Subjects -> CHEMISTRY (Total: 928 journals)
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ANALYTICAL CHEMISTRY (59 journals)

Showing 1 - 45 of 45 Journals sorted alphabetically
Accounts of Chemical Research     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 60)
Acta Analytica     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6)
Advances in Analytical Chemistry     Open Access   (Followers: 29)
American Journal of Analytical Chemistry     Open Access   (Followers: 29)
Analitika i kontrol` (Analytics and control)     Open Access  
Analytica Chimica Acta     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 41)
Analytica Chimica Acta : X     Open Access  
Analytical and Bioanalytical Chemistry     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 27)
Analytical and Bioanalytical Chemistry Research     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Analytical Chemistry     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 234)
Analytical Chemistry Insights     Open Access   (Followers: 20)
Analytical Chemistry Letters     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Analytical Letters     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9)
Annual Review of Analytical Chemistry     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 12)
Chemical Data Collections     Hybrid Journal  
Chinese Journal of Analytical Chemistry     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5)
Composites Communications     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Comprehensive Analytical Chemistry     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 7)
Critical Reviews in Analytical Chemistry     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 26)
Current Analytical Chemistry     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 10)
Drug Testing and Analysis     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 10)
Electroanalysis     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6)
Field Analytical Chemistry and Technology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6)
International Journal of Analytical Chemistry     Open Access   (Followers: 20)
International Journal of Environmental Analytical Chemistry     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7)
International Journal of Polymer Analysis and Characterization     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8)
Journal of Analysis and Testing     Hybrid Journal  
Journal of Analytical Atomic Spectrometry     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8)
Journal of Analytical Chemistry     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 21)
Journal of Electroanalytical Chemistry     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7)
Journal of Essential Oil Research     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Journal of Progressive Research in Chemistry     Open Access  
Journal of Radioanalytical and Nuclear Chemistry     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7)
Journal of Thermal Analysis and Calorimetry     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 24)
Microchemical Journal     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Nature Catalysis     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6)
Nigerian Journal of Chemical Research     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Opflow     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Phytochemical Analysis     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Polish Journal of Chemical Technology     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Surface and Interface Analysis     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 15)
TrAC Trends in Analytical Chemistry     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 46)
Trends in Environmental Analytical Chemistry     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Vibrational Spectroscopy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 10)
World Journal of Analytical Chemistry     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
Similar Journals
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Acta Analytica
Journal Prestige (SJR): 0.367
Number of Followers: 6  
 
  Hybrid Journal Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles)
ISSN (Print) 1874-6349 - ISSN (Online) 0353-5150
Published by Springer-Verlag Homepage  [2469 journals]
  • Lowe vs Lewis vs Lowe on Temporary Intrinsics

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      Abstract: Abstract We find that E. J. Lowe’s resolution to David Lewis’s problem of temporary intrinsics is wrong, but not quite for the reasons adduced by Lewis himself. Our discussion hinges on a connection between state-independent properties and intrinsic properties.
      PubDate: 2022-06-01
       
  • Knowing Falsely: the Non-factive Project

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      Abstract: Abstract Quite likely the most sacrosanct principle in epistemology, it is near-universally accepted that knowledge is factive: knowing that p entails p. Recently, however, Bricker, Buckwalter, and Turri have all argued that we can and often do know approximations that are strictly speaking false. My goal with this paper is to advance this nascent non-factive project in two key ways. First, I provide a critical review of these recent arguments against the factivity of knowledge, allowing us to observe that elements of these arguments mutually reinforce respective weaknesses, thereby offering the non-factive project a much stronger foundation than when these arguments were isolated. Next, I argue tentatively in favor of Bricker’s truthlikeness framework over the representational adequacy account favored by Buckwalter and Turri. Taken together, while none of this constitutes a knock-down argument against factivity, it does allow us to quiet some of the more immediate worries surrounding the non-factive project.
      PubDate: 2022-06-01
       
  • Manifestation and Unrestricted Dispositional Monism

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      Abstract: Abstract Most metaphysicians agree that powers (at least the non-fundamental ones) can exist without being manifested. The main goal of this paper is to show that adherents of an unrestricted version of Dispositional Monism cannot provide a plausible metaphysical account of the difference between a situation in which a power-instance is not manifested and a situation in which a manifestation of that power-instance actually occurs unless they undermine their own view. To this end, two kinds of manifestation-relation (token-level and type-level, respectively) are introduced and it is argued that dispositional monists should appeal to the former in order to offer the required account. After defending the introduction of token-level-manifestation-relations against objections to their metaphysical robustness and explanatory non-redundancy, it is finally argued that their existence is incompatible with the core tenet of an unrestricted form of Dispositional Monism because they cannot be powers.
      PubDate: 2022-06-01
       
  • Properties, Concepts and Empirical Identity

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      Abstract: Abstract Properties and concepts are similar kinds of thing in so far as they are both typically understood to be whatever it is that predicates stand for. However, they are generally supposed to have different identity criteria: for example, heat is the same property as molecular kinetic energy, whereas the concept of heat is different from the concept of molecular kinetic energy. This paper examines whether this discrepancy is really defensible, and concludes that matters are more complex than is generally thought. The distinction between canonical and non-canonical designators, as applied to such entities as propositions, properties and concepts, is examined, as are causal realist accounts of the semantics of such terms as ‘electricity’ and ‘mass’.
      PubDate: 2022-06-01
       
  • Necessitism, Contingentism, and Lewisian Modal Realism

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      Abstract: Abstract Necessitism is the controversial thesis that necessarily everything is necessarily something, namely that everything, everywhere, necessarily exists. What is controversial about necessitism is that, at its core, it claims that things could not have failed to exist, while we have a pre-theoretical intuition that not everything necessarily exists. Contingentism, in accordance with common sense, denies necessitism: it claims that some things could have failed to exist. Timothy Williamson is a necessitist and claims that David Lewis is a necessitist too. The paper argues that, granted the assumptions that lead to interpret the Lewisian as a necessitist, she can preserve contingentist intuitions, by genuinely agreeing with the folk that existence is contingent. This is not just the uncontroversial claim that the Lewisian, as a result of the prevalence of restricted quantification in counterpart theoretic regimentations of natural language, can agree with the folk while disagreeing with them in the metaphysical room. Rather, this is the claim that it is in the metaphysical room that the Lewisian can endorse the intuitions lying behind contingentism.
      PubDate: 2022-06-01
       
  • Naïve Realism with Many Fundamental Kinds

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      Abstract: Abstract Naïve realism is a theory of perception with great explanatory ambitions. It has been influentially argued that, in order to realize these explanatory ambitions, the naïve realist should say that any perception belongs to just one fundamental kind. I think, however, that adopting this commitment does not particularly help the naïve realist to realize her explanatory ambitions, and so is not warranted. This result is significant because once this commitment about fundamental kinds is relinquished, we see that it is possible to develop some new and surprising forms of naïve realism—most notably, what I call pluralist naïve realism.
      PubDate: 2022-06-01
       
  • Can We Have Physical Understanding of Mathematical Facts'

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      Abstract: Abstract A lot of philosophical energy has been devoted recently in trying to determine if mathematics can contribute to our understanding of physical phenomena. Not many philosophers are interested, though, if the converse makes sense, i.e., if our cognitive interaction (scientific or otherwise) with the physical world can be helpful (in an explanatory or non-explanatory way) in our efforts to make sense of mathematical facts. My aim in this paper is to try to fill this important lacuna in the recent literature. My answer to the question of this paper is negative. As I will argue, there are serious problems with the main reasons for believing in the first place that it is possible to have physical understanding of mathematical facts.
      PubDate: 2022-06-01
       
  • Frege’s Puzzle and Act-based Propositions

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      Abstract: Abstract I argue that the act-based accounts of propositions, like the one defended by Soames (2015), cannot be used to address Frege’s Puzzle without also giving up the Millian view of names. I begin by identifying two puzzles—both of which have been called Frege’s puzzle—and discuss the act-based theorist’s solution to the first puzzle. I then raise an objection against the solution and argue that it cannot be overcome unless a concession is made. Making the concession, however, would make it impossible for the act-based theorist to solve the second puzzle. I further argue that any attempt to solve the puzzle while also maintaining a commitment to the Millian view will force such theoretical commitments on the act-based theorist which seriously undermine the scope and motivation of the act-based approaches. Thus, any solution to Frege’s puzzle on the act-based account is bound to conflict with the Millian view of names.
      PubDate: 2022-06-01
       
  • Anti-Luminous Mental States: Logical, Psychological and Epistemic Problems

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      Abstract: Abstract In this paper I shall argue that Tim Williamson’s argument for the anti-luminosity of many mental states faces difficult logical, psychological and epistemological problems. From a logical point of view, his argument is correct. However, the contrary argument that says that the anti-luminosity thesis does not necessarily follow from it is also correct. This opens a sceptical scenario. Hence, if Williamson wants to convince us that we should rationally prefer his argument rather than the other, he needs to add considerations that are not merely logical. These are psychological and epistemological in nature. However, none of these considerations is convincing.
      PubDate: 2022-06-01
       
  • A Dilemma for Globalized Safety

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      Abstract: Abstract The safety condition is supposed to be a necessary condition on knowledge which helps to eliminate epistemic luck. It has been argued that the condition should be globalized to a set of propositions rather than the target proposition believed to account for why not all beliefs in necessary truths are safe. A remaining issue is which propositions are relevant when evaluating whether the target belief is safe or not. In the literature, solutions have been proposed to determine the relevance of propositions. This paper examines a case of luckily true belief—thus a case of ignorance—and a case of knowledge. It argues that no solution in the literature offers a correct verdict in either case. Therefore, the strategy to globalize safety remains unsatisfactory.
      PubDate: 2022-06-01
       
  • The Gruesome Truth About Semantic Dispositionalism

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      Abstract: Abstract The resemblance is plain to see between Kripke’s Wittgenstein introducing bizarre rules such as quaddition (in illustrating the sceptical paradox against theories of meaning) and Goodman’s introducing the equally bizarre grue (in generating the new riddle of induction). But the two sorts of bizarre cases also differ in interesting respects. For those familiar with Goodman’s case, this similarity sparks a strong temptation to enlist to the meaning sceptic’s cause key elements of Goodman’s new riddle, which are missing from Kripke’s case. In this essay, I characterize a natural way of doing just this, which targets dispositionalist solutions to the sceptical paradox. I also show that, despite initial appearances, this new objection to dispositionalism (the symmetry problem) is not nearly as worrisome as originally thought. The solution offered on behalf of semantic dispositionalists does require a trade-off, though, from the severe form of indeterminacy advanced by the meaning sceptic to a much milder thesis.
      PubDate: 2022-05-18
       
  • Naïve Realism Face to Face with the Time Lag Argument

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      Abstract: Abstract Naïve realists traditionally reject the time lag argument by replying that we can be in a direct visual perceptual relation to temporally distant facts or objects. I first show that this answer entails that some visual perceptions—i.e., those that are direct relation between us and an external material object that has visually changed, or ceased to exist, during the time lag—should also count as illusions and hallucinations, respectively. I then examine the possible attempts by the naïve realist to tell such perceptions apart from illusions and hallucinations, and after showing the inadequacy of the answers relying on a mere counterfactual or causal criterion, I explain why the problem is solved by introducing a view of visual perception as temporally extended into the past of objects and, in particular, as consisting in the whole causal chain of events or states of affairs going from external material object x to subject S. But this solution is not immune from defects for the naïve realist. I show that this view of perception raises a number of significant concerns, hence leaving the issue of the time lag problem still open for naïve realism.
      PubDate: 2022-04-22
       
  • Bradley’s Relation Regress and the Inadequacy of the Relata-Specific
           Answer

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      Abstract: Abstract F. H. Bradley’s relation regress poses a difficult problem for metaphysics of relations. In this paper, we reconstruct this regress argument systematically and make its presuppositions explicit in order to see where the possibility of its solution or resolution lies. We show that it cannot be answered by claiming that it is not vicious. Neither is one of the most promising resolutions, the relata-specific answer adequate in its present form. It attempts to explain adherence (relating), which is a crucial component of the explanandum of Bradley’s relation regress, in terms of specific adherence of a relational trope to its relata. Nevertheless, since we do not know the consequences and constituents of a trope adhering to its specific relata, it remains unclear what specific adherence is. It is left as a constitutively inexplicable primitive. The relata-specific answer only asserts against Bradley. This negative conclusion highlights the need for a metaphysical account of the constitution of  the holding of adherence.
      PubDate: 2022-04-15
       
  • Musical Types and Musical Flexibility

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      Abstract: Abstract A central motivation for the type-token model of music works is its ability to explain musical multiplicity—the fact that musical works are capable of having multiple performances through which they can be experienced and which cannot be individually identified with the works themselves. The type-token model explains multiplicity by identifying musical works with structural types and taking performances to be tokens of those types. In this paper, I argue that musical works are flexible in ways which permit performances which are tokens of distinct structural types to be performances of the same musical work. And I argue that various attempts to reconcile the type-token model with musical flexibility are ultimately unsuccessful.
      PubDate: 2022-04-14
       
  • The Putnam-Goodman-Kripke Paradox

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      Abstract: Abstract The extensions of Goodman’s ‘grue’ predicate and Kripke’s ‘quus’ are constructed from the extensions of more familiar terms via a reinterpretation that permutes assignments of reference. Since this manoeuvre is at the heart of Putnam’s model-theoretic and permutation arguments against metaphysical realism (‘Putnam’s Paradox’), both Goodman’s New Riddle of Induction and the paradox about meaning that Kripke attributes to Wittgenstein are instances of Putnam’s. Evidence cannot selectively confirm the green-hypothesis and disconfirm the grue-hypothesis, because the theory of which the green-hypothesis is a part has an unintended model in which the grue-hypothesis is equally confirmed; and there are no meaning-facts that determine reference, because the objects referred to by the referring terms of any language or set of intentional mental states are permutable in a way that is consistent with the truth-values of all other sentences in that language or beliefs in that set. The upshot is that the three paradoxes need to be solved in a unified way.
      PubDate: 2022-03-24
       
  • Correction to: Epistemic Luck and Knowledge

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      PubDate: 2022-03-12
      DOI: 10.1007/s12136-022-00514-3
       
  • Relationism and the Problem of Order

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      Abstract: Abstract Relationism holds that objects entirely depend on relations or that they must be eliminated in favour of the latter. In this article, I raise a problem for relationism. I argue that relationism cannot account for the order in which non-symmetrical relations apply to their relata. In Section 1, I introduce some concepts in the ontology of relations and define relationism. In Section 2, I present the Problem of Order for non-symmetrical relations, after distinguishing it from the Problem of Differential Application. I also examine four main existing strategies to solve it. In Section 3, I develop my argument. The first step consists in arguing that—among those strategies—relationism can only accept directionalism. The second step consists in arguing that directionalism is affected by a serious problem: the Problem of Converses. I also show that relationists who embrace directionalism cannot solve this problem. In Section 4, I introduce and rebut several strategies on behalf of relationists to cope with my argument. In Section 5, I briefly draw some conclusions.
      PubDate: 2022-03-11
      DOI: 10.1007/s12136-022-00513-4
       
  • Why Contingentist Actualists Should Endorse the Barcan Formula

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      Abstract: Abstract On its usual interpretation, the Barcan Formula—◊∃xB → ∃x◊B—says that, if there could have been something that is such and such a way, then there is something that could have been that way. It is traditionally held that contingentist actualists should—indeed, must—reject the Barcan Formula. I argue that contingentist actualists should—indeed, must—endorse the Barcan Formula, at least assuming a standard, Tarskian conception of truth and truth preservation. I end by proposing a logic for contingentist actualists that validates the Barcan Formula. This logic has the surprising feature of also validating the Converse Barcan Formula, □∀xB → ∀x□B, while still invalidating related formulas—such as □∀x□∃y x = y (NNE)—that contingentist actualists should reject. It does this by employing models with fixed domains but assignments to the identity predicate that vary across worlds.
      PubDate: 2022-03-10
      DOI: 10.1007/s12136-022-00508-1
       
  • Evidence, Epistemic Luck, Reliability, and Knowledge

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      Abstract: Abstract In this article, I develop and defend a version of reliabilism – internal reasons reliabilism – that resolves the paradox of epistemic luck, solves the Gettier problem by ruling out veritic luck, is immune to the generality problem, resolves the internalism/externalism controversy, and preserves epistemic closure.
      PubDate: 2022-03-01
       
  • Epistemic Luck and Knowledge

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      PubDate: 2022-02-08
      DOI: 10.1007/s12136-022-00510-7
       
 
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