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LAW (843 journals)            First | 1 2 3 4 5     

Showing 801 - 354 of 354 Journals sorted alphabetically
Veredas do Direito : Direito Ambiental e Desenvolvimento Sustentável     Open Access  
Veritas et Justitia     Open Access  
Verstek     Open Access  
Vertentes do Direito     Open Access  
Via Inveniendi Et Iudicandi     Open Access  
Vianna Sapiens     Open Access  
Victoria University of Wellington Law Review     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 10)
Villanova Environmental Law Journal     Open Access  
Villanova Law Review     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Violence Against Women     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 59)
VirtuaJus - Revista de Direito     Open Access  
Vniversitas     Open Access  
Vox Juris     Open Access  
Waikato Law Review: Taumauri     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 7)
Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment     Open Access  
Washington and Lee Law Review     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Washington Law Review     Free   (Followers: 2)
Washington University Global Studies Law Review     Open Access   (Followers: 7)
Washington University Journal of Law & Policy     Open Access  
Washington University Law Review     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Wayne Law Review     Free  
Western Journal of Legal Studies     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Western New England Law Review     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
William & Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
William & Mary Journal of Women and the Law     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
William and Mary Law Review     Open Access   (Followers: 5)
Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice / Recueil annuel de Windsor d'accès à la justice     Open Access  
Wirtschaftsrechtliche Blätter     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Wroclaw Review of Law, Administration & Economics     Open Access  
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities     Open Access   (Followers: 10)
Yale Journal of Law and Technology     Open Access   (Followers: 12)
Yale Journal on Regulation     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 19)
Yale Law Journal     Open Access   (Followers: 62)
Yearbook of European Law     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 19)
Yearbook of International Disaster Law Online     Full-text available via subscription  
Yuridika     Open Access  
Zuzenbidea ikasten : Irakaskuntzarako aldizkaria     Open Access  
交大法學評論     Open Access  

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Yale Journal on Regulation
Number of Followers: 19  
 
  Full-text available via subscription Subscription journal
ISSN (Print) 0741-9457
Published by Yale University Homepage  [7 journals]
  • Coherent Capital Structure Policy: Between Bailouts and the Interest
           Deduction

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      Authors: Jeff Gordon
      Abstract: The Federal Reserve’s recent, unprecedented corporate debt purchases will further reduce the cost of corporate debt relative to equity. Given the already high degree of leverage in the corporate sector, I argue that this is a dangerous policy choice. However, the best solution is not to outlaw the Fed’s crisis actions, but to reform other federal laws that create a debt bias in aggregate. I show how limiting the corporate interest deduction to those firms with a responsible debt-equity ratio would harmonize the goals of tax policy and bailout policy, establishing a coherent “capital structure policy” for the first time.
      PubDate: Wed, 16 Jun 2021 10:44:29 PDT
       
  • The Separation of Voting and Control: The Role of Contract in Corporate
           Governance

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      Authors: Gabriel Rauterberg
      Abstract: The default rules of corporate law make shareholders’ control rights a function of their voting power. Whether a director is elected or a merger is approved depends on how shareholders vote. Yet, in private corporations shareholders routinely alter their rights by contract. This phenomenon of shareholder agreements—contracts among the owners of a firm— has received far less attention than it deserves, mainly because detailed data about the actual contents of shareholder agreements has been lacking. Private companies disclose little, and shareholder agreements are thought to play a trivial or nonexistent role in public companies.
      I show that this is false—fifteen percent of corporations that went public in recent years did so subject to a shareholder agreement. With this dataset in hand, I show the dramatic extent to which these shareholders redefine their control rights by contract. Shareholders restrict the sale of shares and waive aspects of the duty of loyalty. Above all, however, shareholders use their agreements to bargain with each other over votes for directors, and to bargain with the corporation itself for other control rights, such as vetoes over major corporate actions. In essence, while statutory corporate law makes control rights a function of voting power, shareholder agreements make control rights a function of contract instead, separating voting and control.
      PubDate: Wed, 16 Jun 2021 10:44:24 PDT
       
  • Reviewing Administrative Review

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      Authors: David K. Hausman
      Abstract: In the largest system of federal adjudication—Social Security disability adjudication—outcomes depend more on the randomly assigned judge than on the strength of the case. Does the administrative appeals process use resources effectively to reduce that arbitrariness and limit the discretion of administrative law judges' If not, how and why does it fail' These are empirical questions, and this Article uses a new dataset tracking millions of cases to answer them.
      A system of administrative appeals that efficiently limits the discretion of decisionmakers should display three empirical patterns. First, disappointed claimants should be more likely to appeal the decisions of harsher judges—judges who have lower grant rates than their colleagues in the same hearing office (claim selection). Second, when claimants appeal, harsher judges’ decisions should be reversed more often than the decisions of their more generous colleagues (decisionmaking). Third, judges should try to avoid remands and therefore increase their grant rates after a reversal (remand aversion).
      Testing for each of these patterns offers a method of diagnosing problems with systems of administrative review—and helps identify where new resources would be most useful. For example, if litigants rarely appeal decisions of even extreme adjudicators, a quality assurance process might solve the problem by randomly selecting cases for review. If appellate decisionmaking itself is flawed, peer review may be more promising. And if adjudicators are insensitive to remands, training and feedback might be appropriate.
      PubDate: Wed, 16 Jun 2021 10:44:20 PDT
       
  • Collaborative Governance Under the Endangered Species Act: An Empirical
           Analysis of Protective Regulations

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      Authors: Robert L. Fischman et al.
      Abstract: Recent conservation and administrative law scholarship emphasizes the need for potential legal adversaries to work together. Stakeholders and regulators can pool their political capital, money, property, expertise, and legal leverage to achieve more than could be accomplished through mere mechanical implementation of statutory commands. Most commentators associate collaboration with programs promoting fuzzy objectives to engage the public and advisory groups.
      The Endangered Species Act (ESA) is a polarizing statute that imposes seemingly uncompromising mandates. But this Article demonstrates that the ESA actually provides rich opportunities for collaborative governance. In exploring this underappreciated success story, we document how conservation collaboration adapts otherwise strict, generic prohibitions to the recovery needs of individual species on the brink of extinction. We identify conditions under which collaboration arises.
      This Article examines the nearly two hundred ESA protective regulations that tailor federal restrictions to the ecological and social circumstances of particular extinction threats. Our original empirical study explores how the rules manifest collaborative governance, as well as the extent to which they foster imperiled species recovery. We focus on provisions in which parties agree to constrain activities in exchange for limited statutory liability. Almost threequarters of the protective regulations substitute practice-based limitations for difficult-to-detect, proximate-effect prohibitions.
      PubDate: Wed, 16 Jun 2021 10:44:15 PDT
       
  • Footloose with Green Shoes: Can Underwriters Profit from IPO
           Underpricing'

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      Authors: Patrick M. Corrigan
      Abstract: Why are green shoe options used in initial public offerings (IPOs)' And why do underwriters usually short sell an issuer’s stock in connection with its IPO' Are underwriters permitted to profit from these trading positions'
      Scholars have long argued that underwriters use green shoe options together with short sales to facilitate price stabilizing activities, and that U.S. securities laws prohibit underwriters from using green shoe options to profit from IPO underpricing. This Article finds the conventional wisdom lacking. I find that underwriters may permissibly profit from IPO underpricing by pairing purchases under a green shoe option with offshore short sales. I also find that underwriters may permissibly profit from IPO overpricing by short selling the issuer’s stock in the initial distribution.
      The possession of a green shoe option and the ability to short sell IPOs effectively makes underwriters long a straddle at the IPO price. This position creates troubling incentivizes for underwriters to underprice or overprice IPOs, but not to price them accurately.
      This new principal trading theory for green shoe options and underwriter short sales provides novel explanations for systematic IPO mispricing, the explosive initial return variability during the internet bubble, and the observation of “laddering” in severely underpriced IPOs.
      PubDate: Wed, 16 Jun 2021 10:44:10 PDT
       
  • Legal Analysis, Policy Analysis, and the Price of Deference: An Empirical
           Study of Mayo and Chevron

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      Authors: Jonathan H. Choi
      Abstract: A huge literature contemplates the theoretical relationship between judicial deference and agency rulemaking. But relatively little empirical work has studied the actual effect of deference on how agencies draft regulations. As a result, some of the most important questions surrounding deference—whether it encourages agencies to focus on policy analysis instead of legal analysis, its relationship to procedures like notice and comment—have so far been dominated by conjecture and anecdote.
      Because Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. applied simultaneously across agencies, it has been difficult to separate its specific causal effect from other contemporaneous events in the 1980s, like the rise of cost-benefit analysis and the new textualism. This Article contends with this problem by exploiting a unique event in administrative law: the Supreme Court’s 2011 decision in Mayo Foundation v. United States, which required that courts apply Chevron deference to interpretative tax regulations. By altering the deference regime applicable to one specific category of regulation, Mayo created a natural experiment with a treatment group (interpretative tax regulations) and a control group (all other regulations).
      PubDate: Wed, 16 Jun 2021 10:44:05 PDT
       
  • Claim Durability and Bankruptcy’s Tort Problem

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      Authors: Vincent S.J. Buccola et al.
      Abstract: Bankruptcy has a tort problem. Chapter 11 predictably subordinates the claims of tort and other involuntary creditors to those of financial lenders, a fact which encourages firms to rely excessively on secured debt and discount the interests of those they might incidentally harm. For this reason, many scholars have advocated changing repayment priorities to move tort creditors to the front of the line. But despite broad academic support for a new “super priority,” the idea has yet to inspire legislative action.
      This Article proposes an alternative solution rooted in tort claims’ temporal durability. Chapter 11 subordinates tort claims only because of a convention that assets should emerge free-and-clear of prepetition debts if those who control the reorganization so elect. Bankruptcy courts could buck the convention and insist that tort claims follow a debtor’s assets out of Chapter 11 unless a deal otherwise is struck. The theoretical insight motivating our proposal is that durability and priority are close substitutes. In broad strokes, a super-durability norm should produce similar effects to a super-priority rule. In some respects, using durability may in fact be superior. It could avoid the need for costly, inaccurate judicial efforts to estimate the extent of debtors’ tort liability. It could also be implemented by judicial fiat and without new legislation. Whatever one thinks of implementation, taking claim durability seriously as a design variable raises questions—and extends recent debates—about when bankruptcy law needs to crystallize otherwise fluid legal relationships to achieve its ends.
      PubDate: Wed, 16 Jun 2021 10:44:00 PDT
       
  • When and Why Agencies Must Decide for Themselves: Judge Williams’s
           Restrictive Approach to Administrative Subdelegation

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      Authors: Matthew C. Stephenson
      Abstract: Judge Stephen F. Williams, for whom I had the privilege of clerking from 2003-2004, was an extraordinary person: a gentleman, a scholar, a mentor, and a judge’s judge. He was also one of the most important contributors to the development of administrative law doctrine in the last two generations. His opinions were careful, nuanced, and cogent. They were also grounded in strong normative commitments without ever being doctrinaire or rigidly ideological. Whether you agreed or disagreed with Judge Williams’s analysis or conclusions in any given case, reading one of his opinions would enrich your understanding of the issues and clarify your thinking. His body of judicial opinions, together with his scholarly writings, are a rich source of insights. I can think of no more fitting tribute to Judge Williams than this Special Issue’s exploration of his contributions to doctrine and jurisprudence, and I am honored to have been invited to participate.
      PubDate: Fri, 26 Mar 2021 17:48:24 PDT
       
  • Brevity, Speed, and Deference: An Account from the Williams Chambers

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      Authors: David K. Hausman et al.
      Abstract: One of the leading books on administrative law advocates judicial review for “sound governance.”Reviewing the book while sitting on the D.C. Circuit, Judge Williams posited that, even if “judges are smarter than agency heads, or have more time on their hands, or have cleverer clerks,” the proper institutional role requires more deference. Divining “sound governance” is not for courts. The Judge concluded by quoting Milton’s poem about the role of the blind: “They also serve who only stand and waite.”
      PubDate: Fri, 26 Mar 2021 17:48:19 PDT
       
  • The Principled Leadership of Middle Management: Stephen F. Williams’s
           Liberal Critique of Marks

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      Authors: Peter Conti-Brown
      Abstract: Most law students spend their first year—or sometimes much longer—struggling to discern legal rules from judicial opinions. That is true even for relatively straightforward opinions. When they encounter splintered opinions—especially cases where no opinion commands a majority—the exercise becomes more difficult even for the most seasoned lawyer.
      The U.S. Supreme Court, in an effort to add coherence to these not-infrequent instances of judicial disarray, created a rule to guide this process. The so-called Marks rule instructs courts, including the Supreme Court itself, to honor horizontal and vertical stare decisis even in the face of splintered decisions by discerning what proposition, if appropriately narrowed, would have commanded a majority. It is a hypothetical exercise and a controversial one. Legal scholar Richard Re has recently recommended that we cast it aside entirely, a position I embrace below.
      PubDate: Fri, 26 Mar 2021 17:48:15 PDT
       
  • Foreword

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      Authors: David S. Tatel
      Abstract: This special issue reviews the breathtaking scope of Judge Stephen Williams’s work and his profound impact on administrative law. Steve was an extraordinary jurist and a wonderful man. As his colleague and friend, I take great pleasure in sharing some reflections on his life’s work.
      In his thirty-four years on the D.C. Circuit, Steve became one of the nation’s most admired judges. Everyone knew him for his warm collegiality; his precise, gentle questioning at oral argument; his analytical comments at conference; his wise, graceful, witty, and almost always persuasive opinions; and his fierce commitment to the rule of law.
      PubDate: Fri, 26 Mar 2021 17:48:10 PDT
       
  • What Do Lawyers Contribute to Law and Economics'

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      Authors: Robert E. Scott et al.
      Abstract: The law-and-economics movement has transformed the analysis of private law in the United States and, increasingly, around the world. As the field developed from 1970 to the early 2000s, scholars have developed countless insights about the operation and effects of law and legal institutions. Throughout this period, the discipline of law-and-economics has benefited from a partnership among trained economists and academic lawyers. Yet the tools that are used derive primarily from economics and not law. A logical question thus demands attention: what role do academic lawyers play in law-and-economics scholarship' In this Essay, we offer an interpretive theory of the practice of law-and-economics scholarship over the past 50 years that recognizes the distinct methodological tools of the academic lawyer. We claim that, in addition to the legal resources they provide to the economic analyst, academic lawyers have cognizable analytical skills, developed through their involvement in law as an applied discipline and their mastery of the common lawʼs analogical method of argument. We draw on the idea of analogical argument to explain some of the differences in the ways that economists and lawyers analyze some of the building blocks of our economy, including the relationship between formal and informal modes of enforcement and the reasons why inefficient boilerplate terms persist in certain standardized contracts. By enriching the standard economic model with insights from other disciplines and clarifying the connections among these disciplines, the lawyer provides skills that are critically important for advancing normative claims.
      PubDate: Sat, 06 Mar 2021 09:20:19 PST
       
  • Economic Challenges for the Law of Contract

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      Authors: Alan Schwartz et al.
      Abstract: This Essay introduces general equilibrium theory (GET) and mechanism design theory (MD) in a general sense (rather than in piece meal applications) to the study of contract law. As a positive matter, this introduction reveals three understudied areas: (i) when the equilibrium contract is individually rational but collectively irrational; (ii) the role of courts in market completion projects; and (iii) the implementation of renegotiation- proof mechanisms. As a normative matter, incorporating GET and MD insights into the study of contract law supports broad freedom of contract and formalist interpretative practices. Lastly, this Essay points to several areas for future research, highlighting the central role of law and economics analysis in identifying feasible mechanism design programs for contract law.
      PubDate: Sat, 06 Mar 2021 09:20:13 PST
       
  • The Boundaries of Normative Law and Economics

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      Authors: Eric A. Posner
      Abstract: Normative law and economics remains controversial decades after its emergence despite its successes in legal scholarship and its similarity to influential approaches in economics. The reason is that many of its proponents have exaggerated its value for policy while discounting other methods, tainting the enterprise. Normative law and economics as a method of policy analysis properly operates within narrow boundaries defined by its four main premises: (1) welfarism based on unrestricted preferences; (2) unimportance of distributional effects; (3) unimportance of impacts on non-welfare values; and (4) rational instrumental behavior of affected persons. Scholars have made progress in normative law and economics by abstracting away from these premises. The most successful work proposes “modular” insights at a middle level of abstraction. But this work can be properly put to use only if the excluded factors are reintroduced into analysis prior to application.
      PubDate: Sat, 06 Mar 2021 09:20:06 PST
       
  • Transactions Benefits

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      Authors: Daniel Markovits
      Abstract: At least since Ronald Coase, law and economics has been deeply engaged with transactions costs. These frictions can prevent resources from being efficiently deployed in production and goods from reaching their highest-valuing users. The systematic study of how to reduce or minimize transactions costs has yielded explanations, for example, of the boundary between the firm and the market, the allocation of initial entitlements, and the choice between deploying property rule or liability rule remedies when entitlements are breached.However, the inevitable frictions that attend to human affairs can produce gains as well as losses, and law and economics has almost entirely neglected the study of these transactions benefits. At least three varieties of transactions benefits appear immediately once one starts to look for them. Publicity benefits arise when features of one transaction become known and are valuable to other circumstances and perhaps to the legal system at large. One reason to oppose settlement and arbitration, for example, is that even if these forms of dispute resolution involve lower transactions costs than adjudication, they also fail to generate adjudication’s valuable transactions benefits. Legitimacy benefits arise when the frictions involved in legal arrangements transform the beliefs and desires of those who experience them in ways that sustain the authority that the arrangements have over the parties within them. Accounts from social psychology of the authority of adjudication and, more broadly, the role that procedure plays in producing legitimacy emphasize this variety of transaction benefit. Finally, solidarity benefits arise when legal frictions constitute intrinsically valuable relationships among the parties who produce them. Adjudication’s transformative powers and contractual collaboration illustrate this variety of transactions benefit.
      PubDate: Sat, 06 Mar 2021 09:19:59 PST
       
  • The Eventual Decline of Empirical Law and Economics

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      Authors: Saul Levmore
      Abstract: This Essay suggests the necessity of a co-evolutionary process among empirical and theoretical advances in law and economics. Empirical work alone is suggestive, but should not be taken too seriously. The weaknesses in empirical work, and by this I mostly mean regression-based work which has come to dominate law and economics, lead to a kind of virus that begins with over-statements and misapprehensions, and then spreads as more scholars copy the mistakes and engage in empirical work as a means of entry into the field. Regression-based work will become suspect as its current assumptions are questioned, and as replication failures reveal its weaknesses. Empirical work in law and economics looks very different when underlying distributions are not easily probed with regressions but are understood as reflecting power-laws, or as simply random. Once inconvenient distributions are acknowledged, the key question is why observations might be distributed in this fashion. This is likely to be a task for theorists as law and economics enters its next phase. On the other hand, empirical work has been important and has made law and economics a respectable science. The claim here is that good empirical work—especially in law and economics—is hard to produce, and it is important not to overvalue its products. Moreover, it is more useful when combined with good theory.
      PubDate: Sat, 06 Mar 2021 09:19:52 PST
       
  • Remixing Resources

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      Authors: Lee Anne Fennell
      Abstract: This Essay argues for an approach to resource access that connects rather than separates questions of efficiency and distribution. It proceeds from the premise that putting together the most valuable combinations of resources—including human capital—is of central and increasing normative importance. Structuring law to facilitate these combinations should be a primary task for property scholars working in the law and economics tradition. Doing so requires engaging with the processes through which complementary resources produce value in a modern society, recognizing how property doctrines work to put together and keep together complementary resource sets, and confronting the ways in which material inequality and unremediated injustice stand in the way of realizing valuable complementarities. Because a complementarity-based vision of property holds the potential to promote efficiency and distributive goals simultaneously, it illuminates how an integrative approach might offer policy-relevant traction toward both objectives.
      PubDate: Sat, 06 Mar 2021 09:19:45 PST
       
  • Economic Analysis in Law

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      Authors: Hanoch Dagan et al.
      Abstract: This Essay explores the relationship between normative law and economics and legal theory. We claim that legal theory must account for law’s coerciveness, normativity, and institutional structure. Economic analyses that engage these features are an integral part of legal theory, rather than external observations about law from an economic perspective. These analyses, or economic analysis in law, play a crucial role in understanding the law and in developing legal policy arguments. After establishing economic analysis in law’s terminology, this Essay maps out three contributions of economic analysis in law: prescriptive recommendations in areas amenable to preference satisfaction as a normative criterion, analyzing efficiency as one aspect of a broader normative inquiry, and exposing feasibility constraints. Finally, this Essay turns to an exploration of possibilities for extending economic analysis in law beyond its comfort zone. It suggests that economic analysis might expand into areas where values other than preference satisfaction are or ought to be dominant considerations.
      PubDate: Sat, 06 Mar 2021 09:19:39 PST
       
  • The Economics of Class Action Waivers

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      Authors: Albert H. Choi et al.
      Abstract: Many firms require consumers, employees, and suppliers to sign class action waivers as a condition of doing business with the firm, and the U.S. Supreme Court has endorsed companies’ ability to block class actions through mandatory individual arbitration clauses. Are class action waivers serving the interests of society or are they facilitating socially harmful business practices' This paper synthesizes and extends the existing law and economics literature by analyzing the firms’ incentive to impose class action waivers. While in many settings the firms’ incentive to block class actions may be aligned with maximizing social welfare, in many other settings it is not. We examine conditions in which class action waivers can compromise product safety, facilitate anticompetitive conduct, and support harmful employment practices. Our analysis delivers a more nuanced, policy-based critique of the recent U.S. Supreme Court cases, highlights several new unresolved issues, and identifies future challenges for legal scholarship to address.
      PubDate: Sat, 06 Mar 2021 09:19:32 PST
       
  • Willingness to Pay: A Welfarist Reassessment

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      Authors: Oren Bar-Gill
      Abstract: From a welfarist perspective, willingness to pay (WTP) is relevant only as a proxy for individual preferences or utilities. Much of the criticism levied against the WTP criterion can be understood as saying that WTP is a bad proxy for utility, or that WTP contains limited information about preferences. Specifically, critics of WTP claim wealth effects prevent it from serving as a good proxy for utility. I formalize and extend this critique by developing a methodology for quantifying the informational content of WTP.The informational content of WTP depends on how WTP is measured and applied. First, I distinguish between two types of policies: (i) policies that are not paid for by the individuals they affect and (ii) policies that are paid for by the individuals they affect. Second, I distinguish between two types of WTP measures: (i) individualized WTP and (ii) uniform, average WTP (like the value of a statistical life). When the cost of the policy is not borne by the affected individuals, individualized WTP has low informational content and increases wealth disparity. Uniform, average WTP has higher informational content and reduces wealth disparity, at least in the case of universal benefits. Therefore, when possible, a uniform, average WTP should be preferred in this scenario. When the cost of the policy is borne by the affected individuals, individualized WTP has high informational content but increases wealth disparity. Uniform, average WTP has lower informational content and indeterminate distributional implications. Here, the choice between individualized WTP and uniform, average WTP is more difficult.
      PubDate: Sat, 06 Mar 2021 09:19:25 PST
       
 
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