Similar Journals
|
Acta Analytica
Journal Prestige (SJR): 0.367  Number of Followers: 6  Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles)ISSN (Print) 1874-6349 - ISSN (Online) 0353-5150 Published by Springer-Verlag  [2468 journals]
|
- Knowing What One Likes: Epistemicist Solution to Faultless Disagreement
-
Free pre-print version: Loading...Rate this result: What is this?Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating.
A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Abstract: Abstract In this paper, I argue that the phenomenon of faultless disagreement for predicates of taste may be fruitfully explained by appealing to the vagueness of predicates of taste and the epistemicist reading of vagueness as defended by Timothy Williamson (1994). I begin by arguing that this position is better suited to explain both the “faultless” and “disagreement” intuition. The first is explained here by appealing to the necessary ignorance of the predicate’s boundaries and a plausible account of constitutive norms of taste assertions, while the second by insisting on classical, absolutist semantics for judgments containing predicates of taste. Furthermore, I analyze the arguments against the reading of taste predicates as vague based on the alleged epistemic privilege concerning one’s taste and on the lack of definite cases. Responding to these objections, I develop a plausible account of constitutive norms of taste assertions, comment on the assumed epistemic privilege concerning taste ascriptions and provide a more detailed account of sources of the vagueness of predicates of personal taste, which I dub “super-vagueness.”
PubDate: 2025-03-01
DOI: 10.1007/s12136-024-00593-4
-
- Pritchard, Luck, Risk, and a New Problem for Safety-Based Accounts of
Knowledge-
Free pre-print version: Loading...Rate this result: What is this?Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating.
A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Abstract: Abstract In this paper, I develop a serious new dilemma involving necessary truths for safety-based theories of knowledge, a dilemma that I argue safety theorists cannot resolve or avoid by relativizing safety to either the subject’s basis or method of belief formation in close worlds or to a set of related or sufficiently similar propositions. I develop this dilemma primarily in conversation with Duncan Pritchard’s well-known, oft-modeled safety-based theories of knowledge. I show that Pritchard’s well-regarded anti-luck virtue theory of knowledge and his recently proposed (allegedly superior) anti-risk virtue theory of knowledge clearly succumb to the dilemma, and so they are inadequate as they stand. If Pritchard’s safety-based theories of knowledge are shown to be inadequate by the dilemma that is developed in this paper, then a number of other safety-based theories of knowledge (e.g., Beddor and Pavese’s, Luper’s, Dutant’s, early Pritchard’s, and others) look to be in jeopardy in this connection as well.
PubDate: 2025-03-01
DOI: 10.1007/s12136-024-00591-6
-
- Fragmentalism and Tensed Truths
-
Free pre-print version: Loading...Rate this result: What is this?Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating.
A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Abstract: Abstract Fine’s discussion of McTaggart’s paradox and tense realism may be the most significant progress in the philosophy of time in recent years. Fine reformulates McTaggart’s paradox and develops a novel realist theory called fragmentalism. According to Fine, one major advantage of fragmentalism is its ability to account for the connection between reality and tensed truths. I will argue that fragmentalism cannot give an adequate account of this connection. The reason is that while external relations between fragments are required by this kind of account, these relations are not allowed in fragmentalism.
PubDate: 2025-03-01
DOI: 10.1007/s12136-024-00592-5
-
- Intention, Action, and De Se Indexicality
-
Free pre-print version: Loading...Rate this result: What is this?Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating.
A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Abstract: Abstract The view that first-person (de se) mental content is essential to the explanation of action in general is a strong essential indexicality thesis. A weaker essential indexicality claim is that de se mental content is an essential ingredient of intentional action. An argument by Bermúdez for the former thesis and an argument from Babb in support of the latter are discussed in Section 2, and for reasons presented there it seems that both arguments are unsound and the conclusions are false as well. However, the discussion of their arguments helps us identify a certain class of intentional action, and an apparently very large class, the members of which are guaranteed to have de se origin. This class of intentional action is identified in Sections 3 and 4 and it is shown that necessarily, any member of this class has its origin in indexical, specifically, de se mental content.
PubDate: 2025-03-01
DOI: 10.1007/s12136-024-00588-1
-
- Consequentialism and Its Demands: The Role of Institutions
-
Free pre-print version: Loading...Rate this result: What is this?Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating.
A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Abstract: Abstract Consequentialism is often criticized as being overly demanding, and this overdemandingness is seen as sufficient to reject it as a moral theory. This paper takes the plausibility and coherence of this objection—the Demandingness Objection—as a given. Our question, therefore, is how to respond to the Objection. We put forward a response relying on the framework of institutional consequentialism we introduced in previous work. On this view, institutions take over the consequentialist burden, whereas individuals, special occasions aside, are required to set up and maintain institutions. We first describe the Objection, then clarify the theory of institutional consequentialism and show how it responds to the Objection. In the remainder of the paper, we defend the view against potential challenges.
PubDate: 2025-03-01
DOI: 10.1007/s12136-024-00595-2
-
- Suspension of Judgment, Non-additivity, and Additivity of Possibilities
-
Free pre-print version: Loading...Rate this result: What is this?Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating.
A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Abstract: Abstract In situations where we ignore everything but the space of possibilities, we ought to suspend judgment—that is, remain agnostic—about which of these possibilities is the case. This means that we cannot sum our degrees of belief in different possibilities, something that has been formalised as an axiom of non-additivity. Consistent with this way of representing our ignorance, I defend a doxastic norm that recommends that we should nevertheless follow a certain additivity of possibilities: even if we cannot sum degrees of belief in different possibilities, we should be more confident in larger groups of possibilities. It is thus shown that, in the type of situation considered (in so-called “classical ignorance”, i.e. “behind a thin veil of ignorance”), it is epistemically rational for advocates of suspending judgment to endorse this comparative confidence, while on the other hand it is shown that, even in classical ignorance, no stronger belief—such as a precise uniform probability distribution—is warranted.
PubDate: 2025-03-01
DOI: 10.1007/s12136-024-00590-7
-
- The No-Content View of Contradictions
-
Free pre-print version: Loading...Rate this result: What is this?Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating.
A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Abstract: Abstract This paper challenges the widespread view that contradictions have semantic content. I argue that contradictory sentences in natural language, taken literally and occurring within assertoric contexts, lack content. I present an extended twofold argument, which rests on a set of considerations about the fundamental connection between meaning-constitutivity in natural language and the semantic status of contradictions. First, I argue that the contradictory negations of analytic statements cannot have semantic content as a necessary condition for the possibility of meaning-constitutive facts in natural language. Second, I argue that the special role of contradictions in the constitution of sameness and difference of content in natural language is incompatible with the view that non-analytic contradictions could have semantic content. These two arguments jointly imply that all contradictions in natural language lack content.
PubDate: 2025-01-31
DOI: 10.1007/s12136-025-00624-8
-
- A Plea for Commonality Thesis
-
Free pre-print version: Loading...Rate this result: What is this?Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating.
A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Abstract: Abstract John. R. Searle (2015) argues that the “Commonality thesis” (CT) is a respectable view in the philosophy of perception. According to CT, indistinguishable experiences (veridical perception and corresponding hallucination) can have the same phenomenology and the same intentional content. Searle thinks that to defend CT, one must accept the Common Kind Assumption (CKA). According to CKA, “whatever kind of mental, or more narrowly experiential, event occurs when one perceives, the very same kind of event could occur where one hallucinating.” Recently, CKA received enormous criticism. Therefore, maintaining CT in support of CKA is questionable. This paper aims at a dual purpose: first, to establish that CT is a respectable thesis and second, to defend CT without endorsing CKA.
PubDate: 2025-01-31
DOI: 10.1007/s12136-025-00623-9
-
- Representational Solution to the Messenger-Shooting Objection
-
Free pre-print version: Loading...Rate this result: What is this?Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating.
A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Abstract: Abstract Representational accounts of painful experiences, which characterize contents of pain in indicative terms, face a serious problem known as the Messenger-Shooting Objection. This problem arises from the fact that indicative representational accounts do not seem to be able to accommodate the observation that painful experiences rationalize actions aimed towards their own removal. I present a novel representational account of painful experiences which can solve the Messenger-Shooting Objection while still being an indicative representational theory. I argue that the proposed account is also coherent with the contemporary scientific paradigm concerning pains.
PubDate: 2025-01-15
DOI: 10.1007/s12136-025-00622-w
-
- The Morality and Aesthetics of Personal Beauty
-
Free pre-print version: Loading...Rate this result: What is this?Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating.
A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Abstract: Abstract This paper argues that people commonly make moral and aesthetic errors regarding personal beauty. One moral error involves treating people as if their superficial physical beauty is a key source of their value. This practice immorally objectifies people by treating them as aesthetic objects, such as paintings or sunsets, rather than persons. Physical personal beauty is overrated. And even to the extent to which it may be appropriate to appreciate personal beauty, people still commonly make an aesthetic error by treating people as if their aesthetic value derives primarily from how their faces and bodies look. We thereby overlook much of their aesthetic value, including their aesthetic agency—which involves the aesthetic choices that shape people’s appearance and conduct, as well as their inner selves and character. Moreover, tending to a person’s fuller aesthetic value may mitigate harmful consequences of lookism.
PubDate: 2025-01-06
DOI: 10.1007/s12136-024-00621-3
-
- Grounding Causal Closure or Something Near Enough
-
Free pre-print version: Loading...Rate this result: What is this?Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating.
A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Abstract: Abstract A causal argument for physicalism is widely held to pose a problem for dualism. This view has an unobvious presupposition, namely that the causal closure of the physical has a special sort of ground. The requisite sort of ground must distinguish the causal argument for physicalism from many defective causal arguments. On behalf of physicalists, I develop an account of the ground for the causal closure of the physical, thereby putting the causal argument for physicalism back in the business of causally problematizing dualism. One consequence of my account is that physicalists can pose a causal problem for dualism using a much weaker closure premise than is generally assumed.
PubDate: 2024-12-28
DOI: 10.1007/s12136-024-00620-4
-
- Introduction to the Special Issue
-
Free pre-print version: Loading...Rate this result: What is this?Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating.
A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
PubDate: 2024-12-01
DOI: 10.1007/s12136-024-00615-1
-
- Social Epistemology and Epidemiology
-
Free pre-print version: Loading...Rate this result: What is this?Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating.
A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Abstract: Abstract Recent approaches to the social epistemology of belief formation have appealed to an epidemiological model, on which the mechanisms explaining how we form beliefs from our society or community along the lines of infectious disease. More specifically, Alvin Goldman (2001) proposes an etiology of (social) belief along the lines of an epistemological epidemiology. On this “contagion model,” beliefs are construed as diseases that infect people via some socio-epistemic community. This paper reconsiders Goldman’s epidemiological approach in terms of epistemic trust. By focusing on beliefs as diseases, Goldman misconstrues and underestimates the central role that epistemic trust plays in their formation (maintenance, revision, etc.). I suggest that we put trust, accordingly, as the center of an epidemiological model of social doxology—epistemic trust, rather than beliefs, is the disease with which one is infected. So, contra Goldman, beliefs themselves aren’t the disease—they are symptoms. Trust, on this approach, can be viewed as a pathology. This point connects Annette Baier’s (1994) work on moral trust—taking a cue from her “pathologies of trust.” The real pathology centered in social doxology is the epistemic trust manifested by those beliefs. Accordingly, I shall explore (and tentatively defend) an epidemiological model for such “pathological” epistemic trust inspired by Baier’s work on moral trust, one which can more adequately account for the infectious epistemic trust at work in social belief formation.
PubDate: 2024-12-01
DOI: 10.1007/s12136-024-00589-0
-
- Progress in Understanding Consciousness' Easy and Hard Problems, and
Philosophical and Empirical Perspectives-
Free pre-print version: Loading...Rate this result: What is this?Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating.
A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Abstract: Abstract David Chalmers has distinguished the “hard” and the “easy” problem of consciousness, arguing that progress on the “easy problem”—on pinpointing the physical/neural correlates of consciousness—will not necessarily involve progress on the hard problem—on explaining why consciousness, in the first place, emerges from physical processing. Chalmers, however, was hopeful that refined theorizing would eventually yield philosophical progress. In particular, he argued that panpsychism might be a candidate account to solve the hard problem. Here, I provide a concise stock-take on both the empirical-neuroscientific and philosophical-conceptual progress on consciousness. It turns out that, whereas empirical progress is indisputable, philosophical progress is much less pronounced. While Chalmers was right, I argue, in distinguishing distinctive types of problems of consciousness, his prediction of progress on the hard problem was overly optimistic. Empirical progress and philosophical progress are essentially uncoupled; a more skeptical perspective on progress in philosophy in general is appropriate.
PubDate: 2024-12-01
DOI: 10.1007/s12136-024-00584-5
-
- Evidential Incognizance
-
Free pre-print version: Loading...Rate this result: What is this?Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating.
A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Abstract: Abstract In this article, I explore an epistemic vice I call “evidential incognizance.” It is a vice of failing generally to recognize evidence, or recognize the full force of evidence, in a domain of knowledge. It frequently manifests as a kind of unbridled skepticism or hopelessness about knowing in the domain, including (but not limited to) skepticism about expert testimony. It is epistemically vicious primarily because it leads people to overlook valuable epistemic opportunities, and thus tends to obstruct knowledge and justified belief. I believe it is of interest particularly because it tends to arise as a reaction to a certain kind of information environment and is often induced intentionally by populist candidates and authoritarian regimes. I discuss the nature of evidential incognizance, its relation to and differences from other epistemic shortcomings, its political significance, why it may have been previously overlooked in the literature, and the potential for overcoming it.
PubDate: 2024-12-01
DOI: 10.1007/s12136-024-00608-0
-
- How Seemings Resolve Bergmann’s Dilemma for Internalism
-
Free pre-print version: Loading...Rate this result: What is this?Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating.
A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Abstract: Abstract A prominent argument for internalism appeals to the requirement that justified beliefs not be accidentally true from the subject’s perspective. Bergmann’s dilemma remains the most troublesome obstacle to those who defend internalism in this way. In a word, what is required for a belief to be non-accidental' If we require the subject to justifiably believe that one is aware of something counting in its favor, then a vicious regress results and one is never justified in believing anything. But we cannot require less since beliefs can satisfy any lesser requirements and still be accidental. I argue here that phenomenal conservatism, which appeals to “seemings,” shows a way out of this dilemma. The key is that seemings, via their unique phenomenal character, make their content non-accidental for us simply by our being conscious of them and without our having to reflect on their significance. This is an important step in the larger project of re-envisioning traditional arguments for access internalism as supporting mentalism instead.
PubDate: 2024-12-01
DOI: 10.1007/s12136-023-00579-8
-
- Having a Disposition and Making a Contribution
-
Free pre-print version: Loading...Rate this result: What is this?Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating.
A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Abstract: Abstract Dispositional accounts of various phenomena have claimed that dispositions can be intrinsically masked. In cases of intrinsic masking, something has a disposition while also having an intrinsic property that would prevent that disposition from manifesting in the face of its stimulus. This paper develops a theory of disposition ascriptions capable of recognizing such dispositions. The theory is modeled on the view that dispositions are powers. I propose that having a disposition is a matter of exerting a corresponding kind of influence. Unlike powers theories, however, the account largely falls silent on questions of fundamental metaphysics. It does not build dispositions into fundamental ontology, posit necessary connections between properties, or otherwise appeal to sui generis modality.
PubDate: 2024-07-03
DOI: 10.1007/s12136-024-00599-y
-
- Epistemic Bystander
-
Free pre-print version: Loading...Rate this result: What is this?Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating.
A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Abstract: Abstract Epistemic bystanding occurs when an agent has all the competences, knowledge and opportunity to prevent another person from forming a false or risky belief, but does not prevent the belief formation. I provide a definition of an epistemic bystander and explain the mechanism that makes someone an epistemic bystander. I argue that the phenomenon is genuinely epistemic and not merely linguistic. Moreover, I propose an account of the mechanism of epistemic bystanding building on Ishani Maitra’s notion of licensing. An epistemic bystander licenses a risky belief-forming process in another person and thereby performs a blameworthy epistemic action. This form of licensing explains the distinctive wrong of being an epistemic bystander.
PubDate: 2024-06-26
DOI: 10.1007/s12136-024-00598-z
-
- Truth-Ratios, Evidential Fit, and Deferring to Informants with Low Error
Probabilities-
Free pre-print version: Loading...Rate this result: What is this?Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating.
A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Abstract: Abstract Suppose that an informant (test, expert, device, perceptual system, etc.) is unlikely to err when pronouncing on a particular subject matter. When this is so, it might be tempting to defer to that informant when forming beliefs about that subject matter. How is such an inferential process expected to fare in terms of truth (leading to true beliefs) and evidential fit (leading to beliefs that fit one’s total evidence)' Using a medical diagnostic test as an example, we set out a formal framework to investigate this question. We establish seven results and make one conjecture. The first four results show that when the test’s error probabilities are low, the process of deferring to the test can score well in terms of (i) both truth and evidential fit, (ii) truth but not evidential fit, (iii) evidential fit but not truth, or (iv) neither truth nor evidential fit. Anything is possible. The remaining results and conjecture generalize these results in certain ways. These results are interesting in themselves—especially given that the diagnostic test is not sensitive to the target disease’s base rate—but also have broader implications for the more general process of deferring to an informant. Additionally, our framework and diagnostic example can be used to create test cases for various reliabilist theories of inferential justification. We show, for example, that they can be used to motivate evidentialist process reliabilism over process reliabilism.
PubDate: 2024-06-20
DOI: 10.1007/s12136-024-00597-0
-
- Antipathy as an Emotion
-
Free pre-print version: Loading...Rate this result: What is this?Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating.
A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Abstract: Abstract Antipathy is an affective phenomenon which has not received much attention by philosophers and psychologists, unlike its antonym, sympathy. However, antipathy is a phenomenon that contributes to and fuels many of the challenges related to our social behaviours and interpersonal relationships. Antipathy’s exact nature needs to be identified, if only because of the importance it has, for example, in political opposition, in loss of civility, but also in situations that cause poor psychological well-being. It would be then essential to be able to determine whether antipathy is a phenomenon that could be felt on a short term (an episode) or last in the long term (a disposition), since it would allow to study and measure more precisely the nature of the acts it gives rise to, the range of its intensity or/and its social consequences. Like sympathy, antipathy is most often understood as an affective phenomenon that lasts over time. Antipathy is often presented as an instinctive and irrational aversion to something or someone. Yet this common definition is too similar to the definition of other affective phenomena such as disgust or even fear. This article will therefore examine the nature of antipathy by differentiating it from other emotional phenomena that resemble it. But more importantly, the limited existing literature on antipathy mostly characterises it as an affective disposition. In this paper, I will rather argue that antipathy is a conscious emotion, i.e., an emotion that occurs consciously and has a phenomenology.
PubDate: 2024-06-08
DOI: 10.1007/s12136-024-00596-1
-
