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 Showing 1 - 98 of 98 Journals sorted alphabetically Advances in Statistics       (Followers: 9) Afrika Statistika       (Followers: 1) American Journal of Applied Mathematics and Statistics       (Followers: 11) American Journal of Mathematics and Statistics       (Followers: 9) Annals of Data Science       (Followers: 14) Annual Review of Statistics and Its Application       (Followers: 7) Applied Medical Informatics       (Followers: 11) Asian Journal of Mathematics & Statistics       (Followers: 8) Asian Journal of Probability and Statistics Austrian Journal of Statistics       (Followers: 4) Biostatistics & Epidemiology       (Followers: 4) Cadernos do IME : Série Estatística Calcutta Statistical Association Bulletin Communications in Mathematics and Statistics       (Followers: 4) Communications in Statistics - Simulation and Computation       (Followers: 9) Communications in Statistics: Case Studies, Data Analysis and Applications Comunicaciones en Estadística Econometrics and Statistics       (Followers: 1) Forecasting       (Followers: 1) Foundations and Trends® in Optimization       (Followers: 3) Frontiers in Applied Mathematics and Statistics       (Followers: 1) Game Theory       (Followers: 2) Geoinformatics & Geostatistics       (Followers: 14) Geomatics, Natural Hazards and Risk       (Followers: 13) Indonesian Journal of Applied Statistics International Game Theory Review       (Followers: 1) International Journal of Advanced Statistics and IT&C for Economics and Life Sciences International Journal of Advanced Statistics and Probability       (Followers: 7) International Journal of Algebra and Statistics       (Followers: 3) International Journal of Applied Mathematics and Statistics       (Followers: 3) International Journal of Ecological Economics and Statistics       (Followers: 5) International Journal of Energy and Statistics       (Followers: 3) International Journal of Game Theory       (Followers: 3) International Journal of Mathematics and Statistics       (Followers: 2) International Journal of Multivariate Data Analysis International Journal of Probability and Statistics       (Followers: 4) International Journal of Statistics & Economics       (Followers: 6) International Journal of Statistics and Applications       (Followers: 2) International Journal of Statistics and Probability       (Followers: 3) International Journal of Statistics in Medical Research       (Followers: 5) International Journal of Testing       (Followers: 1) Iraqi Journal of Statistical Sciences Japanese Journal of Statistics and Data Science Journal of Biometrics & Biostatistics       (Followers: 4) Journal of Cost Analysis and Parametrics       (Followers: 5) Journal of Environmental Statistics       (Followers: 4) Journal of Game Theory       (Followers: 1) Journal of Mathematical Economics and Finance Journal of Mathematics and Statistics Studies Journal of Modern Applied Statistical Methods       (Followers: 1) Journal of Official Statistics       (Followers: 2) Journal of Quantitative Economics Journal of Social and Economic Statistics Journal of Statistical Theory and Practice       (Followers: 2) Journal of Statistics and Data Science Education       (Followers: 2) Journal of Survey Statistics and Methodology       (Followers: 4) Journal of the Indian Society for Probability and Statistics Jurnal Biometrika dan Kependudukan Jurnal Ekonomi Kuantitatif Terapan Jurnal Sains Matematika dan Statistika Lietuvos Statistikos Darbai Mathematics and Statistics       (Followers: 2) Methods, Data, Analyses       (Followers: 1) METRON       (Followers: 1) Nepalese Journal of Statistics North American Actuarial Journal       (Followers: 1) Open Journal of Statistics       (Followers: 3) Open Mathematics, Statistics and Probability Journal Pakistan Journal of Statistics and Operation Research       (Followers: 1) Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications       (Followers: 6) Probability, Uncertainty and Quantitative Risk       (Followers: 2) Ratio Mathematica Research & Reviews : Journal of Statistics       (Followers: 3) Revista Brasileira de Biometria Revista Colombiana de Estadística RMS : Research in Mathematics & Statistics Romanian Statistical Review Sankhya B - 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Similar Journals
 International Journal of Game TheoryJournal Prestige (SJR): 0.564 Number of Followers: 3      Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles) ISSN (Print) 1432-1270 - ISSN (Online) 0020-7276 Published by Springer-Verlag  [2469 journals]
• Object reallocation problems under single-peaked preferences: two
characterizations of the crawler

Abstract: Abstract In object reallocation problems, if preferences are strict but otherwise unrestricted, TTC is the leading rule: It is the only rule satisfying efficiency, the endowment lower bound, and strategy-proofness. However, on the subdomain of single-peaked preferences, Bade (J Econ Theory 180:81–99, 2019) defines a new rule, the “crawler”, which also satisfies these properties, and in fact enjoys a stronger strategic property. We identify additional interesting properties that the crawler satisfies, and provide two characterizations of this rule. The first characterization is based on the endowment lower bound and two invariance properties, “adjacent-endowment-swapping invariance” and “separability”. The second characterization is based on the endowment lower bound, strategy-proofness, adjacent-endowment-swapping invariance, and another invariance property, “non-bossiness”.
PubDate: 2022-03-15

• An epistemic approach to explaining cooperation in the finitely repeated
Prisoner’s Dilemma

Abstract: Abstract We use epistemic game theory to explore rationales behind cooperative behaviors in the finitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma. For a class of type structures that are sufficiently rich, the set of outcomes that can arise when each player i is rational and satisfies $$(m_i-1)$$ th order strong belief of rationality is the set of paths on which each player i defects in the last $$m_i$$ rounds. We construct one sufficiently rich type structure to elaborate on how different patterns of cooperative behaviors arise under sufficiently weak epistemic conditions. In this type structure, the optimality of forgiving the opponent’s past defection and the belief that one’s defection will be forgiven account for the richness of the set of behavior outcomes.
PubDate: 2022-03-01
DOI: 10.1007/s00182-021-00785-x

• Existence of value for a differential game with asymmetric information and
signal revealing

Abstract: Abstract In the present paper, we investigate the existence of value for a new class of infinite horizon two-person zero-sum differential games with asymmetric information on the random pay-off. Before the game begins, both players receive private information about the randomly chosen running cost, while during the game a public signal dependent of the cost function is generated and observed by both players. We prove that, with suitable notion of strategies, the game has a value, and its value function is the unique bounded continuous viscosity solution of a Hamilton–Jacobi–Isaacs equation.
PubDate: 2022-03-01
DOI: 10.1007/s00182-021-00790-0

• Cyclical behavior of evolutionary dynamics in coordination games with
changing payoffs

Abstract: Abstract The paper presents a model of two-speed evolution in which the payoffs in the population game (or, alternatively, the individual preferences) slowly adjust to changes in the aggregate behavior of the population. The model investigates how, for a population of myopic agents with homogeneous preferences, changes in the environment caused by current aggregate behavior may affect future payoffs and hence alter future behavior. The interaction between the agents is based on a symmetric two-strategy game with positive externalities and negative feedback from aggregate behavior to payoffs, so that at every point in time the population has an incentive to coordinate, whereas over time the more popular strategy becomes less appealing. Under the best response dynamics and the logit dynamics with small noise levels the joint trajectories of preferences and behavior converge to closed orbits around the unique steady state, whereas for large noise levels the steady state of the logit dynamics becomes a sink. Under the replicator dynamics the unique steady state of the system is repelling and the trajectories are unbounded unstable spirals.
PubDate: 2022-03-01
DOI: 10.1007/s00182-021-00783-z

• Some remarks on the modeling of discrete matching markets

Abstract: Abstract This paper shows that the college admissions model with responsive preferences is not always satisfactory for representing real college admissions markets. Simple examples are used to illustrate real situations, in which the knowledge of the preferences of the institutions over all possible assignments of candidates is necessary for the analysis of relevant problems for the markets under consideration.
PubDate: 2022-03-01
DOI: 10.1007/s00182-021-00788-8

• Some new results on generalized additive games

Abstract: Abstract A Generalized Additive Game (GAG) (Cesari et al. in Int J Game Theory 46(4):919–939, 2017) is a Transferable Utility (TU) game (N, v), where each player in N is provided with an individual value, and the worth v(S) of a coalition $$S \subseteq N$$ is obtained as the sum of the individual values of players in another subset $$\mathcal {M}(S)\subseteq N$$ . Based on conditions on the map $$\mathcal {M}$$ (which associates to each coalition S a set of beneficial players $$\mathcal {M}(S)$$ not necessarily included in S), in this paper we characterize classes of GAGs that satisfy properties like monotonicity, superadditivity, (total) balancedness, PMAS-admissibility and supermodularity, for all nonnegative vectors of individual values. We also illustrate the application of such conditions on $$\mathcal {M}$$ over particular GAGs studied in the literature (e.g., glove games (Shapley and Shubik in Int Econ Rev 10:337–362, 1969), generalized airport games (Norde et al. in Eur J Oper Res 136(3):635–654, 2002), fixed tree games (Bjørndal et al. in Math Methods Oper Res 59(2):249–270, 2004), link-connection games (Moretti in Multi-agent systems and agreement technologies, vol 10767. Springer, Cham, 2008; Nagamochi et al. in Math Oper Res 22(1):146–164, 1997), simple minimum cost spanning tree games (Norde et al. in Eur J Oper Res 154(1):84–97, 2004; Tijs et al. in Eur J Oper Res 175(1):121–134, 2006) and graph coloring games (Deng et al. in Math Program 87(3):441–452, 2000; Hamers et al. in Math Program 145(1–2):509–529, 2014)).
PubDate: 2022-03-01
DOI: 10.1007/s00182-021-00786-w

• Nash blocks

Abstract: Abstract A product set of pure strategies is a Nash block if it contains all best replies to the Nash equilibria of the game in which the players are restricted to the strategies in the block. This defines an intermediate block property, between curb (Basu and Weibull, Econ Lett 36(2):141–146, https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(91)90179-O, http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/016517659190179O, 1991) and coarse tenability (Myerson and Weibull (2015) Econometrica 83(3):943–976, https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA11048). While the new concept is defined without reference to the consideration-set framework that defines tenability, the framework can be used to characterize Nash blocks in terms of potential conventions when large populations of individuals recurrently interact. Although weaker than curb, Nash blocks nevertheless maintain several robustness properties of curb sets. For example, every Nash block contains an essential component and is robust against payoff perturbations.
PubDate: 2022-03-01
DOI: 10.1007/s00182-021-00784-y

• Simplified group activity selection with group size constraints

Abstract: Abstract Several real-world situations can be represented in terms of agents that have preferences over activities in which they may participate. Often, the agents can take part in at most one activity (for instance, since these take place simultaneously), and there are additional constraints on the number of agents that can participate in an activity. In such a setting, we consider the task of assigning agents to activities in a reasonable way. We introduce the simplified group activity selection problem providing a general yet simple model for a broad variety of settings, and start investigating its special case where upper and lower bounds of the groups have to be taken into account. We apply different solution concepts such as envy-freeness and core stability to our setting and provide a computational complexity study for the problem of finding such solutions.
PubDate: 2022-03-01
DOI: 10.1007/s00182-021-00789-7

• The equal collective gains value in cooperative games

Abstract: Abstract The property of equal collective gains means that each player should obtain the same benefit from the cooperation of the other players in the game. We show that this property jointly with efficiency characterize a new solution, called the equal collective gains value (ECG-value). We introduce a new class of games, the average productivity games, for which the ECG-value is an imputation. For a better understanding of the new value, we also provide four alternative characterizations of it, and a negotiation model that supports it in subgame perfect equilibrium.
PubDate: 2022-03-01
DOI: 10.1007/s00182-021-00791-z

• Optimal contracts with random monitoring

Abstract: Abstract We study an optimal contract problem under moral hazard in a principal-agent framework where contracts are implemented through random monitoring. This is a monitoring instrument that reveals the precise action taken by the agent with some nondegenerate probability, and otherwise reveals no information. The agent’s cost of performing the action depends on a random state of nature. This state is private information to the agent, but can be non-verifiably communicated, allowing the contract to specify wages as a function of the agent’s message. We show that the optimal contract partitions the set of types in three regions. The most efficient types exert effort and receive a reward when monitored. Moderately efficient types exert effort but are paid the same wage with monitoring as without. The least efficient types do not exert effort. More intense monitoring increases the value of a contract when the agent is risk averse.
PubDate: 2022-03-01
DOI: 10.1007/s00182-021-00787-9

• Coordination on networks with farsighted and myopic agents

Abstract: Abstract We study a coordination game on a fixed connected network where players have to choose between two projects. Some players are moderate (i.e. they are ex-ante indifferent between both projects) while others are stubborn (i.e. they always choose the same project). Benefits for moderate players are increasing in the number of neighbors who choose the same project. In addition, players are either farsighted or myopic. Farsighted players anticipate the reactions of others while myopic players do not. We show that, when all players are farsighted, full coordination among the moderate players is reached except if there are stubborn players for both projects. When the population is mixed, the set of stable strategy profiles is a refinement of the set of Nash equilibrium strategy profiles. In fact, turning myopic players into farsighted ones eliminates gradually the inefficient Nash equilibria. Finally, we consider a social planner who can improve coordination by means of two policy instruments: adding links to the network (socialization) and/or turning myopic players into farsighted ones (education).
PubDate: 2022-01-09
DOI: 10.1007/s00182-021-00802-z

• Fairness and fuzzy coalitions

Abstract: Abstract In this paper, we study the problem of a fair redistribution of resources among agents in an exchange economy á la Shitovitz (Econometrica 41:467–501, 1973), with agents’ measure space having both atoms and an atomless sector. We proceed by following the idea of Aubin (Mathematical methods of game economic theory. North-Holland, Amsterdam, New York, Oxford, 1979) to allow for partial participation of individuals in coalitions, that induces an enlargement of the set of ordinary coalitions to the so-called fuzzy or generalized coalitions. We propose a notion of fairness which, besides efficiency, imposes absence of envy towards fuzzy coalitions, and which fully characterizes competitive equilibria and Aubin-core allocations.
PubDate: 2021-12-01
DOI: 10.1007/s00182-021-00780-2

• Monopolists of scarce information and small group effectiveness in large
quasilinear economies

Abstract: Abstract In large quasilinear economies, we provide sufficient conditions to establish the nonemptiness of several versions of approximate interim cores with endogenous communication. This is done by proving nonemptiness of approximate ex post cores satisfying incentive compatibility. Our model features a finite number of agents whose information is exclusive, whom we shall term “monopolists of scarce information.” When the number of agents with exclusive information remains finite, the main argument relies on an adaptation of the small group effectiveness condition, previously proposed for games of complete information.
PubDate: 2021-12-01
DOI: 10.1007/s00182-021-00769-x

• Cautious farsighted stability in network formation games with streams of
payoffs

Abstract: Abstract We propose a new notion of farsighted pairwise stability for dynamic network formation which includes two notable features: consideration of intermediate payoffs and cautiousness. This differs from existing concepts which typically consider either only immediate or final payoffs, and which often require that players are optimistic in any environment without full communication and commitment. For arbitrary (and possibly heterogeneous) preferences over the process of network formation, a non-empty cautious path stable set of networks always exists. Furthermore, some general relationships exist between cautious path stability and other farsighted concepts.
PubDate: 2021-12-01
DOI: 10.1007/s00182-021-00771-3

• Spatial competition on 2-dimensional markets and networks when consumers
don’t always go to the closest firm

Abstract: Abstract We investigate the strategic behavior of firms in a Hotelling spatial setting. The innovation is to combine two important features that are ubiquitous in real markets: (1) the location space is two-dimensional, often with physical restrictions on where firms can locate; (2) consumers with some probability shop at firms other than the nearest. We characterise convergent Nash equilibria (CNE), in which all firms cluster at one point, for several alternative markets. In the benchmark case of a square convex market, we provide a new direct geometric proof of a result by Cox (Am J Political Sci 31:82–108, 1987) that CNE can arise in a sufficiently central part of the market. The convexity of the square space is of restricted realism, however, and we proceed to investigate grids, which more faithfully represent a stylised city’s streets. We characterise CNE, which exhibit several new phenomena. CNE in more central locations tend to be easier to support, echoing the unrestricted square case. However, CNE on the interior of edges differ substantially from CNE at nodes and follow quite surprising patterns. Our results also highlight the role of positive masses of indifferent consumers, which arise naturally in a network setting. In most previous models, in contrast, such masses cannot exist or are assumed away as unrealistic.
PubDate: 2021-12-01
DOI: 10.1007/s00182-021-00776-y

• The (non-)robustness of influential cheap talk equilibria when the
sender’s preferences are state independent

Abstract: Abstract Chakraborty and Harbaugh (Am Econ Rev 100(5):2361–2382, 2010) prove the existence of influential cheap talk equilibria in one sender one receiver games when the state is multidimensional and the preferences of the sender are state independent. We show that influential equilibria do not survive the introduction of any small degree of Harsanyi-uncertainty, i.e., uncertainty about the sender’s preferences in the spirit of Harsanyi (Int J Game Theory 2(1):1–23, 1973).
PubDate: 2021-12-01
DOI: 10.1007/s00182-021-00774-0

• An upper bound for the $$\ell _1$$ ℓ 1 -variation along the road to
agreement

Abstract: Abstract Two agents with a common prior on the possible states of the world participate in a process of information transmission, consisting of sharing posterior probabilities of an event of interest. Aumann’s Agreement Theorem implies that such a process must end with both agents having the same posterior probability. We show that the $$\ell _1$$ -variation of the sequence of posteriors of each agent, obtained along this process, must be finite, and provide an upper bound for its value.
PubDate: 2021-12-01
DOI: 10.1007/s00182-021-00781-1

• Equilibrium payoffs in two-player discounted OLG games

Abstract: Abstract This paper studies payoffs in subgame perfect equilibria of two-player discounted overlapping generations games with perfect monitoring. Assuming that mixed strategies are observable and a public randomization device is available, it is shown that sufficiently patient players can obtain any payoffs in the interior of the smallest rectangle containing the feasible and strictly individually rational payoffs of the stage game, when we first choose the rate of discount and then choose the players’ lifespan. Unlike repeated games without overlapping generations, obtaining payoffs outside the feasible set of the stage game does not require unequal discounting.
PubDate: 2021-12-01
DOI: 10.1007/s00182-021-00779-9

• Believing when credible: talking about future intentions and past actions

Abstract: Abstract In an equilibrium framework, we explore how players communicate in games with multiple Nash equilibria when messages that make sense are not ignored. Communication is about strategies and not about private information. It begins with the choice of a language, followed by a message that is allowed to be vague. We focus on equilibria where the sender is believed whenever possible, and develop a theory of credible communication. We show that credible communication is sensitive to changes in the timing of communication. Sufficient conditions for communication leading to efficient play are provided.
PubDate: 2021-12-01
DOI: 10.1007/s00182-021-00772-2

• Improving efficiency in school choice under partial priorities

Abstract: Abstract We provide a school choice model where the student priority orders for schools are allowed not to be total. We introduce a class of algorithms, each of which derives a student optimal stable matching once we have an initial stable matching, when the priorities are represented by partial orders. Since a method to derive a stable matching exists when the priorities are partial orders, we can use it to derive a student optimal stable matching. Moreover, we show that any student optimal stable matchings that Pareto dominate the starting stable one are obtained via an algorithm within this class. For the problem of improving efficiency by allowing some priorities to be violated, the algorithms can also be applied, with a weaker assumption on the violations than in the previous study. Finally, we suggest some specific rules of priorities that can be introduced by weakening the requirement of total ordering.
PubDate: 2021-12-01
DOI: 10.1007/s00182-021-00777-x

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