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PROBABILITIES AND MATH STATISTICS (113 journals)                     

Showing 1 - 98 of 98 Journals sorted alphabetically
Advances in Statistics     Open Access   (Followers: 9)
Afrika Statistika     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
American Journal of Applied Mathematics and Statistics     Open Access   (Followers: 11)
American Journal of Mathematics and Statistics     Open Access   (Followers: 9)
Annals of Data Science     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 14)
Annual Review of Statistics and Its Application     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 7)
Applied Medical Informatics     Open Access   (Followers: 11)
Asian Journal of Mathematics & Statistics     Open Access   (Followers: 8)
Asian Journal of Probability and Statistics     Open Access  
Austrian Journal of Statistics     Open Access   (Followers: 4)
Biostatistics & Epidemiology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Cadernos do IME : Série Estatística     Open Access  
Calcutta Statistical Association Bulletin     Hybrid Journal  
Communications in Mathematics and Statistics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Communications in Statistics - Simulation and Computation     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 9)
Communications in Statistics: Case Studies, Data Analysis and Applications     Hybrid Journal  
Comunicaciones en Estadística     Open Access  
Econometrics and Statistics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Forecasting     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Foundations and Trends® in Optimization     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
Frontiers in Applied Mathematics and Statistics     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Game Theory     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Geoinformatics & Geostatistics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 14)
Geomatics, Natural Hazards and Risk     Open Access   (Followers: 13)
Indonesian Journal of Applied Statistics     Open Access  
International Game Theory Review     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
International Journal of Advanced Statistics and IT&C for Economics and Life Sciences     Open Access  
International Journal of Advanced Statistics and Probability     Open Access   (Followers: 7)
International Journal of Algebra and Statistics     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
International Journal of Applied Mathematics and Statistics     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 3)
International Journal of Ecological Economics and Statistics     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 4)
International Journal of Energy and Statistics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
International Journal of Game Theory     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 3)
International Journal of Mathematics and Statistics     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
International Journal of Multivariate Data Analysis     Hybrid Journal  
International Journal of Probability and Statistics     Open Access   (Followers: 4)
International Journal of Statistics & Economics     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 6)
International Journal of Statistics and Applications     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
International Journal of Statistics and Probability     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
International Journal of Statistics in Medical Research     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5)
International Journal of Testing     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Iraqi Journal of Statistical Sciences     Open Access  
Japanese Journal of Statistics and Data Science     Hybrid Journal  
Journal of Biometrics & Biostatistics     Open Access   (Followers: 4)
Journal of Cost Analysis and Parametrics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 5)
Journal of Environmental Statistics     Open Access   (Followers: 4)
Journal of Game Theory     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Journal of Mathematical Economics and Finance     Full-text available via subscription  
Journal of Mathematics and Statistics Studies     Open Access  
Journal of Modern Applied Statistical Methods     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Journal of Official Statistics     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Journal of Quantitative Economics     Hybrid Journal  
Journal of Social and Economic Statistics     Open Access  
Journal of Statistical Theory and Practice     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Journal of Statistics and Data Science Education     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Journal of Survey Statistics and Methodology     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 4)
Journal of the Indian Society for Probability and Statistics     Full-text available via subscription  
Jurnal Biometrika dan Kependudukan     Open Access  
Jurnal Ekonomi Kuantitatif Terapan     Open Access  
Jurnal Sains Matematika dan Statistika     Open Access  
Lietuvos Statistikos Darbai     Open Access  
Mathematics and Statistics     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Methods, Data, Analyses     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
METRON     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Nepalese Journal of Statistics     Open Access  
North American Actuarial Journal     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Open Journal of Statistics     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
Open Mathematics, Statistics and Probability Journal     Open Access  
Pakistan Journal of Statistics and Operation Research     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 6)
Probability, Uncertainty and Quantitative Risk     Open Access   (Followers: 2)
Ratio Mathematica     Open Access  
Research & Reviews : Journal of Statistics     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
Revista Brasileira de Biometria     Open Access  
Revista Colombiana de Estadística     Open Access  
RMS : Research in Mathematics & Statistics     Open Access  
Romanian Statistical Review     Open Access  
Sankhya B - Applied and Interdisciplinary Statistics     Hybrid Journal  
SIAM Journal on Mathematics of Data Science     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
SIAM/ASA Journal on Uncertainty Quantification     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Spatial Statistics     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Sri Lankan Journal of Applied Statistics     Open Access  
Stat     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 1)
Stata Journal     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 8)
Statistica     Open Access   (Followers: 6)
Statistical Analysis and Data Mining     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 23)
Statistical Theory and Related Fields     Hybrid Journal  
Statistics and Public Policy     Open Access   (Followers: 4)
Statistics in Transition New Series : An International Journal of the Polish Statistical Association     Open Access  
Statistics Research Letters     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
Statistics, Optimization & Information Computing     Open Access   (Followers: 3)
Stats     Open Access  
Synthesis Lectures on Mathematics and Statistics     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 1)
Theory of Probability and its Applications     Hybrid Journal   (Followers: 2)
Theory of Probability and Mathematical Statistics     Full-text available via subscription   (Followers: 2)
Turkish Journal of Forecasting     Open Access   (Followers: 1)
VARIANSI : Journal of Statistics and Its application on Teaching and Research     Open Access  
Zeitschrift für die gesamte Versicherungswissenschaft     Hybrid Journal  

           

Similar Journals
Journal Cover
International Game Theory Review
Journal Prestige (SJR): 0.236
Number of Followers: 1  
 
  Hybrid Journal Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles)
ISSN (Print) 0219-1989 - ISSN (Online) 1793-6675
Published by World Scientific Homepage  [120 journals]
  • Author Index Volume 23 (2021)

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      Abstract: International Game Theory Review, Volume 23, Issue 04, December 2021.

      Citation: International Game Theory Review
      PubDate: 2022-03-02T08:00:00Z
      DOI: 10.1142/S0219198921990012
      Issue No: Vol. 23, No. 04 (2022)
       
  • Mean Field Game Model for an Advertising Competition in a Duopoly

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      Authors: René Carmona, Gökçe Dayanıklı
      Abstract: International Game Theory Review, Volume 23, Issue 04, December 2021.
      In this study, we analyze an advertising competition in a duopoly. We consider two different notions of equilibrium. We model the companies in the duopoly as major players, and the consumers as minor players. In our first game model, we identify Nash Equilibrium (NE) between all the players. Next we frame the model to lead to the search for Multi-Leader–Follower Nash Equilibrium (MLF-NE). This approach is reminiscent of Stackelberg games in the sense that the major players design their advertisement policies assuming that the minor players are rational and settle in a Nash Equilibrium among themselves. This rationality assumption reduces the competition between the major players to a two-player game. After solving these two models for the notions of equilibrium, we analyze the similarities and differences of the two different sets of equilibria.
      Citation: International Game Theory Review
      PubDate: 2022-02-23T08:00:00Z
      DOI: 10.1142/S0219198921500249
      Issue No: Vol. 23, No. 04 (2022)
       
  • A Differential Game Analysis of the Firms’ Process Innovation with
           Technological Spillover Under Different Market Structures in a Duopoly
           Market

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      Authors: Shoude Li
      Abstract: International Game Theory Review, Ahead of Print.
      In this paper, we formulated a dynamic game model of the firms’ process innovation with technological spillover under different market structures (market competition intensity) in a duopoly market, in which the firms are concerned about relative profits as well as their own profits and investigated the relationship between the degree of competitiveness faced by the firms and their R&D expenditure. Our results showed that, under certain conditions, the system always admits saddle point steady-state equilibrium under independent ventures and R&D cartel games, respectively, and although the process innovation investment under R&D cartel is higher than that under the independent ventures, whether the marginal production cost under R&D cartel is less (higher) than that under the independent ventures depends on the degree of technological R&D spillover and the market competition intensity. Furthermore, the marginal production cost under independent ventures is not monotonically decreasing with spillover for the given region of market competition intensity; while the marginal production cost under R&D cartel game always monotonically decreases with spillover for any market competition intensity.
      Citation: International Game Theory Review
      PubDate: 2022-03-30T07:00:00Z
      DOI: 10.1142/S0219198922500128
       
  • Consensus Game: An Extension of Battle of the Sexes Game

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      Authors: Chunlin Wang, Joyendu Bhadury
      Abstract: International Game Theory Review, Ahead of Print.
      This paper introduces “Consensus Game” as a multiplayer extension of the well-known “Battle of the Sexes” game to model situations where multiple parties (e.g., buyers–sellers) need to come to an agreement on a common issue in order for all players to be better off. We develop closed-form analytical expressions for the mixed-strategy Nash Equilibrium of a Consensus Game and thereafter, under a mildly restrictive assumption of completely mixed strategies, demonstrate the uniqueness of this equilibrium. We also show that in the constant-sum version of the Consensus Game, this unique Nash Equilibrium guarantees equal payoffs to all players. This result pertaining to equal payoffs as the only Nash Equilibrium suggests that in applications where multiple parties need to arrive at a consensus in order to share a common and fixed pool of a resource, an equal-utility distribution of the pool is the only stable solution that does not provide any party a unilateral incentive to deviate.
      Citation: International Game Theory Review
      PubDate: 2022-03-28T07:00:00Z
      DOI: 10.1142/S0219198922500116
       
  • Editorial — Special Issue: Dedicated to Professor Leon A. Petrosyan
           on His 80th Birthday

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      Authors: Ekaterina Gromova, Vladimir Mazalov, Artem Sedakov, David Yeung
      Abstract: International Game Theory Review, Ahead of Print.

      Citation: International Game Theory Review
      PubDate: 2022-02-11T08:00:00Z
      DOI: 10.1142/S0219198921020011
       
  • Comparative Dynamics and Envelope Theorems of Open-Loop Stackelberg
           Equilibria in Differential Games

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      Authors: Chen Ling
      Abstract: International Game Theory Review, Ahead of Print.
      A direct proof of the envelope theorems and intrinsic comparative dynamics of locally differentiable open-loop Stackelberg equilibria (OLSE) is given using an extended primal-dual method. It is shown that the follower’s envelope and comparative dynamics results agree in form with those of any player in an open-loop Nash equilibrium, while those of the leader differ. This difference allows, in principle, an empirical test of the leader–follower role in a differential game. Separability conditions are identified on the instantaneous payoff and transition functions under which, for certain parameters, the intrinsic comparative dynamics of the leader’s time-inconsistent OSLE and those in the corresponding optimal control problem are qualitatively identical. However, similar conditions do not exist for time-consistent OSLE.
      Citation: International Game Theory Review
      PubDate: 2022-02-11T08:00:00Z
      DOI: 10.1142/S0219198922500104
       
  • The Role of Deception in a Game of ‘Hide and Seek’

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      Authors: Gordon H. McCormick, Guillermo Owen
      Abstract: International Game Theory Review, Ahead of Print.
      This paper introduces the problem of active deception into the literature on search theory. We consider a game of ‘hide and seek’ in which a hider chooses to hide in one of many cells. Our hider also wishes to remain active which runs the risk of signaling his location. The searcher can look in any cell within the hider’s feasible operating environment but must prioritize his search. To do so, he looks for and has the option of following any indicator of the hider’s possible whereabouts. In conducting his search, however, he also risks signaling where he is about to look next. This gives the hider an opportunity to evade. Each player can employ ‘deceptive signals’, at some cost, to improve their respective chances of success. We examine the nature of the tradeoffs involved in deciding whether or not to use deceptive tactics under different assumptions about the nature of the players’ common operating environment.
      Citation: International Game Theory Review
      PubDate: 2022-01-21T08:00:00Z
      DOI: 10.1142/S0219198922500086
       
  • A Capital-Labor Compact and Green Production

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      Authors: Romar Correa
      Abstract: International Game Theory Review, Ahead of Print.
      The relation between Capital and Labor is well known to comprise of cooperation and noncooperation. Greater profits mean a lower wage bill. At the same time, increasing output brings expanding employment. We confine ourselves to class conflict or cooperation between Capital and Labor in the context of climate change. Our ‘socio-technical’ setup incorporates green technical change. We provide a macro-growth dynamic game with outcomes on output, employment, accumulation, and the use of a ‘solar technology’ between the classes.
      Citation: International Game Theory Review
      PubDate: 2022-01-19T08:00:00Z
      DOI: 10.1142/S0219198922500098
       
  • The Stackelberg Games of Water Extraction with Myopic Agents

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      Authors: Alain Jean-Marie, Mabel Tidball, Víctor Bucarey López
      Abstract: International Game Theory Review, Ahead of Print.
      We consider a discrete-time, infinite-horizon dynamic game of groundwater extraction. A Water Agency charges an extraction cost to water users and controls the marginal extraction cost so that it depends not only on the level of groundwater but also on total water extraction (through a parameter [math] that represents the degree of strategic interactions between water users) and on rainfall (through parameter [math]). The water users are selfish and myopic, and the goal of the agency is to give them incentives so as to improve their total discounted welfare. We look at this problem in several situations. In the first situation, the parameters [math] and [math] are considered to be fixed over time. The first result shows that when the Water Agency is patient (the discount factor tends to 1), the optimal marginal extraction cost asks for strategic interactions between agents. The contrary holds for a discount factor near 0. In a second situation, we look at the dynamic Stackelberg game where the Agency decides at each time what cost parameter they must announce. We study theoretically and numerically the solution to this problem. Simulations illustrate the possibility that threshold policies are good candidates for optimal policies.
      Citation: International Game Theory Review
      PubDate: 2021-12-22T08:00:00Z
      DOI: 10.1142/S0219198921500237
       
  • Strong Time-Consistency of a Core: An Application to the Pollution Control
           Problem in Eastern Siberia

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      Authors: Ekaterina V. Gromova, Polina I. Barsuk, Shimai Su
      Abstract: International Game Theory Review, Ahead of Print.
      In this paper, we study the (strong) time-consistency property of the core for a linear-quadratic differential game of pollution control with nonzero absorption coefficient and real values of the model parameters. The values of parameters are evaluated based on the data for the largest aluminum enterprises of Eastern Siberia region of the Russian Federation for the year 2016. The obtained results are accompanied with illustrations.
      Citation: International Game Theory Review
      PubDate: 2021-12-04T08:00:00Z
      DOI: 10.1142/S0219198922500074
       
  • Differential Game with Slow Pursuers on the Edge Graph of a Simplex

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      Authors: Abdulla Azamov, Tolanbay Ibaydullaev, Gafurjan Ibragimov
      Abstract: International Game Theory Review, Ahead of Print.
      In this paper, a differential game of kind of several pursuers and one evader is studied. All the players move only along the edges of a simplex of dimension [math]. The maximal speed of each pursuer is less than that of the evader. If the state of a pursuer coincides with the state of the evader, then pursuit is completed. An exact mathematical formulation of the problem is given by introducing special classes of strategies adapted for games on graphs. Sufficient conditions for completion of pursuit and possibility of evasion are obtained. In the case where the simplex is regular we obtained a condition. If this condition is satisfied, then pursuit can be completed, else evasion is possible.
      Citation: International Game Theory Review
      PubDate: 2021-11-20T08:00:00Z
      DOI: 10.1142/S0219198922500062
       
  • The Polymatrix Gap Conjecture

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      Authors: Pavel Naumov, Italo Simonelli
      Abstract: International Game Theory Review, Ahead of Print.
      This paper proposes a novel way to compare classes of strategic games based on their sets of pure Nash equilibria. This approach is then used to relate the classes of zero-sum games, polymatrix, and k-polymatrix games. This paper concludes with a conjecture that k-polymatrix games form an increasing chain of classes.
      Citation: International Game Theory Review
      PubDate: 2021-11-11T08:00:00Z
      DOI: 10.1142/S0219198922500050
       
  • Wage Bargaining and Minimum Wages in a Search–Matching Model

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      Authors: Marcus Dittrich
      Abstract: International Game Theory Review, Ahead of Print.
      In this paper, we analyze the introduction of a nonbinding minimum wage in a search–matching model with wage bargaining. Applying the Kalai–Smorodinsky bargaining solution instead of the commonly applied Nash solution, we provide a theoretical explanation for spillover effects of minimum wages on other wages higher up in the wage distribution. The labor market equilibrium in the Kalai–Smorodinsky solution with a minimum wage is characterized by lower market tightness, a higher unemployment rate, and lower vacancy rate than the equilibrium in the Nash solution. Moreover, we show that a nonbinding minimum wage can increase social welfare.
      Citation: International Game Theory Review
      PubDate: 2021-10-27T07:00:00Z
      DOI: 10.1142/S0219198922500049
       
  • A Stackelberg–Nash–Cournot Equilibrium in a Pollution
           Reduction Scheme

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      Authors: Ryle S. Perera
      Abstract: International Game Theory Review, Ahead of Print.
      This paper presents a Stochastic Stackelberg–Nash–Cournot Equilibrium model with continuous market demand distribution to examine the effectiveness of ambient charges as an effective policy measure for reducing nonpoint source pollution in a hybrid scheme. To do so, we consider the supply side of an energy market with hybrid technology that competes in an oligopoly market setting. Within such a setting, each power plant or firm uses a mix of fossil fuels (F) and renewable energy sources (R) to generate power at any given time. The demand for electricity is not realized at the time when the firm (leader) makes the decision. The competition between the two energy sources available to leader is assumed to be of Nash–Cournot equilibria, implying that they use one energy source to generate electricity, whilst holding the other energy source as a constant when the followers reactions are known. Based on the assumption that the demand function is affine and power plants cost functions are quadratic, we obtain the Stackelberg–Nash–Cournot equilibrium. Hence, our analysis provides an interesting insight into the effectiveness of using ambient charges, within the context of a Stochastic Stackelberg–Nash–Cournot competition, as an environmental economic policy measure when included within a robust hybrid scheme. From an economical point of view, this allows pollutants to develop specific control technologies by undertaking research and development (R&D) measures or production processes to maintain emissions standards in a hybrid scheme. From a policy implementations point of view, the environmental authority can use the pollution abatement technology ratio to set ambient charges and industry specific pollutant quantitative limits subject to technological variations.
      Citation: International Game Theory Review
      PubDate: 2021-10-13T07:00:00Z
      DOI: 10.1142/S0219198921500146
       
  • An OLG Differential Game of Pollution Control with the Risk of a
           Catastrophic Climate Change

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      Authors: Stefan Wrzaczek
      Abstract: International Game Theory Review, Ahead of Print.
      This paper studies an overlapping generations (OLG) differential game on optimal emissions with continuous age structure and different types of individuals. At the (stochastic) arrival of a catastrophic climate change, the utility and the damage to the stock of pollution change for the rest of the time horizon. We derive the open-loop (OL) Nash equilibrium and show that it is subgame perfect and moreover equal to the feedback Stackelberg one. We compare the solution to the cooperative one (using the social welfare as objective function) and show the different dynamic evolutions of optimal emissions over time. Finally, we derive a time-consistent tax scheme that reaches the cooperative optimal solution in the OL Nash equilibrium. The tax scheme turns out to be heterogeneous with respect to age and type (anticipating and nonanticipating the catastrophic climate change). Setting taxes that are homogeneous across the individual type leads to an OL Nash solution that produces socially optimal total emissions, but lower individual utilities.
      Citation: International Game Theory Review
      PubDate: 2021-10-13T07:00:00Z
      DOI: 10.1142/S0219198922500025
       
  • Dynamic Bargaining and Time-Consistency in Linear-State and Homogeneous
           Linear-Quadratic Cooperative Differential Games

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      Authors: Jesús Marín-Solano
      Abstract: International Game Theory Review, Ahead of Print.
      Three different solution concepts are reviewed and computed for linear-state and homogeneous linear-quadratic cooperative differential games with asymmetric players. Discount rates can be nonconstant and/or different. Special attention is paid to the issues of time-consistency, agreeability and subgame-perfectness, both from the viewpoint of sustainability of cooperation and from the credibility of the announced equilibrium strategies.
      Citation: International Game Theory Review
      PubDate: 2021-10-06T07:00:00Z
      DOI: 10.1142/S0219198922500037
       
  • Delegation Using Forward Induction

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      Authors: Swagata Bhattacharjee
      Abstract: International Game Theory Review, Ahead of Print.
      This paper explores how delegation can be used as a signal to sustain cooperation. I consider a static principal–agent model with two tasks, one resembling a coordination game. If there is asymmetric information about the agent’s type, the principal with high private belief can delegate the first task as a signal. This is also supported by the forward induction argument. However, in the laboratory setting, this equilibrium is chosen only sometimes. When the subjects have information about past sessions, there is a significant increase in the use of delegation. This finding sheds light on equilibrium selection in Bayesian games.
      Citation: International Game Theory Review
      PubDate: 2021-09-25T07:00:00Z
      DOI: 10.1142/S0219198921500225
       
  • Generating Empirical Core Size Distributions of Hedonic Games Using a
           Monte Carlo Method

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      Authors: Andrew J. Collins, Sheida Etemadidavan, Wael Khallouli
      Abstract: International Game Theory Review, Ahead of Print.
      Hedonic games have gained popularity over the last two decades, leading to several research articles that have used analytical methods to understand their properties better. In this paper, a Monte Carlo method, a numerical approach, is used instead. Our method includes a technique for representing, and generating, random hedonic games. We were able to create and solve, using core stability, millions of hedonic games with up to 16 players. Empirical distributions of the hedonic games’ core sizes were generated, using our results, and analyzed for games of up to 13 players. Results from games of 14–16 players were used to validate our research findings. Our results indicate that core partition size might follow the gamma distribution for games with a large number of players.
      Citation: International Game Theory Review
      PubDate: 2021-09-22T07:00:00Z
      DOI: 10.1142/S0219198922500013
       
  • Nash Equilibrium Points for Generalized Matrix Game Model with Interval
           Payoffs

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      Authors: Ajay Kumar Bhurjee, Vinay Yadav
      Abstract: International Game Theory Review, Ahead of Print.
      Game theory-based models are widely used to solve multiple competitive problems such as oligopolistic competitions, marketing of new products, promotion of existing products competitions, and election presage. The payoffs of these competitive models have been conventionally considered as deterministic. However, these payoffs have ambiguity due to the uncertainty in the data sets. Interval analysis-based approaches are found to be efficient to tackle such uncertainty in data sets. In these approaches, the payoffs of the game model lie in some closed interval, which are estimated by previous information. The present paper considers a multiple player game model in which payoffs are uncertain and varies in a closed intervals. The necessary and sufficient conditions are explained to discuss the existence of Nash equilibrium point of such game models. Moreover, Nash equilibrium point of the model is obtained by solving a crisp bi-linear optimization problem. The developed methodology is further applied for obtaining the possible optimal strategy to win the parliament election presage problem.
      Citation: International Game Theory Review
      PubDate: 2021-09-18T07:00:00Z
      DOI: 10.1142/S0219198921500213
       
  • Asynchronous Horizons Durable-Strategies Dynamic Games and Tragedy of
           Cross-Generational Environmental Commons

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      Authors: David W. K. Yeung, Leon A. Petrosyan
      Abstract: International Game Theory Review, Ahead of Print.
      Different entry and exit times and overlapping generations of players are common in real-life game situations. In addition, durable strategies which have effects over a period of time are no less common than nondurable strategies which have only one-shot effects. This paper develops a new class of dynamic games which contains durable strategies with asynchronous players’ horizons. The optimization techniques for solving asynchronous horizons durable strategies control are derived. Noncooperative game equilibria and cooperative optimal solution are presented. An asynchronous horizons durable strategies dynamic environmental game is provided to analyze the seemingly catastrophe-bound environmental degradation problem. The Price of Anarchy (PoA) in cross-generational exploitation of environmental commons is calibrated. A cooperative solution with a dynamically stable compensatory scheme is presented to alleviate the problem.
      Citation: International Game Theory Review
      PubDate: 2021-09-10T07:00:00Z
      DOI: 10.1142/S0219198921500201
       
  • Theoretic Model of Adversaries and Media Manipulation: A Two-Period
           Extension

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      Authors: Kjell Hausken
      Abstract: International Game Theory Review, Ahead of Print.
      Two adversarial actors interact controversially. Early incomplete evidence emerges about which actor is at fault. In period 1 of a two-period game, two media organizations identify ideologically with each of the two actors who are the players exerting manipulation efforts to support the actor they represent. In period 2, the full evidence emerges. Again, the two players exert efforts to support their preferred actor. This paper illustrates the players’ strategic dilemmas for the typical event that actor 1 is considerably at fault based on the early evidence, and much less at fault based on the full evidence. The model assumes that exerting effort in period 1 implies reward or punishment in period 2 depending on whether the full evidence exceeds the early evidence. Twelve parameters in the model are varied individually relative to a benchmark. For example, the players’ efforts are inverse U shaped to an extent in which the actors they identify with are at fault in the two periods. Increasing the evidence ratio intensity causes lower efforts since the players become more unequally matched.
      Citation: International Game Theory Review
      PubDate: 2021-08-30T07:00:00Z
      DOI: 10.1142/S0219198921500195
       
  • Involuntary Unemployment as a Nash Equilibrium and Fiscal Policy for Full
           Employment

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      Authors: Yasuhito Tanaka
      Abstract: International Game Theory Review, Ahead of Print.
      This study aimed to provide a game-theoretic interpretation of the analyses of involuntary unemployment by deficiency of aggregate demand and fiscal policy to achieve full employment using an overlapping generations model. We showed that involuntary unemployment is in a Nash equilibrium of a game with a firm and consumers. Moreover, we showed that full employment can be achieved through fiscal policies that create budget deficits in recessionary conditions with involuntary unemployment. Once full employment is achieved, it can be sustained without a budget deficit.
      Citation: International Game Theory Review
      PubDate: 2021-08-11T07:00:00Z
      DOI: 10.1142/S0219198921500183
       
  • Matrix Resolving Function in the Nonstationary Linear Group Pursuit
           Problem Concepting Multiple Capture

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      Authors: N. N. Petrov
      Abstract: International Game Theory Review, Ahead of Print.
      In finite-dimensional Euclidean space, an analysis is made of the problem of pursuit of a single evader by a group of pursuers, which is described by a system of the form żi = Ai(t)zi + ui − v,ui ∈ Ui,v ∈ V. The goal of the group of pursuers is the capture of the evader by no less than [math] different pursuers (the instants of capture may or may not coincide). Matrix resolving functions, which are a generalization of scalar resolving functions, are used as a mathematical basis of this study. Sufficient conditions are obtained for multiple capture of a single evader in the class of quasi-strategies. Examples illustrating the results obtained are given.
      Citation: International Game Theory Review
      PubDate: 2021-07-24T07:00:00Z
      DOI: 10.1142/S021919892150016X
       
  • Controlled Switching Diffusions Under Ambiguity: The Average Criterion

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      Authors: Beatris A. Escobedo-Trujillo, Carmen G. Higuera-Chan, José Daniel López-Barrientos
      Abstract: International Game Theory Review, Ahead of Print.
      This paper concerns controlled switching diffusions. In particular, we consider that the drift coefficient of the diffusion process depends on an unknown (and possibly nonobservable) parameter. For giving solution to our control problem, we formulate it as a game against nature, where the ambiguity is represented by nature that chooses values of the unknown parameter through actions so playing the role as an opposite player of the controller. Our objective is to give conditions to characterize the ergodic optimality and guarantee the existence of optiaml policies for the central controller. Finally, we provide two examples to illustrate our results.
      Citation: International Game Theory Review
      PubDate: 2021-07-24T07:00:00Z
      DOI: 10.1142/S0219198921500171
       
  • A Manipulation Game Based on Machiavellian Strategies

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      Authors: Julio B. Clempner
      Abstract: International Game Theory Review, Ahead of Print.
      This paper suggests a manipulation game based on Machiavellianism, which is characterized by three concepts: views, tactics, and immorality. We consider a framework where manipulating players can partially control manipulated players’ information and affect both manipulated players’ information and their allocations. The parties involved are constrained both by adverse selection and moral hazard (immorality) restricted to a class of ergodic Bayesian–Markov problems. We investigate a mechanism that maximize the probability that the manipulated players accept the proposal of the manipulators. We show that a mechanism exists and can be found by solving a nonlinear programming problem for a set of constraints. The mechanism is obtained by introducing an auxiliary variable in the nonlinear programming problem and we develop the relations needed to derive the variables of interest. For the manipulation process, players learn their behavior through a sequence of interactions in a repeated game. The manipulators possess and benefit from some commitment power, which describes the distinctive nature of a manipulation game (views). Then, we represent the game using a Stackelberg model. We also compute the Stackelberg equilibrium (tactics) for our game of incomplete information. This novel perspective is of interest for the Bayesian manipulation and persuasion literature. A simulation and analysis over an example for manipulating emotions in negotiation verify the applicability of proposed model.
      Citation: International Game Theory Review
      PubDate: 2021-07-16T07:00:00Z
      DOI: 10.1142/S0219198921500158
       
  • The Nature of Equilibria Under Noncollusive Product Design and Collusive
           Pricing

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      Authors: Kali P. Rath, Gongyun Zhao
      Abstract: International Game Theory Review, Ahead of Print.
      The basic framework is Hotelling’s model of product choice with quadratic transportation cost. Duopolists choose locations in the initial period and compete in prices in subsequent infinite periods. The firms share profits on the profit possibility frontier. It is shown that under very general conditions, both the firms locating at the center is an equilibrium. It is not necessarily unique and multiple symmetric equilibria can exist. Thus, the products are not necessarily minimally differentiated. How the profits are shared when the firms are located together off the center has a critical bearing on the nature of equilibria. If the firms share profits equally at those locations, then all the equilibria are symmetric. Otherwise, asymmetric equilibria can appear. The equilibria can be classified into three types: a unique equilibrium at the center of the market, multiple symmetric equilibria and multiple asymmetric agglomerated equilibria. The second case entails nonminimal product differentiation. Sufficient conditions for each of these equilibria are given. Necessary conditions for multiple symmetric equilibria off the center are also obtained.
      Citation: International Game Theory Review
      PubDate: 2021-06-25T07:00:00Z
      DOI: 10.1142/S0219198921500134
       
  • Cost Sharing in a Condo Under Law’s Umbrella

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      Authors: Bertrand Crettez, Régis Deloche
      Abstract: International Game Theory Review, Ahead of Print.
      How to share the cost of an improvement in a condo' In France, as in most European civil law countries, the law does not provide any precise method for answering this question. This vagueness of the law calls for further investigation. Focusing on how to distribute costs that are collectively incurred by a group of players, cooperative game theory is a priori an appropriate framework for dealing with this topic. In this theory, the Shapley value is a widely used cost-sharing method. We analyze the interest of using this concept to solve our problem by considering the case of a three-storey condo. We show that taking into account the legal requirement that any decision concerning improvements be made by a majority of the votes affects the characteristic function of the game. We then identify a pitfall of the Shapley value: it almost never receives an affirmative vote from the co-owner association.
      Citation: International Game Theory Review
      PubDate: 2021-05-31T07:00:00Z
      DOI: 10.1142/S0219198921500122
       
  • Privatization Policies by National and Regional Governments

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      Authors: Francisco Martínez-Sánchez
      Abstract: International Game Theory Review, Ahead of Print.
      In order to analyze the privatization policies undertaken by the national and regional governments, I consider a horizontal differentiation model with price competition in which a country consists of two regions of different sizes. I show that public-sector intervention by either the national or regional government is essential for achieving the social optimum. The preferences of consumers and firms about privatization policy are completely opposite: consumers prefer a regional public-sector intervention, while firms prefer a national public-sector intervention. Finally, I find that the preferences of the two regions about market structures are also opposite: the least populated region prefers the private duopoly, while the most populated region prefers a government intervention in the market.
      Citation: International Game Theory Review
      PubDate: 2021-04-19T07:00:00Z
      DOI: 10.1142/S0219198921500110
       
  • “Entanglement” and the Exploitation of Common Pool Resources: A
           Quantum Solution to the Prisoner’s Dilemma

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      Authors: Robert Mamada, Charles Perrings
      Abstract: International Game Theory Review, Ahead of Print.
      The overexploitation of common pool resources is frequently associated with open access regimes in which each resource user operates independently of all other resource users. The outcome is a Nash equilibrium of the prisoner’s dilemma. Restricted access regimes of the sort identified by Ostrom and colleagues typically ensure that individual resource users do not operate independently. Taking a quantum approach to the theory of games, we argue that the institutional arrangements involved in common pool resource management imply the “entanglement” of the strategies of resource users. For a very simple case — two firms exploiting a common pool fishery — we show that there exists an “entanglement” mechanism that assures the cooperative outcome.
      Citation: International Game Theory Review
      PubDate: 2021-04-10T07:00:00Z
      DOI: 10.1142/S0219198921500092
       
  • [math] Constrained Pareto Suboptimal Strategy for Stochastic LPV
           Time-Delay Systems

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      Authors: Hiroaki Mukaidani, Hua Xu, Weihua Zhuang
      Abstract: International Game Theory Review, Ahead of Print.
      Not only in control problems, but also in dynamic games, several sources of performance degradation, such as model variation, deterministic and stochastic uncertainties and state delays, need to be considered. In this paper, we present an [math] constrained Pareto suboptimal strategy for stochastic linear parameter-varying (LPV) time-delay systems involving multiple decision makers. The goal of developing the [math] constrained Pareto suboptimal strategy set is to construct a memoryless state feedback strategy set, so that the closed-loop stochastic LPV system is stochastically mean-square stable. In the paper, the existence condition of the extended bounded real lemma is first established via linear matrix inequalities (LMIs). Then, a quadratic cost bound for cost performance is derived. Based on these preliminary results, sufficient conditions for the existence of such a strategy set under the [math] constraint are derived by using cross-coupled bilinear matrix inequalities (BMIs). To determine the strategy set, a viscosity iterative scheme based on the LMIs is established to avoid the processing of BMIs. Finally, two numerical examples are presented to demonstrate the reliability and usefulness of the proposed method.
      Citation: International Game Theory Review
      PubDate: 2021-04-10T07:00:00Z
      DOI: 10.1142/S0219198921500109
       
  • The Folk Rule for Minimum Cost Spanning Tree Problems with Multiple
           Sources

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      Authors: Gustavo Bergantiños, Youngsub Chun, Eunju Lee, Leticia Lorenzo
      Abstract: International Game Theory Review, Ahead of Print.
      In this paper, we introduce minimum cost spanning tree problems with multiple sources. This new setting is an extension of the classical model where there is a single source. We extend several definitions of the folk rule, the most prominent rule in the classical model, to this new context: first as the Shapley value of the irreducible game; second as an obligation rule; third as a partition rule and finally through a cone-wise decomposition. We prove that all the definitions provide the same cost allocation and present two axiomatic characterizations.
      Citation: International Game Theory Review
      PubDate: 2021-04-06T07:00:00Z
      DOI: 10.1142/S0219198921500079
       
  • A Dynamic Multi-Objective Duopoly Game with Environmentally Concerned
           Firms

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      Authors: Bertrand Crettez, Naila Hayek
      Abstract: International Game Theory Review, Ahead of Print.
      Social pressures, in addition to the law, incite more and more firms to pursue multiple and separate objectives. This trend raises the following question: will the change in the number of objectives pursued by firms affect their strategic interactions' To address this issue we focus on a dynamic duopoly where each firm has two objectives: one of the firms’ objectives is financial and the other is environmental. Production is a polluting activity and the actual level of pollution depends on current and past emissions. We analyze both open-loop Nash and cooperative equilibria (these equilibria are also trivially feedback as the equilibrium strategies are constant). We show that contrary to the case where firms’ unique objective is the financial one, there are Nash equilibria where production is lower than in the cooperative equilibrium. This stems from the fact that in a Nash equilibrium firms do not coordinate the choice of the relative weight given to the environmental objective. We obtain the same conclusion when firms can mitigate pollution. In this case, we also show that there are Nash equilibria where the sum of the firms’ mitigation efforts is higher than its value in the cooperative equilibrium.
      Citation: International Game Theory Review
      PubDate: 2021-03-29T07:00:00Z
      DOI: 10.1142/S0219198921500080
       
  • Discounted Semi-Markov Games and Algorithms for Solving Two Structured
           Classes

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      Authors: Prasenjit Mondal
      Abstract: International Game Theory Review, Ahead of Print.
      Two structured classes of zero-sum two-person finite (state and action spaces) semi-Markov games with discounted payoffs, namely, Additive Reward-Additive Transition and Action Independent Transition Time (AR-AT-AITT) and Additive Reward-Action Independent Transition and Additive Transition Time (AR-AIT-ATT) have been studied. We propose two practical situations of economic competition viz. petroleum game and groundwater game that suitably fit into such classes of games, respectively. Solution (value and pure stationary optimals) to such classes of games can be derived from optimal solution to appropriate bilinear programs with linear constraints. We present a stepwise generalized principal pivoting algorithm for solving the vertical linear complementarity problem (VLCP) obtained from such game problems. Moreover, a neural network dynamics is proposed for solving such structured classes. Examples are worked out to compare the usefulness of the above three algorithms.
      Citation: International Game Theory Review
      PubDate: 2021-02-09T08:00:00Z
      DOI: 10.1142/S0219198921500067
       
  • Transboundary Pollution Abatement, Emission Permits Trading and
           Compensation Mechanism: A Differential Game Analysis

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      Authors: Genlong Guo, Huiquan Li, Zhaoquan Jian
      Abstract: International Game Theory Review, Ahead of Print.
      In this paper, we consider a pollution control problem along a river basin where a portion of the pollution emitted by the upstream region can be transferred to the downstream region. Our model has three significant features: first, we take into account the pollution abatement investment, and the stock of pollution abatement capital follows standard differential equation of motion; second, we introduce the emission permits trading system so that each region has the choice between buying pollution permits or pollution abatement investment; third, we consider the pollution compensation mechanism so that the downstream region pays pollution compensation for the upstream region. We explore and compare the optimal decisions of both the upstream and downstream regions under the cases of the cooperative and no-cooperative strategies, respectively. We find that although the flow of emissions can be better controlled by cooperation between the upstream and downstream regions, the pollution abatement investment is not necessarily higher in the cooperative equilibrium. Further, a sensitivity analysis is also conducted on the parameters of the transboundary river basin pollution.
      Citation: International Game Theory Review
      PubDate: 2021-01-16T08:00:00Z
      DOI: 10.1142/S021919892050022X
       
 
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