Subjects -> BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS (Total: 3570 journals)
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INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE (145 journals)                     

Showing 1 - 136 of 136 Journals sorted alphabetically
Acta Economica Et Turistica     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Advances in Accounting     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 10)
African Journal of Economic and Sustainable Development     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 17)
Amnis     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Antitrust Bulletin     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8)
Asia and the Global Economy     Open Access  
Asian Journal of Shipping and Logistics     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Botswana Journal of Economics     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Career Development International     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 19)
China Business Review     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
China Economic Quarterly International     Open Access  
Competition and Regulation in Network Industries     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 7)
Critical Perspectives on International Business     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Crossroads     Hybrid Journal  
Digital Finance : Smart Data Analytics, Investment Innovation, and Financial Technology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
East Asian Community Review     Hybrid Journal  
EC Tax Review     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5)
Economic Journal of Emerging Markets     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Economics Research International     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Ekonomia Międzynarodowa     Open Access  
EMAJ : Emerging Markets Journal     Open Access  
Emerging Markets Finance and Trade     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7)
Estudos Internacionais : revista de relações internacionais da PUC Minas     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
European Business Law Review     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 17)
European Company Law     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 11)
European Journal of International Management     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Expert Journal of Business and Management     Open Access  
Foreign Trade Review     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
Global & Strategis     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Global Summitry     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Global Trade and Customs Journal     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 6)
Human Resource Development International     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 19)
Human Resource Management International Digest     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 18)
IMF Economic Review     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 44)
IN VIVO     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
Information Resources Management Journal     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 8)
Information Technologies & International Development     Open Access   (Followers: 81)
International Advances in Economic Research     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6)
International Business Review     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9)
International Commerce Review     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
International Economic Journal     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8)
International Economic Review     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 61)
International Economics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
International Economics and Economic Policy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7)
International Entrepreneurship and Management Journal     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8)
International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 14)
International Finance     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 26)
International Insolvency Review     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
International Journal of Applied Behavioral Economics     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 18)
International Journal of Asian Business and Information Management     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
International Journal of Commerce and Management     Hybrid Journal  
International Journal of Export Marketing     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
International Journal of Governance and Financial Intermediation     Hybrid Journal  
International Labor and Working-Class History     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 15)
International Labour Review     Partially Free   (Followers: 60)
International Marketing Review     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 14)
International Public Management Journal     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8)
International Review of Applied Economics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6)
International Review of Economics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
International Review of Economics & Finance     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 28)
International Review of Finance     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9)
International Review of Financial Analysis     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8)
International Review of Law and Economics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 27)
International Review of Retail, Distribution and Consumer Research     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
International Review of Social History     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 32)
International Review on Public and Nonprofit Marketing     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
International Small Business Journal     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 11)
International Studies of Management and Organization     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 8)
International Trade Journal : Western Hemispheric Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
International Transactions In Operational Research     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Intertax     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
Japanese Political Economy     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Journal for International Business and Entrepreneurship Development     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8)
Journal of Accounting and Finance in Emerging Economies     Open Access  
Journal of Advanced Research in Economics and International Business     Full-text available via subscription  
Journal of Antitrust Enforcement     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Journal of Chinese Economic and Foreign Trade Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Journal of Chinese Human Resource Management     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Journal of Comparative International Management     Full-text available via subscription  
Journal of Contemporary European Research     Open Access   (Followers: 16)
Journal of Economics and International Finance     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5)
Journal of International Business Policy     Hybrid Journal  
Journal of International Business Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 47)
Journal of International Commerce, Economics and Policy     Hybrid Journal  
Journal of International Consumer Marketing     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9)
Journal of International Development     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 32)
Journal of International Economics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 38)
Journal of International Entrepreneurship     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 10)
Journal of International Financial Management & Accounting     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 19)
Journal of International Food & Agribusiness Marketing     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Journal of International Management     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5)
Journal of International Marketing     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 24)
Journal of International Money and Finance     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 37)
Journal of International Trade & Economic Development: An International and Comparative Review     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 11)
Journal of International Trade Law and Policy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 19)
Journal of Korea Trade     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Journal of Monetary Economics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 95)
Journal of Revenue and Pricing Management     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Journal of Reviews on Global Economics     Open Access  
Journal of the Association for Consumer Research     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 7)
Journal of the Japanese and International Economies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Journal of Theoretical and Applied Electronic Commerce Research     Open Access  
Journal of World Trade     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 19)
Jurnal Hubungan Internasional     Open Access  
Jurnal Ilmu Ekonomi Terapan     Open Access  
L'Année du Maghreb     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Management international / International Management / Gestiòn Internacional     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Management International Review     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 7)
MEED Middle East Economic Digest     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Monthly Statistics of International Trade - Statistiques mensuelles du commerce international     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
PharmacoEconomics     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 26)
Proceedings of the International Conference on Business Excellence     Open Access  
Qualitative Research in Financial Markets     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Quarterly Journal of Political Science     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 18)
Regional Formation and Development Studies     Open Access  
Relações Internacionais (R:I)     Open Access  
Research World     Hybrid Journal  
Review of International Economics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 14)
Review of International Political Economy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 40)
Revista Brasileira de Gestão de Negócios     Open Access  
Revista Multiface Online     Open Access  
Revue internationale de l'économie sociale     Full-text available via subscription  
Revue Internationale du Travail     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Revue internationale P.M.E. : économie et gestion de la petite et moyenne entreprise     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
South African Journal of International Affairs     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6)
South American Development Society Journal     Open Access  
Studies in Comparative International Development     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 16)
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
TDM Transnational Dispute Management Journal     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5)
Transnational Corporations Review     Hybrid Journal  
World Competition     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 9)
World Food Policy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
World Oil Trade     Hybrid Journal  
World Trade and Arbitration Materials     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 8)

           

Similar Journals
Journal Cover
Quarterly Journal of Political Science
Journal Prestige (SJR): 6.453
Citation Impact (citeScore): 3
Number of Followers: 18  
 
  Full-text available via subscription Subscription journal
ISSN (Print) 1554-0626 - ISSN (Online) 1554-0634
Published by Now Publishers Inc Homepage  [28 journals]
  • Communication in Collective Bargaining

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      Abstract: AbstractWe analyze how institutions shape communication incentives in a Romer–Rosenthal agenda-setting model with private information and private values. An agenda-setter faces multiple voters who are privately informed about their ideal points in a one-dimensional policy space. We consider two institutions. In one setting, cheap-talk communication precedes a take-it-or-leave-it agenda-setting game. The second involves sequential agenda setting where the setter can revise the proposal only when the first one fails to gain enough support. The latter institution requires the setter to commit to a policy as a screening technology. The commitment fosters information disclosure from strategic voters and thus results in efficiency gains over straw polls, where the setter is not constrained in how she reacts to revealed information. In addition, we also find voters' sabotage incentive that may discount the informativeness of political communication. Specifically, when a voter preferring the status quo cannot directly block less preferred policies, he could have an incentive to induce an extreme reform proposal and expect it to fail. With numerical examples, we identify the sabotage phenomenon in nonmonotonic equilibrium, where the types of voters that sufficiently prefer and dislike the status quo send one signal, and the intermediate types send another one.Suggested CitationJidong Chen (2022), "Communication in Collective Bargaining", Quarterly Journal of Political Science: Vol. 17: No. 3. http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/100.00017058
      PubDate: Sun, 31 Jul 2022 00:00:00 +020
       
  • Out of Step and Still in Congress' Electoral Consequences of Incumbent
           and Challenger Positioning Across Time

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      Abstract: AbstractRecent research suggests that the penalty congressional candidates pay for ideological extremism declined abruptly in 1994 when the House majority became competitive for the first time in decades. We reexamine congressional accountability in light of this evidence, first evaluating the centrality of 1994 as a turning point and then allowing that voters may not weigh incumbents' and challengers' positions equally. Several findings emerge. Even when the penalty for extremism is constrained to be equal for challengers and incumbents, accountability does not abruptly decline in 1994 but instead decreases gradually from 1980 through recent elections. Furthermore, once incumbent and challenger ideology are examined separately, the results on incumbents do not match those for challengers. Depending on the specification and ideology measure, incumbent accountability may stay similar, decrease, or even increase over time. By comparison, the relationship between challenger ideology and vote share consistently declines across electoral cycles. These results suggest that analyses treating incumbents and challengers identically will be prone to find decreased congressional accountability, even when the evidence on incumbents does not merit such a conclusion.Suggested CitationBrandice Canes-Wrone and Michael R. Kistner (2022), "Out of Step and Still in Congress' Electoral Consequences of Incumbent and Challenger Positioning Across Time", Quarterly Journal of Political Science: Vol. 17: No. 3. http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/100.00019222
      PubDate: Sun, 31 Jul 2022 00:00:00 +020
       
  • Selective Civilian Targeting: The Unintended Consequences of Partial Peace

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      Abstract: AbstractPeace agreements may inadvertently increase selective violence against civilians when they are incomplete in two key dimensions. First, only a fraction of the existing armed groups participates in the agreement. Second, the legitimate government fails to establish an institutional presence in the areas previously controlled by those who do participate. Under these two conditions, the resulting vacuum of power may attract active armed groups who engage in selective civilian victimization to obtain control. Studying the recent Colombian experience, we find that the permanent ceasefire declared by the FARC insurgency in 2014 led to a surge in the targeting of community leaders in former FARC strongholds, perpetrated by armed groups excluded from the peace process, with the goal of consolidating their dominance in those areas. Critically, selective victimization is attenuated by some dimensions of state capacity and exacerbated in places that are more valuable as proxied by the existence of recent land conflicts.Suggested CitationMounu Prem, Andrés F. Rivera, Dario A. Romero and Juan F. Vargas (2022), "Selective Civilian Targeting: The Unintended Consequences of Partial Peace", Quarterly Journal of Political Science: Vol. 17: No. 3. http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/100.00020088
      PubDate: Sun, 31 Jul 2022 00:00:00 +020
       
  • How Does the Rising Number of Women in the U.S. Congress Change
           Deliberation' Evidence from House Committee Hearings

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      Abstract: AbstractThe rising number of women in Congress changes deliberation. Using committee hearing transcripts from 1995 to 2017, we analyze how the gender composition of committees affects group dynamics in committee hearings. While we find limited evidence that increasing proportions of women affects women's participation, we find that discussion norms within committees change significantly in the presence of more women. Namely, interruptions decrease when there are more women on the committee; with higher proportions of women, men are less likely to interrupt others. Furthermore, committee members are more likely to engage and stay on the same topics in the presence of more women, suggesting a shift in norms toward more in-depth exchange. Overall, our results show that increasing the proportion of women changes discussion dynamics within Congress by shifting norms away from interruptions and one-sided talk in committees, thereby shifting group norms that govern decision-making during an important policy-making stage.Suggested CitationPamela Ban, Justin Grimmer, Jaclyn Kaslovsky and Emily West (2022), "How Does the Rising Number of Women in the U.S. Congress Change Deliberation' Evidence from House Committee Hearings", Quarterly Journal of Political Science: Vol. 17: No. 3. http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/100.00020112
      PubDate: Sun, 31 Jul 2022 00:00:00 +020
       
  • Strategic Civil War Aims and the Resource Curse

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      Abstract: AbstractDoes oil wealth promote or inhibit prospects for civil war' Empirical evidence relating oil to civil war onset is mixed, and depends on the aims of the rebellion: although separatist civil wars (in which rebels aim to create an autonomous region or independent state) occur more frequently in oil-rich regions, oil-rich countries experience fewer center-seeking civil wars (in which rebels aim to capture the capital city). This article provides a new theoretical framework in which the challenger strategically chooses its civil war aims. I first incorporate strategic civil war aims into a formal bargaining model with commitment problems. Then, I derive two countervailing theoretical effects of economic activities, such as oil production, that provide an easy source of government revenues: a conflict-suppressing revenue effect (more money for the government) and a conflict-enhancing predation effect (more for the rebels to capture). Finally, I highlight two reasons that the magnitude of the oil predation effect is larger for separatist than for center-seeking challengers, which connects the theoretical implications to the motivating empirical pattern. First, a strategic selection effect for ethnic minorities: governments face more severe commitment problems toward small ethnic groups — who prefer separatist over center-seeking civil war. Second, a geography of rebellion effect: oil-funded repression more effectively deters center-seeking challenges than peripheral insurgencies.Suggested CitationJack Paine (2022), "Strategic Civil War Aims and the Resource Curse", Quarterly Journal of Political Science: Vol. 17: No. 2. http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/100.00020065
      PubDate: Sat, 30 Apr 2022 00:00:00 +020
       
  • The Unintended Effects of Bottom-Up Accountability: Evidence from a Field
           Experiment in Peru

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      Abstract: AbstractNumerous recent studies show that sharing politician or bureaucrat performance information with voters seldom succeeds at generating bottom-up pressure. One explanation is that local politics in developing democracies are typically mediated through local "development broker" elites, who often lack critical procedural information. Does supplying local leaders with information about decentralized political processes allow them to participate more effectively, generate accountability pressure, and improve public goods provision' A randomized field experiment in Peru demonstrates that information can indeed provoke attitudinal and behavioral change among village elites regarding participation, government performance and protest, but often in unanticipated ways. The study finds that training workshops in fact reduce participation in local participatory budgeting processes, reduce satisfaction with mayors, and increase support for protest and recall elections. Aggregate behavioral measures find a reduction in participatory budgeting attendance, but no changes in the probability of protest or recall initiation. Although village leaders are frustrated with mayoral performance, they struggle to generate collective action and thus have to settle for withdrawing from processes they can leave unilaterally. A test of mechanisms indicates this is not driven primarily by rent-seeking. There are no overall effects on district government performance in the following year. The evidence indicates that information can prompt local leaders to make political moves, but the high costs of collection action makes it difficult to produce meaningful change in politician behavior.Suggested CitationRenard Sexton (2022), "The Unintended Effects of Bottom-Up Accountability: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Peru", Quarterly Journal of Political Science: Vol. 17: No. 2. http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/100.00020079
      PubDate: Sat, 30 Apr 2022 00:00:00 +020
       
  • Accountability and Inclusion in Customary Institutions: Evidence from a
           Village-Level Experiment in Zimbabwe

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      Abstract: AbstractThe problem of traditional leadership is often conceived as one of low accountability due to a single unelected leader having unchecked power within communities. Instead, we argue there are strong norms of collective deliberation in most traditional political institutions. As a result, a key constraint on inclusive decision-making and broad accountability is the composition of traditional leaders' advisers and councils. We test whether encouragement to broaden advisers to village chiefs in Zimbabwe can result in better decision-making outcomes using a field experiment in 270 villages. The field experiment included two treatment arms, one which provided village chiefs with information on laws and norms encouraging inclusive decision-making through workshops and one that additionally included a local civil society leader in the workshops. We find that including a civil society leader results in more inclusive decision-making processes and improved outcomes for the village chief's political opponents, including fairer court decisions and less partisan food aid distribution. These results have important implications for how scholars conceptualize traditional leadership and indicate the possibility for improved representation through incremental changes to traditional political institutions.Suggested CitationKate Baldwin, Shylock Muyengwa and Eric Mvukiyehe (2022), "Accountability and Inclusion in Customary Institutions: Evidence from a Village-Level Experiment in Zimbabwe", Quarterly Journal of Political Science: Vol. 17: No. 2. http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/100.00020110
      PubDate: Sat, 30 Apr 2022 00:00:00 +020
       
  • Policing Ethnicity: Lab-in-the-Field Evidence on Discrimination,
           Cooperation, and Ethnic Balancing in the Liberian National Police

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      Abstract: AbstractEthnic balancing in the security sector increasingly accompanies power sharing agreements after civil war, but new challenges arise as these institutions must sustain cooperation amidst increasing ethnic heterogeneity. Inclusive involvement in security sector institutions may reduce discrimination against minority groups. But pressure to assimilate may also foment "loyalty conflict" among minority group members, exacerbating discrimination. We test these competing logics using surveys and lab-in-the-field experiments with teams of Liberian National Police officers. Consistent with a logic of loyalty conflict, we find that teams with minority police officers are more rather than less discriminatory against minority civilians. This effect is not driven by heterogeneity, but rather by the presence of minority police officers per se. We also find that teams that include minority police officers are no more or less cooperative than those that do not, and that heterogeneous teams are no more or less cooperative than homogeneous ones. We argue that these effects are likely a result of professionalization processes that encourage conformity and loyalty to an existing police subculture.Suggested CitationRobert A. Blair, Sabrina M. Karim, Michael J. Gilligan and Kyle Beardsley (2022), "Policing Ethnicity: Lab-in-the-Field Evidence on Discrimination, Cooperation, and Ethnic Balancing in the Liberian National Police", Quarterly Journal of Political Science: Vol. 17: No. 2. http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/100.00019226
      PubDate: Sat, 30 Apr 2022 00:00:00 +020
       
  • Can the Political Ambition of Young Women Be Increased' Evidence from
           U.S. High School Students

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      Abstract: AbstractThe under-representation of women in American politics can likely be explained, at least in part, by women's comparatively lower levels of political ambition. We analyze a co-ed, religious program for high school students in which participants lobby their Members of Congress and receive political skills training. By leveraging longitudinal survey data about the participants and a difference-in-differences design, we find that the program successfully increased the political ambition of its female participants. To the best of our knowledge, we offer the first quasi-experimental evidence demonstrating a possible means of increasing the political ambition of high school-aged American women. Our results demonstrate that female political ambition can be increased without relying on programs that explicitly focus on gender and ambition.Suggested CitationJoshua Kalla and Ethan Porter (2022), "Can the Political Ambition of Young Women Be Increased' Evidence from U.S. High School Students", Quarterly Journal of Political Science: Vol. 17: No. 2. http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/100.00020106
      PubDate: Sat, 30 Apr 2022 00:00:00 +020
       
  • Third-Party Intervention and Strategic Militarization

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      Abstract: AbstractCodified at the 2005 United Nations World Summit, the doctrine of Responsibility to Protect articulates an ideal of international interventions motivated by compassion for victims and a desire to bring stability to hot-spots around the world. Despite this consensus, practitioners and scholars have debated the importance of unintended consequences stemming from the expectation of third-party intervention. We analyze how third-party intervention shapes the incentives to arm, negotiate settlements, and fight wars in a parsimonious game theoretic model. Among the unintended consequences we find: interventions that indiscriminately lower the destructiveness of war increase the probability of conflict and increasing the cost of arming makes destructive wars more likely. Other interventions, however, can have much more beneficial effects and our analysis highlights peace-enhancing forms of third-party intervention. From a welfare perspective, most interventions do not change the ex-ante loss from war, but do have distributional effects on the terms of peace. As a result R2P principles are hard to implement because natural forms of intervention create incentives that make them largely self-defeating. Suggested CitationAdam Meirowitz, Massimo Morelli, Kristopher W. Ramsay and Francesco Squintani (2022), "Third-Party Intervention and Strategic Militarization", Quarterly Journal of Political Science: Vol. 17: No. 1. http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/100.00019118
      PubDate: Mon, 31 Jan 2022 00:00:00 +010
       
  • Coordination and Innovation in Judiciaries: Correct Law versus Consistent
           Law

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      Abstract: AbstractWe identify the coordination consideration among judges who do not have formal authority over each other, and investigate its consequences for their decisions and legal innovations. Coordination concerns arise because judges value the consistent application of law. To mitigate their strategic uncertainty, judges overweight interpretations that are visible throughout the judiciary (e.g., prominent judges’ opinions) because their visibility facilitates coordination. This creates a tradeoff between the consistent and correct application of law—the two desiderata of judicial decision-making. In particular, anticipating overreactions to their opinions, some prominent judges refrain from expressing their informed opinions. Paradoxically, the propensity to refrain is strongest in prominent judges who care most about the correct application of law. From their perspective, excessive concern for uniformity in the judiciary overrides the informational value of expressing informed opinions. We explore the implications for issuing narrow or broad opinions, the stickiness of precedent, and the practice of stare decisis. We provide concrete examples from contract, property, tort, and constitutional law that support our theoretical mechanisms. Suggested CitationMehdi Shadmehr, Sepehr Shahshahani and Charles Cameron (2022), "Coordination and Innovation in Judiciaries: Correct Law versus Consistent Law", Quarterly Journal of Political Science: Vol. 17: No. 1. http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/100.00019216
      PubDate: Mon, 31 Jan 2022 00:00:00 +010
       
  • A Theory of Power Wars

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      Abstract: AbstractWe present a theory of war onset and war duration in which power is multidimensional and can evolve through conflict. The resources players can secure without fighting are determined by their political power, while the ability of appropriating resources with violence is due to their military power. When deciding whether to wage a war, players evaluate the consequences on the current allocation of resources as well as on the future distribution of military and political powers. We deliver three main results: a key driver of war is the mismatch between military and political power; dynamic incentives may amplify static incentives, leading forwardlooking players to be more belligerent; and a war is more likely to last for longer if political power is initially more unbalanced than military power and the politically under-represented player is militarily advantaged. Our results are robust to allowing the peaceful allocation of resources to be a function of both political and military powers. Finally, we provide empirical correlations on interstate wars that are consistent with the theory. Suggested CitationHelios Herrera, Massimo Morelli and Salvatore Nunnari (2022), "A Theory of Power Wars", Quarterly Journal of Political Science: Vol. 17: No. 1. http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/100.00019136
      PubDate: Mon, 31 Jan 2022 00:00:00 +010
       
  • Parents, Infants, and Voter Turnout: Evidence from the United States

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      Abstract: AbstractDespite evidence that infants affect families’ economic and social behaviors, little is known about how young children influence their parents’ political engagement. I show that U.S. women with an infant during an election year are 3.5 percentage points less likely to vote than women without children; men with an infant are 2.2 percentage points less likely to vote. Suggesting that this effect may be causal, I find no significant decreases in turnout the year before parents have an infant. Using a triple-difference approach, I then show that universal vote-by-mail systems mitigate the negative association between infants and mothers’ turnout. Suggested CitationAngela Cools (2022), "Parents, Infants, and Voter Turnout: Evidence from the United States", Quarterly Journal of Political Science: Vol. 17: No. 1. http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/100.00020072
      PubDate: Mon, 31 Jan 2022 00:00:00 +010
       
  • Transparency and Stability

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      Abstract: AbstractWe revisit the theory that Hollyer, Rosendorff, and Vreeland use in their research program on transparency and political stability. We show that in a representative citizen setting and in their multi-citizen model, more transparency increases the likelihood of revolution if this likelihood is sufficiently small, but reduces the likelihood of revolution if it is sufficiently large. Rather than coordination concerns, the mechanism driving this result reflects the logic of “gambling for resurrection”: when you’re ahead, don’t give information, but when you’re behind, gamble for resurrection by providing more information. Their model suggests that protest risk drives transparency, not the converse: regimes facing a low likelihood of revolution should reduce transparency, while those facing a high likelihood of revolution should raise transparency, generating a positive correlation between transparency and instability. Moreover, we show that in Hollyer et al.’s core models, a citizen’s net payoff from revolting does not depend on either the citizen’s private economic well-being, or the public economic situation: economic interest, either self-interest or sociotropic interest, is not itself an incentive to protest. Rather, the model is a sunspot game, with economic data playing the role of sunspots, which, by assumption, act as focal points for coordination. Suggested CitationMehdi Shadmehr and Dan Bernhardt (2022), "Transparency and Stability", Quarterly Journal of Political Science: Vol. 17: No. 1. http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/100.00019195
      PubDate: Mon, 31 Jan 2022 00:00:00 +010
       
  • "Leakage" in International Regulatory Regimes: Did the OECD Anti-bribery
           Convention Increase Bribery'

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      Abstract: AbstractWhen do well-intended regulatory regimes have unintended consequences' We examine one obstacle to successful regulation, "regulatory leakage," in the context of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention (ABC). Leakage occurs when regulated behavior decreases for actors under a regime's jurisdiction, but increases among those outside of it. We analyze a formal model that demonstrates how the ABC may simultaneously reduce bribery among firms from member countries, while increasing bribery by firms from non-ABC member countries. We also show how the ABC may lead firms from ABC member countries to shift to bribery through intermediaries. New empirical evidence of MNC activity in Vietnam shows evidence of both regulatory leakage and bribery through intermediaries.Suggested CitationTerrence L. Chapman, Nathan M. Jensen, Edmund J. Malesky and Scott Wolford (2021), ""Leakage" in International Regulatory Regimes: Did the OECD Anti-bribery Convention Increase Bribery'", Quarterly Journal of Political Science: Vol. 16: No. 4, pp 387-427. http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/100.00019193
      PubDate: Mon, 18 Oct 2021 00:00:00 +020
       
  • Contemporary U.S. Policymaking

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      Abstract: AbstractThis paper presents a model with a legislature, courts, and an executive that can take unilateral action. The legislature is polarized, and when government is divided, parties or factions bargain over legislation, understanding that failure can result in executive action. The theory characterizes legislative bargains, identifies which party factions bargain, and presents comparative statics. Executive action represents a threat to the opposition party, and policies are more favorable to the executive the stronger is the threat. The opposition can attempt to block the executive action in the courts, and the higher the probability of success the weaker the threat is. The theory predicts that bargains are stuck, but during the divided government years of the Obama and Trump administrations no major legislation was enacted. Bargaining failure is explained in the theory by ideological hatred resulting from increased polarization in Congress and by party competition for the electoral prize of unified government. Failure results in rejection of legislative proposals or immediate executive action. The theory is applied to the cases of nationwide injunctions, Obamacare, DACA, and WOTUS (Waters of the United States), that are either currently or likely to be before the Supreme Court.Suggested CitationDavid P. Baron (2021), "Contemporary U.S. Policymaking", Quarterly Journal of Political Science: Vol. 16: No. 4, pp 429-465. http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/100.00019221
      PubDate: Mon, 18 Oct 2021 00:00:00 +020
       
  • Lobbying, Inside and Out: How Special Interest Groups Influence Policy
           Choices

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      Abstract: AbstractSpecial interest groups (SIGs) have multiple channels of influence: contributing to decision-makers or providing them with information (henceforth, inside lobbying) and grassroots mobilizations or advertising their position to voters (henceforth, outside lobbying). How do these channels interact' I study a signaling model in which a politician chooses the scope of a reform, two SIGs, one defending the status quo, the other pushing for change, use inside lobbying to bias the content of the proposed policy and outside lobbying to affect its fate. In equilibrium, inside lobbying expenditures are associated with policy compromises, a mark of influence of the SIG supportive of the status quo; meanwhile, outside lobbying activities are associated with comprehensive reforms, a sign of pro-change SIG power. I discuss how these findings can potentially inform the empirical research on SIG influence.Suggested CitationStephane Wolton (2021), "Lobbying, Inside and Out: How Special Interest Groups Influence Policy Choices", Quarterly Journal of Political Science: Vol. 16: No. 4, pp 467-503. http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/100.00020007
      PubDate: Mon, 18 Oct 2021 00:00:00 +020
       
  • Friends Don't Let Friends Free Ride

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      Abstract: AbstractTheory predicts that social sanctioning can solve the collective action problem, but only when people find out whether their peers participate. We evaluate this prediction using data from the near-universe of cell phone subscribers in Venezuela. Those whose behavior is more easily observed by peers are much more likely to protest and much more likely to sign a political petition than otherwise similar people in less-visible social network positions. Together with qualitative and survey data, we interpret this finding as evidence that social network structure can facilitate (or frustrate) social sanctioning as a solution to the collective action problem.Suggested CitationNicholas Eubank and Dorothy Kronick (2021), "Friends Don't Let Friends Free Ride", Quarterly Journal of Political Science: Vol. 16: No. 4, pp 533-557. http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/100.00020143
      PubDate: Mon, 18 Oct 2021 00:00:00 +020
       
  • Do Newspapers Benefit Incumbents' Evidence from Denmark
           1849–1915

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      Abstract: AbstractScholars have long been interested in how the media shapes electoral accountability, but most of the existing empirical evidence suffers from endogeneity issues. Exploiting the inflow of newspapers engendered by the abolition of censorship in Denmark, this paper studies how newspapers affect the advantages enjoyed by members of parliament. I collect a new dataset on parliamentary candidates (1849–1915) and link them to the complete universe of local Danish newspapers, as well as candidate-level information on news coverage obtained from a database of scanned newspaper pages. Employing a series of difference-in-differences and regression-discontinuity designs, I document three main findings. First, office holders enjoy privileged access to local press coverage. Second, the entry of local newspapers leads to an increase in reelection rates. Third, the benefits enjoyed by incumbents are most pronounced when MPs and newspaper editors are affiliated with the same political party. Taken together, these findings could suggest that office holders in low-information environments benefit more directly from the presence of local media than previously assumed.Suggested CitationAlexander Fouirnaies (2021), "Do Newspapers Benefit Incumbents' Evidence from Denmark 1849–1915", Quarterly Journal of Political Science: Vol. 16: No. 4, pp 505-532. http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/100.00019054
      PubDate: Mon, 18 Oct 2021 00:00:00 +020
       
  • Party Bans: Deterrence or Backlash' Evidence from the Basque Country

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      Abstract: AbstractThis paper investigates the electoral effects of party bans, studying the case of the ban on Batasuna, the political wing of ETA. In an initial electoral term, in 2003, Batasuna was banned from contesting local elections in all Basque municipalities; in a second term, in 2007, it was banned only in a subset of them, and in 2011 it became legal again. Exploiting the finite and heterogeneous length of the ban across municipalities, I find that a longer ban has a negative effect on electoral support for the targeted party. This effect is explained by the extent of the immediate loss in support in treated municipalities under the 2007 ban, observable in this instance because Batasuna called for a null vote. This pattern and further heterogeneous effects are consistent with voters learning from the new electoral scenario rather than with a direct cost attributable to the party no longer having institutional representation. This suggests that party bans may be used by incumbents to reduce their challengers' strength by triggering an electoral reshuffling, with voters learning about new parties and potentially switching allegiances.Suggested CitationAndreu Arenas (2021), "Party Bans: Deterrence or Backlash' Evidence from the Basque Country", Quarterly Journal of Political Science: Vol. 16: No. 3, pp 325-358. http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/100.00018119
      PubDate: Tue, 13 Jul 2021 00:00:00 +020
       
  • Protest Puzzles: Tullock's Paradox, Hong Kong Experiment, and the Strength
           of Weak States

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      Abstract: AbstractTullock's (1971) Paradox of Revolution uses an Olsonian logic to conclude that revolutions should not happen in large societies. et al.'s (2019) Hong Kong Experiment shows that, in sharp contrast to the literature that models protest as a coordination problem, actions can be strategic substitutes. We develop a model to address these standing puzzles, and investigate its empirical implications. We show that when the movement's goal is modest, free-riding concerns dominate the citizens' interactions, making their actions strategic substitutes. By contrast, when the movement's goal is to topple the regime, coordination concerns dominate, and actions become strategic complements. Moreover, with natural other-regarding preferences, some citizens participate in costly revolt even in large societies. A new empirical implication of the model is that as a regime grows stronger in the sense that a larger fraction of citizens is needed to overthrow it, the likelihood of regime change may rise.Suggested CitationMehdi Shadmehr (2021), "Protest Puzzles: Tullock's Paradox, Hong Kong Experiment, and the Strength of Weak States", Quarterly Journal of Political Science: Vol. 16: No. 3, pp 245-264. http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/100.00019038
      PubDate: Tue, 13 Jul 2021 00:00:00 +020
       
  • Viral Voting: Social Networks and Political Participation

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      Abstract: AbstractSocial context theory suggests that an important driver of political participation is the behavior of family, friends, co-workers and neighbors. How do social ties between individuals shape equilibrium behavior in larger populations' Despite theoretical inroads into this question, direct empirical tests remain scarce due to data limitations. We fill this gap using full social network data from 15 villages in rural Uganda, where village-level turnout is the outcome of interest. We find that levels of participation predicted by structural features of village networks are strongly associated with actual village-level turnout in low-salience local elections, and weakly associated in high-salience presidential elections. We also find that these features predict other forms of political participation, including attending village meetings and contributing to village projects. In addition to demonstrating that networks help explain political participation, we provide evidence that the mechanism of influence is that proposed by social context theory rather than alternative mechanisms like the presence of central brokers or the ability of networks to diffuse information.Suggested CitationNicholas Eubank, Guy Grossman, Melina R. Platas and Jonathan Rodden (2021), "Viral Voting: Social Networks and Political Participation", Quarterly Journal of Political Science: Vol. 16: No. 3, pp 265-284. http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/100.00019092
      PubDate: Tue, 13 Jul 2021 00:00:00 +020
       
  • Political Corruption Cycles in Democracies and Autocracies: Evidence from
           Micro-data on Extortion in West Africa

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      Abstract: AbstractUsing two large cross-national micro datasets on extortion and commodity flows, I provide evidence of corruption cycles around elections in five West African states. In democracies but not in autocracies, police and other officials extort bribes that are 30% higher in the buildup to elections. These cycles occur on the intensive margin — the price at which bribes are set — rather than on the extensive margin — the total number of agents extorting. When incumbents lose, prices remain abnormally high. When incumbents win, prices return to normal levels. I find no evidence of political cycles in the composition, quantity, or direction of commodity flows, and scant support for the idea that politicians use extortion for illicit campaign fundraising. Traditional political business cycles also do not appear to explain corruption cycles in this context. Rather, I argue that corruption cycles may result from independent decision-making by bureaucrats who need to insure against the uncertainty of future leadership.Suggested CitationJasper Cooper (2021), "Political Corruption Cycles in Democracies and Autocracies: Evidence from Micro-data on Extortion in West Africa", Quarterly Journal of Political Science: Vol. 16: No. 3, pp 285-323. http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/100.00019175
      PubDate: Tue, 13 Jul 2021 00:00:00 +020
       
  • Insights from the Blinder–Oaxaca Decomposition on Polarization in
           the US Senate

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      Abstract: AbstractI study the change in polarization in the US Senate from the period 1947–1966 to 1995–2014. I use a decomposition approach to quantify how much of the increase in polarization between those two periods can be explained by the representation relationship with all voters versus the representation relationship with copartisans. The decomposition also identifies the portion that arose from voters changing positions and how much arose from politicians changing how responsive they are to voters. I find that the representation relationship explains a majority of the increase in polarization. Furthermore, I find that Republicans have become more conservative because they have become more responsive to the positions of their copartisan base. Copartisan sub-constituencies matter for representation and are a source of increased polarization. The data also shows that Democrats have contributed to polarization because the overall electorate in their districts have become more socially liberal.Suggested CitationDaniel M. Butler (2021), "Insights from the Blinder–Oaxaca Decomposition on Polarization in the US Senate", Quarterly Journal of Political Science: Vol. 16: No. 3, pp 359-386. http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/100.00019219
      PubDate: Tue, 13 Jul 2021 00:00:00 +020
       
  • Optimal Size of Rebellions: Trade-off Between Large Group and Maintaining
           Secrecy

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      Abstract: AbstractThis paper studies a model of regime change in which a rebel leader seeking to mobilize supporters faces a trade-off between increasing the rebel group's size and risking information leaks. I find that repressing a rebellion via collective punishment — whereby not only rebel participants but also those individuals who knew about (but did not report) the rebellion are punished — may result in a smaller-sized rebel group than in the case of targeted punishment, under which only the actual rebel participants are punished. Authorities prefer collective punishment to induce information leaks from rebel groups, however one consequence of adopting collective punishment is that citizens are then put to side with the insurgency, which in turn reduces the regime's odds of survival. My findings also indicate that, whereas targeted punishment helps prevent rebellion by ordinary citizens who simply desire policy changes, collective punishment helps prevent a revolution staged by those who are driven by pecuniary rewards. Finally, if authorities compete with rebel leaders for support by threatening retribution against non-supporters, then both parties prefer using relatively harsh methods as a means of forcing civilians to choose sides.Suggested CitationCongyi Zhou (2021), "Optimal Size of Rebellions: Trade-off Between Large Group and Maintaining Secrecy", Quarterly Journal of Political Science: Vol. 16: No. 2, pp 157-183. http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/100.00017112
      PubDate: Wed, 24 Feb 2021 00:00:00 +010
       
  • Polarized Extremes and the Confused Centre: Campaign Targeting of Voters
           with Correlation Neglect

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      Abstract: AbstractWe model the effect of competing political campaigns on the opinion of voters who exhibit correlation neglect, i.e., fail to understand that different campaigns might be correlated. We show that political campaigners can manipulate voters' beliefs even when voters understand the informativeness of each campaign separately. The optimal coordination of campaigns involves negative correlation of good news and sometimes full positive correlation of bad news. We show that competition in targeted campaigns has the effect of changing the opinions of different groups in different ways; competition increases polarisation among extreme voters but at the same time increases the variance and the quality of moderates' voting decisions.Suggested CitationGilat Levy, Inés Moreno de Barreda and Ronny Razin (2021), "Polarized Extremes and the Confused Centre: Campaign Targeting of Voters with Correlation Neglect", Quarterly Journal of Political Science: Vol. 16: No. 2, pp 139-155. http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/100.00019125
      PubDate: Wed, 24 Feb 2021 00:00:00 +010
       
  • Local Representation and Voter Mobilization in Closed-list Proportional
           Representation Systems

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      Abstract: AbstractWe investigate whether geographic representation affects local voting behavior in closed-list proportional representation (PR) systems, where conventional theoretical wisdom suggests a limited role of localism in voter preferences. Using detailed data on Norwegian parliamentary candidates' hometowns, we show that parties engage in geographic balancing when constructing candidate lists. However, because most districts contain more municipalities than seats, not all municipalities will ultimately see a local candidate elected. A regression discontinuity design applied to marginal candidates reveals that parties obtain higher within-district support in subsequent elections in incumbents' hometowns — novel evidence of "friends-and-neighbors" voting in an otherwise party-centered environment. Exploring the mechanisms, we find that represented municipalities often continue to have locally-connected candidates in top positions, in contrast to municipalities with losing candidates, and are more frequently referenced in legislative speeches. There is no evidence that unequal representation creates inequalities in distributive policies.Suggested CitationJon H. Fiva, Askill H. Halse and Daniel M. Smith (2021), "Local Representation and Voter Mobilization in Closed-list Proportional Representation Systems", Quarterly Journal of Political Science: Vol. 16: No. 2, pp 185-213. http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/100.00019147
      PubDate: Wed, 24 Feb 2021 00:00:00 +010
       
  • Presidents and the Status Quo

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      Abstract: AbstractThe dominant paradigm for policymaking by chief executives is that they are first-movers who change the status quo. I re-evaluate this notion by extending recent advances in measuring the conservatism of policy, and by constructing a new comprehensive measure of presidential action. Though executive unilateralism theories predict whether a given status quo will change, empirical studies rely on aggregate analyses of executive productivity and second-order predictions based on assumptions about the spatial distribution of policies. I fail to find support for unilateral action theory in presidential initiatives at the policy-level from 1992 to 2016. Most of the prediction error is due to a high false-negative rate—with the president acting despite supposed constraints enforced by the Congress. Despite widespread acceptance of unilateral action theory, the results imply either that persistent measurement challenges limit opportunities to assess its empirical implications, that the theory itself over-emphasizes the separation of powers as a constraint on action, or both.Suggested CitationKenneth Lowande (2021), "Presidents and the Status Quo", Quarterly Journal of Political Science: Vol. 16: No. 2, pp 215-244. http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/100.00019170
      PubDate: Wed, 24 Feb 2021 00:00:00 +010
       
  • Does the Media Cover the Economy Accurately' An Analysis of Sixteen
           Developed Democracies

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      Abstract: AbstractCan voters learn what they need to learn to hold governments accountable for the economy through news coverage' Employing the first large-scale cross-national dataset of media coverage of the economy — over 2 million articles related to three economic indicators in 32 mainstream newspapers, one left-wing and one right-wing, in 16 developed countries and 6 languages — we investigate media coverage of the economy that bears implications for electoral accountability and partisan advantage. We find that the tone of most mainstream newspapers tracks the economy faithfully, although the frequency of coverage increases with negative outcomes. While we find some evidence for partisan bias in tone for growth headlines and in frequency of coverage for unemployment articles, its substantive magnitude is diminutive. Mainstream newspaper coverage of the economy provides voters with largely accurate information.Suggested CitationMark A. Kayser and Michael Peress (2021), "Does the Media Cover the Economy Accurately' An Analysis of Sixteen Developed Democracies", Quarterly Journal of Political Science: Vol. 16: No. 1, pp 1-33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/100.00019098
      PubDate: Mon, 11 Jan 2021 00:00:00 +010
       
  • A Model of Interest Group Influence and Campaign Advertising

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      Abstract: AbstractWe analyze a citizen–candidate model of elections between an incumbent and challenger to investigate the logic of interest group influence on election outcomes through campaign advertising. Whereas the incumbent's position is known to voters, the challenger is relatively unknown, and groups may allocate spending (either directly through independent expenditures or indirectly through campaign donations) to advertise the challenger's position. We prove that equilibria can feature either positive or negative advertising, but not both at the same time: ex ante evaluations of the challenger by the median voter determine which kind of advertising will arise. In a positive advertising equilibrium, only challengers located in a centrally located spending interval are advertised and win, while in a negative advertising equilibrium, challengers who are too extreme are targeted and lose. The analysis sheds light on the determinants of political advertising and voter beliefs, and it emphasizes their endogeneity with respect to the parameters of the model, e.g., the incumbent's location, prior beliefs of voters about the challenger's location, and the effectiveness of advertising technology. Moreover, it illuminates the preconditions for positive and negative advertising, and indicates circumstances in which one tactic is more likely to be employed than the other.Suggested CitationZuheir Desai and John Duggan (2021), "A Model of Interest Group Influence and Campaign Advertising", Quarterly Journal of Political Science: Vol. 16: No. 1, pp 105-137. http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/100.00019123
      PubDate: Mon, 11 Jan 2021 00:00:00 +010
       
  • Trumping Hate on Twitter' Online Hate Speech in the 2016 U.S. Election
           Campaign and its Aftermath

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      Abstract: AbstractTo what extent did online hate speech and white nationalist rhetoric on Twitter increase over the course of Donald Trump's 2016 presidential election campaign and its immediate aftermath' The prevailing narrative suggests that Trump's political rise — and his unexpected victory — lent legitimacy to and popularized bigoted rhetoric that was once relegated to the dark corners of the Internet. However, our analysis of over 750 million tweets related to the election, in addition to almost 400 million tweets from a random sample of American Twitter users, provides systematic evidence that hate speech did not increase on Twitter over this period. Using both machine-learning-augmented dictionary-based methods and a novel classification approach leveraging data from Reddit communities associated with the alt-right movement, we observe no persistent increase in hate speech or white nationalist language either over the course of the campaign or in the six months following Trump's election. While key campaign events and policy announcements produced brief spikes in hateful language, these bursts quickly dissipated. Overall we find no empirical support for the proposition that Trump's divisive campaign or election increased hate speech on Twitter.Suggested CitationAlexandra A. Siegel, Evgenii Nikitin, Pablo Barberá, Joanna Sterling, Bethany Pullen, Richard Bonneau, Jonathan Nagler and Joshua A. Tucker (2021), "Trumping Hate on Twitter' Online Hate Speech in the 2016 U.S. Election Campaign and its Aftermath", Quarterly Journal of Political Science: Vol. 16: No. 1, pp 71-104. http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/100.00019045
      PubDate: Mon, 11 Jan 2021 00:00:00 +010
       
  • Do Reelection Incentives Improve Policy Implementation' Accountability
           versus Political Targeting

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      Abstract: AbstractAlthough re-election prospects can improve policy implementation by incumbents, they can also create incentives for politically-motivated targeting, which might jeopardize distributional efficiency. While existing empirical tests typically focus on these potential countervailing incentives in isolation, this paper analyzes their net effect in the context of Bolsa Família (BF) in Brazil, using a regression discontinuity design and data on seven million households from the program's registry. The evidence supports political targeting over accountability: mayors with re-election incentives are four times more likely to include nonpoor, ineligible households in the policy. These results cannot be explained by higher effort in indiscriminate program expansion. On the contrary, evidence from both a survey with 11,000+ households and the heterogeneity in the estimates suggests that they reflect a breakdown on the information channels that lead the excluded poor to hold local administrations accountable. On the other hand, the included nonpoor are more likely to support incumbents in their re-election attempts, as they fear losing the benefit should the administration change. Finally, anomalous income reporting patterns also show that this electorally-driven targeting is more common for households enrolled by public servants politically connected to the mayor.Suggested CitationAnderson Frey (2021), "Do Reelection Incentives Improve Policy Implementation' Accountability versus Political Targeting", Quarterly Journal of Political Science: Vol. 16: No. 1, pp 35-69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/100.00019089
      PubDate: Mon, 11 Jan 2021 00:00:00 +010
       
 
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