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Abstract: Abstract Leader visits constitute an important signal in international relations. While studies of U.S. diplomacy can all use the same dataset from the Office of the Historian, IR scholars on China must make do with ad hoc datasets and often need to build their own from scratch. We contribute a novel dataset, China V isits, to fill this glaring gap. Our dataset has three major advantages: (1) it covers the period from 1998 onwards so that it is widely applicable to different research agendas; (2) each recorded visit has rich auxiliary information, including its date and duration, and is accompanied by a document from official websites for verification, and the dataset in its entirety is evaluated against existing datasets; (3) it is publicly available and indexed annually with country codes and country names. To facilitate its use, we provide a detailed analysis of the patterns in leader visits. PubDate: 2022-04-22
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Abstract: Abstract The Technocratic and Education Dataset (TED) provides comprehensive new data on the educational and professional backgrounds of the heads of government of all sovereign states between 1946 and 2015. TED details the educational and employment credentials of 1733 unique heads of government, and provides additional information on their demographic backgrounds and military experience. TED comes in leader-level and country-year versions. These data make three major contributions to the study of leadership. First, TED offers a longer time series than most extant data sets on leadership. Second, TED offers data on a broader cross section of countries, facilitating scholarship on a wider variety of countries, including non-OECD ones, which are excluded from many existing datasets on leaders. Third, by offering detailed data on the educational and employment experiences of leaders, TED helps scholars interested in the mechanisms underlying the effects of these experiences generate more rigorous tests of their theories. TED, therefore, represents a major step forward for those interested in leadership. In this article, we introduce TED and use it to show how the pool of international leaders has changed over time. We end with an empirical application of the data in which we use leadership characteristics to predict countries’ sovereign credit ratings. The article concludes with a discussion of other potential applications of these new data. PubDate: 2022-04-02
Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Abstract: Abstract Many observers worry that growing numbers of international institutions with overlapping functions undermine governance effectiveness via duplication, inconsistency and conflict. Such pessimistic assessments may undervalue the mechanisms available to states and other political agents to reduce conflictual overlap and enhance inter-institutional synergy. Drawing on historical data I examine how states can mitigate conflict within Global Governance Complexes (GGCs) by dissolving or merging existing institutions or by re-configuring their mandates. I further explore how “order in complexity” can emerge through bottom-up processes of adaptation in lieu of state-led reform. My analysis supports three theoretical claims: (1) states frequently refashion governance complexes “top-down” in order to reduce conflictual overlap; (2) “top-down” restructuring and “bottom-up” adaptation present alternative mechanisms for ordering relations among component institutions of GGCs; (3) these twin mechanisms ensure that GGCs tend to (re)produce elements of order over time–albeit often temporarily. Rather than evolving towards ever-greater fragmentation and disorder, complex governance systems thus tend to fluctuate between greater or lesser integration and (dis)order. PubDate: 2022-04-01
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Abstract: Abstract Most issue areas in world politics today are governed neither by individual institutions nor by regime complexes composed of formal interstate institutions. Rather, they are governed by “hybrid institutional complexes” (HICs) comprising heterogeneous interstate, infra-state, public–private and private transnational institutions, formal and informal. We develop the concept of the HIC as a novel descriptive and analytical lens for the study of contemporary global governance. The core structural difference between HICs and regime complexes is the greater diversity of institutional forms within HICs. Because of that diversity, HICs operate differently than regime complexes in two significant ways: (1) HICs exhibit relatively greater functional differentiation among their component institutions, and hence suffer from relatively fewer overlapping claims to authority; and (2) HICs exhibit greater informal hierarchy among their component institutions, and hence benefit from greater ordering. Both are systemic features. HICs have characteristic governance benefits: they offer good “substantive fit” for multi-faceted governance problems and good “political fit” for the preferences of diverse constituents; constrain conflictive cross-institutional strategies; and are conducive to mechanisms of coordination, which enhance substantive coherence. Yet HICs also pose characteristic governance risks: individual institutions may take on aspects of problems for which they are ill-suited; multiple institutions may create confusion; HICs can amplify conflict and contestation rather than constraining them; and the “soft” institutions within HICs can reduce the focality of incumbent treaties and intergovernmental organizations and forestall the establishment of new ones. We outline a continuing research agenda for exploring the structures, operations and governance implications of HICs. PubDate: 2022-04-01
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Abstract: Abstract Global governance complexes offer member states opportunities for “regime shifting”: playing off an institutional forum against another with the goal of improving one’s relative bargaining position. I probe the internal validity of this strategy. The model makes two contributions to the governance complex literature. Formally, first, the analysis goes beyond current “outside-option” models of regime shifting, involving a permanent break of negotiations, to “inside-option” models, involving temporary disagreements. Substantively, second, the article models two scenarios of regime shifting, one that works for the weak and another that works for the powerful, and then “tests” the claim held by some in the literature that powerful countries are more likely to avail themselves of the possibility of regime shifting than weaker countries. I conclude that regime shifting is more likely to work for the weak than for the strong. PubDate: 2022-04-01
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Abstract: Abstract Over the past decade, an increasingly sophisticated literature has sought to capture the nature, sources, and consequences of a novel empirical phenomenon in world politics: the growing complexity of global governance. However, this literature has paid only limited attention to questions of measurement, which is a prerequisite for a more comprehensive understanding of global governance complexity across space and time. In taking a first step in this direction, we make two contributions in the article. First, we propose new quantitative measures that gauge the extent of complexity in global governance, which we conceptualize as the degree to which global governance institutions overlap. Dyadic, weighted, directed-dyadic, and monadic measures enable a multifaceted understanding of this important development in world politics. Second, we illustrate these measures by applying them to an updated version of the most comprehensive data set on the design of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs): the Measure of International Authority (MIA). This allows us to identify cross-sectional and temporal patterns in the extent to which important IGOs, which tend to form the core of sprawling regime complexes in many issue areas, overlap. We conclude by outlining notable implications for, and potential applications of, our measures for research on institutional design and evolution, legitimacy, and legitimation, as well as effectiveness and performance. This discussion underscores the utility of the proposed measures, as both dependent and independent variables, to researchers examining the sources and consequences of institutional overlap in global governance and beyond. PubDate: 2022-04-01
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Abstract: Abstract The last decades have seen a remarkable expansion in the number of International Organizations (IOs) that have mainstreamed environmental issues into their policy scope—in many cases due to the pressure of civil society. We hypothesize that International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs), whose headquarters are in proximity to the headquarters of IOs, are more likely to affect IOs' expansion into the environmental domain. We test this explanation by utilizing a novel dataset on the strength of environmental global civil society in proximity to the headquarters of 76 IOs between 1950 and 2017. Three findings stand out. First, the more environmental INGOs have their secretariat in proximity to the headquarter of an IO, the more likely the IO mainstreams environmental policy. Second, proximate INGOs’ contribution increases when they can rely on domestically focused NGOs in member states. Third, a pathway case reveals that proximate INGOs played an essential role in inside lobbying, outside lobbying and information provision during the campaign to mainstream environmental issues at the World Bank. However, their efforts relied to a substantial extent on the work of local NGOs on the ground. PubDate: 2022-04-01
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Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Please help us test our new pre-print finding feature by giving the pre-print link a rating. A 5 star rating indicates the linked pre-print has the exact same content as the published article.
Abstract: Abstract Do ethno-linguistic divisions in a country hamper the implementation of IMF-supported programs' We construct a new measure of implementation and compliance with IMF programs approved during the 1992–2014 period covering 104 countries. Using several measures of diversity, we find that higher levels of ethno-linguistic and cultural fractionalization affect the probability of successful implementation of IMF conditions. Our results show that diverse preferences and coordination failures due to ethnic and cultural diversity undermine the successful implementation of IMF programs. Furthermore, we find that ethno-linguistic fractionalization weakens the implementation of ‘hard’ IMF conditions relative to ‘soft’ conditions. Our findings also show that ethno-linguistic divisions do not affect the implementation of IMF conditions in autocracies as opposed to democracies. These findings are robust to addressing endogeneity concerns using an instrumental variable approach and to a number of alternative specifications, data sets, and approaches. PubDate: 2022-03-04 DOI: 10.1007/s11558-022-09454-4
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Abstract: Abstract Sanctions are among the most widely used foreign policy tools of governments and international organizations in response to national or international wrongdoings. Beyond the dichotomous question of whether to adopt or not to adopt sanctions against a target, decision-makers develop different designs when they impose restrictions: targeted sanctions like asset freezes and travel bans, arms embargoes, or economic sanctions such as financial restrictions and commodity bans. What accounts for this variation in the design of sanctions regimes' This article investigates this question by developing a configurational explanation that combines domestic- and international-level factors for the choice of an economic versus a targeted sanctions design. I test these factors on original data mapping European Union (EU) autonomous sanctions against third countries in force in 2019 through set-theoretic methods. The analysis shows that a militarily strong target’s serious misbehavior through grave human rights violations triggers EU action in the form of economic sanctions, however, only in combination with two conditions: first, the EU reacts to a misbehavior through the adoption of an economic design when the United States imposes economic sanctions, too (path 1); second, the salience of a target’s conflict triggers an economic design of sanctions in case of grave human rights violations (path 2). PubDate: 2022-02-24 DOI: 10.1007/s11558-022-09458-0
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Abstract: Abstract Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have actively participated in the policymaking process within international organizations (IOs) by providing policy information. But due to limited policy attention and agenda space, IOs are capable of accommodating some but not all NGO information. How do IOs decide which NGO information to be accepted on the international agenda' Leveraging a unique information-filtering mechanism in the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights’ (OHCHR) preparation of summary reports that selectively incorporate information from NGO shadow reports during the United Nations Universal Periodic Review between 2008 and 2016, this article looks inside the “black box” of agenda setting in global governance. Using an original corpus of documents from OHCHR and more than 7000 advocacy organizations or coalitions, and a new method that quantifies OHCHR’s information gatekeeping behavior, I provide empirical support for the general claim that IOs are more likely to adopt NGO information provided by more reputable informants, expressed in neutral language, and supported by a greater number of organizations. These findings highlight the importance of IO agency in shaping the transnational advocacy agenda. PubDate: 2022-02-23 DOI: 10.1007/s11558-022-09455-3
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Abstract: Abstract What effects do international crises have on the public legitimacy of International Organizations (IOs)' Deviating from previous research, we argue that such crises make those international organizations more salient that are mandated to solve the respective crisis. This results in two main effects. First, the public legitimacy of those IOs becomes more dependent on citizens’ crisis-induced worries, leading to a more positive view of those IOs. Second, as the higher salience also leads to higher levels of elite communication regarding IOs, elite blaming of the IOs during crises results in direct negative effects on public legitimacy beliefs on IOs. Finally, both the valence and content of the elite discourse additionally moderate the positive effects of crisis-induced worries. Implementing survey experiments on public legitimacy beliefs on the WHO during the COVID-19 crisis with about 4400 respondents in Austria, Germany and Turkey, we find preliminary evidence for the expectations derived from our salience argument. In the conclusion, we discuss the implications of these findings for future research on IO legitimacy and IO legitimation. PubDate: 2022-02-11 DOI: 10.1007/s11558-021-09452-y
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Abstract: Abstract Is expropriation - the seizure of assets from foreign investors - a sign of wider repression in host countries' If so, under which circumstances' The relationship between expropriation and human rights has been under-explored in the international relations and international political economy literatures. We argue that domestic repression and expropriation are interrelated: both can be part of a state’s repertoire of coercive activities, the use of these tools reflecting a leader’s insecurity about their power position. Expropriation, however, often attracts widespread media attention, and thus may signal wider repressive acts against citizens, which are typically harder to detect. We present an exploratory analysis using a cross-country sample of seventy-eight non-OECD countries (1960-2006). Results show that expropriation is connected to higher repression, and that the effect is stronger in countries with higher historical human rights protection, which are in the middle of the democracy-autocracy spectrum. Our theoretical and empirical contributions illuminate a relationship between property rights and human rights, and give important insights to understanding state incentives to repress. PubDate: 2022-01-26 DOI: 10.1007/s11558-021-09447-9
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Abstract: Abstract As the world becomes more complicated, so too does global governance. The political consequences of the rising density of institutions, policies, rules and strategies to address global phenomena has been a central focus of the scholarship on international regime complexity. This conclusion to a special issue grapples with the promise and perils of theorizing about international regime complexity in a constantly evolving world. It discusses the special issue contributions while uniting the different conversations about the increasingly complex global governance space we refer to as international regime complexity. The goal is to bridge existing debates about global governance, to expand the scholarly conversation by drawing from and better connecting to IR debates, and to ensure that we can address practical and pressing global governance challenges. PubDate: 2022-01-10 DOI: 10.1007/s11558-021-09448-8