Subjects -> LAW (Total: 1397 journals)
    - CIVIL LAW (30 journals)
    - CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (52 journals)
    - CORPORATE LAW (65 journals)
    - CRIMINAL LAW (28 journals)
    - CRIMINOLOGY AND LAW ENFORCEMENT (161 journals)
    - FAMILY AND MATRIMONIAL LAW (23 journals)
    - INTERNATIONAL LAW (161 journals)
    - JUDICIAL SYSTEMS (23 journals)
    - LAW (843 journals)
    - LAW: GENERAL (11 journals)

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (52 journals)

Showing 1 - 44 of 44 Journals sorted alphabetically
Anuario de Derechos Humanos. Nueva Época     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
Anuario Iberoamericano de Justicia Constitucional     Open Access  
Asia Pacific Journal on Human Rights and the Law     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 20)
Berkeley Journal of African-American Law & Policy     Open Access   (Followers: 4)
Cittadinanza Europea (LA)     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Constitutional Commentary     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 7)
Constitutional Forum : Forum constitutionnel     Open Access   (Followers: 6)
Constitutional Political Economy     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 10)
Contemporary Politics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 10)
Cuestiones Constitucionales     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Duke Journal of Constitutional Law & Public Policy     Open Access   (Followers: 10)
Estudios Constitucionales     Open Access   (Followers: 5)
European Constitutional Law Review (EuConst)     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 47)
Global Constitutionalism     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 19)
Harvard Law School Journal on Legislation     Free   (Followers: 13)
Health and Human Rights     Open Access   (Followers: 10)
Human Rights Law Review     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 70)
Humanity : An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 20)
Intergenerational Justice Review     Open Access  
International Human Rights Law Review     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 34)
International Journal of Constitutional Law     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 69)
International Journal of Human Rights     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 71)
International Journal of Human Rights and Constitutional Studies     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 17)
International Journal on Minority and Group Rights     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9)
Ius Humani: Revista de derecho     Open Access  
Journal of Human Rights and the Environment     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 6)
Journal of Law, Religion and State     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Journal of Legislation     Open Access   (Followers: 4)
Law & Governance     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 5)
Law and Humanities     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8)
Pensamiento Constitucional     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
Religion and Human Rights     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 13)
Revista de Estudos Constitucionais, Hermenêutica e Teoria do Direito     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Revista de Investigações Constitucionais     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Revista Española de Derecho Constitucional     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Revus     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
SASI     Open Access   (Followers: 7)
Seton Hall Legislative Journal     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
Theory and Practice of Legislation     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 8)
University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law     Open Access   (Followers: 5)
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice     Open Access   (Followers: 8)
William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal     Open Access   (Followers: 6)
Yale Human Rights & Development Law Journal     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 19)
Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 21)
Similar Journals
Journal Cover
Constitutional Political Economy
Journal Prestige (SJR): 0.252
Citation Impact (citeScore): 1
Number of Followers: 10  
 
  Hybrid Journal Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles)
ISSN (Print) 1572-9966 - ISSN (Online) 1043-4062
Published by Springer-Verlag Homepage  [2467 journals]
  • The case for the five in final five voting

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      Abstract: Abstract My central concern is not, which electoral system would elect the best winner, but rather: which electoral system would be most likely to elect a Congress that would deliver optimal democratic outcomes' I use a theory of politics as an industry, first presented in Gehl & Porter (2017), that analyzes incentives and behaviors through the lens of competition. I argue that the optimal system is Final Five Voting (FFV), which is the combination of an open top-five primary and instant runoff voting (IRV) in the general election. Open, non-partisan primaries that select two candidates exist in California and Washington, while Alaska elects four in its open primary. Here I explain why the optimal number of candidates to advance from the primary to the general election is five.
      PubDate: 2023-01-27
       
  • Individual accountability, collective decision-making

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      Abstract: Abstract An influential theoretical literature studies a single executive’s electoral incentives to knowingly pursue bad policies because they are popular. I develop a model to study pandering in a legislative setting where multiple politicians, each accountable to their own constituency, are responsible for policymaking. Individual politicians receive private information about the best policy for achieving outcomes that citizens value. Politicians then privately deliberate to select a policy. Under certain conditions, politicians face electoral incentives to misrepresent their private evidence during deliberation in order to convince their colleagues to adopt a popular policy. I find that these perverse incentives become weaker as the number of politicians involved in policymaking increases. In larger groups, politicians share more responsibility for their policy choices. Individual politicians therefore have less to gain electorally from pandering. This result suggests that in addition to giving politicians more information about which policies are in citizens’ best interest, larger groups provide stronger incentives for politicians to use this information when policymaking is non-transparent.
      PubDate: 2023-01-23
       
  • Choosing among the Variety of proposed Voting Reforms

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      Abstract: Abstract A wide variety of voting reforms are offered for consideration in this special issue. This paper draws connections among them and identifies the beliefs that make particular proposals more attractive than others.
      PubDate: 2023-01-16
       
  • The failure of Instant Runoff to accomplish the purpose for which it was
           adopted: a case study from Burlington Vermont

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      Abstract: Abstract Instant-Runoff Voting (IRV) has been marketed to “guarantee that the majority candidate is elected,” to “eliminate the spoiler effect,” and to empower voters, particularly those supporting third-party or independent candidates, to “vote your hopes, not your fears,” which is meant to level the playing field between such candidates and those from the major-party duopoly. This paper shows that in Burlington Vermont, IRV objectively failed to deliver on these promises. However, this failure is not blamed on the use of ranked ballots, but rather on the Hare method of tallying the ballots and identifying the winner. To avoid the failure, this paper presents a variation on IRV, Bottom Two Runoff-IRV (BTR-IRV), including a template for possible legislative language.
      PubDate: 2023-01-10
       
  • Electoral reform: the case for majority judgment

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      Abstract: Abstract The majority judgment (MJ) voting method works well in theory and in practice. Not only does MJ avoid the classical Condorcet and Arrow paradoxes, but it also overcomes the domination paradox, from which paired comparisons by majority rule, approval voting, and all Condorcet consistent methods suffer. This article also shows why MJ best reduces the impact of strategic manipulation and minimizes ties to the extreme. The article illustrates the resistance of MJ to manipulations in a real example, discusses other salient properties of MJ, and summarizes several recent applications that show MJ to be, despite its newness, the right basis of electoral reform.
      PubDate: 2022-12-28
       
  • Testing public reaction to constitutional fiscal rules violations

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      Abstract: Abstract Politicians are less likely to breach constitutional fiscal rules than statutory rules because the breach of constitutional rules arguably puts them in a more negative spotlight and hampers their re-election prospects. This is one of the main arguments for explaining why constitutional fiscal rules tend to be more effective in correcting for political deficit bias vis-à-vis statutory rules. In this paper I isolate the reaction of the public to the potential breach of constitutional fiscal rules from the reaction of other players, such as the opposition, media and civil society organizations. Poland was chosen as a case study because it provides a highly realistic context where the numerical fiscal rule, the 60% of GDP debt limit, is enshrined in both constitutional and statutory laws. To test for the public reaction to constitutional fiscal rules violations, this study gathered data from three well-powered population-based survey experiments. In the first experiment (N = 1,106), a negative, albeit negligible, effect of constitutional breach (as compared to statutory law breach) on the policy approval was identified. The second (N = 1,587) and the third experiment (N = 1,082) displayed null results, i.e., no evidence was found that the public perceived the breach of constitutional fiscal rule as more negative than the violation of the statutory fiscal rule. It therefore seems that, on average, the public tends to care to the same extent about the violations of constitutional and statutory fiscal rules. It is of note that the experiments were conducted in highly unusual circumstances, i.e., in the context the COVID-19 crisis, presidential elections and war. Further and more extended research on these aspects should thus follow.
      PubDate: 2022-12-24
       
  • Classification of preferential ballot voting methods

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      Abstract: Abstract We examine 17 preferential ballot voting methods using three criteria: (1) mathematical properties, (2) game-theoretic considerations, and (3) practical real-world outcomes. The challenge of comparing and contrasting the real-world outcomes of different voting methods is the sheer number of possible elections that can exist. We combat this challenge by introducing a new way of visualizing outcomes in what we dub a “DNA sequence” for each voting method.
      PubDate: 2022-12-24
       
  • The best Condorcet-compatible election method: Ranked Pairs

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      Abstract: Abstract Condorcet-compatible election methods are examined and compared. The Ranked Pairs method proves significantly better than Beatpath; that both are clone-free, and have other desirable properties, makes them much better than any alternative.
      PubDate: 2022-12-23
       
  • The case for approval voting

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      Abstract: Abstract Citizens in many US states and cities in recent years have pushed for various reforms of voting methods. This raises the important question of which reform will best meet both normative and practical goals of representative democracy. While also evaluating criticisms of it, we make the case in this article that approval voting is the simplest actionable response. More specifically, we argue that approval voting offers distinct advantages, not only relative to the status quo of plurality voting, but also relative to alternative reforms. By giving voters the ability to support multiple candidates equally, approval voting grants true agency to the electorate to select strong winners among a candidate pool that is more competitive, diverse, and responsive to what voters want. As a low-cost yet high-impact electoral reform, the implementation of approval voting can create meaningful and lasting improvements in the quality of representation and policies.
      PubDate: 2022-12-19
       
  • Election cycles and corruption perception in Africa

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      Abstract: Abstract This paper empirically examines whether Africa’s low corruption agenda can be achieved amid election cycles. We employ country-level data from 36 African countries covering the period 1998–2020. Using fixed effects, random effects and dynamic panel data regressions, our results suggest that in election years, increment in government expenditure is associated with higher corruption perception while increment in real GDP growth lowers corruption perception than in non-election years. On regional differences, the effect of election cycles on corruption perception was found to be greater in southern part of Africa than the rest of the sub-regions. These findings may have important implications for policy.
      PubDate: 2022-12-17
       
  • Selecting a voting method: the case for the Borda count

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      Abstract: Abstract Of importance when selecting a voting method is whether, on a regular basis, its outcomes accurately capture the intent of voters. A surprise is that very few procedures do this. Another desired feature is for a decision approach to assist groups in reaching a consensus (Sect. 5). As described, these goals are satisfied only with the Borda count. Addressing these objectives requires understanding what can go wrong, what causes voting difficulties, and how bad they can be. To avoid technicalities, all of this is illustrated with examples accompanied by references for readers wishing a complete analysis. As shown (Sects. 1–3), most problems reflect a loss of vital information. Understanding this feature assists in showing that the typical description of Arrow’s Theorem, “with three or more alternatives, no voting method is fair,” is not accurate (Sect. 2).
      PubDate: 2022-12-16
       
  • Clientelism or public goods: dilemma in a ‘divided democracy’

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      Abstract: Abstract An ‘elite’ party caters to ‘elite’ voters, while a ‘non-elite’ party caters to ‘non-elite’ voters. Now, the ‘elite’ party wants to expand its support base to include ‘non-elite’ voters. It can do so using one of two possible strategies—it can provide them public goods or it can dole out clientelistic benefits to them. We present a probabilistic voting model to study the conditions under which the ‘elite’ party is likely to choose one or the other strategy. Our findings are supported by several historical and contemporary political experiences like that of the BJP in India, and the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated parties in Egypt, Yemen, and Indonesia.
      PubDate: 2022-12-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10602-022-09361-1
       
  • A classification of the methodology of James M. Buchanan from a
           multidisciplinary perspective

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      Abstract: Abstract James M. Buchanan (1919–2013) was notable for his contributions to different fields of Economics, being awarded with the Nobel Memorial Prize in this area in 1986. His methodology is characterized by three fundamental aspects: methodological individualism, a constitutional approach, and a contractarian political philosophy. In this paper, we explore the development of these features in Buchanan’s works and contrast them with alternative classifications in these categories by scholars in other areas of knowledge. We show that Buchanan’s individualism uses a concept of homo economicus that differs from most of his peers in economics. His constitutionalism follows a specific strand that differs from other constitutionalists of political science and law, and leads to his contractarianism, which also has its particularities within political philosophy and ethics.
      PubDate: 2022-12-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10602-021-09359-1
       
  • Lessons from the Japanese ninja: on achieving a higher trade equilibrium
           under anarchy and private constitutions

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      Abstract: Abstract This paper investigates the possibility of anarchy achieving a high trade equilibrium via the example of ninja communities in Japan. Initially, ninjas in the mountainous regions of Iga and Kōka were stateless, constantly feuded, and had few opportunities for exchange. With the advent of civil war in the sixteenth century, ninjas’ economic conditions changed. The mercenary market significantly expanded and presented great profit opportunities for the ninjas. However, instead of creating a formal government to move to a higher trade equilibrium, the ninjas resorted to forming voluntary confederations held together by private constitutions. I argue that this development was possible because the institutional environment of the Sengoku period enabled a framework of self-governing institutions and principles. The ninjas were able to build on this framework with very low organizational costs. As a result, the ninjas were able to reap large economic gains on the mercenary market while remaining stateless—a seemingly paradoxical development that goes against the standard dichotomy of “states and thick markets” versus “anarchy and thin markets.”
      PubDate: 2022-12-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10602-021-09354-6
       
  • Political inequality, political participation, and support for populist
           parties

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      Abstract: Abstract We theoretically investigate how political abstention among certain social groups encourages populist parties to enter the political stage, trying to absorb inactive voters. We design a two-stage game with two established parties and n voters who jointly determine a taxation policy. The electorate is divided into two groups, the advantaged and the disadvantaged. Voters’ decisions on whether to participate depend on a party’s tax rate proposal and on general party ideology. Effective political participation requires a certain amount of financial, social and intellectual resources to, for example, evaluate party programs or to engage in political discussion. As the disadvantaged are endowed with fewer resources, they lack political efficacy, resulting in less political participation. Consequently, the established parties propose a tax rate which is biased towards the preferences of the advantaged. The unused voter potential among the disadvantaged draws the interest of a populist challenger. To win support from the disadvantaged, the challenger party optimally proposes a respectively biased tax rate, which then works to polarize the political spectrum.Please confirm if the author names are presented accurately and in the correct sequence (given name, middle name/initial, family name). Author 1 Given name: [Kim Leonie] Last name [ Kellermann]. Also, kindly confirm the details in the metadata are correct.All correct.
      PubDate: 2022-12-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10602-021-09357-3
       
  • Giants among us: do we need a new antitrust paradigm'

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      Abstract: Abstract Traditional antitrust policy was formulated to control pricing and output decisions that were not disciplined by competitive forces, either because of monopoly power or agreements in restraint of trade. Because there is no single criterion for evaluating political policy outcomes, antitrust regulators eventually settled on the “consumer welfare standard,” correctly recognizing that any other standard was incoherent. Recently “platforms” (defined here as firms or apps that solve the key transaction costs problems of triangulation, transfer, and trust) have tended toward giantism. This had led to calls for a new approach to antitrust, restoring the old multiple set of goals. But every platform by definition defines an industry, and is a monopoly within that industry. Such network economies or advantages in managing trust are the reasons platforms exist in the first place. This paper reviews the history of antitrust, defines platforms and the problems of “giantism,” and suggests some policies that certainly won't work and should be abandoned. The problem is power, not monopoly. So power is what the “new paradigm” needs to address.
      PubDate: 2022-12-01
      DOI: 10.1007/s10602-021-09350-w
       
  • Covid-19 and the 2020 presidential election

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      Abstract: Abstract Whether deserved on not, US Presidents often receive the blame or the credit for the nature of the economy and direction of the country. Therefore, the status of the economy and the country in an election year can be a very important factor in election success for an incumbent President (or his party if an incumbent is not running). This is especially true in ‘battleground states’ due to the presence of the Electoral College system where Presidential candidates need only win different combinations of states in order to become President. However, the 2020 Presidential election was vastly different from past election cycles in that an additional variable, COVID-19, was added to the decision calculus of voters. Eventually, the 2020 election came down to the extremely slim margins in three states (Arizona, Georgia, and Wisconsin) and thin margins in two others (Pennsylvania and Michigan). This paper shows that deaths from COVID-19 at the county level played a small role in demotivating voters to turnout in 2020 to cast their vote for Joe Biden as President. In other words, without Covid-19, President Trump’s losses within these five states would have been even larger.
      PubDate: 2022-10-31
      DOI: 10.1007/s10602-022-09371-z
       
  • Money and the rule of Law

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      PubDate: 2022-10-19
      DOI: 10.1007/s10602-022-09372-y
       
  • State capacity, economic freedom, and classical liberalism

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      Abstract: Abstract This paper evaluates state capacity from the perspective of classical liberalism, especially the relationship of state capacity to economic freedom. It argues that a revenue-maximizing ruler is incentivized to allow for more economic freedom in the presence of more state capacity for most dimensions of economic freedom, as long as the time horizon for the ruler is non-myopic. In doing so, findings elsewhere concerning the relationship between other liberalizations (such as religious freedom and free trade) and state capacity are generalized. Expansions in state capacity are framed as facilitating efficiency-enhancing tax swaps which allow for more revenue generation and political support at the cost of the same or lower levels of deadweight loss. In the context of these issues, the classical liberal concern of a state using its capacity to repress society, rather than support markets, is also confronted.
      PubDate: 2022-10-07
      DOI: 10.1007/s10602-022-09374-w
       
  • Geoffrey Brennan

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      PubDate: 2022-08-23
      DOI: 10.1007/s10602-022-09369-7
       
 
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