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Authors:Alexandra Main Abstract: Emotion Review, Ahead of Print. I strongly agree with the AUTHORS’ criticisms of the restrictive isomorphic (RIM) definition of empathy and largely agree with their conceptualization of empathy as a dynamic process best defined by its function. In this commentary, I extend this argument by emphasizing the relational, interpersonal aspects of empathy. It is my view that in order to understand the functions of empathy, we must take into account not only the internal experience of the individual empathizing, but also the individual (or group) whose perspective the empathizer is attempting to take. I highlight how the emotional needs of others are dynamic and require flexible adaptation and underscore the role of context in appreciating the function of empathy. Citation: Emotion Review PubDate: 2022-06-15T05:28:29Z DOI: 10.1177/17540739221107030
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Authors:Dan Zahavi Abstract: Emotion Review, Ahead of Print.
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Authors:Abigail A. Marsh Abstract: Emotion Review, Ahead of Print. Empathy is a construct that is notoriously difficult to define. Murphy and colleagues argue for leaning into the construct's inherent fuzziness and reverting to what they term a classical definition informed by the observations of philosophers and clinicians: as a dynamic, “unfolding process of imaginatively experiencing the subjective consciousness of another person, sensing, understanding, and structuring the world as if one were that person.” Although consistent with some historical conceptualizations, this definition risks incorporating so many processes it would make empathy difficult to operationalize or distinguish from any generally socially sensitive interaction. Defining empathy instead as the attempted representation, or simulation, of another's subjective internal experiences (whether sensory, affective, or cognitive) would increase its clarity and empirical utility. Citation: Emotion Review PubDate: 2022-06-08T05:54:32Z DOI: 10.1177/17540739221107029
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Authors:Maciej Behnke, Magdalena Pietruch, Patrycja Chwiłkowska, Eliza Wessel, Lukasz D. Kaczmarek, Mark Assink, James J. Gross Abstract: Emotion Review, Ahead of Print. The undoing hypothesis proposes that positive emotions serve to undo sympathetic arousal related to negative emotions and stress. However, a recent qualitative review challenged the undoing effect by presenting conflicting results. To address this issue quantitatively, we conducted a meta-analytic review of 16 studies (N = 1,220; 72 effect sizes) measuring sympathetic recovery during elicited positive emotions and neutral conditions. Findings indicated that in most cases, positive emotions did not speed sympathetic recovery compared to neutral conditions. However, when a composite index of cardiovascular reactivity was used, undoing effects were evident. Our findings suggest the need for further work on the functions of positive emotions. Citation: Emotion Review PubDate: 2022-06-07T05:13:56Z DOI: 10.1177/17540739221104457
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Authors:Khen Lampert Abstract: Emotion Review, Ahead of Print. The phenomenological understanding of empathy as the direct experiencing of the mental states (feelings, intentions, moods) of others eschews the identification of empathy with caring. At the same time, it leaves open the possibility of sadistic pleasure, indifference, or malice as consequences of empathic experience.In this paper, I intend to defend the place of caring as an inseparable part of the empathic experience, specifically when understood as direct perception. My defense relies on (a) conceiving of attentive concern as a perceptual predisposition, and (b) understanding the caring responsiveness of the empathizer as embedded in her direct perception of the empathee's mental states.My claim proceeds by three steps. Firstly, I will present the need to include caring within empathy through the problem that arises from excluding it. Secondly, I will argue for the presence of active responsiveness, inherent in the phenomenological concept of perception and expressed more explicitly in its Gibsonian understanding. Thirdly, I will propose my understanding of attentive concern as a predisposition, which together with the intentionality attributed to the other (itself also a disposition) forms the pre-perceptual basis for identifying empathy with caring. Citation: Emotion Review PubDate: 2022-06-02T05:12:07Z DOI: 10.1177/17540739221104804
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Authors:Assaf Kron, Assaf Weksler Abstract: Emotion Review, Ahead of Print. This paper proposes and develops the feelings of goals hypothesis (FGH). It has two aims: first, to describe the evolutionary function of emotional feelings (EFs), and second, to describe the content and the format of EFs. According to FGH, the evolutionary function of EFs is to enable motoric flexibility. Specifically, EFs are a component of a psychological mechanism that permits differential motoric reactions to the same stimulus. Further, according to FGH, EF is a special type of mental representation with the content of an action goal, and with a non-motoric, non-conceptual format. This paper thoroughly clarifies the assumptions underlying FGH and discusses its theoretical implications and empirical predictions. Citation: Emotion Review PubDate: 2022-06-01T05:39:08Z DOI: 10.1177/17540739221104456
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Authors:Slawa Loev Abstract: Emotion Review, Ahead of Print. This paper develops the claim that epistemic feelings are affective experiences. To establish some diagnostic criteria, characteristic features of affective experiences are outlined: valence and arousal. Then, in order to pave the way for showing that epistemic feelings have said features, an initial challenge coming from introspection is addressed. Next, the paper turns to empirical findings showing that we can observe physiological and behavioural proxies for valence and arousal in epistemic tasks that typically rely on epistemic feelings. Finally, it is argued that the affective properties do not only correlate with epistemic feelings but that we, in fact, capitalise on these affective properties to perform the epistemic tasks. In other words: the affective properties in question constitute epistemic feelings. Citation: Emotion Review PubDate: 2022-05-31T02:15:53Z DOI: 10.1177/17540739221104464
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Authors:Brett A. Murphy, Scott O. Lilienfeld, Sara B. Algoe Abstract: Emotion Review, Ahead of Print. A growing cadre of influential scholars has converged on a circumscribed definition of empathy as restricted only to feeling the same emotion that one perceives another is feeling. We argue that this restrictive isomorphic matching (RIM) definition is deeply problematic because (1) it deviates dramatically from traditional conceptualizations of empathy and unmoors the construct from generations of scientific research and clinical practice; (2) insistence on an isomorphic form undercuts much of the functional value of empathy from multiple perspectives of analysis; and (3) combining the opposing concepts of isomorphic matching and self-other awareness implicitly requires motivational content, causing the RIM definition to implicitly require the kind of non-matching emotional content that it explicitly seeks to exclude. Citation: Emotion Review PubDate: 2022-05-02T07:10:58Z DOI: 10.1177/17540739221082215
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Authors:Kevin Mulligan Abstract: Emotion Review, Ahead of Print. Müller's account of the way episodic emotions function depends on a contrast between these and what he calls cares, concerns and attachments and the claim that the latter are in several respects prior to the former. The account seems to attribute no normative features to the latter. But this is implausible. If a preference for liberty over social justice is a concern, it is justified if liberty really is more important than social justice. Citation: Emotion Review PubDate: 2022-03-15T08:38:57Z DOI: 10.1177/17540739221086587
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Authors:Jean Moritz Müller Abstract: Emotion Review, Ahead of Print. This article is a précis of my 2019 monograph The World-Directedness of Emotional Feeling: On Affect and Intentionality. The book engages with a growing trend of philosophical thinking according to which the felt dimension and the intentionality of emotion are unified. While sympathetic to the general approach, I argue for a reconceptualization of the form of intentionality that emotional feelings are widely thought to possess and, accordingly, of the kind of role they play in our mental lives. More specifically, I argue that the way we feel in having an emotion is not a perception-like awareness of evaluative properties of its object, but instead constitutes the taking of a stand or position on this object in light of its evaluative properties. Citation: Emotion Review PubDate: 2022-03-14T12:24:22Z DOI: 10.1177/17540739221085573
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Authors:Rick Anthony Furtak Abstract: Emotion Review, Ahead of Print. According to Jean Moritz Müller's The world-directedness of emotional feeling, the reason why emotions do not apprehend or disclose value is that one cannot apprehend what one has already apprehended: the value in question, he claims, is apprehended prior to the emotional feeling. Emotions, then, should not be conceived as apprehending value since they already presuppose awareness of it. I can be acquainted with a fact without feeling aware of the meaning it holds. Yet I argue that only an emotional reaction (e.g., grief) actually registers value or disvalue (e.g., personal loss). My value-responsive concept of emotion is one that Müller rejects. Yet I contend that to recognize the loss of a beloved person, for instance, just is to feel the emotion of grief. Citation: Emotion Review PubDate: 2022-03-10T10:25:23Z DOI: 10.1177/17540739221085574
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Authors:Ronald de Sousa Abstract: Emotion Review, Ahead of Print. Müller argues that the perceptual or “Axiological Receptivity” (AR) model of emotions is incoherent, because it requires an emotion to apprehend and respond to its formal object at the same time. He defends a contrasting view of emotions as “Position-Takings" (PT) towards “formal objects”, aspects of an emotion's target pertinent to the subject's concerns. I first cast doubt on the cogency of Müller's attack on AR as begging questions about the temporal characteristics of perceptual events. I then argue that Müller's version of PT is not radical enough. On my attitudinal view, formal objects are not values but natural properties that justify specific affective or behavioral responses. Values are constituted only by a negotiated social aggregation of individual evaluative attitudes. Citation: Emotion Review PubDate: 2022-03-07T10:40:11Z DOI: 10.1177/17540739221085575
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Authors:Gaurav Suri, James J. Gross First page: 99 Abstract: Emotion Review, Ahead of Print. Researchers often disagree as to whether emotions are largely consistent across people and over time, or whether they are variable. They also disagree as to whether emotions are initiated by appraisals, or whether they may be initiated in diverse ways. We draw upon Parallel-Distributed-Processing to offer an algorithmic account in which features of an emotion instance are bi-directionally connected to each other via conjunction units. We propose that such indirect connections may be innate as well as learned. These ideas lead to the development of the Interactive Activation and Competition framework for Emotion (IAC-E) which allows us to specify when emotions are consistent and when they are variable, as well as when they are appraisal-led and when they are input-agnostic. Citation: Emotion Review PubDate: 2022-02-28T03:33:28Z DOI: 10.1177/17540739221082203
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Authors:Agnes Moors First page: 111 Abstract: Emotion Review, Ahead of Print. Suri and Gross's 2022 connectionist emotion theory can be considered as one version of a family of theories known as network theories of emotion. It presents similarities and differences with older versions of network theories. Like previous network theories and several other traditional emotion theories, however, the connectionist theory remains a reactive theory. The class of reactive theories can be meaningfully contrasted with a class of instrumental theories of which the goal-directed theory is a representative example. Although the latter theory does not deny the existence of emotion networks in memory, it does not grant them many causal powers, thereby seriously restricting their explanatory territory. Future research efforts may help disambiguate between both classes of theories. Citation: Emotion Review PubDate: 2022-03-21T08:13:31Z DOI: 10.1177/17540739221089689
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Authors:Heather C. Lench, Noah T. Reed First page: 114 Abstract: Emotion Review, Ahead of Print. The question “what is emotion'” has long been at the core of theoretical debates. The IAC-E is a useful framework for understanding relationships among responses in emotional situations. However, this approach cannot address the nature of emotion. Researchers determine what counts as emotion in the IAC-E, and this decision impacts the relationships detected and inferences made. The assumptions of researchers about emotion change the output. Further, the model is not theoretically agnostic and is best suited to examine emotion perception/knowledge, as in the simulations presented. According to some theories, experienced emotion is qualitatively different than situations that involve perceiving others' emotion or semantic knowledge. Addressing the nature of emotion requires empirical examination of the assumptions made in each theory. Citation: Emotion Review PubDate: 2022-03-29T07:38:21Z DOI: 10.1177/17540739221089692
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Authors:Gaurav Suri, James J. Gross First page: 116 Abstract: Emotion Review, Ahead of Print. To make progress related to long-standing questions related to the nature of emotion, we offer the Interactive Activation and Competition framework for Emotion (IAC-E). The IAC-E is not another conventional theory of emotion. Rather, it offers a neural-network-based, algorithmic account of how emotion instances and categories arise. Our approach suggests that there need not be a contradiction between instances of the same emotion being sometimes consistent and sometimes variable. Similarly, there need not be a contradiction between observations of homogeneity (common in the basic emotion approach) and heterogeneity (common in the constructed emotion approach) within emotion categories Citation: Emotion Review PubDate: 2022-03-23T07:17:04Z DOI: 10.1177/17540739221089693
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Authors:Claudio Celis Bueno, Claudia Schettini First page: 121 Abstract: Emotion Review, Ahead of Print. The aim of this article is to explore how some aspects of Gilbert Simondon's philosophy of individuation may contribute to outlining a posthumanist theory of emotions. According to Simondon, the relation between affection and emotion is a key case study for examining the transindividual character of psychosocial individuation. Affection and emotion appear to him not as a binary opposition, but as an example of a transductive operation. The article suggests the concept of ‘transindividual affect’ as a way of challenging some key dualisms (rationality and emotion; the individual and the collective; emotion and affect). From this perspective, Simondon can contribute to a redefinition of the human from the non-dualistic and non-anthropocentric perspective that characterises critical posthumanism. Citation: Emotion Review PubDate: 2022-04-05T06:35:45Z DOI: 10.1177/17540739221091984
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Authors:Maciej Behnke, Sylvia D. Kreibig, Lukasz D. Kaczmarek, Mark Assink, James J. Gross First page: 132 Abstract: Emotion Review, Ahead of Print. Autonomic nervous system (ANS) activity is a fundamental component of emotional responding. It is not clear, however, whether positive emotional states are associated with differential ANS reactivity. To address this issue, we conducted a meta-analytic review of 120 articles (686 effect sizes, total N = 6,546), measuring ANS activity during 11 elicited positive emotions, namely amusement, attachment love, awe, contentment, craving, excitement, gratitude, joy, nurturant love, pride, and sexual desire. We identified a widely dispersed collection of studies. Univariate results indicated that positive emotions produce no or weak and highly variable increases in ANS reactivity. However, the limitations of work to date – which we discuss – mean that our conclusions should be treated as empirically grounded hypotheses that future research should validate. Citation: Emotion Review PubDate: 2022-02-04T05:01:00Z DOI: 10.1177/17540739211073084
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Authors:Guillaume Dezecache, Christine Sievers, Thibaud Gruber First page: 161 Abstract: Emotion Review, Ahead of Print. The role emotions play in the dynamics of cultural phenomena has long been neglected. The collection of articles recently published in Emotion Review provides an important first step into this necessary endeavor. In this commentary, we discuss this contribution by emphasizing the role epistemological parsimony should play in the future of this research agenda. The cultural behavior and emotions of chimpanzees is taken as reference. Citation: Emotion Review PubDate: 2022-03-14T12:24:02Z DOI: 10.1177/17540739221082217