Publisher: U of Cincinnati College of Law   (Total: 1 journals)   [Sort by number of followers]

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University of Cincinnati Law Review     Open Access   (Followers: 1, SJR: 0.29, CiteScore: 0)
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University of Cincinnati Law Review
Journal Prestige (SJR): 0.29
Number of Followers: 1  

  This is an Open Access Journal Open Access journal
ISSN (Print) 0009-6881
Published by U of Cincinnati College of Law Homepage  [1 journal]
  • Reconstituting the United States: Could an Article V Convention Prevent
           the Next January 6'

    • Authors: Paul G. Rando
      PubDate: Tue, 20 Dec 2022 08:08:39 PST
       
  • Declaring Dankruptcy: Exploring Avenues to Relief for Debtors Involved
           With Cannabis

    • Authors: Danny O'Connor
      PubDate: Tue, 20 Dec 2022 08:08:38 PST
       
  • Hiring Criteria and Title VII: How One Manifestation of Employer Bias
           Evades Judicial Scrutiny

    • Authors: Max Londberg
      PubDate: Tue, 20 Dec 2022 08:08:36 PST
       
  • Bittersweet: A Potential Avenue to International Tort Liability for
           American Companies in the Cocoa Supply Chain

    • Authors: Sara Leonhartsberger
      PubDate: Tue, 20 Dec 2022 08:08:35 PST
       
  • Evaluating the Pro Se Plight: A Comprehensive Review of Access to Justice
           Initiatives in Ohio Landlord-Tenant Law

    • Authors: Caleigh M. Harris
      PubDate: Tue, 20 Dec 2022 08:08:33 PST
       
  • Corporate Innovation: One Path to More Sustainable Big Business

    • Authors: David Nows
      PubDate: Tue, 20 Dec 2022 08:08:32 PST
       
  • Revisiting Employment Division v. Smith

    • Authors: Blaine L. Hutchison
      Abstract: The Supreme Court wrongly decided Employment Division v. Smith. Without briefing or argument over the Free Exercise Clause’s meaning, Smith eliminated the constitutional right to exercise religion and replaced it with an equal protection rule. The decision threatens religious freedom and encourages conflict. The Supreme Court should revisit Smith. This article shows that the majority’s arguments in Smith fail and contradict the Free Exercise Clause’s text, purpose, and original meaning.The Smith majority gave no sound legal or policy reason for its decision. Indeed, the decision conflicted with settled precedents that no party questioned. Nor did it determine the constitutional text’s meaning or examine historical evidence. The decision solely rests on the majority’s mistaken fears that religious liberty would require arbitrary judicial balancing and cause anarchy.The Free Exercise Clause’s text, purpose, and original meaning confirm that the clause protects religious freedom, not equality. The text guarantees the right to exercise religion without government interference—and it presents no exception. History shows why. The founding generation considered religious liberty an unalienable right that supersedes civil duties. This understanding prompted the Founders to protect religious freedom. To this end, the founders used a familiar legal concept from the colonies and states: the free exercise principle. It protected the broad right to freely exercise religion but excluded practices that would endanger peace and safety. The Founders enshrined this principle in the Free Exercise Clause.
      PubDate: Tue, 20 Dec 2022 08:08:31 PST
       
  • Invasions of Dicamba Particles: Holding States Accountable for Taking
           Offsite Property Owners' Right to Exclude

    • Authors: Terence J. Centner
      Abstract: In 2017, special formulations of dicamba herbicides known as over-the-top products were marketed for post-emergent use on genetically engineered soybeans and cotton. The use of these products was accompanied by considerable herbicide drift and volatilization that harmed millions of acres of nearby crops. In 2018, the EPA added requirements to the products’ labels to preclude offsite injuries. However, for each growing season during 2018-2021, unacceptable offsite injuries were reported in the major soybean and cotton producing states. Because they received reported injuries, state agencies issuing new registrations for dicamba products in 2018 and 2020 knew offsite spray drift and volatilization would carry dicamba particles onto nearby properties. Despite their knowledge, states issuing permits to use dicamba products were granting applicators easements over nearby properties. These easements involved entries of dicamba particles that damaged vegetation.The legality of state-granted easements taking rights from property owners was recently examined by the U.S. Supreme Court in Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid. There, a California regulation granting an easement for temporary entries by union organizers on growers’ properties was found to effect a taking under the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause. The Court found that the state appropriated a right to invade and a property owners’ right to exclude others from their properties. By taking these rights, the state effected a per se physical taking of private property. Under the rationale of Cedar Point, approval of dicamba registrations by state governments can be viewed as appropriations of neighbors’ right to exclude. The registrations grant dicamba applicators easements that allow dicamba particles to enter non-target properties. These intrusions suggest that the registrations appropriate property interests. Depositions of dicamba particles onto offsite properties effect per se physical takings. States should compensate injured property owners for losses from dicamba spray applications.
      PubDate: Tue, 20 Dec 2022 08:08:29 PST
       
  • Ethnic Economies, Cultural Resources, and the African American Question

    • Authors: Lan Cao
      PubDate: Tue, 20 Dec 2022 08:08:28 PST
       
  • The Connick/Garcetti Split: Is Public Employee Association a Matter of
           Public Concern'

    • Authors: Austin J. Wishart
      PubDate: Fri, 14 Oct 2022 08:10:00 PDT
       
  • Why is a Debt Collector Texting Me' The Modernization of Debt
           Collection Practices

    • Authors: Emily Schmidt
      PubDate: Fri, 14 Oct 2022 08:09:59 PDT
       
  • Attack on the SPAC: The Push to Regulate Special Purpose Acquisition
           Companies as Investment Companies Under the Investment Company Act

    • Authors: Sean Meyer
      PubDate: Fri, 14 Oct 2022 08:09:57 PDT
       
  • Speech Markets & Web3: Refreshing the First Amendment for Non-Fungible
           Tokens (NFTs)

    • Authors: Tanner Dowdy
      PubDate: Fri, 14 Oct 2022 08:09:56 PDT
       
  • Privacy Please — Direct Observation Drug Testing & Invasion of
           Privacy

    • Authors: Elizabeth Black
      PubDate: Fri, 14 Oct 2022 08:09:54 PDT
       
  • Unsticking American Tort Theory

    • Authors: Benjamin Sundholm
      Abstract: In the United States, the debate over the foundations of tort law is at an impasse. On one side of the dispute, economic theorists contend that tort law is primarily concerned with the forward-looking aim of maximizing societal wealth. The most prominent critics of this view claim that an economic analysis of tort law cannot explain the field’s backward-looking concern with achieving corrective justice by remedying wrongs. Despite the strength of this critique, economic theorists have a legitimate response available to them: corrective justice describes the reparative aspect of tort law, but it stops short of providing a justificatory account of the field’s primary rights. Economic theorists claim that without such an account, their critics’ theory stands in need of justification and cannot serve as the foundational principle of tort law.In this article, I explain how philosopher Alan Gewirth’s work can help make progress toward resolving this impasse by articulating the foundation of tort law’s primary rights and explaining the field’s bilateral structure. Gewirth’s argument for what he calls the principle of generic consistency provides a rational standard for determining the rightness and wrongness of all human action, including the activity of lawmaking. As such, the principle of generic consistency can serve as the rational foundation for the primary rights and duties at the heart of tort law. In this way, Gewirth’s theory can overcome the difficulty corrective justice theorists have in providing an account of tort law’s primary rights. Further, the principle of generic consistency can explain tort law’s backward-looking concern with remedying wrongs in a way that economic theorists cannot.
      PubDate: Fri, 14 Oct 2022 08:09:53 PDT
       
  • On Account of Youth: Winning Asylum for Children

    • Authors: Linda Kelly
      PubDate: Fri, 14 Oct 2022 08:09:51 PDT
       
  • Leading Law Schools: Relationships, Influence, and Negotiation

    • Authors: Michael T. Colatrella Jr.
      PubDate: Fri, 14 Oct 2022 08:09:49 PDT
       
  • Racecraft and Identity in the Emergence of Islam as a Race

    • Authors: Cyra Choudhury
      Abstract: Can a religion, over time and through its social and legal resignification, come to be a race' Drawing on Critical Race Theory (“CRT”), Critical Discourse Theory, the work of Karen E. and Barbara J. Fields and Cedric Robinson, this article argues that Islam has emerged as a race and Muslims as a racial group. To support the claim, Part I examines the theoretical basis for the argument. Applying the concept of “racecraft,” the article theorizes that racism produces both the racial group and race. As many have already argued, race is not based in biology; it is not a fact but rather an artifact of racism. The appearance or specter of race, moreover, is an assemblage that coheres in response to specific racism targeted at a population with shared characteristics. Thus, there is no reason to suppose that Islam could not be a race. Islamophobia as a specific form of racism produces the Muslim as a raced people and Islam as a race through racecraft—the tools and practices of racism. However, for racism to produce a subject racialized group, it must first make racial meaning of the group members’ shared attributes. Part II offers a genealogy of Islam-as-race, arguing that Islam has always been coded as a religion of color and categorically different from European, white, Christian civilization. It is the connection to Islam that has rendered the Muslim an alien. That is the substratum of Islam-as-race. In Part III, the article goes on to examine the racecraft that was deployed in the anti-sharia law panic of the 2010s and in the current anti-CRT panic. In this section, the article applies Critical Discourse Studies to the law to demonstrate how discourses of legitimation that support the differential treatment of Muslims and Blacks is produced. Finally, the article provides examples of material discrimination and its overlap in these communities. The article shows how racism’s rituals and tools are honed and sharpened against one community and then repurposed for use against another. The central claim throughout the article is that theorists of Islamophobia have not gone far enough. They have stopped short, preferring to refer to Muslims as “racialized” depending on analogies to other races or relying on the already ethnic differences of Muslims yet struggling to explain the role of religion in the racialization. These theories are unable to account for how white or white passing Muslims become racialized once they are outed or how Muslims evade racialization while non-Muslims sometimes do not. This article suggests that it is Islam that “races” them. We should now consider Muslims a racial group, Islamophobia as a form of racism, and Islam as a race.
      PubDate: Fri, 14 Oct 2022 08:09:48 PDT
       
  • All of the Products, None of the Liability: Examining the Supreme Court of
           Ohio's Decision in Stiner v. Amazon.com, Inc.

    • Authors: Danny O'Connor
      PubDate: Thu, 12 May 2022 07:30:47 PDT
       
  • The Fate of Comment 8: Analyzing a Lawyer's Ethical Obligation of
           Technological Competence

    • Authors: Lisa Z. Rosenof
      PubDate: Thu, 12 May 2022 07:30:44 PDT
       
 
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