Authors:Maria Tysiachniouk, Laura Henry, Leah Horowitz Pages: 1 - 31 Abstract: This paper examines how a transnational corporation (TNC) translates global standards and corporate policies into programs at sites of extraction. We explore this question through a comparative analysis of ExxonMobil’s operations in two different politico-economic contexts: the Sakhalin-1 project in Russia and the Point Thomson project on the North Slope of Alaska, with field work on Sakhalin Island in 2013–2015 and in Alaska in 2015–2018. Theoretically, we use the Deleuzian concept of “diagram” as a lens through which to examine corporate policies, and a governance generating network (GGN) approach to analyze similarities and differences in benefit-sharing programs in both localities. We show that while global commitments and corporate principles contribute to a standardized approach to community engagement, Indigenous movements and associations, the government, and other corporate actors may play important roles in influencing how corporate policies and global standards are implemented at sites of extraction. Moreover, adaptation of community engagement, benefit-sharing, and environmental monitoring in one location may shape how the company’s strategies are implemented in other sites of extraction. PubDate: 2022-02-02 DOI: 10.23865/arctic.v13.3549 Issue No:Vol. 13 (2022)
Authors:Njord Wegge, Sigbjørn Halsne Pages: 32 - 33 Abstract: For a long time, the Arctic has been regarded as a stable region with low tension. However, even though low tension prevails, it is a fact that the circumpolar region also encompasses some of the world’s most capable and potent military capabilities. The key role of the Arctic regarding security issues, international relations and geopolitics, is sometimes underplayed or not fully understood. These aspects of security are investigated in this thematic issue of Arctic Review on Law and Politics. PubDate: 2022-03-09 DOI: 10.23865/arctic.v13.3831 Issue No:Vol. 13 (2022)
Authors:Jonas Kjellén Pages: 34 - 52 Abstract: Over the last decade, Russia has considerably ramped up its military presence in the Arctic. This is something that attracted much attention from Western countries, especially against the backdrop of deteriorated relations and general mistrust following the annexation of Crimea in 2014. Current developments are to some extent familiar, as they echo the militarisation of the Arctic during the Cold War and the attendant US-Soviet tensions. Although comparisons with the Soviet Union’s Arctic military posture lie close at hand, we need to analyse Russia’s current military build-up in the Arctic with fresh eyes. Two of the most indicative developments were studied. Firstly, the formation of a single Arctic military command, with its implications for a reassessment of the Arctic strategic direction; secondly, the physical expansion of its Arctic military footprint, which includes both the construction of modern facilities and the increased activity of its armed forces there. In both these developments, the Northern Fleet is taking on a leading role, but the overall military posture relies on other military and civilian actors as well, and is closely related to security concerns of the developing latitudinal axis of the Northern Sea Route, rather than the Cold War longitudinal axis of a massive nuclear weapons exchange. PubDate: 2022-03-09 DOI: 10.23865/arctic.v13.3338 Issue No:Vol. 13 (2022)
Authors:Håkon Lunde Saxi Pages: 53 - 71 Abstract: Since the start of the Ukrainian crisis in 2014, the Nordic states have sought to advance their defence cooperation “beyond peacetime” to also encompass operational military cooperation in crisis and armed conflict. Relations between the two Nordic non-NATO members, Sweden and Finland, have formed a vanguard, encompassing bilateral operational planning beyond peacetime. While no formal security policy guarantees have been exchanged, Sweden and Finland have created strong expectations that they will lend each other support in a crisis. In short, while no formal alliance treaty exists, the two states have nevertheless become closely aligned. In 2020, Sweden and Finland joined NATO member Norway in signalling their intention to strengthen their trilateral defence relationship. The following year, NATO members Norway and Denmark signed a similar agreement with Sweden. The goal of these documents was to coordinate their national operational plans – their “war plans” – and perhaps develop some common operational plans. In this article, it is argued that these agreements fall short of a formal military alliance, but that they represent an alignment policy between the Nordic states. PubDate: 2022-03-09 DOI: 10.23865/arctic.v13.3380 Issue No:Vol. 13 (2022)
Authors:Lon Strauss, Ryan Gordinier, Michael Byrne Pages: 72 - 93 Abstract: The U.S. Department of the Navy released A Strategic Blueprint for the Arctic on 5 January 2021. The Navy is focused on preparing for an Alaskan and “Blue” Arctic. Recognizing the changing landscape of the Arctic, the US Navy seeks to maintain a competitive edge, freedom of the seas, and deterrent effect. For the Marine Corps, both the 2021 document and the previous Advantage at Sea: Prevailing with Integrated All-Domain Naval Power, highlight the Marines’ mission to assist the Navy in sea control and sea denial. These strategic documents reflect the direction both the Navy and Marine Corps are taking to better engage in the Arctic, and, therefore on NATO’s northern flank and elsewhere in the world. The Marine Corps’ new concept for warfighting, represented in The Tentative Manual for Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) presumes that Marines are a “stand-in” force, i.e., they are already in areas within an adversary’s weapon’s engagement zone (WEZ). However, this is not the case on NATO’s northern flank, where Marines conduct training with NATO and under bilateral agreements. In order to better understand how these new concepts and strategic documents influence the USMC’s engagement on NATO’s northern flank, it is important to relate them to the overall strategic context in this region, as well as the possible gaps that exist down to include operational and some tactical levels implications. PubDate: 2022-03-09 DOI: 10.23865/arctic.v13.3381 Issue No:Vol. 13 (2022)
Authors:Njord Wegge Pages: 94 - 113 Abstract: The debate about how to defend NATO’s northern flank is closely connected to geographic particularities, the demanding Arctic climate, as well as to ever-evolving technological developments. This research article aims at investigating the role land power plays in this region, with a special focus on northern Norway. Through investigating how structure and composition of land forces matter at the political-strategic level, as well as the role played by allied land forces in Northern Norway, this article seeks to better connect the ongoing debate about the structure of land forces in northern Norway to the political-strategic level. The article seeks to answer the research question by using historical sources and official military documents, as well as qualitative interviews. PubDate: 2022-03-09 DOI: 10.23865/arctic.v13.3428 Issue No:Vol. 13 (2022)
Authors:Julie Wilhelmsen, Anni Roth Hjermann Pages: 114 - 142 Abstract: How does a security dilemma dynamic between parties deemed not to hold hostile intentions toward each other emerge and escalate' This article investigates Russian official discourse on NATO engagement in Europe post-Crimea (2014), and its impact on security interaction in the Arctic. We also examine how Russia represents NATO intentions and actions in a context seen by Russia as a relation of war. We identify the effect of these changing representations of self and other for the emerging securitization dilemma in relations between Russia and NATO, arguing that they have replaced uncertainty about NATO’s hostile intentions with certainty. Although Russia still articulates the Arctic as a unique cooperative region, there may be little space left for non-conflictual Russian action when encountering NATO in the Arctic. We highlight the agency and importance of evolving political rhetoric in creating a dangerous situation where lethal conflict can occur between parties who do not seek it, and also suggest that adjustments to patterns of official speech could be a tool of mitigation. PubDate: 2022-03-09 DOI: 10.23865/arctic.v13.3378 Issue No:Vol. 13 (2022)
Authors:Ingrid Handeland Pages: 143 - 159 Abstract: Climate change has renewed the debate about shipping in the Arctic due to an expected reduction of ice in these sea lanes. Because of the Arctic slowly opening, allowing for more activity, navigational rights for ships have caught the attention of the world once again, including those of warships. Through analysing the navigational regime for warships in the Northwest and Northeast Passages, this article aims to introduce the different rules for navigation and the consequences for maritime operations in the Arctic, including the right to overflight. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea provides navigational rights for warships and overflight in peace time operations, but the matter of which navigation rules should apply in the passages is under debate. Based on an analysis of the Convention, case law, legal theory and customary law, the article aims to shed light on different interpretations of the legal regimes of navigation in the passages and which rules should apply to warships and overflight in the future. PubDate: 2022-03-09 DOI: 10.23865/arctic.v13.3383 Issue No:Vol. 13 (2022)
Authors:Giuseppe Amatulli Pages: 160 - 170 Abstract: On June 29, 2021, the BC Supreme Court issued the verdict of the Yahey v. British Columbia litigation (S151727). For the first time in Canadian legal history, a First Nation Band (BRFN – BlueBerry River First Nation) sued a provincial Government for the cumulative effects of industrial development intertwined with Treaty 8 infringements. The proceeding lasted for six years (2015–2021), with more than 160 days of trials and dozens of hours of affidavits sworn, and it resulted in a ground-breaking verdict. The Court recognised that in authorising industrial development, the Province had been unable to consider and deal with the cumulative impacts that projects had on the traditional lifestyle of BRFN members, besides breaching its obligation to BRFN under Treaty 8. This comment argues that by recognising that the Province cannot continue to authorise activities that breach Treaty 8 and Section 35 of the 1982 Constitution, the verdict may pave the way to a real implementation of the FPIC (Free, Prior and Informed Consent) in the BC legal framework. The ruling provides that the BC Government and the Band engage in meaningful consultation and negotiation to enforce mechanisms to assess and manage cumulative effects on the BRFN traditional territory. The parties were given six months to negotiate based on the litigation outcomes. On October 7, 2021, a preliminary agreement between the BRFN and the BC Province was signed. Important issues had been addressed throughout the trial. From confidentiality and the duty to consult in good faith to the constitutionality of Court hearing fees and the possibility to obtain other kinds of injunctions until the trial; the outcomes of this litigation may well be considered as a milestone to advance the Canadian legal framework, further recognising essential rights of Canadian Indigenous peoples in terms of Constitutional, social, and environmental justice. PubDate: 2022-03-21 DOI: 10.23865/arctic.v13.3802 Issue No:Vol. 13 (2022)
Authors:Christian Prip Pages: 171 - 190 Abstract: The distribution of legal authority to protect biodiversity in marine areas beyond national jurisdiction (ABNJ) between the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and the UN Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC) has been a contentious issue. In practice, main responsibility has been allocated to LOSC, under which a new implementing agreement on conservation and sustainable use of marine biodiversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction (BBNJ) is currently being negotiated. CBD was allocated responsibility for providing scientific information and advice on marine biodiversity, which has resulted in the identification and description of 321 Ecologically or Biologically Significant Marine Areas (EBSAs) worldwide, within and beyond national jurisdiction. These could provide important scientific backing for a coming BBNJ instrument under LOSC, especially as regards the designation of marine protected areas and the conduct of environmental impact assessments in ABNJ. However, the process of modifying EBSAs and identifying new ones has recently been challenged by the CBD Conference of the Parties, harking back to previous disputes over the legal mandate and thereby threatening the entire mechanism that has been established. In the context of international environmental law and law of the sea, this article discusses the potential importance of EBSAs for the expected BBNJ instrument, using the Central Arctic Ocean EBSA as an example. PubDate: 2022-03-31 DOI: 10.23865/arctic.v13.3635 Issue No:Vol. 13 (2022)
Authors:Mikhail Lysenko, Alexander Vylegzhanin, Oran Young Pages: 191– - 191– Abstract: The Arctic is saturated with nuclear facilities bringing both benefits for regional economic and social development and risks of nuclear and radiological accidents and concerns about radioactive wastes. There is every reason to expect the Arctic will remain a nuclearized region during the foreseeable future. This makes it important to direct attention to issues of nuclear safety and security in the region. We identify several clusters of these issues in the Arctic, including the challenges of potential nuclear accidents, the handling of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste, the cleanup of radiological contaminants, and concerns about nuclear security. An analysis of international conventions and voluntary codes of conduct shows that they are applicable to Arctic nuclear safety and security, but only in general terms. This suggests a need for an Arctic-specific agreement on nuclear and radiological safety, emergency preparedness and response, and cleanup of radiological contaminants. The outbreak of military hostilities in Ukraine in February 2022 has disrupted normal procedures for addressing issues of common concern in the Arctic. But the need for co-operation regarding matters like nuclear safety and security will not go away. Assuming it is possible to devise “necessary modalities” for restarting the work of the Arctic Council following the acute phase of the Ukraine crisis, an Arctic-specific agreement on nuclear safety and security could be developed under the auspices of the Arctic Council, which already has taken an interest in nuclear safety through the activities of its Working Group on Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response. Once such an agreement is in place, it will become important to consider the infrastructure needed to ensure that its provisions are implemented effectively. PubDate: 2022-05-05 DOI: 10.23865/arctic.v13.3820 Issue No:Vol. 13 (2022)
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