Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles) ISSN (Print) 0167-5133 - ISSN (Online) 1477-4593 Published by Oxford University Press[425 journals]
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Pages: 1 - 68 Abstract: AbstractNegative Polarity Items (NPIs) with emphatic prosody such as ANY or EVER, and minimizers such as lift a finger or sleep a wink are known to generate particular contextual inferences that are absent in the case of non-emphatic NPIs such as unstressed any or ever. It remains an open question, however, what the exact status of these inferences is and how they come about. In this paper, we analyze these cases as NPIs bearing focus, and examine the interaction between focus semantics and the lexical semantics of NPIs across statements and questions. In the process, we refine and expand the empirical landscape by demonstrating that focused NPIs give rise to a variety of apparently heterogeneous contextual inferences, including domain widening in statements and inferences of negative bias in questions. These inferences are further shown to be modulated in subtle ways depending on the specific clause-type in which the NPI occurs (e.g., polar questions vs. wh-questions) and the type of emphatic NPI involved (e.g., ANY vs. lift a finger). Building on these empirical observations, we propose a unified account of NPIs which posits a single core semantic operator, even, across both focused and unfocused NPIs. What plays a central role in our account is the additive component of even, which we formulate in such a way that it applies uniformly across statements and questions. This additive component of even, intuitively paraphrased as the implication that all salient focus alternatives of the prejacent of the operator must be settled in the doxastic state of the speaker, is selectively activated depending on the presence of focus alternatives, and is shown to be able to derive all the observed contextual inferences stemming from focused NPIs, both in statements and in questions. PubDate: Thu, 16 Feb 2023 00:00:00 GMT DOI: 10.1093/jos/ffac014 Issue No:Vol. 40, No. 1 (2023)
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Pages: 69 - 91 Abstract: AbstractCopredication occurs when a sentence receives a true reading despite prima facie ascribing categorically incompatible properties to a single entity. For example, ‘The red book is by Tolstoy’ can have a true reading even though it seems that being red is only a property of physical copies, while being by Tolstoy is only a property of informational texts.A tempting strategy for resolving this tension is to claim that at least one of the predicates has a non-standard interpretation, with the salient proposal involving reinterpretation via meaning transfer. For example, in ‘The red book is by Tolstoy’, one could hold that the predicate ‘by Tolstoy’ is reinterpreted (or on the more specific proposal, transferred) to ascribe a property that physical copies can uncontroversially instantiate, such as expresses an informational text by Tolstoy. On this view, the truth of the copredicational sentence is no longer mysterious. Furthermore, such a reinterpretation view can give a straightforward account of a range of puzzling copredicational sentences involving counting an individuation.Despite these substantial virtues, we will argue that reinterpretation approaches to copredication are untenable. In §1 we introduce reinterpretation views of copredication and contrast them with key alternatives. In §2 we argue against a general reinterpretation theory of copredication on which every copredicational sentence contains at least one reinterpreted predicate. We also raise additional problems for the more specific proposal of implementing reinterpretation via meaning transfer. In §3 we argue against more limited appeals to reinterpretation on which only some copredicational sentences contain reinterpretation. In §4 we criticize a series of arguments in favour of reinterpretation theories. The upshot is that reinterpretation theories of copredication, and in particular, meaning transfer-based accounts, should be rejected. PubDate: Sat, 01 Apr 2023 00:00:00 GMT DOI: 10.1093/jos/ffad001 Issue No:Vol. 40, No. 1 (2023)
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Pages: 93 - 125 Abstract: AbstractThe depth charge illusion occurs when compositionally incongruous sentences such as No detail is too unimportant to be left out are assigned plausible non-compositional meanings (Don’t leave out details). Results of two online reading and judgment experiments show that moving the incongruous degree phrase to the beginning of the sentence in German (lit. “Too unimportant to be left out is surely no detail”) results in an attenuation of this semantic illusion, implying a role for incremental processing. Two further experiments show that readers cannot consistently turn the communicated meaning of depth charge sentences into its opposite, and that acceptability varies greatly between sentences and subjects, which is consistent with superficial interpretation. A meta-analytic fit of the Wiener diffusion model to data from six experiments shows that world knowledge is a systematic driver of the illusion, leading to stable acceptability judgments. Other variables, such as sentiment polarity, influence subjects’ depth of processing. Overall, the results shed new light on the role of superficial processing on the one hand and of communicative competence on the other hand in creating the depth charge illusion. I conclude that the depth charge illusion combines aspects of being a persistent processing “bug” with aspects of being a beneficial communicative “feature”, making it a fascinating object of study. PubDate: Mon, 10 Apr 2023 00:00:00 GMT DOI: 10.1093/jos/ffad003 Issue No:Vol. 40, No. 1 (2023)
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Pages: 127 - 151 Abstract: AbstractIn this paper I observe a number of new plural and (apparently) quantified examples of free indirect discourse (FID) and protagonist projection (PP). I analyse them within major current theoretical approaches, proposing extensions to these approaches where needed. In order to derive the wide range of readings observed with plural protagonists, I show how we can exploit existing mechanisms for the interpretation of plural anaphora and plural predication. The upshot is that the interpretation of plural examples of perspective shift relies on a remarkable concert of covert semantic and pragmatic operations. PubDate: Mon, 03 Apr 2023 00:00:00 GMT DOI: 10.1093/jos/ffad004 Issue No:Vol. 40, No. 1 (2023)
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Pages: 153 - 178 Abstract: AbstractIndicative conditionals and configurations with neg-raising predicates have been brought up as potential candidates for constructions involving world pluralities. I argue against this hypothesis, showing that cumulativity and quantifiers targeting a plurality’s part structure cannot access the presumed world pluralities. I furthermore argue that this makes worlds special in the sense that the same tests provide evidence for pluralities in various other semantic domains. PubDate: Mon, 03 Apr 2023 00:00:00 GMT DOI: 10.1093/jos/ffad002 Issue No:Vol. 40, No. 1 (2023)
Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles)
[425 journals]
