes the taking of a stand or position on this object in light of its evaluative properties.
      Citation: Emotion Review
      PubDate: 2022-03-14T12:24:22Z
      DOI: 10.1177/17540739221085573
       
  • Emotion, Action, and Passivity: A Commentary on Müller

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      Authors: Rick Anthony Furtak
      Abstract: Emotion Review, Ahead of Print.
      According to Jean Moritz Müller's The world-directedness of emotional feeling, the reason why emotions do not apprehend or disclose value is that one cannot apprehend what one has already apprehended: the value in question, he claims, is apprehended prior to the emotional feeling. Emotions, then, should not be conceived as apprehending value since they already presuppose awareness of it. I can be acquainted with a fact without feeling aware of the meaning it holds. Yet I argue that only an emotional reaction (e.g., grief) actually registers value or disvalue (e.g., personal loss). My value-responsive concept of emotion is one that Müller rejects. Yet I contend that to recognize the loss of a beloved person, for instance, just is to feel the emotion of grief.
      Citation: Emotion Review
      PubDate: 2022-03-10T10:25:23Z
      DOI: 10.1177/17540739221085574
       
  • Who Needs Values When We Have Valuing' Comments on Jean Moritz
           Müller, The World-Directedness of Emotional Feeling

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      Authors: Ronald de Sousa
      Abstract: Emotion Review, Ahead of Print.
      Müller argues that the perceptual or “Axiological Receptivity” (AR) model of emotions is incoherent, because it requires an emotion to apprehend and respond to its formal object at the same time. He defends a contrasting view of emotions as “Position-Takings" (PT) towards “formal objects”, aspects of an emotion's target pertinent to the subject's concerns. I first cast doubt on the cogency of Müller's attack on AR as begging questions about the temporal characteristics of perceptual events. I then argue that Müller's version of PT is not radical enough. On my attitudinal view, formal objects are not values but natural properties that justify specific affective or behavioral responses. Values are constituted only by a negotiated social aggregation of individual evaluative attitudes.
      Citation: Emotion Review
      PubDate: 2022-03-07T10:40:11Z
      DOI: 10.1177/17540739221085575
       
  • Why we Should Reject the Restrictive Isomorphic Matching Definition of
           Empathy

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      Authors: Brett A. Murphy, Scott O. Lilienfeld, Sara B. Algoe
      First page: 167
      Abstract: Emotion Review, Ahead of Print.
      A growing cadre of influential scholars has converged on a circumscribed definition of empathy as restricted only to feeling the same emotion that one perceives another is feeling. We argue that this restrictive isomorphic matching (RIM) definition is deeply problematic because (1) it deviates dramatically from traditional conceptualizations of empathy and unmoors the construct from generations of scientific research and clinical practice; (2) insistence on an isomorphic form undercuts much of the functional value of empathy from multiple perspectives of analysis; and (3) combining the opposing concepts of isomorphic matching and self-other awareness implicitly requires motivational content, causing the RIM definition to implicitly require the kind of non-matching emotional content that it explicitly seeks to exclude.
      Citation: Emotion Review
      PubDate: 2022-05-02T07:10:58Z
      DOI: 10.1177/17540739221082215
       
  • Empathy as a Flexible and Fundamentally Interpersonal Phenomenon: Comment
           on “Why we Should Reject the Restrictive Isomorphic Matching Definition
           of Empathy”

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      Authors: Alexandra Main
      First page: 182
      Abstract: Emotion Review, Ahead of Print.
      I strongly agree with the AUTHORS’ criticisms of the restrictive isomorphic (RIM) definition of empathy and largely agree with their conceptualization of empathy as a dynamic process best defined by its function. In this commentary, I extend this argument by emphasizing the relational, interpersonal aspects of empathy. It is my view that in order to understand the functions of empathy, we must take into account not only the internal experience of the individual empathizing, but also the individual (or group) whose perspective the empathizer is attempting to take. I highlight how the emotional needs of others are dynamic and require flexible adaptation and underscore the role of context in appreciating the function of empathy.
      Citation: Emotion Review
      PubDate: 2022-06-15T05:28:29Z
      DOI: 10.1177/17540739221107030
       
  • Getting our Affect Together: Shared Representations as the Core of Empathy

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      Authors: Abigail A. Marsh
      First page: 184
      Abstract: Emotion Review, Ahead of Print.
      Empathy is a construct that is notoriously difficult to define. Murphy and colleagues argue for leaning into the construct's inherent fuzziness and reverting to what they term a classical definition informed by the observations of philosophers and clinicians: as a dynamic, “unfolding process of imaginatively experiencing the subjective consciousness of another person, sensing, understanding, and structuring the world as if one were that person.” Although consistent with some historical conceptualizations, this definition risks incorporating so many processes it would make empathy difficult to operationalize or distinguish from any generally socially sensitive interaction. Defining empathy instead as the attempted representation, or simulation, of another's subjective internal experiences (whether sensory, affective, or cognitive) would increase its clarity and empirical utility.
      Citation: Emotion Review
      PubDate: 2022-06-08T05:54:32Z
      DOI: 10.1177/17540739221107029
       
  • Debating Empathy: Historical Awareness and Conceptual Precision

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      Authors: Dan Zahavi
      First page: 187
      Abstract: Emotion Review, Ahead of Print.

      Citation: Emotion Review
      PubDate: 2022-06-09T01:23:10Z
      DOI: 10.1177/17540739221107027
       
  • Empathy and Creativity: Dangers of the Methodological Tail Wagging the
           Conceptual Dog

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      Authors: Brett A. Murphy, Sara B. Algoe
      First page: 189
      Abstract: Emotion Review, Ahead of Print.
      The three commentaries on “Why We Should Reject the Restrictive Isomorphic Matching (RIM) Definition of Empathy” mostly concurred with our critique of that widely adopted definition of empathy. Yet, commenters also raised important questions relating to the clarity and operationalizability of our recommended alternative: returning to a classical conceptualization of empathy as a dynamic, functionally oriented, multi-faceted unfolding process. To help contextualize these issues, we provide an extended analogy between empathy research and creativity research, areas of study which are conceptually linked and have faced similar conceptual and methodological obstacles. In doing so, we highlight the challenge of (a) distilling empathy down to a firm operationalizable definition without (b) losing sight of the general meaning and real-world value of the construct.
      Citation: Emotion Review
      PubDate: 2022-07-05T06:30:51Z
      DOI: 10.1177/17540739221108220
       
  • Caring as the Default of Empathic Direct Perception

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      Authors: Khen Lampert
      First page: 194
      Abstract: Emotion Review, Ahead of Print.
      The phenomenological understanding of empathy as the direct experiencing of the mental states (feelings, intentions, moods) of others eschews the identification of empathy with caring. At the same time, it leaves open the possibility of sadistic pleasure, indifference, or malice as consequences of empathic experience.In this paper, I intend to defend the place of caring as an inseparable part of the empathic experience, specifically when understood as direct perception. My defense relies on (a) conceiving of attentive concern as a perceptual predisposition, and (b) understanding the caring responsiveness of the empathizer as embedded in her direct perception of the empathee's mental states.My claim proceeds by three steps. Firstly, I will present the need to include caring within empathy through the problem that arises from excluding it. Secondly, I will argue for the presence of active responsiveness, inherent in the phenomenological concept of perception and expressed more explicitly in its Gibsonian understanding. Thirdly, I will propose my understanding of attentive concern as a predisposition, which together with the intentionality attributed to the other (itself also a disposition) forms the pre-perceptual basis for identifying empathy with caring.
      Citation: Emotion Review
      PubDate: 2022-06-02T05:12:07Z
      DOI: 10.1177/17540739221104804
       
  • Epistemic Feelings are Affective Experiences

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      Authors: Slawa Loev
      First page: 206
      Abstract: Emotion Review, Ahead of Print.
      This paper develops the claim that epistemic feelings are affective experiences. To establish some diagnostic criteria, characteristic features of affective experiences are outlined: valence and arousal. Then, in order to pave the way for showing that epistemic feelings have said features, an initial challenge coming from introspection is addressed. Next, the paper turns to empirical findings showing that we can observe physiological and behavioural proxies for valence and arousal in epistemic tasks that typically rely on epistemic feelings. Finally, it is argued that the affective properties do not only correlate with epistemic feelings but that we, in fact, capitalise on these affective properties to perform the epistemic tasks. In other words: the affective properties in question constitute epistemic feelings.
      Citation: Emotion Review
      PubDate: 2022-05-31T02:15:53Z
      DOI: 10.1177/17540739221104464
       
  • The Feelings of Goals Hypothesis: Emotional Feelings are Non-Conceptual,
           Non-Motoric Representations of Goals

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      Authors: Assaf Kron, Assaf Weksler
      First page: 217
      Abstract: Emotion Review, Ahead of Print.
      This paper proposes and develops the feelings of goals hypothesis (FGH). It has two aims: first, to describe the evolutionary function of emotional feelings (EFs), and second, to describe the content and the format of EFs. According to FGH, the evolutionary function of EFs is to enable motoric flexibility. Specifically, EFs are a component of a psychological mechanism that permits differential motoric reactions to the same stimulus. Further, according to FGH, EF is a special type of mental representation with the content of an action goal, and with a non-motoric, non-conceptual format. This paper thoroughly clarifies the assumptions underlying FGH and discusses its theoretical implications and empirical predictions.
      Citation: Emotion Review
      PubDate: 2022-06-01T05:39:08Z
      DOI: 10.1177/17540739221104456
       
 
JournalTOCs
School of Mathematical and Computer Sciences
Heriot-Watt University
Edinburgh, EH14 4AS, UK
Email: journaltocs@hw.ac.uk
Tel: +00 44 (0)131 4513762
 


Your IP address: 44.210.237.158
 
Home (Search)
API
About JournalTOCs
News (blog, publications)
JournalTOCs on Twitter   JournalTOCs on Facebook

JournalTOCs © 2009-