JournalTOCs

Experimental Economics
Journal Prestige (SJR): 2.276

Citation Impact (citeScore): 2
Number of Followers: 23

Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles)
ISSN (Print) 1573-6938 - ISSN (Online) 1386-4157
Published by Springer-Verlag

[2469 journals]

Capital structure irrelevance in the laboratory: an experiment with
complete and asymmetric information
- Free pre-print version: Loading...
  Rate this result: What is this?
  
  Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating.
  A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
  
  Abstract: Abstract This article presents a laboratory experiment about capital structure irrelevance. The equity and debt issued by a firm are traded in two double-auction markets. In the Public treatment a signal carrying information about the firm’s value is known to all traders, while in the Private treatment, it is only disclosed to some randomly chosen participants. In treatment Public the conditions for capital structure irrelevance hold. The experimental results support the irrelevance of the capital structure but reject the rational expectations (risk-neutral) valuation. Treatment effects are significant and information is more efficiently embedded in prices in the Public treatment. The results from treatment Private on prices support the prior information over the rational expectations equilibrium. The analysis of the final portfolios of informed and uninformed participants suggests incomplete adjustment towards the prior information equilibrium predicted holdings.
  PubDate: 2022-05-10
COVID-19 and pro-sociality: How do donors respond to local pandemic
severity, increased salience, and media coverage'
- Free pre-print version: Loading...
  Rate this result: What is this?
  
  Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating.
  A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
  
  Abstract: Abstract Has the COVID-19 pandemic affected pro-sociality among individuals' After the onset of the pandemic, many charitable appeals were updated to include a reference to COVID-19. Did donors increase their giving in response to such changes' In order to answer these questions, we conducted a real-donation online experiment with more than 4200 participants from 149 local areas in England and over 21 weeks. First, we varied the fundraising appeal to either include or exclude a reference to COVID-19. We found that including the reference to COVID-19 in the appeal increased donations. Second, in a natural experiment-like approach, we studied how the relative local severity of the pandemic and media coverage about local COVID-19 severity affected giving in our experiment. We found that both higher local severity and more related articles increased giving of participants in the respective areas. This holds for different specifications, including specifications with location fixed effects, time fixed effects, a broad set of individual characteristics to account for a potentially changing composition of the sample over time and to account for health- and work-related experiences with and expectations regarding the pandemic. While negative experiences with COVID-19 correlate negatively with giving, both approaches led us to conclude that the pure effect of increased salience of the pandemic on pro-sociality is positive. Despite the shift in public attention toward the domestic fight against the pandemic and away from developing countries’ challenges, we found that preferences did not shift toward giving more to a national project and less to developing countries.
  PubDate: 2022-04-22
A reassessment of the potential for loss-framed incentive contracts to
increase productivity: a meta-analysis and a real-effort experiment
- Free pre-print version: Loading...
  Rate this result: What is this?
  
  Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating.
  A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
  
  Abstract: Abstract Substantial productivity increases have been reported when incentives are framed as losses rather than gains. Loss-framed contracts have also been reported to be preferred by workers. The results from our meta-analysis and real-effort experiment challenge these claims. The meta-analysis’ summary effect size of loss framing is a 0.16 SD increase in productivity. Whereas the summary effect size in laboratory experiments is a 0.33 SD, the summary effect size from field experiments is 0.02 SD. We detect evidence of publication biases among laboratory experiments. In a new laboratory experiment that addresses prior design weaknesses, we estimate an effect size of 0.12 SD. This result, in combination with the meta-analysis, suggests that the difference between the effect size estimates in laboratory and field experiments does not stem from the limited external validity of laboratory experiments, but may instead stem from a mix of underpowered laboratory designs and publication biases. Moreover, in our experiment, most workers preferred the gain-framed contract and the increase in average productivity is only detectable in the subgroup of workers (~ 20%) who preferred the loss-framed contracts. Based on the results from our experiment and meta-analysis, we believe that behavioral scientists should better assess preferences for loss-framed contracts and the magnitude of their effects on productivity before advocating for greater use of such contracts among private and public sector actors.
  PubDate: 2022-04-21
Ambiguity and enforcement
- Free pre-print version: Loading...
  Rate this result: What is this?
  
  Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating.
  A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
  
  Abstract: Abstract Law enforcement officials face numerous decisions regarding their enforcement choices. One important decision, that is often controversial, is the amount of knowledge that law enforcement distributes to the community regarding their policing strategies. Assuming the goal is to minimize criminal activity (alternatively, maximize citation rates), our theoretical analysis suggests that agencies should reveal (shroud) their resource allocation if criminals are uncertainty seeking, and shroud (reveal) their allocation if criminals are uncertainty averse. We run a laboratory experiment to test our theoretical framework, and find that enforcement behavior is approximately optimal given the observed non-expected utility uncertainty preferences of criminals.
  PubDate: 2022-04-20
The Influence of Indirect Democracy and Leadership Choice on Cooperation
- Free pre-print version: Loading...
  Rate this result: What is this?
  
  Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating.
  A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
  
  Abstract: Abstract The paper examines whether an institution has a differing impact on cooperation if it is introduced by a representative of the affected subjects rather than exogenously imposed. The experimental design controls for selection effects arising from the endogenous policy choice. The treatment varies whether the decision-maker is elected or randomly appointed. There is evidence of a large democracy premium in the sense that endogenously chosen institutions lead to more cooperation than identical exogenous institutions, but only if the group leader is democratically chosen. Especially the subjects who initially did not prefer the policy are more likely to cooperate if it was brought about by an elected representative. There is no democracy premium for randomly appointed group leaders.
  PubDate: 2022-04-15
Behavioral welfare economics and risk preferences: a Bayesian approach
- Free pre-print version: Loading...
  Rate this result: What is this?
  
  Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating.
  A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
  
  Abstract: Abstract We propose the use of Bayesian estimation of risk preferences of individuals for applications of behavioral welfare economics to evaluate observed choices that involve risk. Bayesian estimation provides more systematic control of the use of informative priors over inferences about risk preferences for each individual in a sample. We demonstrate that these methods make a difference to the rigorous normative evaluation of decisions in a case study of insurance purchases. We also show that hierarchical Bayesian methods can be used to infer welfare reliably and efficiently even with significantly reduced demands on the number of choices that each subject has to make. Finally, we illustrate the natural use of Bayesian methods in the adaptive evaluation of welfare.
  PubDate: 2022-04-15
Obviousness around the clock
- Free pre-print version: Loading...
  Rate this result: What is this?
  
  Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating.
  A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
  
  Abstract: Abstract Li (Am Econ Rev 107(11):3257–3287, 2017) introduces a theoretical notion of obviousness of a dominant strategy, to be used as a refinement in mechanism design. This notion is supported by experimental evidence that bidding is closer to dominance in the dynamic ascending-clock auction than the static second-price auction (private values), noting that dominance is theoretically obvious in the former but not the latter. We replicate his experimental study and add three intermediate auction formats that decompose the designs’ differences to quantify the cumulative effects of (1) simply seeing an ascending-price clock (after bid submission), (2) bidding dynamically on the clock, and (3) getting (theoretically irrelevant) drop-out information about other bidders. The theory predicts dominance to become obvious through (2), dynamic bidding. We find no significant behavioral effect of (2), however, while the feedback effects (1) and (3) are highly significant. We conclude that behavioral differences between second-price and ascending-clock auctions offer rather limited support for the theory of obviousness and that framing has surprisingly large potential in mechanism design.
  PubDate: 2022-04-01
Investigating the failure to best respond in experimental games
- Free pre-print version: Loading...
  Rate this result: What is this?
  
  Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating.
  A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
  
  Abstract: Abstract We examine strategic sophistication using eight two-person 3 × 3 one-shot games. To facilitate strategic thinking, we design a ‘structured’ environment where subjects first assign subjective values to the payoff pairs and state their beliefs about their counterparts’ probable strategies, before selecting their own strategies in light of those deliberations. Our results show that a majority of strategy choices are inconsistent with the equilibrium prediction, and that only just over half of strategy choices constitute best responses to subjects’ stated beliefs. Allowing for other-regarding considerations increases best responding significantly, but the increase is rather small. We further compare patterns of strategies with those made in an ‘unstructured’ environment in which subjects are not specifically directed to think strategically. Our data suggest that structuring the pre-decision deliberation process does not affect strategic sophistication.
  PubDate: 2022-04-01
Subsidizing unit donations: matches, rebates, and discounts compared
- Free pre-print version: Loading...
  Rate this result: What is this?
  
  Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating.
  A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
  
  Abstract: Abstract An influential result in the literature on charitable giving is that matching subsidies dominate rebate subsidies in raising funds. We investigate whether this result extends to “unit donation” schemes, a popular alternative form of soliciting donations. There, the donors’ choices are over the number of units of a charitable good to fund at a given unit price, rather than the amount of money to give. Comparing matches and rebates as well as simple discounts on the unit price, we find no evidence of dominance in our online experiment: the three subsidy types are equally effective overall. At a more disaggregated level, rebates lead to a higher likelihood of giving, while matching and discount subsidies lead to larger donations by donors. This suggests that charities using a unit donation scheme enjoy additional degrees of freedom in choosing a subsidy type. Rebates merit additional consideration if the primary goal is to attract donors.
  PubDate: 2022-04-01
Magnitude effect in intertemporal allocation tasks
- Free pre-print version: Loading...
  Rate this result: What is this?
  
  Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating.
  A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
  
  Abstract: Abstract Intertemporal choices are affected by both discount rate and utility curvature. We investigate how the two aspects of time preference are affected by the size of the total budget using an intertemporal allocation task. At the aggregate level as well as at the individual level, we find magnitude effects both on the discount rate and on intertemporal substitutability (i.e., utility curvature). Individuals are more patient when dealing with larger budgets and also regard larger budgets to be more fungible. The latter effect suggests that the degree of asset integration is increasing in the stake.
  PubDate: 2022-04-01
Externalities in knowledge production: evidence from a randomized field
experiment
- Free pre-print version: Loading...
  Rate this result: What is this?
  
  Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating.
  A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
  
  Abstract: Abstract Are there positive or negative externalities in knowledge production' We analyze whether current contributions to knowledge production increase or decrease the future growth of knowledge. To assess this, we use a randomized field experiment that added content to some pages in Wikipedia while leaving similar pages unchanged. We compare subsequent content growth over the next 4 years between the treatment and control groups. Our estimates allow us to rule out effects on 4-year growth of content length larger than twelve percent. We can also rule out effects on 4-year growth of content quality larger than four points, which is less than one-fifth of the size of the treatment itself. The treatment increased editing activity in the first 2 years, but most of these edits only modified the text added by the treatment. Our results have implications for information seeding and incentivizing contributions. They imply that additional content may inspire future contributions in the short- and medium-term but do not generate large externalities in the long term.
  PubDate: 2022-04-01
Voluntary redistribution mechanism in asymmetric coordination games
- Free pre-print version: Loading...
  Rate this result: What is this?
  
  Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating.
  A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
  
  Abstract: Abstract An inequality game is an asymmetric 2 × 2 coordination game in which player 1 earns a substantially higher payoff than player 2 except in the inefficient Nash equilibrium (NE). The two players may have either common or conflicting interests over the two NE. This paper studies a redistribution scheme which allows the players to voluntarily transfer their payoffs after the play of an inequality game. We find that the redistribution scheme induces positive transfer from player 1 to player 2 in both common- and conflicting- interest games, and is particularly effective in increasing efficient coordination and reducing coordination failures in conflicting-interest games. We explain these findings by considering reciprocity by player 1 in response to the sacrifice made by player 2 in achieving efficient coordination in conflicting-interest games.
  PubDate: 2022-04-01
Health workers’ behavior, patient reporting and reputational concerns:
lab-in-the-field experimental evidence from Kenya
- Free pre-print version: Loading...
  Rate this result: What is this?
  
  Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating.
  A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
  
  Abstract: Abstract We examine the effectiveness of accountability systems that rely on patient reporting in Kenyan health clinics. Patients and health care providers from public and private health clinics participate in a lab-in-the field experiment focusing on the relationship of trust between patient and provider. Patients decide whether to trust providers, providers have discretion over their reciprocity, and patients can complain. We compare the effectiveness of: (1) a client reporting system where patients’ complaints are disclosed to the providers’ professional peers, possibly leading to non-monetary penalties, (2) a system where complaints lead to monetary penalties, and (3) a system that, like a standard complaint box, attaches no tangible consequences to complaints. Overall, our findings suggest that citizen reporting systems that leverage peer pressure and reputational concerns can improve service delivery.
  PubDate: 2022-04-01
What is considered deception in experimental economics'
- Free pre-print version: Loading...
  Rate this result: What is this?
  
  Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating.
  A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
  
  Abstract: Abstract In experimental economics there is a norm against using deception. But precisely what constitutes deception is unclear. While there is a consensus view that providing false information is not permitted, there are also “gray areas” with respect to practices that omit information or are misleading without an explicit lie being told. In this paper, we report the results of a large survey among experimental economists and students concerning various specific gray areas. We find that there is substantial heterogeneity across respondent choices. The data indicate a perception that costs and benefits matter, so that such practices might in fact be appropriate when the topic is important and there is no other way to gather data. Compared to researchers, students have different attitudes about some of the methods in the specific scenarios that we ask about. Few students express awareness of the no-deception policy at their schools. We also briefly discuss some potential alternatives to “gray-area” deception, primarily based on suggestions offered by respondents.
  PubDate: 2022-04-01
Deliberative structures and their impact on voting under economic conflict
- Free pre-print version: Loading...
  Rate this result: What is this?
  
  Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating.
  A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
  
  Abstract: Abstract We conduct a laboratory experiment to investigate how different deliberative structures of varying inclusiveness affect collective decisions in the presence of economic conflict. An electorate consists of two groups, one informed and one uninformed about an uncertain state of the economy. This state affects payoffs differently for the two groups. We study three deliberative structures that vary in how the uninformed are included in pre-vote communication. Compared with a setting without any communication, we find that communication in all three deliberation treatments leads to more frequent votes for the efficient policies. The most inclusive deliberative structure motivates more truthfulness, more trust, more cooperativeness (i.e. refraining from protest votes), and more votes for the efficient policies, than the least inclusive structure. However, comparison among the deliberation treatments reveals that the most inclusive deliberative structure is not the one that generates the highest degree of truthfulness. The dynamics of communication lead to a general deterioration of truth-telling and cooperativeness, reinforced by the use of disrespectful and uncooperative language.
  PubDate: 2022-04-01
By chance or by choice' Biased attribution of others’ outcomes when
social preferences matter
- Free pre-print version: Loading...
  Rate this result: What is this?
  
  Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating.
  A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
  
  Abstract: Abstract Decision makers in positions of power often make unobserved choices under risk and uncertainty. In many cases, they face a trade-off between maximizing their own payoff and those of other individuals. What inferences are made in such instances about their choices when only outcomes are observable' We conduct two experiments that investigate whether outcomes are attributed to luck or choices. Decision makers choose between two investment options, where the more costly option has a higher chance of delivering a good outcome (that is, a higher payoff) for the group. We show that attribution biases exist in the evaluation of good outcomes. On average, good outcomes of decision makers are attributed more to luck as compared to bad outcomes. This asymmetry implies that decision makers get too little credit for their successes. The biases are exhibited by those individuals who make or would make the less prosocial choice for the group as decision makers, suggesting that a consensus effect may be shaping both the belief formation and updating processes.
  PubDate: 2022-04-01
Flip a coin or vote' An experiment on the implementation and
efficiency of social choice mechanisms
- Free pre-print version: Loading...
  Rate this result: What is this?
  
  Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating.
  A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
  
  Abstract: Abstract Corporate boards, experts panels, parliaments, cabinets, and even nations all take important decisions as a group. Selecting an efficient decision rule to aggregate individual opinions is paramount to the decision quality of these groups. In our experiment we measure revealed preferences over and efficiency of several important decision rules. Our results show that: (1) the efficiency of the theoretically optimal rule is not as robust as simple majority voting, and efficiency rankings in the lab can differ from theory; (2) participation constraints often hinder implementation of more efficient mechanisms; (3) these constraints are relaxed if the less efficient mechanism is risky; (4) participation preferences appear to be driven by realized rather than theoretic payoffs of the decision rules. These findings highlight the difficulty of relying on theory alone to predict what mechanism is better and acceptable to the participants in practice.
  PubDate: 2022-04-01
Cognitive heterogeneity and complex belief elicitation
- Free pre-print version: Loading...
  Rate this result: What is this?
  
  Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating.
  A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
  
  Abstract: Abstract The Stochastic Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (SBDM) mechanism is a theoretically elegant way of eliciting incentive-compatible beliefs under a variety of risk preferences. However, the mechanism is complex and there is concern that some participants may misunderstand its incentive properties. We use a two-part design to evaluate the relationship between participants’ probabilistic reasoning skills, task complexity, and belief elicitation. We first identify participants whose decision-making is consistent and inconsistent with probabilistic reasoning using a task in which non-Bayesian modes of decision-making lead to violations of stochastic dominance. We then elicit participants’ beliefs in both easy and hard decision problems. Relative to Introspection, there is less variation in belief errors between easy and hard problems in the SBDM mechanism. However, there is a greater difference in belief errors between consistent and inconsistent participants. These results suggest that while the SBDM mechanism encourages individuals to think more carefully about beliefs, it is more sensitive to heterogeneity in probabilistic reasoning. In a follow-up experiment, we also identify participants with high and low fluid intelligence with a Raven task, and high and low proclivities for cognitive effort using an extended Cognitive Reflection Test. Although performance on these tasks strongly predict errors in both the SBDM mechanism and Introspection, there is no significant interaction effect between the elicitation mechanism and either ability or effort. Our results suggest that mechanism complexity is an important consideration when using elicitation mechanisms, and that participants’ probabilistic reasoning is an important consideration when interpreting elicited beliefs.
  PubDate: 2022-04-01
Framing effects on risk-taking behavior: evidence from a field experiment
in multiple choice tests
- Free pre-print version: Loading...
  Rate this result: What is this?
  
  Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating.
  A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
  
  Abstract: Abstract We exploit testing data to gain better understanding on framing effects on decision-making and performance under risk. In a randomized field experiment, we modified the framing of scoring rules for penalized multiple-choice tests. In penalized multiple-choice tests, right answers are typically framed as gains while wrong answers are framed as losses (Mixed-framing). In the Loss-framing proposed, both non-responses and wrong answers are presented in a loss domain. According to our theoretical model, we expect the change in the framing to decrease students’ non-response and to increase students’ performance. Under the Loss-framing, students’ non-response reduces by a 18%-20%. However, it fails to increase students’ scores. Indeed, our results support the possibility of impaired performance in the Loss-framing.
  PubDate: 2022-03-26
Revealing good deeds: disclosure of social responsibility in competitive
markets
- Free pre-print version: Loading...
  Rate this result: What is this?
  
  Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating.
  A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
  
  Abstract: Abstract We experimentally study competitive markets with socially responsible production. Our main focus is on the producers’ decision whether or not to reveal the degree of social responsibility of their product. Compared to two benchmark cases where either full transparency is enforced or no disclosure is possible, we show that voluntary and costless disclosure comes close to the full transparency benchmark. However, when the informational content of disclosure is imperfect, social responsibility in the market is significantly lower than under full transparency. Our results highlight an important role for transparent and standardized information about social externalities.
  PubDate: 2022-03-23