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Journal of Hindu Studies
Journal Prestige (SJR): 0.153  Number of Followers: 6  Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles)ISSN (Print) 1756-4255 - ISSN (Online) 1756-4263 Published by Oxford University Press  [425 journals]
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- Buddhist–Hindu Allogamy: Productive Influences Across Traditions
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Pages: 1 - 4
Abstract: Botanists distinguish between two forms of plant fertilisation: autogamy and allogamy. The first occurs when a plant self-fertilises, and the second occurs when a plant is cross-pollinated by another. Prevailing wisdom would lead us to believe that evolution favours allogamy since it promotes genetic diversity and thus affords a species greater adaptability to environmental pressures. However, the historical record reveals that, at least in some species, plants may alternate between autogamous and allogamous strategies over the longue durée. If, for example, proximity between plants wanes or there is a dearth of cross-pollinating animals present, then autogamy becomes evolutionarily advantageous (Armbruster 1993).
PubDate: Wed, 17 Jan 2024 00:00:00 GMT
DOI: 10.1093/jhs/hiad034
Issue No: Vol. 17, No. 1 (2024)
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- Rethinking ‘Classical Yoga’ and Buddhism: Meditation, Metaphors and
Materiality. By Karen O’Brien-Kop.-
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Pages: 167 - 170
Abstract: Rethinking ‘Classical Yoga’ and Buddhism: Meditation, Metaphors and Materiality. By O’Brien-Kop.KarenLondon: Bloomsbury Academic, 2022. ISBN: 9781350230033. pp. xiv, 262.
PubDate: Mon, 08 Jan 2024 00:00:00 GMT
DOI: 10.1093/jhs/hiad030
Issue No: Vol. 17, No. 1 (2024)
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- The Philosophy of the Brahma-sūtra: An Introduction (Bloomsbury
Introductions to World Philosophies Series). By Aleksandar Uskokov.-
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Pages: 170 - 172
Abstract: The Philosophy of the Brahma-sūtra: An Introduction (Bloomsbury Introductions to World Philosophies Series). By Uskokov.AleksandarLondon: Bloomsbury Academic, 2022. ISBN: 978-1-3501-5001-0, pp. xvi, 219. $22.95 (paperback).
PubDate: Wed, 17 Jan 2024 00:00:00 GMT
DOI: 10.1093/jhs/hiad036
Issue No: Vol. 17, No. 1 (2024)
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- Biographies
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Pages: 173 - 174
Abstract: NILANJAN DAS is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Toronto. His primary areas of research are epistemology and the history of Philosophy. He is currently working on two book-length projects: One on the 12th-century philosopher and poet Śrīharṣa, and the other on the 8th-century Buddhist philosopher Prajñākaragupta. His work has appeared in numerous journals including Noûs, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, and the British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
PubDate: Sat, 25 May 2024 00:00:00 GMT
DOI: 10.1093/jhs/hiae005
Issue No: Vol. 17, No. 1 (2024)
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- Uddyotakara on Universals I: Against Resemblance Nominalism
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Pages: 5 - 52
Abstract: AbstractUniversals are properties that are shared by multiple objects. In classical South Asia, Brahmanical thinkers from Vyākaraṇa, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, and Mīmāṃsā text traditions were realists about universals, while most Buddhists were nominalists. In this paper, my aim is to reconstruct the early Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of universals, with special emphasis on the arguments of the Nyāya philosopher Uddyotakara (6th century CE) against a Buddhist strand of resemblance nominalism. I show that Uddyotakara's contribution to this debate is twofold. First, he is possibly the first Naiyāyika to adopt a sparse theory of universals, a theory according to which it is necessary to posit only those universals which explain how objects resemble each other in the most fundamental or irreducible respects. On the other hand, he offers a few arguments for realism, which are explicitly motivated by a causal constraint on intentionality.
PubDate: Sat, 18 Mar 2023 00:00:00 GMT
DOI: 10.1093/jhs/hiac012
Issue No: Vol. 17, No. 1 (2023)
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- Apoha for Beginners
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Pages: 53 - 61
Abstract: AbstractThis study proposes, as an entryway into the complex debate about ‘exclusion’ (apoha) in Indian philosophy, that the main idea underlying Dignāga’s theory of apoha is that the relation between a word and its meaning—all the individuals that it can refer to—is established more by noticing what it is not used for than what it is used for. The Mīmāṃsā philosopher Kumārila raises a number of objections based on his construal of an apoha as a ‘non-existence’ (abhāva), but he also zeroes in on the problem of how, if apohas are known only by language and inference, they could ever be known at all. In this connection, he criticises Dignāga’s idea that the meaning of a word is learned by noticing that it is not used for things other than its usual referent. It seems, then, that much of what Dharmakīrti is doing in his discussion of apoha is to provide, in response to Kumārila, an account of how perceptual experiences of distinct particulars that have the same effects naturally give rise to an ascertainment of their exclusion from other entities, which can then be assigned as the meaning of an expression.
PubDate: Mon, 10 Apr 2023 00:00:00 GMT
DOI: 10.1093/jhs/hiad014
Issue No: Vol. 17, No. 1 (2023)
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- Our epistemic dependence on others: Nyāya and Buddhist accounts of
testimony as a source of knowledge-
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Pages: 62 - 80
Abstract: AbstractThis paper argues that philosophical debates between Nyāya and Buddhists on the nature and acquisition of testimonial knowledge present contrasting images of the role played by the epistemic agent in the knowing process. According to Nyāya, an individual can acquire testimonial knowledge automatically—and with little epistemic work—from a trustworthy speaker’s say-so. On the other hand, Buddhist epistemologists, who claim that testimonial knowledge is a species of inferential knowledge, argue that, in order to acquire knowledge from a speaker’s statements, an epistemic agent must possess non-testimonial evidence for the reliability of the testimony in question. This disagreement regarding the division of epistemic labour in testimonial exchanges demonstrates how differently Nyāya and Buddhist philosophers view the prevalence and practical importance of testimonial knowledge. For Nyāya, the ubiquity and easy acquisition of testimonial knowledge help explain the success of our daily actions. However, for Buddhist epistemologists, despite the regularity with which we successfully act based on what others tell us, testimonial knowledge is, in fact, less common, and more difficult to acquire, than we might think.
PubDate: Tue, 18 Apr 2023 00:00:00 GMT
DOI: 10.1093/jhs/hiad003
Issue No: Vol. 17, No. 1 (2023)
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- The Nyāyamañjarī’s Arguments Against the Existence of God:
Translation and Commentary-
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Pages: 81 - 116
Abstract: The treatment of the question of God’s existence in Jayanta’s Nyāyamañjarī falls into two parts. In the first, an atheist opponent (pūrvapakṣin) argues against God on the grounds that no means of knowledge attest to his existence. It is that part that is translated below. Our translation of the second part (the siddhānta section) is due to be published in a future volume of this same journal. There Jayanta begins to speak in his own Naiyāyika voice, and answers all of the objections that the atheist has articulated in the first part.
PubDate: Sat, 23 Dec 2023 00:00:00 GMT
DOI: 10.1093/jhs/hiad025
Issue No: Vol. 17, No. 1 (2023)
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- Why Care About Freedom and Agency'
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Pages: 117 - 142
Abstract: AbstractIn ethical systems that focus on apportioning praise and blame, a key consideration is often whether or not the individual is a free agent since individuals are only held to be responsible for what they freely choose. As various critiques indicate, if it were to be the case that freedom is in some way illusory or radically restricted, these systems would have a significant problem since reactive attitudes would involve holding individuals responsible for actions that they did not freely choose. I will argue that the problem may run even deeper: even if there is such a thing as free agency, it is a mistake to think that autonomous individuals uniquely instantiate this agency. I will draw on arguments from Pratyabhijñā Śaivism, which state that although there is ultimately no such thing as a praise or blameworthy individual agent, free agency is the precondition for manifestation itself. Worlds, not individuals, are the proper unit of analysis for ethical theories. This position picks up on many of the critiques of the kind of substantial self that stands apart from the world that were offered by various Buddhist traditions in the Classical Sanskritic context. At the same time, it does not fall prey to these objections precisely because the self that Pratyabhijñā theorists argue for is neither an unchanging substance nor a minimally thin kind of self-awareness that could be accommodated by no-self theorists. Pratyabhijñā theorists’ particular way of understanding agency, then, presents a productive exchange between some of the most ethically salient ramifications of Buddhist no-self theories and insights into why, nevertheless, freedom and agency are inextricably bound up in our worlds.
PubDate: Fri, 08 Dec 2023 00:00:00 GMT
DOI: 10.1093/jhs/hiad027
Issue No: Vol. 17, No. 1 (2023)
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- Subtle, hidden, and far-off: The intertextuality of the Yogasūtras
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Pages: 143 - 166
Abstract: AbstractModern scholarship discusses ‘Buddhist influences’ on the Patañjali’s Yogasūtras (YS). Indeed, Patañjali borrowed key Buddhist concepts, particularly from Yogācāra. But this borrowing does not evince that the YS is just ‘crypto-Buddhism’. In fact, during the first millennium CE, the YS was equally influential on Buddhist thinkers. I make this argument by focusing on YS 3.25, which discusses the yogic ability to see subtle (sūkṣma), hidden (vyavahita), and far-off (viprakṛṣṭa) objects. Tracing textual occurrences of these three words, I use this stable mimetic trope to demonstrate the influence of YS on Buddhist, Nyāya, and Vaiśeṣika writings. This influence is all the more interesting given that Buddhists explicitly disagree with many of the theoretical suppositions latent in YS 3.25. I demonstrate that despite this theoretical disagreement, Buddhists make ample use of YS 3.25. This paper thus complicates any clear direction of influence between Buddhist and Hindu traditions, and further questions the cogency of strict delineations between different philosophical schools. I also offer the method used in this paper as a novel approach to textual exegesis. By focusing on stable textual memes and tracing their occurrences across sources, we gain a powerful method to more deeply plumb India's rich intertextual intellectual history.
PubDate: Mon, 10 Apr 2023 00:00:00 GMT
DOI: 10.1093/jhs/hiad013
Issue No: Vol. 17, No. 1 (2023)
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