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Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
Journal Prestige (SJR): 4.302
Citation Impact (citeScore): 6
Number of Followers: 307  
 
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ISSN (Print) 0022-3514 - ISSN (Online) 1939-1315
Published by APA Homepage  [86 journals]
  • “The chains on all my people are the chains on me: Restrictions to
           collective autonomy undermine the personal autonomy and psychological
           well-being of group members”: Correction to Kachanoff et al. (2019).
    • Abstract: Reports an error in "The chains on all my people are the chains on me: Restrictions to collective autonomy undermine the personal autonomy and psychological well-being of group members" by Frank J. Kachanoff, Donald M. Taylor, Julie Caouette, Thomas H. Khullar and Michael J. A. Wohl (Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 2019[Jan], Vol 116[1], 141-165). In the article, an error was detected in the syntax used to compute the ICCs and R² values reported in Study 2 and Study 4. In Study 2, the ICCs reported in the Results section should be as follows: collective autonomy restriction (ICC = .65, 95% CI [.63, .66], personal autonomy (ICC = .51, 95% CI [.48, .53], and psychological well-being (ICC .59, 95% CI [.57, .61]. In Study 4 the ICCs reported in the Multi-level analysis strategy subsection and in Table 11 should be as follows: collective autonomy restriction (ICC .57, 95% CI [.52, .61]; personal autonomy = 0; personal competence = 0; Satisfaction with GQ avatar = .06 [.02, .20]; Enjoyment of GQ = .04 [.01, .22]; Group identification = .09 [.04, .19]; Collective agency = .17 [.11, .25]; Personal autonomy support = .01 [.00, .97]. The R² for Personal autonomy support from ingroup members reported in Table 12 should be .005. The supplemental material has been updated. These changes do not alter the main significance tests reported for the relevant studies, nor do they change the interpretation or conclusions that can be drawn from the results. The online version of this article has been corrected. (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 2018-00811-001.) Four studies assessed the potentially detrimental effects that restrictions to collective autonomy (i.e., a group’s freedom to determine and practice its own identity) may have for the personal autonomy and psychological well-being of group members. In Study 1, using 3 distinct samples (NSample1a = 123, NSample1b = 129, NSample1c = 370), correlational and cross-cultural evidence indicates that perceived restrictions to the collective autonomy of one’s group is directly associated with reduced personal autonomy, and indirectly associated with diminished well-being through personal autonomy. In Study 2 (N = 411), a longitudinal assessment of group members over 3 time-points during a 4-month period found that group members who perceived greater collective autonomy restriction also experienced reduced personal autonomy, and in turn, reduced psychological well-being over time. In Study 3 (N = 255), group members described a time during which their ingroup had (or did not have) its collective autonomy unduly restricted by other groups. Participants who were primed to think that their group lacked collective autonomy reported reduced feelings of personal autonomy, and reduced psychological well-being (compared with those primed to think their group had collective autonomy). In Study 4 (N = 389), collective autonomy was manipulated within the context of an intensive laboratory simulation. Collective autonomy-restricted group members experienced less personal autonomy than those who did not have their collective autonomy restricted. Together these findings suggest that restrictions to a group’s collective autonomy may have detrimental consequences for the personal autonomy and psychological well-being of group members. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved)
      PubDate: Thu, 20 Jun 2019 04:00:00 GMT
       
  • Can other-derogation be beneficial' Seeing others as low in agency can
           lead to an agentic reputation in newly formed face-to-face groups.
    • Abstract: Whenever groups form, members readily and intuitively judge each other’s agentic characteristics (e.g., self-confidence or assertiveness). We tested the hypothesis that perceiving others as low in these characteristics triggers agentic interpersonal behavior among perceivers, which benefits their own reputation in terms of agency. We analyzed data from a longitudinal field study (Study 1, n = 109), a multiwave laboratory study (Study 2, n = 311), and a preregistered experimental laboratory study (Study 3, n = 206). In Study 1, low other-perceptions of agency predicted agentic reputations at zero acquaintance and the reception of leadership nominations later in time. In Study 2, low other-perceptions of agency predicted within-person increases in agentic reputations over time. In both studies, effects of other-perceptions on reputations were mediated by hostile-dominant interpersonal behaviors. In Study 3, experimentally induced low other-perceptions of agency did not predict hostile-dominant behavior, which calls for more research on the proposed mechanism. By emphasizing the role of other-perceptions, the current research provides a new perspective on reputation formation and leadership emergence. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved)
      PubDate: Thu, 16 May 2019 04:00:00 GMT
       
  • Compassion magnifies third-party punishment.
    • Abstract: The last decades of research have provided overwhelming evidence that compassion fosters a vast range of behaviors toward reducing suffering of others. In this regard, compassion has been described as a prosocial tendency par excellence, fostering helping behavior across a variety of social situations. With the present contribution, we apply a differentiated perspective on compassion. Building on just deserts theory, we argue that when other individuals suffer from unjust actions, compassion for the suffering individuals can foster harmful tendencies toward those who caused the suffering (i.e., third-party punishment). In Studies 1a to 1f, we examined a rich variety of situations in which unjust suffering occurs (i.e., terrorist attacks, sexual assaults, rape of children, and war) and documented a positive relation between compassion for suffering victims and punishment inclinations toward those who caused the suffering. Applying an experimental approach using various paradigms in Studies 2 through 6, compassion was shown to increase third-party punishment. Additional analyses revealed that (a) this increase occurs because compassion intensified moral outrage, which in turn predicted third-party punishment (Studies 2 to 6), and (b) compassion only fosters third-party punishment when suffering was caused by high (vs. low) unjust acts (Study 5). Overall, the present research discusses compassion in a different light in that harmful consequences of compassion are considered. Implications are discussed from a perspective of basic research on compassion and third-party punishment as well as from a societal perspective. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved)
      PubDate: Thu, 04 Apr 2019 04:00:00 GMT
       
  • Agentic narcissism, communal narcissism, and prosociality.
    • Abstract: Grandiose narcissism and prosociality are important topics in personality and social psychology, but research on their interplay is lacking. We present a first large-scale, systematic, and multimethod investigation linking the two. In 2 studies (N1 = 688, N2 = 336), we assessed grandiose narcissism comprehensively (i.e., agentic and communal narcissism) and examined its relations with instantiations of prosociality, namely, objective prosociality (actual behavior in Study 1; round-robin informant-reports in a real-life setting in Study 2) and subjective prosociality (self-perceptions in Studies 1 and 2). We obtained a consistent set of results. Agentic narcissism was related to lower objective prosociality and lower subjective prosociality. Communal narcissism, by contrast, was unrelated to objective prosociality, but was related to higher subjective prosociality. Additionally, we tested for prosociality self-enhancement among agentic and communal narcissists. Agentic narcissists evinced the same (and modest) level of prosociality self-enhancement as their non-narcissistic counterparts. Communal narcissists, by contrast, evinced substantial levels of prosociality self-enhancement, whereas their non-narcissistic counterparts did not enhance their prosociality at all. We discuss implications of the findings for the literature on narcissism and antisociality, and for the concept of prosocial personality. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved)
      PubDate: Thu, 04 Apr 2019 04:00:00 GMT
       
  • On the updating of spontaneous impressions.
    • Abstract: A large body of work has shown that perceivers form spontaneous inferences about others’ characteristics (e.g., mean, bad) as soon as they observe their behaviors. However, a question that has not been addressed by previous research is the integration of contingencies of those actions (e.g., perceivers’ ultimate goals) that are typically learned over time into the initial spontaneous impressions of those others. Three experiments examined updating of spontaneously formed trait inferences (STIs) and evaluative inferences (SEIs) as a function of the contingency information that alters the meaning of the initial information. All three studies showed that perceivers update their SEIs (both positive and negative) immediately after learning about the contingencies (i.e., transforming information). STIs, however, were not updated, even when the contingency information was provided immediately after the initial behavior information (Experiment 3). Instead, in all three experiments participants formed multiple STIs; one from the behavior information before and one from the information after the contingency. It was only when participants had the opportunity to elaborate on their trait judgments within explicit measures that they revised their judgments and aligned them with the contingency information. The results and the implications of the findings are discussed in light of the theoretical models suggesting separate mechanisms of semantic and evaluative processing in person perception. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved)
      PubDate: Thu, 14 Mar 2019 04:00:00 GMT
       
  • Understanding the process of moralization: How eating meat becomes a moral
           issue.
    • Abstract: A large literature demonstrates that moral convictions guide many of our thoughts, behaviors, and social interactions. Yet, we know little about how these moral convictions come to exist. In the present research we explore moralization—the process by which something that was morally neutral takes on moral properties—examining what factors facilitate and deter it. In 3 longitudinal studies participants were presented with morally evocative stimuli about why eating meat should be viewed as a moral issue. Study 1 tracked students over a semester as they took a university course that highlighted the suffering animals endure because of human meat consumption. In Studies 2 and 3 participants took part in a mini-course we developed which presented evocative videos aimed at inducing moralization. In all 3 studies, we assessed participants’ beliefs, attitudes, emotions, and cognitions at multiple time points to track moral changes and potential factors responsible for such changes. A variety of factors, both cognitive and affective, predicted participants’ moralization or lack thereof. Model testing further pointed to two primary conduits of moralization: the experience of moral emotions (e.g., disgust, guilt) felt when contemplating the issue, and moral piggybacking (connecting the issue at hand with one’s existing fundamental moral principles). Moreover, we found individual differences, such as how much one holds their morality as central to their identity, also predicted the moralization process. We discuss the broad theoretical and applied implications of our results. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved)
      PubDate: Thu, 14 Mar 2019 04:00:00 GMT
       
  • Reducing discrimination: A bias versus noise perspective.
    • Abstract: Discrimination can occur when people fail to focus on outcome-relevant information and incorporate irrelevant demographic information into decision-making. The magnitude of discrimination then depends on (a) how many errors are made in judgment and (b) the degree to which errors disproportionately favor one group over another. As a result, discrimination can be reduced through two routes: reducing noise—lessening the total number of errors but not changing the proportion of remaining errors that favor one group—or reducing bias—lessening the proportion of errors that favor one group but not changing the total number of errors made. Eight studies (N = 7,921) investigate how noise and bias rely on distinct psychological mechanisms and are influenced by different interventions. Interventions that removed demographic information not only eliminated bias, but also reduced noise (Studies 1a and 1b). Interventions that either decreased (Studies 2a–2c) or increased (Study 3) the time available to evaluators impacted noise but not bias, as did interventions altering motivation to process outcome-relevant information (Study 4). Conversely, an intervention asking participants to avoid favoring a certain group impacted bias but not noise (Study 5). Finally, a novel intervention that both asked participants to avoid favoring a certain group and required them to take more time when making judgments impacted bias and noise simultaneously (Study 5). Efforts to reduce discrimination will be well-served by understanding how interventions impact bias, noise, or both. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved)
      PubDate: Thu, 07 Mar 2019 05:00:00 GMT
       
  • Happy fish in little ponds: Testing a reference group model of achievement
           and emotion.
    • Abstract: A theoretical model linking achievement and emotions is proposed. The model posits that individual achievement promotes positive achievement emotions and reduces negative achievement emotions. In contrast, group-level achievement is thought to reduce individuals’ positive emotions and increase their negative emotions. The model was tested using one cross-sectional and two longitudinal datasets on 5th to 10th grade students’ achievement emotions in mathematics (Studies 1–3: Ns = 1,610, 1,759, and 4,353, respectively). Multilevel latent structural equation modeling confirmed that individual achievement had positive predictive effects on positive emotions (enjoyment, pride) and negative predictive effects on negative emotions (anger, anxiety, shame, and hopelessness), controlling for prior achievement, autoregressive effects, reciprocal effects, gender, and socioeconomic status (SES). Class-level achievement had negative compositional effects on the positive emotions and positive compositional effects on the negative emotions. Additional analyses suggested that self-concept of ability is a possible mediator of these effects. Furthermore, there were positive compositional effects of class-level achievement on individual achievement in Study 2 but not in Study 3, indicating that negative compositional effects on emotion are not reliably counteracted by positive effects on performance. The results were robust across studies, age groups, synchronous versus longitudinal analysis, and latent-manifest versus doubly latent modeling. These findings imply that individual success drives emotional well-being, whereas placing individuals in high-achieving groups can undermine well-being. Thus, the findings challenge policy and practice decisions on achievement-contingent allocation of individuals to groups. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved)
      PubDate: Mon, 21 Jan 2019 05:00:00 GMT
       
  • Norm talk and human cooperation: Can we talk ourselves into
           cooperation'
    • Abstract: Norm talk is verbal communication that explicitly states or implicitly implies a social norm. To investigate its ability to shape cultural dynamics, 2 types of norm talk were examined: injunction, which explicitly states what should be done, and gossip, which implies a norm by stating an action approved or disapproved of by the communicator. In 2 experiments, participants engaged in norm talk in repeated public goods games. Norm talk was found to help sustain cooperation relative to the control condition; immediately after every norm talk opportunity, cooperation spiked, followed by a gradual decline. Despite the macrolevel uniformity in their effects on cooperation, evidence suggests different microlevel mechanisms for the cooperation-enhancing effects of injunction and gossip. A 3rd study confirmed that both injunction and gossip sustain cooperation by making salient the norm of cooperation, but injunction also effects mutual verification of the communicated norm, whereas gossip emphasizes its reputational implications by linking cooperation to status conferral and noncooperation to reputational damage. A 4th experiment provided additional evidence that norm talk was superior to the promise of conditional cooperation in sustaining cooperation. Implications of the findings for cultural dynamics are discussed in terms of how feelings of shared morality, language-based interpersonal communication, and ritualization of norm communication contribute to social regulation. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved)
      PubDate: Mon, 26 Nov 2018 05:00:00 GMT
       
  • Third-party prejudice accommodation increases gender discrimination.
    • Abstract: We investigated how gatekeepers sometimes arrive at discriminatory hiring selections to accommodate prejudiced third parties due to role demands (i.e., the “third-party prejudice effect”). Studies 1 and 2 show that individuals in charge of personnel decisions were significantly less likely to select a woman when a relevant third party (the chief executive officer of the company in Study 1; the “proposer” in an ultimatum game in Study 2) was prejudiced against women. Gatekeepers accommodate third-party prejudice in this way in order to avoid conflict in relations and task-related problems that would likely occur if the gatekeeper introduced a member of the target of prejudice into an organization. Studies 3 and 4 demonstrated that both interpersonal and task-focused concerns significantly mediated third-party prejudice accommodation. Furthermore, experimentally reducing task-focused concerns significantly reduced the accommodation of third-party prejudice against women (Study 4). We also found that gatekeepers accommodate third-party prejudice regardless of their own beliefs and attitudes (Studies 5 and 6), or their own desire to get along or affiliate with the third party (Study 7), and despite leading to feelings of guilt (Studies 4 and 5). Both men and women accommodated third-party prejudice against women. A role-based framework can be useful to understand the persistence of gender inequality in various fields and organizations, even as individuals endorse increasingly gender-egalitarian views. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved)
      PubDate: Thu, 18 Oct 2018 04:00:00 GMT
       
  • Reassessing the good judge of personality.
    • Abstract: Are some people truly better able to accurately perceive the personality of others' Previous research suggests that the good judge may be of little practical importance and individual differences minimal. In four large samples we assessed whether expressive accuracy (the good target) is a necessary condition for perceptive accuracy (the good judge) to emerge. As predicted from Funder’s (1995) realistic accuracy model, assessments of the good judge predicted increased impression accuracy in the context of judgments of the good target. In contrast, evaluative tendencies for judges did not evidence a similar interaction; the positivity of impressions did not reliably increase as a function of how positively targets tend to be viewed. The present results suggest the good judge does indeed exist—some individuals are much better able to detect and utilize valid cues from targets—but this is only strongly evident when perceiving a good target. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved)
      PubDate: Mon, 25 Jun 2018 04:00:00 GMT
       
 
 
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