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Showing 1 - 136 of 136 Journals sorted alphabetically
Acta Economica Et Turistica     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Advances in Accounting     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 10)
African Journal of Economic and Sustainable Development     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 17)
Amnis     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Antitrust Bulletin     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8)
Asia and the Global Economy     Open Access  
Asian Journal of Shipping and Logistics     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Botswana Journal of Economics     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Career Development International     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 18)
China Business Review     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
China Economic Quarterly International     Open Access  
Competition and Regulation in Network Industries     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 7)
Critical Perspectives on International Business     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Crossroads     Hybrid Journal  
Digital Finance : Smart Data Analytics, Investment Innovation, and Financial Technology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
East Asian Community Review     Hybrid Journal  
EC Tax Review     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5)
Economic Journal of Emerging Markets     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Economics Research International     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Ekonomia Międzynarodowa     Open Access  
EMAJ : Emerging Markets Journal     Open Access  
Emerging Markets Finance and Trade     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7)
Estudos Internacionais : revista de relações internacionais da PUC Minas     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
European Business Law Review     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 17)
European Company Law     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 11)
European Journal of International Management     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Expert Journal of Business and Management     Open Access  
Foreign Trade Review     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Global & Strategis     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Global Summitry     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Global Trade and Customs Journal     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 6)
Human Resource Development International     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 19)
Human Resource Management International Digest     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 17)
IMF Economic Review     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 44)
IN VIVO     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
Information Resources Management Journal     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 8)
Information Technologies & International Development     Open Access   (Followers: 82)
International Advances in Economic Research     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6)
International Business Review     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9)
International Commerce Review     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
International Economic Journal     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8)
International Economic Review     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 61)
International Economics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
International Economics and Economic Policy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7)
International Entrepreneurship and Management Journal     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8)
International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 14)
International Finance     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 26)
International Insolvency Review     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
International Journal of Applied Behavioral Economics     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 19)
International Journal of Asian Business and Information Management     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
International Journal of Commerce and Management     Hybrid Journal  
International Journal of Export Marketing     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
International Journal of Governance and Financial Intermediation     Hybrid Journal  
International Labor and Working-Class History     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 15)
International Labour Review     Partially Free   (Followers: 60)
International Marketing Review     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 13)
International Public Management Journal     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8)
International Review of Applied Economics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6)
International Review of Economics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
International Review of Economics & Finance     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 28)
International Review of Finance     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9)
International Review of Financial Analysis     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8)
International Review of Law and Economics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 27)
International Review of Retail, Distribution and Consumer Research     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
International Review of Social History     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 32)
International Review on Public and Nonprofit Marketing     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
International Small Business Journal     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 11)
International Studies of Management and Organization     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 8)
International Trade Journal : Western Hemispheric Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
International Transactions In Operational Research     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Intertax     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
Japanese Political Economy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Journal for International Business and Entrepreneurship Development     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8)
Journal of Accounting and Finance in Emerging Economies     Open Access  
Journal of Advanced Research in Economics and International Business     Full-text available via subscription  
Journal of Antitrust Enforcement     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Journal of Chinese Economic and Foreign Trade Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Journal of Chinese Human Resource Management     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Journal of Comparative International Management     Full-text available via subscription  
Journal of Contemporary European Research     Open Access   (Followers: 16)
Journal of Economics and International Finance     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5)
Journal of International Business Policy     Hybrid Journal  
Journal of International Business Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 46)
Journal of International Commerce, Economics and Policy     Hybrid Journal  
Journal of International Consumer Marketing     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9)
Journal of International Development     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 32)
Journal of International Economics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 38)
Journal of International Entrepreneurship     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 10)
Journal of International Financial Management & Accounting     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 19)
Journal of International Food & Agribusiness Marketing     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Journal of International Management     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5)
Journal of International Marketing     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 24)
Journal of International Money and Finance     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 37)
Journal of International Trade & Economic Development: An International and Comparative Review     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 12)
Journal of International Trade Law and Policy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 19)
Journal of Korea Trade     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Journal of Monetary Economics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 95)
Journal of Revenue and Pricing Management     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Journal of Reviews on Global Economics     Open Access  
Journal of the Association for Consumer Research     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 9)
Journal of the Japanese and International Economies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Journal of Theoretical and Applied Electronic Commerce Research     Open Access  
Journal of World Trade     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 19)
Jurnal Hubungan Internasional     Open Access  
Jurnal Ilmu Ekonomi Terapan     Open Access  
L'Année du Maghreb     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Management international / International Management / Gestiòn Internacional     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Management International Review     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7)
MEED Middle East Economic Digest     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Monthly Statistics of International Trade - Statistiques mensuelles du commerce international     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
PharmacoEconomics     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 25)
Proceedings of the International Conference on Business Excellence     Open Access  
Qualitative Research in Financial Markets     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Quarterly Journal of Political Science     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 18)
Regional Formation and Development Studies     Open Access  
Relações Internacionais (R:I)     Open Access  
Research World     Hybrid Journal  
Review of International Economics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 14)
Review of International Political Economy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 40)
Revista Brasileira de Gestão de Negócios     Open Access  
Revista Multiface Online     Open Access  
Revue internationale de l'économie sociale     Full-text available via subscription  
Revue Internationale du Travail     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Revue internationale P.M.E. : économie et gestion de la petite et moyenne entreprise     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
South African Journal of International Affairs     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6)
South American Development Society Journal     Open Access  
Studies in Comparative International Development     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 16)
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
TDM Transnational Dispute Management Journal     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5)
Transnational Corporations Review     Hybrid Journal  
World Competition     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 9)
World Food Policy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
World Oil Trade     Hybrid Journal  
World Trade and Arbitration Materials     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 8)

           

Similar Journals
Journal Cover
Antitrust Bulletin
Number of Followers: 8  
 
  Hybrid Journal Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles)
ISSN (Print) 0003-603X - ISSN (Online) 1930-7969
Published by Sage Publications Homepage  [1174 journals]
  • Platform and Device Neutrality Regime: The New Competition Rulebook for
           App Stores'

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      Authors: Oscar Borgogno, Giuseppe Colangelo
      Abstract: The Antitrust Bulletin, Ahead of Print.
      Among the numerous legislative initiatives implemented around the globe on digital platforms, some of these provisions are explicitly directed toward app stores. As they have all the distinctive features of multi-sided markets, app store owners represent the prototype of digital gatekeepers, controlling access to mobile ecosystems and competing with business users operating on the platforms. In light of the rule-setting and dual role of these gateway players, regulatory interventions are required in order to ensure that large app stores are treated like common carriers or public utilities, thereby imposing upon them a neutrality regime vis-à-vis new entrants. For the very same reasons, dominant app store providers have been subject to an increasing number of antitrust investigations attempting to ensure equal treatment and to avoid self-preferencing at the expense of rivals’ services. Against this background, the article investigates whether antitrust provisions are flexible enough to curb anticompetitive practices carried out by app stores and the extent to which regulatory interventions could, on the other hand, be necessary in order to address the seemingly unique features of the app economy.
      Citation: The Antitrust Bulletin
      PubDate: 2022-06-22T07:31:03Z
      DOI: 10.1177/0003603X221103122
       
  • Vertical Mergers that Induce Exit

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      Authors: David J. Balan
      Abstract: The Antitrust Bulletin, Ahead of Print.
      It is well understood that vertical mergers can create an incentive for the merged firm to foreclose unintegrated rivals, and that one way this foreclosure can manifest itself is by driving an unintegrated rival below its minimum viable scale and causing it to exit. The central claims of this article are (1) that exit-inducing mergers are likely to be especially harmful because they result in the elimination of a competitor and (2) that even a modest amount of foreclosure can induce exit if the rival was not too far above its minimum viable scale before the merger. I argue that exit-inducing mergers merit explicit treatment in a revised version of the DOJ/FTC Vertical Merger Guidelines, both because they are harmful and because the possibility that they may occur with only modest foreclosure has important implications for how they should be investigated.
      Citation: The Antitrust Bulletin
      PubDate: 2022-06-16T09:57:51Z
      DOI: 10.1177/0003603X221103198
       
  • A Suggested Revision of the 2020 Vertical Merger Guidelines (Version:
           April 30, 2022)

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      Authors: Steven C. Salop
      Abstract: The Antitrust Bulletin, Ahead of Print.
      The Department of Justice (DOJ)/Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Vertical Merger Guidelines (VMGs) were adopted by the FTC in June 2020 by a party-line 3-2 party line over the dissent of the Acting Chair. They were withdrawn by the FTC in September 2021. Withdrawal was appropriate because the VMGs are both incomplete and overly permissible. At this writing, the Guidelines are currently under revision, This draft is designed to aid that process and act as a supplement to the Guidelines that are adopted.
      Citation: The Antitrust Bulletin
      PubDate: 2022-06-16T09:17:20Z
      DOI: 10.1177/0003603X221103110
       
  • The 2020 Vertical Merger Guidelines: Some Suggestions for Revision

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      Authors: Brianna L. Alderman, Roger D. Blair
      Abstract: The Antitrust Bulletin, Ahead of Print.
      In 2020, the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) published their Vertical Merger Guidelines (VM Guidelines). The Guidelines were intended to reveal the principal analytical techniques, practices, and enforcement policies employed by the two Agencies, but they were short-lived at the FTC. In 2021, the VM Guidelines were rescinded by the FTC. Even before they were rescinded, their general language and some of the illustrative examples were not fully specified, which made them misleading. As work begins on reconstructing the VM Guidelines, we illustrate some of the weaknesses of the 2020 version and offer some suggestions for their revision. In this article, we will demonstrate why the incomplete specification can lead to some analytical difficulties. In addition, we will offer some clarifications and corrections. Our goal is to suggest refinements to the 2020 VM Guidelines so that they will be more useful in developing future guidelines for antitrust enforcement policy.
      Citation: The Antitrust Bulletin
      PubDate: 2022-06-15T09:36:40Z
      DOI: 10.1177/0003603X221103111
       
  • Double Markups, Information, and Vertical Mergers

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      Authors: Simon Loertscher, Leslie M. Marx
      Abstract: The Antitrust Bulletin, Ahead of Print.
      In vertical contracting models with complete information and linear prices, double markups that arise between independent firms provide an efficiency rationale for vertical mergers since these eliminate double markups (EDM). However, the double markups vanish even without vertical integration if the firms are allowed to use two-part tariffs. Hence, the efficiency rationale for vertical mergers in models of complete information requires restrictions on the contracts that firms can use. In a sense, with complete information, two-part tariffs are simply too powerful. If instead one allows incomplete information and removes the restriction on contract forms, then vertical mergers continue to have an effect that is analogous to EDM, but they also have the potential to affect the overall efficiency of the market to the detriment of society. Consequently, the social surplus effects of vertical integration depend on the underlying market structure, and vertical mergers are, in and of themselves, neither good nor bad. We illustrate through an example that with incomplete information, the private benefits from vertical integration tend to be excessive; that is, vertical mergers remain profitable even when they are socially harmful.
      Citation: The Antitrust Bulletin
      PubDate: 2022-06-15T09:27:24Z
      DOI: 10.1177/0003603X221103115
       
  • The Vast Space in Which the Vertical Merger Guidelines Lived

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      Authors: Edward A. Snyder
      Abstract: The Antitrust Bulletin, Ahead of Print.
      The thesis of this article is that the gap left by the abandoned Vertical Merger Guidelines (VMGs) is small, and that the gap should not be filled until a sound foundation for guidelines is built. The VMGs operated with a narrow scaffolding in a vast space of real-world decisions and a continuum of organizational forms. The illustrations in the VMGs were based on pricing models that show that anticompetitive exclusion may result from vertical mergers. But these models are incapable of generalization, and they do not account for investments, market uncertainty, contracting problems, information asymmetries, and governance issues. Perplexingly, the VMGs ignored research that considers such factors and illuminates a broad range of empirically verifiable efficiencies. The requisite foundation for effective vertical guidelines is not in place. Until it is developed, replacements will fail to screen vertical mergers that do not raise concerns and will not be of assistance when mergers are challenged. Antitrust scholars could advance the foundational work by developing authoritative briefs on topics such as anticompetitive exclusion, asset-specific investments, incomplete contracts and opportunistic behavior, information asymmetries and principal–agent problems, the purposes and effects of restrictive contracts, and the implications of network economies for the scope of firms.
      Citation: The Antitrust Bulletin
      PubDate: 2022-06-15T09:25:54Z
      DOI: 10.1177/0003603X221103114
       
  • Vertical Merger Guidelines and the Rule of Law

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      Authors: Gregory J. Werden
      Abstract: The Antitrust Bulletin, Ahead of Print.
      Mid-1960s Supreme Court decisions undermined the rule of law by giving the government unbridled discretion in enforcing Section 7 of the Clayton Act. Since 1968, the government has promoted the rule of law through guidelines limiting discretion. The Vertical Merger Guidelines, however, place no meaningful limits on agency discretion. They articulate theories under which mergers can be harmful but neither specific nor general standards. They set out no principles for determining when a merger harms competition, rather than a competitor, and no criteria for determining when harm to competition is likely, rather than merely possible. Nor do they convey the agencies’ general attitude toward vertical mergers.
      Citation: The Antitrust Bulletin
      PubDate: 2022-06-15T09:23:11Z
      DOI: 10.1177/0003603X221103113
       
  • Symposium: Taming Tech Giants

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      Authors: Anne C. Witt
      First page: 187
      Abstract: The Antitrust Bulletin, Ahead of Print.

      Citation: The Antitrust Bulletin
      PubDate: 2022-03-24T07:01:59Z
      DOI: 10.1177/0003603X221084153
       
  • Self-Preferencing and Competitive Damages: A Focus on Exploitative Abuses

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      Authors: Patrice Bougette, Oliver Budzinski, Frédéric Marty
      First page: 190
      Abstract: The Antitrust Bulletin, Ahead of Print.
      Conceived as a theory of competitive harm, self-preferencing has been at the core of recent European landmark cases (e.g., Google Android, Google Shopping). In the context of EU competition law, beyond the anticompetitive leveraging effect, self-preferencing may lead to vertical and horizontal exclusionary abuses, encourage exploitation abuses, and generate economic dependence abuses. In this paper, we aim at characterizing the various forms of self-preferencing, investigating platforms’ capacity and incentives to do so through their dual role, by shedding light on the economic assessment of these practices in an effects-based approach. We analyze the different options for remedies in this context, by insisting on their necessity, adequacy, and proportionality.
      Citation: The Antitrust Bulletin
      PubDate: 2022-03-21T10:10:42Z
      DOI: 10.1177/0003603X221082757
       
  • Who’s Afraid of Conglomerate Mergers'

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      Authors: Anne C. Witt
      First page: 208
      Abstract: The Antitrust Bulletin, Ahead of Print.
      Conglomerate merger control went out of fashion in the United States and the European Union several decades ago. Both jurisdictions embraced the premise that nonhorizontal mergers should normally be considered benign because exclusionary theories of harm are economically implausible, and nonhorizontal mergers are almost always certain to result in significant efficiency effects that the merged entity can be expected to pass on to consumers. Conglomerate effects analysis subsequently all but disappeared from the enforcement practice. However, the emergence of a handful of powerful digital platforms with vast global ecosystems of interconnected services is currently causing competition agencies a great deal of concern. Their growth has not been entirely internal. Collectively, Alphabet, Meta, Apple, Amazon, and Apple have acquired over eight hundred companies. Many of their targets were innovative start-ups operating in complementary markets. This contribution compares and critically assesses how this development has affected the U.S., EU, and U.K. competition agencies’ approach to conglomerate merger control. It finds that, as a reaction to the advent of Big Tech, conglomerate effects analysis has made a significant comeback in EU merger control. While the U.S. and U.K. authorities have not yet intervened against any conglomerate acquisitions in practice, evidence suggests that they are also more open to nonhorizontal theories of harm again.
      Citation: The Antitrust Bulletin
      PubDate: 2022-04-02T10:41:58Z
      DOI: 10.1177/0003603X221082748
       
  • The Incursion of Antitrust into China’s Platform Economy

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      Authors: Sandra Marco Colino
      First page: 237
      Abstract: The Antitrust Bulletin, Ahead of Print.
      This article adopts a holistic approach to China’s antitrust strategy toward the platform economy. As enforcers everywhere come to terms with the unique challenges posed by the market power amassed by digital gatekeepers, China’s sudden, fierce attack on its own tech giants has been as effective as it has been baffling to observers, and has helped antitrust policy progress by leaps and bounds. However, antitrust is only one of several battlefields of the war on platforms. This article first dissects the competition law developments that have taken place in the first year of China’s “Big Tech crackdown,” focusing on enforcement, policymaking, and law and institutional reform. Thereafter, this article joins the dots and assesses the results of the (partly) Big Tech-motivated refurbishment of the Chinese antitrust law and policy landscape. It identifies certain risks stemming from the new reinforced system, and proposes ways circumvent these and reap the benefits of the improved legal framework.
      Citation: The Antitrust Bulletin
      PubDate: 2022-04-20T05:31:41Z
      DOI: 10.1177/0003603X221084152
       
  • Antitrust, Big Tech, and Democracy: A Research Agenda

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      Authors: Viktoria H. S. E. Robertson
      First page: 259
      Abstract: The Antitrust Bulletin, Ahead of Print.
      In the twenty-first century, voter choice and the broader political debate are within the reach of those that can access and channel the vast streams of user data that are generated online. How digital platforms utilize personal user data to influence the outcome of democratic processes has become a central issue that liberal democracies must confront. The paper explores whether competition law has a role to play when it comes to addressing this intersection of Big Tech, data, and democracy. It first sets out the democratic roots of competition or antitrust law in the United States and the European Union. From these, the paper deduces that competition law cannot remain inactive when it comes to maintaining a democratic society in the face of the abilities of Big Tech to influence democratic processes and outcomes. The paper then goes a step further and asks what role competition law could play in this regard. Should democratic values simply be reflected in the procedural set-up of antitrust law, or is there a role for democratic values in the substantive provisions as well' And if so, does antitrust law’s focus on keeping market power in check suffice to fulfill its role in a democratic society, or does this role require the law to specifically target antidemocratic market behavior as anticompetitive harm' In navigating these questions, the paper contributes to the ongoing debate on political antitrust and sets out an ambitious research agenda on how to carry this discussion forward.
      Citation: The Antitrust Bulletin
      PubDate: 2022-04-05T05:02:25Z
      DOI: 10.1177/0003603X221082749
       
  • Taming Tech Giants: The Neglected Interplay Between Competition Law and
           Data Protection (Privacy) Law

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      Authors: Wolfgang Kerber
      First page: 280
      Abstract: The Antitrust Bulletin, Ahead of Print.
      The debate about the economic power of large tech firms has led to the insight that due to the key role of personal data on large digital platforms competition and privacy issues are deeply intertwined. This leads also to a complex relationship between competition law and data protection (or privacy) law, and—also from an economic perspective—the need for policy-makers to take into account the interplay between both legal regimes. This article analyzes current discussions about (1) how to integrate privacy effects into traditional competition law and (2) the far-reaching reform discussions about taming the power of the large tech firms, for example, the Digital Markets Act in the European Union or the new antitrust discussion in the United States, with respect to the question whether and to what extent they take into account this interplay between competition policy and data protection (or privacy) law. It is surprising that also the second reform discussion, which directly intends to target the power of the large tech firms, does not take into account sufficiently this interplay and the ensuing need for a more collaborative approach between these policies. Therefore, the opportunities of developing a more effective joint strategy for achieving better both competition and privacy are still missed.
      Citation: The Antitrust Bulletin
      PubDate: 2022-04-13T06:25:20Z
      DOI: 10.1177/0003603X221084145
       
  • Reshaping Digital Competition: The New Platform Regulations and the Future
           of Modern Antitrust

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      Authors: Elias Deutscher
      First page: 302
      Abstract: The Antitrust Bulletin, Ahead of Print.
      This article reflects on the way in which the new initiatives to regulate powerful online platforms in the European Union, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany challenge well-established fundamentals of modern antitrust and thereby reshape the future of competition law. It shows that the new platform regulations set in motion a profound transformation of modern antitrust law that operates along four parameters. First, the new platform regulations unsettle the long-standing baseline assumption that the maximization of consumer welfare constitutes competition law’s core mission. Second, the new instruments repudiate the orthodox understanding of error costs that advocates under-enforcement as the optimal standard of intervention in innovation-driven markets. Third, by relying primarily on rule-like presumptions as legal commands to regulate digital competition, the new platform regulations reverse the trend toward an increasingly inductive mode of analysis that characterized modern antitrust under the “more economic” or “effects-based” approach. Fourth, the new platform regulations also fundamentally diverge from a purely probabilistic standard of proof which requires the showing that impugned conduct is more likely than not to cause anticompetitive harm. The reconfiguration of modern antitrust along these four vectors, the article concludes, foreshadows a new, more inclusive model of innovation and growth in digital markets.
      Citation: The Antitrust Bulletin
      PubDate: 2022-04-20T05:31:12Z
      DOI: 10.1177/0003603X221082742
       
  • Pro-competition Regulation in the Digital Economy: The United
           Kingdom’s Digital Markets Unit

    • Free pre-print version: Loading...

      Authors: Niamh Dunne
      First page: 341
      Abstract: The Antitrust Bulletin, Ahead of Print.
      The United Kingdom, like many jurisdictions, is introducing more demanding ex ante regulation for the digital economy. Centered on the work of a Digital Markets Unit located within the existing copetition authority, the U.K. proposals are defined by an explicit commitment to “pro-competition” regulation. This article traces the evolution and emerging design of the forthcoming U.K. regime. It then explores the notion of pro-competition regulation in greater detail. While the concept increasingly transcends its domestic origins, this article argues that the balancing act between conventional competition law and traditional regulation that it reflects can be fully understood only when located within the distinctive circumstances of the wider U.K. regulatory landscape.
      Citation: The Antitrust Bulletin
      PubDate: 2022-03-21T10:09:04Z
      DOI: 10.1177/0003603X221082733
       
 
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