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Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization
Journal Prestige (SJR): 1.585
Citation Impact (citeScore): 1
Number of Followers: 49  
  Hybrid Journal Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles)
ISSN (Print) 8756-6222 - ISSN (Online) 1465-7341
Published by Oxford University Press Homepage  [396 journals]
  • Bid Rigging and Entry Deterrence in Public Procurement: Evidence from an
           Investigation into Collusion and Corruption in Quebec
    • Authors: Clark R; Coviello D, Gauthier J, et al.
      Pages: 301 - 363
      Abstract: We study the impact of an investigation into collusion and corruption to learn about the organization of cartels in public procurement auctions. Our focus is on Montreal’s asphalt industry, where there have been allegations of bid rigging, market segmentation, complementary bidding, and bribes to bureaucrats, and where, in 2009, a police investigation was launched. We collect procurement data and use a difference-in-difference approach to compare outcomes before and after the investigation in Montreal and in Quebec City, where there have been no allegations of collusion or corruption. We find that entry and participation increased, and that the price of procurement decreased. We then decompose the price decrease to quantify the importance of two aspects of cartel organization, coordination and entry deterrence, for collusive pricing. We find that the latter explains only a small part of the decrease.
      PubDate: Fri, 20 Jul 2018 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/jleo/ewy011
      Issue No: Vol. 34, No. 3 (2018)
  • Corruption and Sensitive Soccer Games: Cross-Country Evidence
    • Authors: Elaad G; Krumer A, Kantor J.
      Pages: 364 - 394
      Abstract: We utilize data from sensitive soccer games in 75 countries between the years 2001 and 2013. In these games one team was in immediate danger of relegation to a lower division (Team A) and another team was not affected by the result (Team B). Using within-country variation, our difference-in-difference analysis reveals that the more corrupt the country, according to Corruption Perceptions Index, the higher is the probability that Team A would achieve the desired result in the sensitive games relative to achieving this result in other, non-sensitive games against the same team. We also find that in the later stages of the following year, the probability that Team A would lose against Team B compared to losing against a similar team (usually better than Team B) is significantly higher in more corrupt countries than in less corrupt countries. This result serves as evidence of quid pro quo behavior. (JEL A12, D73, C93, Z20)
      PubDate: Thu, 05 Jul 2018 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/jleo/ewy013
      Issue No: Vol. 34, No. 3 (2018)
  • Partisanship, Political Institutions, and Debt Issues
    • Authors: Peskowitz Z; Sridharan S.
      Pages: 395 - 424
      Abstract: We investigate the effect of gubernatorial partisanship on municipal bond issues in the United States using a regression discontinuity design. Our unique dataset of individual bond issues allows us to precisely measure the issuing behavior of different entity types—states, state authorities, and localities—and examine how the response of debt issues to gubernatorial partisanship varies across jurisdictions. The election of Democratic governors results in higher levels of debt issuance, with an annual per capita increase of approximately $73–$147 in states that lack debt referenda requirements. In states with debt referenda requirements, the estimated per capita annual effect of a Democratic governor is approximately $23–$28. We find that governors are not able to circumvent debt referenda requirements by issuing debt through state authorities or local governments. (JEL D72, D73, H74, H77)
      PubDate: Sat, 23 Jun 2018 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/jleo/ewy010
      Issue No: Vol. 34, No. 3 (2018)
  • Clueless Politicians: On Policymaker Incentives for Information
           Acquisition in a Model of Lobbying
    • Authors: Cotton C Li C.
      Pages: 425 - 456
      Abstract: We develop a model of policymaking in which a politician decides how much expertise to acquire or how informed to become about issues before interest groups (IGs) engage in monetary lobbying. For a range of issues, the policymaker (PM) prefers to remain less informed about policy than may be socially optimal, even when acquiring expertise or better information is costless. Such a strategy leads to more-intense lobbying competition and larger political contributions. We identify a novel benefit of campaign finance reform, showing how contribution limits decrease the incentives that PMs have to remain under-informed on the issues on which they vote. The analysis goes on to allow for a fully general information strategy in the spirit of Bayesian Persuasion. In the case of symmetric IGs, a PM’s optimal strategy maximizes the probability he is “on the fence” when deciding between policies. (JEL C72, D72)
      PubDate: Fri, 13 Jul 2018 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/jleo/ewy009
      Issue No: Vol. 34, No. 3 (2018)
  • The Effect of Social Norms on Bribe Offers
    • Authors: Abbink K; Freidin E, Gangadharan L, et al.
      Pages: 457 - 474
      Abstract: We report a sequential bribery game to disentangle the effect of descriptive social norms among public officials on bribe offers by firms. Participants who knew that they were interacting with a partner from a group with a majority of corrupt (as opposed to honest) partners offered twice as many bribes. This effect of norms occurred independently of strategic considerations and the possibility of being sanctioned. Indeed, the effect of sanctions was not significant. These findings highlight a causal connection from perceptions of bribery to actual behavior. (JEL C91, D73, K42)
      PubDate: Fri, 20 Jul 2018 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/jleo/ewy015
      Issue No: Vol. 34, No. 3 (2018)
  • Evidence Suppression by Prosecutors: Violations of the Brady Rule
    • Authors: Daughety A; Reinganum J.
      Pages: 475 - 510
      Abstract: We develop a model of individual prosecutors (and teams of prosecutors) to address the incentives for the suppression of exculpatory evidence. Our model assumes that each individual prosecutor trades off a desire for career advancement (by winning a case) and a disutility for knowingly convicting an innocent defendant. We assume a population of prosecutors that is heterogeneous with respect to this disutility, and each individual’s disutility rate is their own private information. A convicted defendant may later discover exculpatory information; a judge will then void the conviction and may order an investigation. Judges are also heterogeneous in their opportunity costs (which is each judge’s private information) of pursuing suspected misconduct. We show that the equilibrium information configuration within the team involves concentration of authority about suppressing/disclosing evidence. We further consider the effect of angst about teammate choices, office culture, and the endogenous choice of effort to suppress evidence. (JEL D73, D82, K4)
      PubDate: Thu, 26 Jul 2018 00:00:00 GMT
      DOI: 10.1093/jleo/ewy014
      Issue No: Vol. 34, No. 3 (2018)
School of Mathematical and Computer Sciences
Heriot-Watt University
Edinburgh, EH14 4AS, UK
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