Authors:Philip Hackney Pages: 130 - 186 Abstract: Critics are increasingly calling for Congress to remove charity regulation from the IRS. The critics are wrong. Congress should maintain charity regulation in the IRS. What is at stake is balancing power between the state, charity as civil society, and the economic order. In a well-balanced democracy, civil society maintains its independence from the state and the economic order. Removing charitable jurisdiction from the IRS would blind the IRS to dollars placed in the charitable sector increasing tax and political shelters and wealthy dominance of charities as civil society. A new agency without understanding of, or jurisdiction over, tax cannot act as the bulwark as can the IRS. The critics are right that both the states and the IRS are failing at charitable regulation. Ideally, Congress would allocate sufficient resources to the IRS. However, the long history of charity regulation shows that they are unwilling to allocate the resources to this endeavor. This, in fact, is a flaw of the proposals for a quasi-federal charitable regulatory agency. These proposals will not generate new funds but will instead spread scarce resources even thinner. Instead, Congress should acknowledge its unwillingness to adequately fund charity regulation and shrink the tax-exempt sector by removing the parts that have limited justification for charitable benefits, such as hospitals and private foundations. PubDate: 2024-05-22 DOI: 10.52214/cjtl.v15i2.12713 Issue No:Vol. 15, No. 2 (2024)
Authors:Leopoldo Parada Pages: 187 - 211 Abstract: The world has seemingly embraced the altruistic idea of ensuring a minimum level of corporate income taxation worldwide, consolidating a “benefits for all” narrative by which both developed and developing countries apparently gain. However, this altruistic narrative proves to be quite unrealistic for many developing countries. As argued in this article, the perceived benefits of a global minimum corporate income tax in developing countries rest exclusively upon three unconvincing premises. These include the assumption that all corporate income tax incentives provided by developing countries are equally inefficient, the idea that all developing countries can seamlessly transition from corporate income tax competition to alternative forms of tax and non-tax competition, and most notably, the notion that supporting or opposing a global minimum corporate income tax could either boost or diminish tax revenue for developing countries. This article urges a departure from these premises and elaborates upon three strategic recommendations for developing countries, which include: first, viewing a global minimum corporate income tax as a concept divorced from the assumption of revenue gain or loss; second, using the global minimum corporate income tax as an opportunity to reassess their tax and non-tax incentives, encompassing alternative competitive strategies; and third, striving for simplicity and ease of administration in designing and implementing a minimum tax approach. In doing so, developing countries could perhaps find an opportunity to refine their general action plan to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) more effectively while they still try to ride the wave of minimum global corporate income taxation that the world seems to be in. PubDate: 2024-05-22 DOI: 10.52214/cjtl.v15i2.12714 Issue No:Vol. 15, No. 2 (2024)
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