Subjects -> CHEMISTRY (Total: 928 journals)
    - ANALYTICAL CHEMISTRY (59 journals)
    - CHEMISTRY (661 journals)
    - CRYSTALLOGRAPHY (23 journals)
    - ELECTROCHEMISTRY (28 journals)
    - INORGANIC CHEMISTRY (45 journals)
    - ORGANIC CHEMISTRY (47 journals)
    - PHYSICAL CHEMISTRY (65 journals)

ANALYTICAL CHEMISTRY (59 journals)

Showing 1 - 40 of 40 Journals sorted alphabetically
Accounts of Chemical Research     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 68)
Acta Analytica     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6)
Advances in Analytical Chemistry     Open Access   (Followers: 32)
American Journal of Analytical Chemistry     Open Access   (Followers: 29)
Analitika i kontrol` (Analytics and control)     Open Access  
Analytica Chimica Acta     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 37)
Analytical and Bioanalytical Chemistry     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 24)
Analytical Chemistry     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 248)
Analytical Chemistry Insights     Open Access   (Followers: 21)
Analytical Chemistry Letters     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Analytical Letters     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9)
Annual Review of Analytical Chemistry     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 11)
Chemical Data Collections     Hybrid Journal  
Chinese Journal of Analytical Chemistry     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5)
Composites Communications     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Comprehensive Analytical Chemistry     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 7)
Critical Reviews in Analytical Chemistry     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 27)
Current Analytical Chemistry     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 10)
Drug Testing and Analysis     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8)
Electroanalysis     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6)
Field Analytical Chemistry and Technology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6)
International Journal of Environmental Analytical Chemistry     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7)
International Journal of Polymer Analysis and Characterization     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7)
Journal of Analysis and Testing     Hybrid Journal  
Journal of Analytical Chemistry     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 22)
Journal of Electroanalytical Chemistry     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8)
Journal of Essential Oil Research     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Journal of Radioanalytical and Nuclear Chemistry     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7)
Journal of Thermal Analysis and Calorimetry     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 27)
Microchemical Journal     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Nature Catalysis     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 10)
Nigerian Journal of Chemical Research     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Opflow     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Phytochemical Analysis     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Polish Journal of Chemical Technology     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Surface and Interface Analysis     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 14)
TrAC Trends in Analytical Chemistry     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 36)
Trends in Environmental Analytical Chemistry     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Vibrational Spectroscopy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6)
World Journal of Analytical Chemistry     Open Access   (Followers: 4)
Similar Journals
Journal Cover
Acta Analytica
Journal Prestige (SJR): 0.367
Number of Followers: 6  
 
  Hybrid Journal Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles)
ISSN (Print) 1874-6349 - ISSN (Online) 0353-5150
Published by Springer-Verlag Homepage  [2468 journals]
  • From Metaphysics to Methods': Pluralism in Cancer Research

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      Abstract: Abstract There is a growing recognition among many scientists and philosophers that metaphysical presuppositions guide scientific research. These ontological claims, in turn, prescribe a particular methodology for how to go about investigating and explaining those kinds of things. There is thus what I call a move from metaphysics to methods. Using cancer research as a case study, I defend the existence of this move, and I argue for an “agnostic” attitude towards the metaphysical presuppositions guiding cancer research. I defend this agnosticism on two grounds: first, the underdetermination of metaphysical frameworks by empirical research, and second, on the ground of inductive risk, namely that when it comes to cancer research, there are more than just epistemic consequences for making the wrong metaphysical choice. I conclude that one should instead allow for a pluralism of metaphysical frameworks to guide cancer research.
      PubDate: 2024-07-20
       
  • Towards a Realist Shifty Semantic Account of Moral Vagueness

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      Abstract: Abstract A widely shared intuition says moral statements like “Aborting at 150 days is permissible” seem vague. But what is the nature of such vagueness' This article proposes a novel, shifty semantic account of moral vagueness which argues: Moral vagueness is essentially a semantic phenomenon existing in our imperfect (moral) language; the referents of vague moral terms may shift under the right circumstance; our usage of vague moral terms may contribute to such shifts, but so may some factors beyond our control. After the account is fleshed out, some distinctions will be drawn to differentiate it from other accounts of moral vagueness, and more importantly, efforts will be made to reconcile this account and moral realism. In conclusion, my account is by far the first (minimal) moral realism-friendly shifty semantic account of moral vagueness that successfully explains our intuitions about vague moral statements.
      PubDate: 2024-07-19
       
  • Moral Responsibility in a Vat

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      Abstract: Abstract This paper investigates an ingenious argument by Andrew Khoury which, if valid, could shed new light on some of the most relevant discussions within the field of moral philosophy. The argument is based on the idea that if we deny the phenomenon of resultant moral luck, then the proper objects of moral responsibility must be internal willings. I analyse the argument and find it unsound. The argument does not adequately account for the positions of all relevant moral actors when it comes to the moral evaluation of agents and their actions.
      PubDate: 2024-07-17
       
  • Many Bombers of the Principle of Double Effect: An Analysis of
           Strategic/Terror Bomber Thought Experiment Variants

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      Abstract: Abstract The strategic/terror bomber thought experiment is often employed in the contemporary debate on the principle of double effect (PDE). It is taken to show the intuitive appeal of PDE. In this paper, it is argued, however, that the thought experiment is used in a confused way. What is taken to be one thought experiments in fact is a series of subtly differing examples. Those differences, although subtle, bear on the applicability of these examples in the argumentation for PDE. The main objectives of this paper are to provide a precise description and analysis of the variants of strategic/terror bomber thought experiments. The analysis shows that some variants are flawed mainly because of underdetermination of the cases by their descriptions and problems with rationality of the presented agents. This result seems to cast some new doubts on employment of the strategic/terror bomber thought experiment as an argumentative device supporting PDE.
      PubDate: 2024-07-13
       
  • Having a Disposition and Making a Contribution

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      Abstract: Abstract Dispositional accounts of various phenomena have claimed that dispositions can be intrinsically masked. In cases of intrinsic masking, something has a disposition while also having an intrinsic property that would prevent that disposition from manifesting in the face of its stimulus. This paper develops a theory of disposition ascriptions capable of recognizing such dispositions. The theory is modeled on the view that dispositions are powers. I propose that having a disposition is a matter of exerting a corresponding kind of influence. Unlike powers theories, however, the account largely falls silent on questions of fundamental metaphysics. It does not build dispositions into fundamental ontology, posit necessary connections between properties, or otherwise appeal to sui generis modality.
      PubDate: 2024-07-03
       
  • Epistemic Bystander

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      Abstract: Abstract Epistemic bystanding occurs when an agent has all the competences, knowledge and opportunity to prevent another person from forming a false or risky belief, but does not prevent the belief formation. I provide a definition of an epistemic bystander and explain the mechanism that makes someone an epistemic bystander. I argue that the phenomenon is genuinely epistemic and not merely linguistic. Moreover, I propose an account of the mechanism of epistemic bystanding building on Ishani Maitra’s notion of licensing. An epistemic bystander licenses a risky belief-forming process in another person and thereby performs a blameworthy epistemic action. This form of licensing explains the distinctive wrong of being an epistemic bystander.
      PubDate: 2024-06-26
       
  • Truth-Ratios, Evidential Fit, and Deferring to Informants with Low Error
           Probabilities

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      Abstract: Abstract Suppose that an informant (test, expert, device, perceptual system, etc.) is unlikely to err when pronouncing on a particular subject matter. When this is so, it might be tempting to defer to that informant when forming beliefs about that subject matter. How is such an inferential process expected to fare in terms of truth (leading to true beliefs) and evidential fit (leading to beliefs that fit one’s total evidence)' Using a medical diagnostic test as an example, we set out a formal framework to investigate this question. We establish seven results and make one conjecture. The first four results show that when the test’s error probabilities are low, the process of deferring to the test can score well in terms of (i) both truth and evidential fit, (ii) truth but not evidential fit, (iii) evidential fit but not truth, or (iv) neither truth nor evidential fit. Anything is possible. The remaining results and conjecture generalize these results in certain ways. These results are interesting in themselves—especially given that the diagnostic test is not sensitive to the target disease’s base rate—but also have broader implications for the more general process of deferring to an informant. Additionally, our framework and diagnostic example can be used to create test cases for various reliabilist theories of inferential justification. We show, for example, that they can be used to motivate evidentialist process reliabilism over process reliabilism.
      PubDate: 2024-06-20
       
  • Antipathy as an Emotion

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      Abstract: Abstract   Antipathy is an affective phenomenon which has not received much attention by philosophers and psychologists, unlike its antonym, sympathy. However, antipathy is a phenomenon that contributes to and fuels many of the challenges related to our social behaviours and interpersonal relationships. Antipathy’s exact nature needs to be identified, if only because of the importance it has, for example, in political opposition, in loss of civility, but also in situations that cause poor psychological well-being. It would be then essential to be able to determine whether antipathy is a phenomenon that could be felt on a short term (an episode) or last in the long term (a disposition), since it would allow to study and measure more precisely the nature of the acts it gives rise to, the range of its intensity or/and its social consequences. Like sympathy, antipathy is most often understood as an affective phenomenon that lasts over time. Antipathy is often presented as an instinctive and irrational aversion to something or someone. Yet this common definition is too similar to the definition of other affective phenomena such as disgust or even fear. This article will therefore examine the nature of antipathy by differentiating it from other emotional phenomena that resemble it. But more importantly, the limited existing literature on antipathy mostly characterises it as an affective disposition. In this paper, I will rather argue that antipathy is a conscious emotion, i.e., an emotion that occurs consciously and has a phenomenology.
      PubDate: 2024-06-08
       
  • Acquaintance, Attention, and Introspective Justification

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      Abstract: Abstract This paper develops a version of the acquaintance theory of introspective justification. In the process, it rejects the view that acquaintance is sui generic in favor of a view that identifies acquaintance with availability for selection by attention mechanisms. Moreover, unlike many recent accounts of knowledge by acquaintance, it explains the epistemic significance of acquaintance in terms of the epistemic basing relation without any need to appeal to the structure or existence of phenomenal concepts. Lastly, while in ideal cases acquaintance will provide a kind of infallible justification, the paper shows how to extend these ideas to allow that acquaintance can provide fallible introspective justification.
      PubDate: 2024-06-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s12136-023-00576-x
       
  • Epiphenomenalism and the Epistemic Argument

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      Abstract: Abstract The epistemic argument against epiphenomenalism aims to prove that even if epiphenomenalism is true, its adherents are not able to justify their inferential beliefs. This would mean that they cannot know that they are right which is a self-stultifying consequence. I elaborate on this problem and then present an updated version of epiphenomenalism based on property dualism. I argue that this position is capable of refuting the conclusion of the epistemic argument even in spite of accepting its essential assumptions. This was made possible by an upgraded property exemplification account of events. I also argue against a view which, if true, gives substantial support to the epistemic argument: that a belief justified by other beliefs is knowledge only if it is caused by those beliefs in virtue of their contents.
      PubDate: 2024-06-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s12136-023-00565-0
       
  • Tricky Truths: How Should Alethic Pluralism Accommodate Racial Truths'

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      Abstract: Abstract Some alethic pluralists maintain that there are two kinds of truths operant in our alethic discourse: a realist kind and an anti-realist kind. In this paper, we argue that such a binary conception cannot accommodate certain social truths, specifically truths about race. Most alethic pluralists surprisingly overlook the status of racial truths. Douglas Edwards is, however, an exception. In his version of alethic pluralism—Determination Pluralism—racial truths are superassertible (anti-realist) true rather than correspondence (realist) true. We argue that racial truths exhibit features of both superassertibility (anti-realism) and correspondence (realism). This suggests a fuzzy boundary between realist and anti-realist kinds of truth. There may be a continuum rather than a dichotomy of truths. We conclude by sketching one way for alethic pluralists to accommodate such a notion.
      PubDate: 2024-06-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s12136-023-00572-1
       
  • Motivating (Underdetermination) Scepticism

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      Abstract: Abstract The aim of this paper is to analyse and develop how scepticism becomes an intelligible question starting from requirements that epistemologists themselves aim to endorse. We argue for and defend the idea that the root of scepticism is the underdetermination principle by articulating its specificity as a respectable epistemic principle and by defending it against objections in current literature. This engagement offers a novel understanding of underdetermination-based scepticism. While most anti-sceptical approaches challenge scepticism by understanding it as postulating uneliminated scenarios of mass deception, or as endorsing unnatural epistemic requirements, we argue here that both contentions are mistaken. Underdetermination-based scepticism targets our beliefs by issuing a genuine question about the rational support they enjoy. If we cannot establish that the sources of our beliefs provide them the required epistemic merit and authority, they lack non-arbitrary grounds. This has a sizable impact on what constitutes a satisfactory anti-sceptical strategy. Strategies that merely focus on the scenario-based aspect of scepticism, or on the truth-functional evaluation of our beliefs, are shown to miss the mark of the sceptical threat. The proposed analysis ultimately provides a shift in perspective concerning the character and reach of philosophical doubt.
      PubDate: 2024-06-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s12136-023-00563-2
       
  • The Invalidity of the Argument from Illusion and the Argument from
           Appearance

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      Abstract: Abstract One crucial premise in the argument from illusion is the Phenomenal Principle. It states that if there sensibly appears to be something that possesses a sensible quality, then there is something of which the subject is aware that has that sensible quality. The principle thus enables the inference from a mere appearance to an existence (usually a mental one). In the argument from appearance, a similar move is taken by some philosophers—they infer a content from a mere appearance. There are two kinds of defences for the Phenomenal Principle in the literature, namely, the epistemological one (e.g. H.H. Price) and the semantic one (e.g. Frank Jackson). I argue that neither consolidates the Phenomenal Principle. I particularly demonstrate that the appearance verb in premise 1 of the argument from illusion is not used in the phenomenal sense as it is used in the Phenomenal Principle, which renders the argument essentially invalid. To avoid invalidity, the proponents either give up the phenomenal use, which makes the argument unable to serve its original purpose, i.e. inferring an unusual existence, or they insist on the phenomenal use in all premises of the argument, which will trivialise the argument. I also demonstrate that a similar objection applies to the argument from appearance.
      PubDate: 2024-06-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s12136-023-00570-3
       
  • Partially Autonomous Belief

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      Abstract: Abstract Adam Carter (2022) recently proposed that a successful analysis of knowledge needs to include an autonomy condition. Autonomy, for Carter, requires a lack of a compulsion history. A compulsion history bypasses one’s cognitive competences and results in a belief that is difficult to shed. I argue that Carter’s autonomy condition does not cover partially autonomous beliefs properly. Some belief-forming processes are partially bypassing one’s competences, but not bypassing them completely. I provide a case for partially autonomous belief based on processing fluency effects and argue that partially autonomous beliefs only amount to knowledge in some cases. I finally suggest how to adjust the autonomy condition to capture partially autonomous belief properly.
      PubDate: 2024-06-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s12136-023-00559-y
       
  • Knowledge as a Social Kind

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      Abstract: Abstract I argue that knowledge can be seen as a quality standard that governs our sharing and storing of information. This standard satisfies certain functional needs, namely it allows us to share and store trustworthy information more easily. I argue that this makes knowledge a social kind, similar in important ways to other social kinds like money. This provides us with a way of talking about knowledge without limiting ourselves to the concept of knowledge. I also outline three ways in which this view of knowledge can shed light on familiar epistemological problems: it can explain why knowledge is the norm of assertion, it can help us carve out the harm associated with testimonial injustice, and it can provide us with a clear analysis of the dangers associated with spreading misinformation.
      PubDate: 2024-06-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s12136-023-00561-4
       
  • Three Kinds of Arguments for Panpsychism

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      Abstract: Abstract Panpsychism may be roughly defined as a view that at least some of the properties constituting the fundamental level of reality are mental or proto-mental. Despite its long history, it has been revived in recent discussions as a solution to the problems raised by the mind, especially to the so-called hard problem of consciousness. Contemporary panpsychism differs significantly from incarnations known from the history of philosophy mainly due to the fact that the former is often combined with so-called Russellian monism. According to Russellian monism, the intrinsic properties of physical things remain unknown. This encourages panpsychists to argue that those properties are in fact mental. In my paper, I examine the three most common arguments for panpsychism: the Continuity Argument, the Hegelian Argument, and the Agnostic Argument. I take a closer look at each of them to assess their advantages and weaknesses. As I point out, the way in which one argues implies the version of panpsychism one adopts. This turns out to be especially important with regard to the Hegelian Argument and the Agnostic Argument. Both can be combined with Russellian monism, resulting in Russellian panpsychism. However, I claim that the philosophical consequences of these arguments are different, so it is legitimate to distinguish two kinds of Russellian panpsychism. In conclusion, I hold that there are reasons to prefer panpsychism based on the Agnostic Argument, which is more promising, as it responds to some general problems of panpsychism.
      PubDate: 2024-06-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s12136-023-00566-z
       
  • Virtue, Self-Narratives, and the Causes of Action

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      Abstract: Abstract Virtues can be considered to play a causal role in the production of behaviour and so too can our self-narratives. We identify a point of connection between the two cases and draw a parallel between them. But, those folk psychological notions, virtues and self-narratives, fail to reduce smoothly to the underlying human physiology. As a first step towards handling that failure to connect with the scientific framework that is the familiar grounding for our understanding of causation, we consider the causal theory of action, a leading theory of action, which shows how reasons, understood as an appropriate pair of beliefs and desires, can be treated as causes of action. Davidson’s picture is based on cause as a relation between events, which can have both a description in scientific terms and in folk psychological terms. The character of both virtues and self-narratives is not that of events, even extended ones, so we need to refer to examples of scientific explanation that incorporate structural properties of objects. While we retain the spirit of the causal theory, we wish to guard against any unwarranted optimism that an explicitly scientific explanation for human action lies in our future, drawing on Chomsky’s view that a causal explanation of human actions is likely to remain beyond human science forming capacities. We take a mild-realist view of virtues and self-narratives, in the style of Dennett. We argue that, in spite of that limited form of realism, underlined by Chomsky’s mysterian position in this domain, we still need to frame our explanations of behaviour based on virtues and self-narratives in causal terms.
      PubDate: 2024-06-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s12136-023-00569-w
       
  • Non-Factualist Interpretation of the Skeptical Solution and the
           Self-Refutation Argument

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      Abstract: Abstract The skeptical solution is based on two assumptions — the rejection of semantic facts and the denial of semantic nihilism. On the basis of the non-factualist interpretation of this solution, these two assumptions are reconciled by stating that meaning ascriptions possess non-descriptive function. Nonetheless, Alexander Miller argues that this position is self-refuting since, as despite its non-descriptivism, by rejecting any kind of semantic facts, it inevitably leads to semantic nihilism. In this text, I demonstrate that Miller’s argument is not sound. I argue that a coherent non-factualist way of formulating the conditions of correct use of meaning ascriptions may be performed by rejecting the closure principle of assertibility of meaning ascriptions. On this basis, I demonstrate that argument formulated against non-factualist interpretation by Miller may be refuted. What is more, I argue that rejection of the closure principle should be regarded as the central aspect of Kripke’s skeptical solution.
      PubDate: 2024-06-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s12136-023-00571-2
       
  • Knowing What One Likes: Epistemicist Solution to Faultless Disagreement

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      Abstract: Abstract In this paper, I argue that the phenomenon of faultless disagreement for predicates of taste may be fruitfully explained by appealing to the vagueness of predicates of taste and the epistemicist reading of vagueness as defended by Timothy Williamson (1994). I begin by arguing that this position is better suited to explain both the “faultless” and “disagreement” intuition. The first is explained here by appealing to the necessary ignorance of the predicate’s boundaries and a plausible account of constitutive norms of taste assertions, while the second by insisting on classical, absolutist semantics for judgments containing predicates of taste. Furthermore, I analyze the arguments against the reading of taste predicates as vague based on the alleged epistemic privilege concerning one’s taste and on the lack of definite cases. Responding to these objections, I develop a plausible account of constitutive norms of taste assertions, comment on the assumed epistemic privilege concerning taste ascriptions and provide a more detailed account of sources of the vagueness of predicates of personal taste, which I dub “super-vagueness.”
      PubDate: 2024-05-08
      DOI: 10.1007/s12136-024-00593-4
       
  • False Authorities

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      Abstract: Abstract An epistemic agent A is a false epistemic authority for others if they falsely believe A to be in a position to help them accomplish their epistemic ends. A major divide exists between what I call epistemic quacks, who falsely believe themselves to be relevantly competent, and epistemic charlatans, i.e., false authorities who believe or even know that they are incompetent. Neither type of false authority covers what Lackey (2021) calls predatory experts: experts who systematically misuse their social-epistemic status as a cover for predatory behavior. Qua experts, predatory experts are competent and thus could (and maybe sometimes do) help their clients. But should we count them as genuine epistemic authorities' No. I argue that they are false epistemic authorities because in addition to their practical and moral misconduct, such experts systematically deceive their clients, thereby thwarting the clients’ epistemic ends.
      PubDate: 2024-04-18
      DOI: 10.1007/s12136-024-00594-3
       
 
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  Subjects -> CHEMISTRY (Total: 928 journals)
    - ANALYTICAL CHEMISTRY (59 journals)
    - CHEMISTRY (661 journals)
    - CRYSTALLOGRAPHY (23 journals)
    - ELECTROCHEMISTRY (28 journals)
    - INORGANIC CHEMISTRY (45 journals)
    - ORGANIC CHEMISTRY (47 journals)
    - PHYSICAL CHEMISTRY (65 journals)

ANALYTICAL CHEMISTRY (59 journals)

Showing 1 - 40 of 40 Journals sorted alphabetically
Accounts of Chemical Research     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 68)
Acta Analytica     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6)
Advances in Analytical Chemistry     Open Access   (Followers: 32)
American Journal of Analytical Chemistry     Open Access   (Followers: 29)
Analitika i kontrol` (Analytics and control)     Open Access  
Analytica Chimica Acta     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 37)
Analytical and Bioanalytical Chemistry     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 24)
Analytical Chemistry     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 248)
Analytical Chemistry Insights     Open Access   (Followers: 21)
Analytical Chemistry Letters     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Analytical Letters     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9)
Annual Review of Analytical Chemistry     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 11)
Chemical Data Collections     Hybrid Journal  
Chinese Journal of Analytical Chemistry     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5)
Composites Communications     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Comprehensive Analytical Chemistry     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 7)
Critical Reviews in Analytical Chemistry     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 27)
Current Analytical Chemistry     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 10)
Drug Testing and Analysis     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8)
Electroanalysis     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6)
Field Analytical Chemistry and Technology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6)
International Journal of Environmental Analytical Chemistry     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7)
International Journal of Polymer Analysis and Characterization     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7)
Journal of Analysis and Testing     Hybrid Journal  
Journal of Analytical Chemistry     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 22)
Journal of Electroanalytical Chemistry     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8)
Journal of Essential Oil Research     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Journal of Radioanalytical and Nuclear Chemistry     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7)
Journal of Thermal Analysis and Calorimetry     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 27)
Microchemical Journal     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Nature Catalysis     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 10)
Nigerian Journal of Chemical Research     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Opflow     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Phytochemical Analysis     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Polish Journal of Chemical Technology     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Surface and Interface Analysis     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 14)
TrAC Trends in Analytical Chemistry     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 36)
Trends in Environmental Analytical Chemistry     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Vibrational Spectroscopy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6)
World Journal of Analytical Chemistry     Open Access   (Followers: 4)
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Edinburgh, EH14 4AS, UK
Email: journaltocs@hw.ac.uk
Tel: +00 44 (0)131 4513762
 


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