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Authors:Gerald C. Wright, Elizabeth Rigby Pages: 395 - 415 Abstract: State Politics & Policy Quarterly, Volume 20, Issue 4, Page 395-415, December 2020. Recent studies of representation at the national and state levels have provided evidence that elected officials’ votes, political parties’ platforms, and enacted policy choices are more responsive to the preferences of the affluent, while those with average incomes and the poor have little or no impact on the political process. Yet, this research on the dominance of the affluent has overlooked key partisan differences in the electorate. In this era of hyperpartisanship, we argue that representation occurs through the party system, and we test whether taking this reality into account changes the story of policy dominance by the rich. We combine data on public preferences and state party positions to test for income bias in parties’ representation of their own co-partisans. The results show an interesting pattern in which underrepresentation of the poor is driven by Democratic parties pushing the more liberal social policy stances of rich Democrats and Republican parties reflecting the particularly conservative economic policy preferences of rich Republicans. Thus, we have ample evidence that the wealthy, more often than not, do call the shots, but that the degree to which this disproportionate party responsiveness produces less representative policies depends on the party in power and the policy dimension being considered. We conclude by linking this pattern of influence and “coincidental representation” to familiar changes which define the transformation of the New Deal party system. Citation: State Politics & Policy Quarterly PubDate: 2020-04-08T11:59:27Z DOI: 10.1177/1532440020912461 Issue No:Vol. 20, No. 4 (2020)
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Authors:Zoe Nemerever, Daniel Butler Pages: 416 - 436 Abstract: State Politics & Policy Quarterly, Volume 20, Issue 4, Page 416-436, December 2020. Legislators who know their constituents’ opinions are more likely to be successful in providing substantive representation on issues of the day. However, previous work suggests that state legislators and candidates commonly misestimate their constituents’ preferences. Some of that work also finds that candidates and current incumbents in highly professionalized legislatures are less likely to misestimate constituent opinion. We investigate why this professionalism advantage exists. We use a Blinder–Oaxaca decomposition to determine how much of the professionalism advantage can be attributed to three sources: attracting knowledgeable candidates, fostering legislator knowledge in office, and retaining incumbents. We apply the decomposition to data on candidates’ perceptions of public opinion from the 2014 National Candidate Survey. Fostering knowledge in office and retaining incumbents are not responsible for the professionalism advantage. We find evidence that the professionalism advantage occurs because higher professionalism legislatures attract more knowledgeable nonincumbent candidates. Citation: State Politics & Policy Quarterly PubDate: 2020-06-27T06:31:22Z DOI: 10.1177/1532440020930709 Issue No:Vol. 20, No. 4 (2020)
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Authors:Jeffrey E. Cohen Pages: 437 - 461 Abstract: State Politics & Policy Quarterly, Volume 20, Issue 4, Page 437-461, December 2020. Research finds that voters benchmark the state’s unemployment level to the nation’s when holding state policy makers accountable. Yet benchmarking requires some voter knowledge if the standard is to be applied correctly as an accountability rule. This article leverages the fact that voters have more knowledge about their state governors than legislatures assess how much knowledge is necessary for holding these policy makers accountable. Using pooled Cooperative Congressional Election Study data from 2006 to 2016, results find that knowledge has stronger mediating effects for the state legislature than governor. Furthermore, despite the low knowledge levels among voters about the state legislature, collectively there appears to be enough knowledge to hold that policymaking body accountable. The conclusion offers directions for future research. Citation: State Politics & Policy Quarterly PubDate: 2020-02-15T09:34:21Z DOI: 10.1177/1532440020905800 Issue No:Vol. 20, No. 4 (2020)
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Authors:Joshua M. Jansa Pages: 462 - 488 Abstract: State Politics & Policy Quarterly, Volume 20, Issue 4, Page 462-488, December 2020. Political scientists and policy scholars have traditionally looked at the role of welfare and tax policies in shaping income inequality. Less attention has been paid to the key policy area of economic development. But states spend billions on economic development incentives each year to encourage firms to locate in their state. The few studies that have examined the impact of economic development policy on inequality have found mixed results, and have not considered who shapes and benefits from economic development policy when identifying possible causal mechanisms. I argue that increased incentive spending leads to increased inequality through either a market conditioning effect (incentives disproportionately boost the incomes of top earners prior to taxes) or a redistributive effect (incentives allow wealthy firms, investors, and employees to keep income that would otherwise be taxed and transferred). These mechanisms are tested using data on incentive spending and inequality across the 50 states from 1999 to 2014. The findings demonstrate that incentives increase income inequality via a redistributive effect only. This effect, though, is relatively large, long-lasting, and robust to different measures of incentive spending. Despite using economic development incentives to try to generate greater prosperity, state governments may be inadvertently exacerbating inequality. Citation: State Politics & Policy Quarterly PubDate: 2020-01-22T05:17:09Z DOI: 10.1177/1532440019900259 Issue No:Vol. 20, No. 4 (2020)
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Authors:Michelangelo Landgrave Pages: 489 - 507 Abstract: State Politics & Policy Quarterly, Volume 20, Issue 4, Page 489-507, December 2020. The use of deception is common in elite correspondence audit studies. Elite audit studies are a type of field experiment used by researchers to test for discrimination against vulnerable populations seeking to access government resources. These studies have provided invaluable insights, but they have done so at the cost of using deception. They have relied on identity, activity, and motivation deception. In addition, they request unnecessary work. Is there a less deceptive alternative' In this article, I present results from a field experiment with state legislative offices that minimize the use of deception. Consistent with elite correspondence audit studies, I find evidence of discrimination against Hispanics among state legislative offices. In addition, I find that discrimination is mitigated when subjects believe their behavior will be public knowledge. This suggests that discrimination can be mitigated through increased monitoring. This article advances the discussion on how to minimize the use of deception in elite field experimentation and how to mitigate discrimination against vulnerable populations. Citation: State Politics & Policy Quarterly PubDate: 2020-06-04T10:10:28Z DOI: 10.1177/1532440020925723 Issue No:Vol. 20, No. 4 (2020)
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Authors:David Cottrell, Michael C. Herron, Daniel A. Smith Abstract: State Politics & Policy Quarterly, Ahead of Print. Lines at the polls raise the cost of voting and can precipitate unequal treatment of voters. Research on voting lines is nonetheless hampered by a fundamental measurement problem: little is known about the distribution of time voters spend in line prior to casting ballots. We argue that early, in-person voter check-in times allow us identify individuals who waited in line to vote. Drawing on election administrative records from two General Elections in Florida—1,031,179 check-ins from 2012 and 1,846,845 from 2016—we find that minority voters incurred disproportionately long wait times in 2012 and that in-person voters who waited excessively in 2012 had a slightly lower probability—approximately one percent—of turning out to vote in 2016, ceteris paribus. These individuals also had slightly lower turnout probabilities in the 2014 Midterm Election, ceteris paribus. Our results draw attention to the ongoing importance of the administrative features of elections that influence the cost of voting and ultimately the extent to which voters are treated equally. Citation: State Politics & Policy Quarterly PubDate: 2020-08-13T06:54:24Z DOI: 10.1177/1532440020943884
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Authors:Laine P. Shay Abstract: State Politics & Policy Quarterly, Ahead of Print. What is the role of legislative term limits in the structure of legislative institutions' Using Mooney’s collective action problem theoretical framework on legislative leadership power, I claim that legislative term limits should be a key determinant in a state Speaker’s power via the delegation of institutional tools that control the lawmaking process. Speakers can use these tools to influence policy outcomes and their colleagues. I test this expectation in an analysis of lower chamber rules in nearly all states between 1981 and 2015. The results indicate that states with implemented term limits are associated with a more powerful Speaker. These findings suggest that a more nuanced relationship between legislative term limits and leadership power exist than previously thought. Citation: State Politics & Policy Quarterly PubDate: 2020-08-12T09:30:03Z DOI: 10.1177/1532440020947643
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Authors:Madelyn Fife, Greg Goelzhauser, Stephen T. Loertscher Abstract: State Politics & Policy Quarterly, Ahead of Print. What characteristics do state supreme court justices prioritize when choosing leaders' At the federal level, collegial court leaders are appointed or rotated by seniority. A plurality of states permit peer-vote selection, but the consequences of employing this mechanism are not well known. We develop a theory of chief justice selection emphasizing experience, bias, and politics. Leveraging within-contest variation and more than a half century’s worth of original contest data, we find that chief justice peer votes often default to seniority rotation. Ideological divergence from the court median, governor, and legislature is largely unassociated with selection. Justices who dissent more than their peers are, however, disadvantaged. We find no evidence of discrimination against women or people of color. The results have implications for policy debates about political leader selection. Citation: State Politics & Policy Quarterly PubDate: 2020-08-05T10:20:42Z DOI: 10.1177/1532440020945285
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Authors:Luke Fowler, Jaclyn J. Kettler Abstract: State Politics & Policy Quarterly, Ahead of Print. Does the partisanship of officeholders affect environmental outcomes' The popular perception is that Republicans are bad for the environment, but complicating factors like federalism may limit this outcome. Using a dataset that tracks toxic releases over 20 years, we examine how partisan control of executive and legislative branches at both state and federal levels affect environmental policy. Moving beyond the passage of policies or environmental program spending allows us to fully understand the impact of Republicans on the environment. In addition, we take into account structural complications that may shape the relationship between Republican control and environmental outcomes. We find that the conventional wisdom that Republicans are bad for the environment has some validity, but it is dependent on what offices Republican elected officials occupy. More specifically, Republicans significantly affect toxic chemical releases when occupying governorships and controlling Congress. Our conclusions provide further insight into understanding how partisanship affects environmental outcomes, including how partisanship composition across the federal system matters. Citation: State Politics & Policy Quarterly PubDate: 2020-07-27T10:53:34Z DOI: 10.1177/1532440020941794
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Authors:Jeff Gill Abstract: State Politics & Policy Quarterly, Ahead of Print. In this article, we develop and make available measures of public ideology in 2010 for the 50 American states, 435 congressional districts, and state legislative districts. We do this using the geospatial statistical technique of Bayesian universal kriging, which uses the locations of survey respondents, as well as population covariate values, to predict ideology for simulated citizens in districts across the country. In doing this, we improve on past research that uses the kriging technique for forecasting public opinion by incorporating Alaska and Hawaii, making the important distinction between ZIP codes and ZIP Code Tabulation Areas, and introducing more precise data from the 2010 Census. We show that our estimates of ideology at the state, congressional district, and state legislative district levels appropriately predict the ideology of legislators elected from these districts, serving as an external validity check. Citation: State Politics & Policy Quarterly PubDate: 2020-07-16T12:01:38Z DOI: 10.1177/1532440020930197
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Authors:Karin E. Kitchens Abstract: State Politics & Policy Quarterly, Ahead of Print. Do state politicians reward school districts that vote in favor of the party in power more than school districts that vote in favor of the opposing party' With large shares of money at the state level to transfer to local governments and the ability to target core voters, it would seem likely that politicians would take advantage of the ability to distribute education funds. However, in understanding how states distribute education funds, little emphasis is given to partisan influences, particularly the congruence between local school districts and the state level. To test this, I collected data at the precinct level within each state and, using mapping software, spatially joined precinct boundaries to school district boundaries. Once this relationship was established, I aggregated precinct-level information to school districts to understand the partisan voting patterns within each school district for elections from 2000 to 2010. This article finds evidence that funding formulas are susceptible to political influence and that parties are able to influence the geographic distribution of education funds to core voters. Citation: State Politics & Policy Quarterly PubDate: 2020-06-26T02:51:48Z DOI: 10.1177/1532440020933205
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Authors:William W. Franko Abstract: State Politics & Policy Quarterly, Ahead of Print. This study examines how state government responses to economic crisis, in the form of unexpected changes in state fiscal policy, influence income inequality. State governments are vital actors in times of fiscal stress as nearly every state must make difficult policy decisions related to taxes and spending to address budget deficits, both of which are policies that shape the income gap. Focusing on periods of fiscal stress is important for the study of state inequality as those with fewer resources are the most likely to experience the consequences of their state’s fiscal response during these times. Using time-series cross-sectional data, this research demonstrates that income inequality increases when states respond to economic crisis by relying on unexpected spending cuts. These effects tend to persist even after initial economic downturns. In addition, one individual-level implication of the aggregate relationship between state policy responses and inequality—that people will be worse off financially when their states emphasize budget cuts in response to economic decline—is assessed using several post–Great Recession surveys. The findings have implications for the future of inequality in the United States and provide potential paths for state fiscal reform. Citation: State Politics & Policy Quarterly PubDate: 2020-06-02T01:21:18Z DOI: 10.1177/1532440020919806
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Authors:Sung Eun Kim, Johannes Urpelainen, Joonseok Yang Abstract: State Politics & Policy Quarterly, Ahead of Print. State policies shape firms’ incentives to lobby in the United States, but the existing lobbying literature mostly ignores these incentives. Using lobbying records for all electric utilities in the United States from 1998 to 2012, we examine how state policies affect federal lobbying by both proponents and opponents of federal support for the renewable energy policy. Our theory predicts that supportive state policies reduce the returns to lobbying by both proponents and opponents. Empirically, we show that when the federal production tax credit for renewable energy is about to expire, electric utilities from states without renewable portfolio standards become more likely to lobby than those from states with these policies. Because the timing of the expiration of the production tax credit is quasi-random, these findings carry a causal interpretation. Using text analysis techniques, we also show that the lobbying efforts are focused on energy and environmental issues while lobbying on unrelated topics remains unaffected. Citation: State Politics & Policy Quarterly PubDate: 2020-05-22T11:07:28Z DOI: 10.1177/1532440020918865
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