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World Competition
Journal Prestige (SJR): 0.225

Number of Followers: 9

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ISSN (Print) 1011-4548
Published by Kluwer Law International

[21 journals]

Book Review: Alexandr Svetlicinii, Chinese State Owned Enterprises and EU
Merger Control, Routledge. 2021
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  Abstract:
  Volume 45 Online ISSN 1011-4548
  PubDate: Tue, 17 May 2022 00:01:11 GMT
  Issue No: Vol. 45 (2022)
Digital Platforms and Journalism in Australia: Analysing the Role of
Competition Law
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  Abstract: News media businesses compete with search engines and social media networks for advertising revenue but at the same time depend on the latter to reach and interact with audiences. The Digital Platforms Inquiry (DPI) completed by the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) found that media businesses’ dependency on digital platforms gives companies like Google and Facebook substantial bargaining power over Australian news media businesses. This development over the past decade has caused negative repercussions for the choice and quality of news available to Australians. In response to thegse findings, Australia’s News Media and Digital Platforms Mandatory Bargaining Code 2021 extends the application of competition law into digital news and advertising markets. The reform is intended to address the impact of digital platforms on the commercial viability of Australian news companies. In this article, we assess the application of competition law to the relationship between news media and digital platforms, including the strength of the DPI findings and the appropriateness of the resulting reforms. We argue that after decades of deregulation of the media sector in Australia the News Media Bargaining Code is a hybrid legislation, which introduces news media industry regulations under the guise of competition law. While we see a continued role for competition law in digital platform markets, this article indicates the challenges posed by digital platforms on media pluralism and the limitations of a market-driven approach to news media policy.
  Volume 45 Online ISSN 1011-4548
  PubDate: Tue, 17 May 2022 00:01:11 GMT
  Issue No: Vol. 45 (2022)
The European Commission’s Handling of Non-priority Antitrust Complaints:
An Empirical Assessment
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  Abstract: The Union legislature and courts leave the European Commission a wide discretion in dealing with antitrust complaints submitted to it. The principal external constraint is that if the Commission chooses not to pursue a formal complaint, it must reject it by means of a reasoned decision, which may be subject to judicial review. But the Commission’s administrative discretion is primarily structured and confined by self-imposed rules and principles. Most of these were introduced or formalized when Regulation 1/2003 was adopted and were intended to incentivize complainants to inform the Commission about potential infringements of the EU antitrust rules. This article maps the precise boundaries of the Commission’s discretion to shelve non-priority antitrust complaints and subsequently examines how the Commission operates within that discretionary space. The empirical analysis is based on a unique dataset of all the rejection decisions the Commission adopted between 2009 and 2021, many of which were uncovered and obtained through access to documents requests. It reveals certain discrepancies between the stated rules and principles governing its treatment of complaints and their implementation in practice, which have the clear potential to undermine the incentives the current complaint handling system sought to create for the filing of formal complaints.Volume 45 Online ISSN 1011-4548
  PubDate: Tue, 17 May 2022 00:01:11 GMT
  Issue No: Vol. 45 (2022)
A Positive Program for Antitrust' Enforcement in Times of Political
Tides
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  Abstract: The rise of Big Tech led to a still ongoing debate over the shape of antitrust enforcement. Many of such discussions take place in the United States and focus on the validity of consumer welfare standard, often leading each party of the discussion to entrench its position. In the European context, however, the success of the consumer welfare standard was never so full as in the United States, making way instead to the adoption of a ‘more economic approach’. This article discusses how the current tension within antitrust could be looked at from the European point of view. It suggests that antitrust might be subject to a perpetual movement between what has already been described in European antitrust as the more economic approach and what could be now termed as a more political approach. The article investigates what elements could be seen as part of such a more political approach. It leaves aside the question of which approach is the ‘correct’ one and attempts instead to look for ways of adjusting enforcement in times of change. The article concludes that while the more economic and more political approach are at odds, there appear to be ways of easing tensions within antitrust when political conditions change.
  Volume 45 Online ISSN 1011-4548
  PubDate: Tue, 17 May 2022 00:01:11 GMT
  Issue No: Vol. 45 (2022)
Why Does Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 Provide for the Imposition of Penalties
Only on Undertakings': A Historical Perspective
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  Abstract: According to Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003, the Commission may impose any fines for the breach of substantive competition rules only on ‘undertakings’. The provision does not contemplate the imposition of fines on individuals considered responsible for the conduct of the undertaking concerned, even though, as explained in this article, this position is not imposed by the relevant legal basis (Article 83 EC [the Treaty establishing the European Community in the version following the Treaty of Amsterdam], corresponding to Article 87 EEC Treaty [the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community in its version of 1957] and the present Article 103 TFEU [the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union]) That legal basis would indeed allow such liability to be established. From a policy point of view, however, it is often argued that sanctions should also be imposed on such individuals. This raises the question as to why the Union legislator chose not to provide for corresponding powers on the Commission’s part. From the relevant legislative history exposed in this article, it emerges that the approach of Article 23(2)(a) ultimately originates from the ECSC Treaty [theTreaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community]. In this latter context, it reflected the particular limits placed by its authors on that Treaty. It did not reflect the contemporary orientations at national level regarding punitive sanctions. The approach gradually found its way into Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 without any further specific discussion on the way, despite the different context offered by the relevant provisions of the EEC/EC Treaty. It was first transplanted into Regulation No 11, based on Article 79 EEC Treaty (today Article 95 TFEU) and concerning the abolition of discrimination in transport rates and conditions. The negotiations preceding the adoption of this Regulation brought to light strong reserves regarding the conferral of sanctioning powers upon the (then) EEC, and it was no doubt unrealistic to expect that it would have been granted powers more far-reaching than those available under the ECSC Treaty. When Regulation No 17 (and specifically Article 15) was elaborated, the drafters were aware of the scheme established by Regulation No 11, which served as a reference. No genuine discussion regarding possible powers to punish the persons considered responsible for the conduct of the ‘undertaking’ took place. It is likely that any such innovation would not have been realistic at that point. Lastly, the reform brought about by Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 focused on other aspects regarding the implementation of competition law, and the scheme of Article 15(2) of Regulation No 17 has been taken over into Article 23(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2013 without major changes. No consideration was given to the possible imposition of penalties on natural persons implicated in the commission of breaches of competition law.
  Volume 45 Online ISSN 1011-4548
  PubDate: Tue, 17 May 2022 00:01:11 GMT
  Issue No: Vol. 45 (2022)
Cultural Capture of Competition Policy: Exploring the Risk in the US and
the EU
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  Abstract: This article explores whether there is a risk that competition policy on both sides of the Atlantic could be distorted by cultural capture. This type of capture differs from traditional regulatory capture operating through self-interest of public officials. It instead arises when policy-relevant views of the officials are subject to disproportionate social influence exerted by representatives of the private sector. The question here is hence whether social interactions enabling this influence take place between competition officials and practitioners. The article answers in the affirmative, finding that many competition officials seem to self-identify with a community dominated by competition practitioners, hold the practitioners in high regard, and have interpersonal relationships with the practitioners. These risk factors are especially pronounced in the United States. There is thus a possibility that competition policy could be designed and enforced in a way that furthers interests of big business to the detriment of consumers and small businesses. The article also discusses preventive measures to limit cultural capture of competition policy such as promotion of diversity and reduction of revolving door, cautioning nevertheless that difficult trade-offs may need to be made in their implementation.
  Volume 45 Online ISSN 1011-4548
  PubDate: Tue, 17 May 2022 00:01:11 GMT
  Issue No: Vol. 45 (2022)
Editor’s Note
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  Abstract: Volume 45 Online ISSN 1011-4548
  PubDate: Tue, 17 May 2022 00:01:11 GMT
  Issue No: Vol. 45 (2022)