Journal Cover Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization
  [SJR: 1.458]   [H-I: 53]   [52 followers]  Follow
    
   Hybrid Journal Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles)
   ISSN (Print) 8756-6222 - ISSN (Online) 1465-7341
   Published by Oxford University Press Homepage  [370 journals]
  • Choice of Enterprise Form: Spain, 1886–1936
    • Authors: Guinnane T; Martínez-Rodríguez S.
      Pages: 1 - 26
      Abstract: Every new firm selects a legal form. Organizing as a corporation, a limited company, or a partnership shapes the firm’s access to capital markets, its governance arrangements and tax liabilities, and its treatment in bankruptcy. We use multinomial choice models to estimate the determinants of enterprise form using firm-level data on Spain for the period 1886–1936. Our results support hypotheses drawn from the corporate-finance and ownership literatures; entrepreneurs preferred the corporation for the largest firms and for firms vulnerable to holdup. In 1919, Spain introduced a new legal form, a limited company combining attributes of the corporation and the partnership. This Sociedad de Responsabilidad Limitada (SRL) displaced both corporations and partnerships, and was especially popular for small and medium-sized firms whose owners were unrelated. Counterfactual calculations suggest that few enterprises created prior to 1919 would have chosen the SRL even if it had been available.
      PubDate: Fri, 05 Jan 2018 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/jleo/ewx015
      Issue No: Vol. 34, No. 1 (2018)
       
  • The Limits of Judicial Control and the Nondelegation Doctrine
    • Authors: Stiglitz E.
      Pages: 27 - 53
      Abstract: The nondelegation doctrine has been fought over for decades, yet scholars have not examined a foundational question: can judicial doctrine materially shape legislative drafting practices' Even if a strong nondelegation doctrine provides legislators an incentive to draft narrow statutes, they would have many reasons to persist in broad delegations, and it is not clear whether the doctrinal incentives predominate. Here, I examine the relationship between the nondelegation doctrine and lawmaking behavior at the state level using several novel datasets, including a collection of state session laws between 1990 and 2010, and a comprehensive survey of state nondelegation judicial decisions over the last 20 years. Contrary to the common assumption, I find that the robustness of the nondelegation doctrine appears essentially unrelated to legislative drafting practices. This pattern suggests the limited extent to which judicial doctrine can control legislative practices; it also suggests a revived nondelegation doctrine at the federal level is unlikely to effectuate the hopes of proponents or the fears of opponents.
      PubDate: Mon, 19 Feb 2018 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/jleo/ewy002
      Issue No: Vol. 34, No. 1 (2018)
       
  • Delegation or Unilateral Action'
    • Authors: Lowande K.
      Pages: 54 - 78
      Abstract: Unilateral presidential actions often face implementation problems in the executive branch. I argue these actions are better studied as delegation. I model the conditions under which a president is likely to delegate and provide discretion to subordinates either insulated or uninsulated from their control. I find legislators benefit from agency discretion when presidents pursue policymaking in the executive branch. The threat of legislative sanction induces agents to deviate from presidential priorities, and inter-branch disagreement increases bureaucratic non-compliance in insulated agencies. Nonetheless, in equilibrium, the president is more likely to delegate to insulated agents. Ultimately, the model demonstrates how the politics of direct action are influenced by the need for bureaucratic cooperation. Case studies on US presidential directives mandating public funding of gun violence research and security reforms at government facilities illustrate key features of the model.
      PubDate: Mon, 05 Feb 2018 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/jleo/ewy001
      Issue No: Vol. 34, No. 1 (2018)
       
  • Amendment Politics and Agenda Setting: A Theory with Evidence from the US
           House of Representatives1
    • Authors: Magleby D; Monroe N, Robinson G.
      Pages: 108 - 131
      Abstract: Much recent work on legislative policy making has focused on the implications of agenda power. Yet, a critical step of the legislative process—floor amendments—has been almost entirely ignored in the most prominent theories of legislative decision making. In this paper, we fill this gap by developing a theoretical treatment of agenda setting at the amendment stage. Specifically, our theoretical approach defines the relationship between agenda setting at the amendment stage and outcomes at final passage. We test several implications using data from the US House of Representatives, and show that amendments do mitigate some of the majority party’s agenda setting advantage by moderating initial proposals away from the majority party position. However, amendments do not systematically undermine the majority party’s negative agenda control, as we find that amendment rolls do not increase the incidence of final passage rolls for the majority party.
      PubDate: Wed, 10 Jan 2018 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/jleo/ewx016
      Issue No: Vol. 34, No. 1 (2018)
       
  • Incentive Contracts and Downside Risk Sharing
    • Authors: Sinclair-Desgagné B; Spaeter S.
      Pages: 79 - 107
      Abstract: This paper seeks to characterize incentive compensation in a static principal–agent moral hazard setting in which both the principal and the agent are prudent (or downside risk averse). We show that optimal incentive pay should then be “approximately concave” in performance, the approximation being closer the more downside risk averse the principal is compared with the agent. Limiting the agent’s liability would improve the approximation, but taxing the principal would make it coarser. The notion of an approximately concave function we introduce here to describe optimal contracts is relatively recent in mathematics; it is intuitive and translates into concrete empirical implications, notably for the composition of incentive pay packages. We also clarify which measure of prudence—among the various ones proposed in the literature—is relevant to investigate the tradeoff between downside risk sharing and incentives.
      PubDate: Wed, 13 Dec 2017 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/jleo/ewx014
      Issue No: Vol. 34, No. 1 (2017)
       
 
 
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