Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles) ISSN (Print) 0144-3593 - ISSN (Online) 1464-3863 Published by Oxford University Press[419 journals]
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Authors:Greenberg D. Abstract: One of the earliest and most basic lessons that a legislative drafter learns is that circularity in a definition must be avoided at all costs because it literally renders the definition meaningless. PubDate: Tue, 01 Feb 2022 00:00:00 GMT DOI: 10.1093/slr/hmac001 Issue No:Vol. 43, No. 1 (2022)
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Authors:Carter R. Pages: 1 - 67 Abstract: AbstractThe paper considers the purposes and evolution of Interpretation Acts, including the following points:• how, as default law, they inform and interact with other legislation;• their scope as, and interaction with other, interpretation law (including links with interpretation legislation in related jurisdictions);• ways they can stop being, or fail to be, great law (that is, law that is accessible, fit for purpose, and constitutionally sound);• ways policy-makers and drafters can meet the challenges (in Te Reo Māori: ngā wero) of making them, and all the other law that interacts with them, great law. PubDate: Wed, 28 Apr 2021 00:00:00 GMT DOI: 10.1093/slr/hmab007 Issue No:Vol. 43, No. 1 (2021)
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Authors:Kohli R. Pages: 68 - 78 Abstract: AbstractUnlike the US First Amendment, Article 19 of the Indian Constitution expressly enumerates eight grounds on which free speech may be restricted. Despite being a fundamental issue of constitutional interpretation, the question of whether Article 19 provides for an exhaustive list of restrictions has largely been neglected in academic literature and Indian jurisprudence. The latest site of contestations on the scope of the free speech clause has been the case of Kaushal Kishor, where the Supreme Court is currently hearing arguments on whether speech can be restricted by invoking fundamental rights beyond Article 19. This Article seeks to develop a principled answer by excavating the meaning of constitutional silences on the relationships between fundamental rights under the Indian Constitution. It argues that a strict textualist approach leads to a distinct form of rights absolutism that is both doctrinally incoherent and inconsistent with Indian jurisprudence. Examining the shift in the Supreme Court’s interpretive outlook from strict textualism to interpretive holism, it finds that the Court’s rich fundamental rights jurisprudence allows importing restrictions on speech from beyond Article 19. Such an approach also provides a meaningful framework for resolving intra-right, inter-right, and right-interest conflicts in the constitutional adjudication of free speech issues. PubDate: Tue, 07 Jul 2020 00:00:00 GMT DOI: 10.1093/slr/hmaa012 Issue No:Vol. 43, No. 1 (2020)
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Authors:Goldsworthy J. Pages: 79 - 102 Abstract: AbstractIn his 2017 Hamlyn Lectures, Professor (now Lord) Burrows set out his opinions about statutory interpretation. Given his recent appointment to the UK Supreme Court, these opinions now have more practical importance than those of most academic theorists. One of his main theses is that the modern approach to statutory interpretation, which focuses on text, context and purpose, should not include any reference to legislative intention. He dismisses this as ‘an unhelpful fiction or mask that should be avoided altogether’. I show that this thesis is mistaken, internally inconsistent, and might in practice undermine sound interpretation based on fundamental constitutional principles. PubDate: Fri, 16 Oct 2020 00:00:00 GMT DOI: 10.1093/slr/hmaa019 Issue No:Vol. 43, No. 1 (2020)
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Authors:Bailey D. Pages: 103 - 108 Abstract: AbstractThis note considers Re: A Company (Injunction to Restrain Presentation of Petition) [2020] EWHC 1406 (Ch) and Travelodge Ltd v. Prime Aesthetics Ltd [2020] EWHC 1217 (Ch) in the context of earlier case law and looks at the circumstances in which the courts have shown a willingness to have regard to the likelihood of future legislation. PubDate: Wed, 05 Aug 2020 00:00:00 GMT DOI: 10.1093/slr/hmaa014 Issue No:Vol. 43, No. 1 (2020)
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Authors:Thakur K; Thakur D. Pages: 109 - 119 Abstract: AbstractWith the passing of the Specific Relief (Amendment) Act, 2018, the primary remedy for breach of contract was changed to specific performance from that of damages. The amendment brought in many other path-breaking changes, along with the introduction of a provision on substituted performance under Indian contract law. Now, a non-defaulting party will have a statutory remedy to either perform the contract himself or get it performed by a third party, the cost of which must be borne by the defaulting party. Despite being a welcomed provision, the faulty legislative drafting of the provision has left many issues unresolved. The authors, in this article, have tried to point out those issues. Thereafter, using the cross-jurisdictional analysis and taking into consideration the jurisprudence developed on past contractual practices, the authors have come up with suggestions to improve the provision. PubDate: Fri, 10 Jan 2020 00:00:00 GMT DOI: 10.1093/slr/hmz028 Issue No:Vol. 43, No. 1 (2020)
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Authors:Mohr T. Pages: 120 - 137 Abstract: AbstractThis article examines the attempts at legislation in Ireland made by an elected assembly known as ‘Dáil Éireann’ in the revolutionary years between 1919 and 1922. These attempts at legislation, popularly known as ‘Dáil decrees’, have not been published or used as sources of law since the foundation of the Irish state on 6 December 1922. This analysis builds on a pioneering article on this subject published in 1975 by Brian Farrell and attempts to provide additional information on the final fate of the Dáil decrees. The conclusion argues that the fate of this legislation was not, as has been suggested, dictated by divisions created by the Irish civil war of 1922–23. Instead, this analysis concludes that the Dáil decrees faced insuperable practical barriers that could not be overcome after the foundation of the state in 1922. PubDate: Fri, 16 Oct 2020 00:00:00 GMT DOI: 10.1093/slr/hmaa015 Issue No:Vol. 43, No. 1 (2020)
Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles)
[419 journals]
