Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Authors:Abella; Rosalie Silberman Pages: 305 - 315 Abstract: I graduated from law school in 1970 and I’ve been proud every day since of being a lawyer. My father was a lawyer, as are our two sons, and I’ve always seen lawyers as democracy’s warriors: the people who protect rights and by protecting rights protect justice. You law students are the future democracy warriors—actually, the future of democracy full stop—so this lecture is dedicated to you and to the hope that you will make justice your transcendent preoccupation, no matter what you decide to do with your law degree. You are, after all, in law school where you have a window on what the law says—guided by your professors—and a window on what the law looks like outside the walls of your classrooms—guided by watching the news. PubDate: 2023-08-02 DOI: 10.1017/cjlj.2023.12
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Authors:Barshack; Lior Pages: 317 - 339 Abstract: The essay proposes that children should not participate in custody proceedings because they lack a place in the public world, a concept which was developed by Arendt and which I elaborate on the basis of her writings. Arendt’s concepts of place in the world and of childhood are correlated, polar ethical concepts. ‘Place in the world’ as described by Arendt combines commitment to worldbuilding as a collaborative enterprise, relations of mutual-recognition among equal co-builders of the public world, an inviolable place in public and private realms, and self-disclosure through the staging of public appearances. We should recognize children as rightful participants in divorce proceedings when we are ready to treat them as occupants of place in the world, split between public and private realms and corresponding public and private voices. Recent practices of children’s participation undermine the intimate realm of childhood as well as the public world. PubDate: 2023-01-30 DOI: 10.1017/cjlj.2022.34
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Authors:Graham; Aaron Pages: 341 - 358 Abstract: The Standard Picture holds that the contribution to the law made by an authoritative legal pronouncement is directly explained by the linguistic content of that pronouncement. This essay defends the Standard Picture from Mark Greenberg’s purported counterexamples drawn from patterns of statutory interpretation in U.S. criminal law. Once relevant features of the U.S. rule of recognition are admitted into the analysis—namely, that it arranges sources of law hierarchically, and that judicial decisions are sources of valid law—Greenberg’s counterexamples are revealed as only apparent, not genuine. The legal norms that result from the patterns of interpretation he identifies can be directly explained in terms of the linguistic contents of authoritative pronouncements: judicial decisions. Furthermore, those norms can be understood as modifications of the valid norms contained in their originating statutes because judicial decisions are permitted ‘explanatory intermediaries’ of statutes by the rule of recognition. PubDate: 2023-02-14 DOI: 10.1017/cjlj.2023.3
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Authors:Jiménez; Felipe Pages: 359 - 386 Abstract: This paper makes a conceptual prescription: it argues that judges and lawyers should adopt a positivist concept of law, on normative grounds. The positivist view, I will argue, is more consistent with reasonable disagreement and majority rule than nonpositivist views, offers a better view of law’s moral standing, and is more consistent with what Dworkin called ‘integrity’ than non-positivism. As the paper explains, this is an argument about what I call the ‘operative’ concept of law. As such, the argument avoids potential problems for conceptual prescription, and shows why even those who adopt non-positivist views about the nature of law might accept it. PubDate: 2023-02-15 DOI: 10.1017/cjlj.2022.36
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Authors:Kramer; Matthew H. Pages: 387 - 405 Abstract: This paper first recapitulates the objections by H.L.A. Hart to the ways in which John Austin’s command model of law obfuscated the importance and the very existence of power-conferring laws. Although those objections are familiar in the world of contemporary legal philosophy, their insightfulness is highlighted here because they contrast so sharply with Hart’s own neglect of power-conferring laws at some key junctures in his theorizing. In the second half of this paper, I ponder a few of the junctures where Hart failed to heed the admonitions which he had so deftly leveled against Austin. PubDate: 2023-01-30 DOI: 10.1017/cjlj.2022.32
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Authors:Long; Bernard Pages: 407 - 435 Abstract: Gambling self-exclusion agreements enable a person to have themselves prevented from gambling for some future period. In light of evidence of their effectiveness in helping problem gamblers manage their addiction, these agreements enjoy growing popularity. In particular, several jurisdictions now oblige gambling operators to offer self-exclusion to their clientele. If self-exclusion has a unique value that is distinct from paternalistic measures, such as forced exclusion, it is surely because it prizes the gambler’s autonomy. In this article, however, I will argue that self-exclusion’s theoretical basis cannot, in fact, be found in a procedural theory of autonomy that only regards agents’ own values and decisions. Rather, I will contend that if agents may bind their future selves in only some ways—for example, by preventing themselves from gambling but not preventing themselves from self-excluding or selling themselves into slavery—it can only be because of a normative, substantive claim. PubDate: 2023-01-31 DOI: 10.1017/cjlj.2022.30
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Authors:Newhouse; M. E. Pages: 437 - 462 Abstract: Individuals sometimes do things that they know will violate the terms of a statute. Most scholars deny that such actions are always morally wrong, but a coherent theoretical account of the relationships between 1) moral obligation, 2) legal obligation, and 3) criminal wrongdoing that can robustly classify hard cases has been elusive. This article starts with a Kantian account of the relationship between law and morality, and it proposes two closely related standards: one for legal obligation, and another for criminal wrongdoing. It then tests the plausibility and resilience of these standards by using them to generate illuminating new analyses of classic hypothetical cases involving alleged crimes committed under circumstances of necessity. These analyses offer reason to believe that the standards proposed in this article can anchor a Kantian theory of criminal responsibility that is simultaneously rigorous and humane. PubDate: 2023-02-16 DOI: 10.1017/cjlj.2022.35
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Authors:Schlesinger; Chagai Pages: 463 - 490 Abstract: When evaluating religious accommodation claims, courts refrain from examining the relationship between the specific claim and the common religious practice of the relevant religion. This paper rethinks this doctrine. I argue that it stems from understanding religious accommodation as a protection of conscience. This idea itself suffers from conceptual and practical challenges, which can be mitigated if we understand religion as a communal function of conscientious actions. The communal aspect bears practical and moral significance, and I explore three dimensions of it: the epistemic implications; its effect on constituting moral obligations toward others; and its importance as part of one’s culture. A communal-conscientious approach to religion can mitigate many challenges that confront conscience accommodation. This suggests that the relationship between the individual’s claim and their communal practice is crucial and should be evaluated by courts. I conclude by outlining the main considerations for creating a new, nuanced doctrine. PubDate: 2023-07-18 DOI: 10.1017/cjlj.2023.4
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Authors:Ṣóyẹmí; Ẹniọlá Ànúolúwapọ́ Pages: 491 - 524 Abstract: This article argues that despite its claim to be most concerned with the nature of law in the generality of cases, legal positivism’s almost exclusive focus on Anglo-American law has prevented the tradition from adequately answering the question of law’s authority. This article argues that much positivist analysis either ignores, or takes for granted, the participation of the local population in the historical development of any given society’s law and legal system. This failing means that positivism, and much of analytical jurisprudence, does not provide a truly general, non-circular explanation of authority that accounts as equally for post-colonial legal systems as it does for the Anglo-American systems with which positivism has been most concerned. I argue that the conceptual inadequacies in the explanations of law and legitimate authority offered by those such as H.L.A. Hart and Joseph Raz are most clearly exposed by post-colonial cases, such as Nigeria. PubDate: 2023-05-29 DOI: 10.1017/cjlj.2023.9
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Authors:Swaminathan; Shivprasad Pages: 525 - 551 Abstract: This article outlines two models of constructing contract theory: The impinging model (based on metaethical cognitivism), which gives central place to truth and justification; and the projectivist model (based on metaethical non-cognitivism), which gives central place to attitudes and motivation. It is argued that modern contract theories which typically seek to present the whole body of contract doctrine as deducible from, and morally justifiable by, one or a small number of apex principles, presuppose the impinging model. By contrast, a projectivist approach to theory creation does not purport to offer justificatory apex principles, but rather argues for propositions that are likely to have maximum motivational purchase in the practical reasoning of contract law’s subjects. The article then goes on to point out the theoretical cost of the impinging model and argues that projectivist accounts do a better job of accommodating the internal point of view of contract law’s subjects. PubDate: 2023-01-30 DOI: 10.1017/cjlj.2022.31
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Authors:Simmonds; N. E. Pages: 553 - 574 Abstract: Rights seem to occupy a prominent place within the moral and political lexicon of modernity. But is this truly an age in which the idea of individual rights has flourished' Or might the frequency with which we speak of rights reflect a failure to appreciate the stringent demands that genuine rights would inevitably place upon us' Does our willingness to frame so many moral issues in terms of rights simply illustrate our failure to take the idea of rights seriously' Does our monocular focus upon rights lead us to ignore the broader context of law, virtue, and civility that is necessary if rights are to be a reality' These are the questions forming the background to my discussion in this essay. PubDate: 2023-08-03 DOI: 10.1017/cjlj.2023.14
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