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American Political Science Review
Journal Prestige (SJR): 5.587
Citation Impact (citeScore): 4
Number of Followers: 274  
 
  Hybrid Journal Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles)
ISSN (Print) 0003-0554 - ISSN (Online) 1537-5943
Published by Cambridge University Press Homepage  [372 journals]
  • PSR volume 112 issue 4 Cover and Front matter
    • PubDate: 2018-11-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0003055418000230
      Issue No: Vol. 112, No. 4 (2018)
       
  • PSR volume 112 issue 4 Cover and Back matter
    • PubDate: 2018-11-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0003055418000576
      Issue No: Vol. 112, No. 4 (2018)
       
  • Notes from the Editors
    • Abstract: Like other sciences, Political Science consists of subfields with, at times, different focuses, methodological approaches, and understandings of what constitutes “scholarly research of exceptional merit” that is worth being published in the American Political Science Review (APSR). In these Notes from the Editors, we want to take a closer look at subfield developments over time and provide some insights into the role of subfield classification in our editorial process. Being a cornerstone of this journal, we work hard as editors to publish a balanced selection of research from these subfields, which should theoretically mirror the submission rates we receive. Yet, despite having their own standards and principles for the evaluation of excellent manuscripts, subfield classifications often overlap in practice and change over time. Before we go into detail, we would therefore like to stress that the comparison of subfield developments, such as the number of submissions and acceptances, should always be taken with a grain of salt as their classification is neither exclusive nor complete.
      PubDate: 2018-10-10T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0003055418000540
      Issue No: Vol. 112, No. 4 (2018)
       
  • When Do the Advantaged See the Disadvantages of Others' A
           Quasi-Experimental Study of National Service
    • Authors: CECILIA HYUNJUNG MO; KATHARINE M. CONN
      Pages: 721 - 741
      Abstract: Are there mechanisms by which the advantaged can see the perspectives of the disadvantaged' If advantaged individuals have prolonged engagement with disadvantaged populations and confront issues of inequality through national service, do they see the world more through the lens of the poor' We explore this question by examining Teach For America (TFA), as TFA is a prominent national service program that integrates top college graduates into low-income communities for two years and employs a selection model that allows for causal inference. A regression discontinuity approach, utilizing an original survey of over 32,000 TFA applicants and TFA’s selection data for the 2007–2015 application cycles, reveals that extended intergroup contact in a service context causes advantaged Americans to adopt beliefs that are closer to those of disadvantaged Americans. These findings have broad implications for our understanding of the impact of intergroup contact on perceptions of social justice and prejudice reduction.
      PubDate: 2018-11-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0003055418000412
      Issue No: Vol. 112, No. 4 (2018)
       
  • Exclusion and Cooperation in Diverse Societies: Experimental Evidence from
           Israel
    • Authors: RYAN D. ENOS; NOAM GIDRON
      Pages: 742 - 757
      Abstract: It is well-established that in diverse societies, certain groups prefer to exclude other groups from power and often from society entirely. Yet as many societies are diversifying at an increasingly rapid pace, the need for cross-group cooperation to solve collective action problems has intensified. Do preferences for exclusion inhibit the ability of individuals to cooperate and, therefore, diminish the ability for societies to collectively provide public goods' Turning to Israel, a society with multiple overlapping and politically salient cleavages, we use a large-scale lab-in-the-field design to investigate how preferences for exclusion among the Jewish majority predict discriminatory behavior toward Palestinian Citizens of Israel. We establish that preferences for exclusion are likely symbolic attitudes, and therefore stable and dominating of other attitudes; are held especially strongly by low-status majority group members; and powerfully predict costly non-cooperation. This preferences/behavior relationship appears unaffected by mitigating factors proposed in the intergroup relations literature. The demonstrated influence of symbolic attitudes on behavior calls for further examination of the social roots of exclusionary preferences.
      PubDate: 2018-11-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0003055418000266
      Issue No: Vol. 112, No. 4 (2018)
       
  • When the Money Stops: Fluctuations in Financial Remittances and Incumbent
           Approval in Central Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia
    • Authors: KATERINA TERTYTCHNAYA; CATHERINE E. DE VRIES, HECTOR SOLAZ, DAVID DOYLE
      Pages: 758 - 774
      Abstract: Fluctuations in the volume and the value of financial remittances received from abroad affect the livelihood of households in developing economies across the world. Yet, political scientists have little to say about how changes in remittances, as opposed to the receipt of remittance payments alone, affect recipients’ political attitudes. Relying on a unique four-wave panel study of Kyrgyz citizens between 2010–2013 and a cross-sectional sample of 28 countries in Central Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia, we show that when people experience a decrease (increase) in remittances, they become less (more) satisfied about their household economic situation and misattribute responsibility to the incumbent at home. Our findings advance the literature on the political consequences of remittance payments and suggest that far from exclusively being an international risk-sharing mechanism for developing countries, remittances can also drive fluctuations in incumbent approval and compromise rudimentary accountability mechanisms in the developing world.
      PubDate: 2018-11-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0003055418000485
      Issue No: Vol. 112, No. 4 (2018)
       
  • How Clients Select Brokers: Competition and Choice in India's Slums
    • Authors: ADAM MICHAEL AUERBACH; TARIQ THACHIL
      Pages: 775 - 791
      Abstract: Conventional models of clientelism often assume poor voters have little or no choice over which local broker to turn to for help. Yet communities in many clientelistic settings are marked by multiple brokers who compete for a following. Such competition makes client choices, and the preferences guiding such choices, pivotal in fueling broker support. We examine client preferences for a pervasive broker—slum leaders—in the context of urban India. To identify resident preferences for slum leaders, we conducted an ethnographically informed conjoint survey experiment with 2,199 residents across 110 slums in two Indian cities. Contra standard emphases on shared ethnicity, we find residents place heaviest weight on a broker's capability to make claims on the state. A survey of 629 slum leaders finds client-preferred traits distinguish brokers from residents. In highlighting processes of broker selection, and the client preferences that undergird them, we underscore the centrality of clients in shaping local brokerage environments.
      PubDate: 2018-11-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S000305541800028X
      Issue No: Vol. 112, No. 4 (2018)
       
  • How Internal Constraints Shape Interest Group Activities: Evidence from
           Access-Seeking PACs
    • Authors: ZHAO LI
      Pages: 792 - 808
      Abstract: Interest groups contribute much less to campaigns than legally allowed. Consequently, prevailing theories infer these contributions must yield minimal returns. I argue constraints on PAC fundraising may also explain why interest groups give little. I illuminate one such constraint: access-seeking PACs rely on voluntary donations from affiliated individuals (e.g., employees), and these PACs alienate donors with partisan preferences when giving to the opposite party. First, difference-in-differences analysis of real giving shows donors withhold donations to access-seeking PACs when PACs contribute to out-partisan politicians. Next, an original survey of corporate PAC donors demonstrates they know how their PACs allocate contributions across parties, and replicates the observational study in an experiment. Donors’ partisanship thus limits access-seeking PACs’ fundraising and influence. This provides a new perspective on why there is little interest group money in elections, and has broad implications for how partisan preferences and other internal constraints shape interest group strategy.
      PubDate: 2018-11-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0003055418000382
      Issue No: Vol. 112, No. 4 (2018)
       
  • Political Competition in Legislative Elections
    • Authors: STEFAN KRASA; MATTIAS K. POLBORN
      Pages: 809 - 825
      Abstract: We develop a theory of electoral competition in multidistrict legislative elections when nomination decisions are made by local policy-motivated party members, and voters care about both local and national positions. We show that the asymmetry generated by different national party positions reduces or even entirely removes the competitive pressure to nominate moderate candidates. The model has important implications for our understanding of policy divergence and, in particular, of the effects of gerrymandering.
      PubDate: 2018-11-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0003055418000503
      Issue No: Vol. 112, No. 4 (2018)
       
  • Primaries and Candidate Polarization: Behavioral Theory and Experimental
           Evidence
    • Authors: JONATHAN WOON
      Pages: 826 - 843
      Abstract: Do primary elections cause candidates to take extreme, polarized positions' Standard equilibrium analysis predicts full convergence to the median voter’s position with complete information, but behavioral game theory predicts divergence when players are policy-motivated and have out-of-equilibrium beliefs. Theoretically, I show that primary elections can cause greater extremism or moderation, depending on the beliefs candidates and voters have about their opponents. In a controlled incentivized experiment, I find that candidates diverge substantially and that primaries have little effect on average positions. Voters employ a strategy that weeds out candidates who are either too moderate or too extreme, which enhances ideological purity without increasing divergence. The analysis highlights the importance of behavioral assumptions in understanding the effects of electoral institutions.
      PubDate: 2018-11-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0003055418000515
      Issue No: Vol. 112, No. 4 (2018)
       
  • Leadership with Trustworthy Associates
    • Authors: TORUN DEWAN; FRANCESCO SQUINTANI
      Pages: 844 - 859
      Abstract: Group members value informed decisions and hold ideological preferences. A leader takes a decision on their behalf. Good leadership depends on characteristics of moderation and judgment. The latter emerges (endogenously) via advice communicated by “trustworthy associates.” Trustworthy advice requires ideological proximity to the leader. A group may choose a relatively extreme leader with a large number of such associates. Paradoxically, this can happen though it is in the group’s collective interest to choose a moderate leader. To assess whether these insights persist when political groups compete, we embed our analysis in a model of elections. Each of two parties chooses a leader who implements her preferred policy if elected. We find that a party may choose an extreme leader who defeats a moderate candidate chosen by the opposing party. Our results highlight the importance of party cohesion and the relations between a leader and her party. These can be more important to electoral success than proximity of a leader’s position to the median voter.
      PubDate: 2018-11-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0003055418000229
      Issue No: Vol. 112, No. 4 (2018)
       
  • On the Limits of Officials’ Ability to Change Citizens’ Priorities: A
           Field Experiment in Local Politics
    • Authors: DANIEL M. BUTLER; HANS J.G. HASSELL
      Pages: 860 - 873
      Abstract: We test whether politicians’ communications shape their supporters’ policy priorities by conducting a field experiment in collaboration with several local elected officials. In the experiment, the officials sent out email messages to the constituents on their distribution lists. Half the constituents received messages where the official advocated for the priority of a given issue, while the other half received a placebo email. We surveyed the constituents one to two months before the message went out and again the week after the official sent the message. The experiment shows that politicians did not change citizens’ priorities in the desired direction. Moreover, citizens who received a message where the official indicated the issue was a priority were not more likely to act when invited to sign a petition on the issue. Elected officials’ ability to shape the priorities of the politically active citizens with whom they regularly communicate is limited and can even be self-defeating.
      PubDate: 2018-11-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0003055418000473
      Issue No: Vol. 112, No. 4 (2018)
       
  • Who Polices the Administrative State'
    • Authors: KENNETH LOWANDE
      Pages: 874 - 890
      Abstract: Scholarship on oversight of the bureaucracy typically conceives of legislatures as unitary actors. But most oversight is conducted by individual legislators who contact agencies directly. I acquire the correspondence logs of 16 bureaucratic agencies and re-evaluate the conventional proposition that ideological disagreement drives oversight. I identify the effect of this disagreement by exploiting the transition from George Bush to Barack Obama, which shifted the ideological orientation of agencies through turnover in agency personnel. Contrary to existing research, I find ideological conflict has a negligible effect on oversight, whereas committee roles and narrow district interests are primary drivers. The findings may indicate that absent incentives induced by public auditing, legislator behavior is driven by policy valence concerns rather than ideology. The results further suggest collective action in Congress may pose greater obstacles to bureaucratic oversight than previously thought.
      PubDate: 2018-11-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0003055418000497
      Issue No: Vol. 112, No. 4 (2018)
       
  • The Power of the Multitude: Answering Epistemic Challenges to Democracy
    • Authors: SAMUEL BAGG
      Pages: 891 - 904
      Abstract: Recent years have witnessed growing controversy over the “wisdom of the multitude.” As epistemic critics drawing on vast empirical evidence have cast doubt on the political competence of ordinary citizens, epistemic democrats have offered a defense of democracy grounded largely in analogies and formal results. So far, I argue, the critics have been more convincing. Nevertheless, democracy can be defended on instrumental grounds, and this article demonstrates an alternative approach. Instead of implausibly upholding the epistemic reliability of average voters, I observe that competitive elections, universal suffrage, and discretionary state power disable certain potent mechanisms of elite entrenchment. By reserving particular forms of power for the multitude of ordinary citizens, they make democratic states more resistant to dangerous forms of capture than non-democratic alternatives. My approach thus offers a robust defense of electoral democracy, yet cautions against expecting too much from it—motivating a thicker conception of democracy, writ large.
      PubDate: 2018-11-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0003055418000527
      Issue No: Vol. 112, No. 4 (2018)
       
  • The Right to Strike: A Radical View
    • Authors: ALEX GOUREVITCH
      Pages: 905 - 917
      Abstract: Workers face a common dilemma when exercising their right to strike. For the worst-off workers to go on strike with some reasonable chance of success, they must use coercive strike tactics like mass pickets and sit-downs. These tactics violate some basic liberties, such as contract, association, and private property, and the laws that protect those liberties. Which has priority, the right to strike or the basic liberties strikers might violate' The answer depends on why the right to strike is justified. In contrast to liberal and social democratic arguments, on the radical view defended here, the right to strike is a right to resist oppression. This oppression is partly a product of the legal protection of basic economic liberties, which explains why the right to strike has priority over these liberties. The radical view thus best explains why workers may use some coercive, even lawbreaking, strike tactics.
      PubDate: 2018-11-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0003055418000321
      Issue No: Vol. 112, No. 4 (2018)
       
  • Technological Change and Political Turnover: The Democratizing Effects of
           the Green Revolution in India
    • Authors: ADITYA DASGUPTA
      Pages: 918 - 938
      Abstract: Can technological change contribute to political turnover' Influential theories suggest that technological change represents a form of creative destruction that can weaken incumbents and strengthen outsiders, leading to political turnover. This paper investigates a large-scale historical natural experiment: the impact of the green revolution on single-party dominance in India. Drawing on a theoretical framework based on models of contests, this paper argues that high-yielding variety (HYV) crops strengthened the incentives and capacity of a politically excluded group, in this case agricultural producers, to seek greater political representation. Exploiting the timing of the introduction of HYV crops, together with district-level variation in suitability for the new crop technology, instrumental variables analyses show that the green revolution played a pivotal role in the rise of agrarian opposition parties and decline of single-party dominance. The findings support theories linking technological change to political turnover, with important implications for the political economy of democratization.
      PubDate: 2018-11-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S000305541800031X
      Issue No: Vol. 112, No. 4 (2018)
       
  • Cabinet Durability and Fiscal Discipline
    • Authors: DAVID FORTUNATO; MATT W. LOFTIS
      Pages: 939 - 953
      Abstract: We argue that short government durations in parliamentary democracies increase public spending by driving a political budget cycle. We present a revision of the standard political budget cycle model that relaxes the common (often implicit) assumption that election timing is fixed and known in advance. Instead, we allow cabinets to form expectations about their durability and use these expectations to inform their spending choices. The model predicts that (1) cabinets should spend more as their expected term in office draws to a close and (2) cabinets that outlive their expected duration should run higher deficits. Using data from 15 European democracies over several decades, we show that governments increase spending as their expected duration withers and run higher deficits as they surpass their forecasted life expectancy.
      PubDate: 2018-11-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0003055418000436
      Issue No: Vol. 112, No. 4 (2018)
       
  • Media Bias against Foreign Firms as a Veiled Trade Barrier: Evidence from
           Chinese Newspapers
    • Authors: SUNG EUN KIM
      Pages: 954 - 970
      Abstract: While the rules of international trade regimes prevent governments from employing protectionist instruments, governments continue to seek out veiled means of supporting their national industries. This article argues that the news media can serve as one channel for governments to favor domestic industries. Focusing on media coverage of auto recalls in China, I reveal a systematic bias against foreign automakers in those newspapers under strict government control. I further analyze subnational reporting patterns, exploiting variation in the level of regional government interest in the automobile industry. The analysis suggests that the media’s home bias is driven by the government’s protectionist interests but rules out the alternative hypothesis that home bias simply reflects the nationalist sentiment of readers. I show that this home bias in news coverage has meaningful impact on actual consumer behavior, combining automobile sales data and information on recall-related web searches.
      PubDate: 2018-11-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0003055418000242
      Issue No: Vol. 112, No. 4 (2018)
       
  • Office-Selling, Corruption, and Long-Term Development in Peru
    • Authors: JENNY GUARDADO
      Pages: 971 - 995
      Abstract: The paper uses a unique hand-collected dataset of the prices at which the Spanish Crown sold colonial provincial governorships in seventeenth and eighteenth century Peru to examine the impact of colonial officials on long-run development. Combining provincial characteristics with exogenous variation in appointment criteria due to the timing of European wars, I first show that provinces with greater extraction potential tended to fetch higher prices and attract worse buyers. In the long run, these high-priced provinces have lower household consumption, schooling, and public good provision. The type of governors ruling these provinces likely exacerbated political conflict, ethnic segregation, and undermined institutional trust among the population.
      PubDate: 2018-11-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S000305541800045X
      Issue No: Vol. 112, No. 4 (2018)
       
  • Endogenous Taxation in Ongoing Internal Conflict: The Case of Colombia
    • Authors: RAFAEL CH; JACOB SHAPIRO, ABBEY STEELE, JUAN F. VARGAS
      Pages: 996 - 1015
      Abstract: Recent empirical evidence suggests an ambiguous relationship between internal conflicts, state capacity, and tax performance. In theory, internal conflict should create strong incentives for governments to develop the fiscal capacity necessary to defeat rivals. We argue that one reason that this does not occur is because internal conflict enables groups with de facto power to capture local fiscal and property rights institutions. We test this mechanism in Colombia using data on tax performance and property rights institutions at the municipal level. Municipalities affected by internal conflict have tax institutions consistent with the preferences of the parties dominating local violence. Those suffering more right-wing violence feature more land formalization and higher property tax revenues. Municipalities with substantial left-wing guerrilla violence collect less tax revenue and witness less land formalization. Our findings provide systematic evidence that internal armed conflict helps interest groups capture municipal institutions for their own private benefit, impeding state-building.
      PubDate: 2018-11-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0003055418000333
      Issue No: Vol. 112, No. 4 (2018)
       
  • Reelection and Renegotiation: International Agreements in the Shadow of
           the Polls
    • Authors: PETER BUISSERET; DAN BERNHARDT
      Pages: 1016 - 1035
      Abstract: We study dynamic international agreements when one of the negotiating parties faces a threat of electoral replacement during negotiations, when agreements made before the election are the starting point for any subsequent renegotiation, and when governments cannot commit to future negotiation strategies. Conflicts of interest between governments may be softened or intensified by the governments’ conflicts of interest with voters. We characterize when the threat of electoral turnover strengthens the prospect for successful negotiations, when it may cause negotiations to fail, and how it affects the division of the surplus from cooperation. We also show how changes in domestic politics—including uncertainty about the preferences of domestic political parties—affect a domestic government’s ability to extract greater concessions in negotiations.
      PubDate: 2018-11-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0003055418000400
      Issue No: Vol. 112, No. 4 (2018)
       
  • Between Presumption and Despair: Augustine's Hope for the Commonwealth
    • Authors: MICHAEL LAMB
      Pages: 1036 - 1049
      Abstract: Many political theorists dismiss Augustine as a pessimist about politics, assuming his “otherworldly” account of love precludes hope for this-worldly politics. This article challenges this pessimism by applying recent research on Augustine's “order of love” to reconstruct his implicit order of hope. Analyzing neglected sermons, letters, and treatises, I argue that Augustine encourages hope for temporal goods as long as that hope is rightly ordered and avoids the corresponding vices of presumption and despair. I then identify “civic peace” as a common object of hope that diverse citizens can share. By recovering hope as a virtue and reframing civic peace as a positive form of civic friendship, I argue that Augustine commends a hope for the commonwealth that avoids both presumption and despair. I conclude by analyzing how Augustine's vision of the commonwealth can inform contemporary political theory and practice.
      PubDate: 2018-11-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0003055418000345
      Issue No: Vol. 112, No. 4 (2018)
       
  • Examining a Most Likely Case for Strong Campaign Effects: Hitler’s
           Speeches and the Rise of the Nazi Party, 1927–1933
    • Authors: PETER SELB; SIMON MUNZERT
      Pages: 1050 - 1066
      Abstract: Hitler’s rise to power amidst an unprecedented propaganda campaign initiated scholarly interest in campaign effects. To the surprise of many, empirical studies often found minimal effects. The predominant focus of early work was on U.S. elections, though. Nazi propaganda as the archetypal and, in many ways, most likely case for strong effects has rarely been studied. We collect extensive data about Hitler’s speeches and gauge their impact on voter support at five national elections preceding the dictatorship. We use a semi-parametric difference-in-differences approach to estimate effects in the face of potential confounding due to the deliberate scheduling of events. Our findings suggest that Hitler’s speeches, while rationally targeted, had a negligible impact on the Nazis’ electoral fortunes. Only the 1932 presidential runoff, an election preceded by an extraordinarily short, intense, and one-sided campaign, yielded positive effects. This study questions the importance of charismatic leaders for the success of populist movements.
      PubDate: 2018-11-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0003055418000424
      Issue No: Vol. 112, No. 4 (2018)
       
  • How to Make Causal Inferences with Time-Series Cross-Sectional Data under
           Selection on Observables
    • Authors: MATTHEW BLACKWELL; ADAM N. GLYNN
      Pages: 1067 - 1082
      Abstract: Repeated measurements of the same countries, people, or groups over time are vital to many fields of political science. These measurements, sometimes called time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) data, allow researchers to estimate a broad set of causal quantities, including contemporaneous effects and direct effects of lagged treatments. Unfortunately, popular methods for TSCS data can only produce valid inferences for lagged effects under some strong assumptions. In this paper, we use potential outcomes to define causal quantities of interest in these settings and clarify how standard models like the autoregressive distributed lag model can produce biased estimates of these quantities due to post-treatment conditioning. We then describe two estimation strategies that avoid these post-treatment biases—inverse probability weighting and structural nested mean models—and show via simulations that they can outperform standard approaches in small sample settings. We illustrate these methods in a study of how welfare spending affects terrorism.
      PubDate: 2018-11-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0003055418000357
      Issue No: Vol. 112, No. 4 (2018)
       
  • Are Human Rights Practices Improving'
    • Authors: DAVID CINGRANELLI; MIKHAIL FILIPPOV
      Pages: 1083 - 1089
      Abstract: Has government protection of human rights improved' The answer to this and many other research questions is strongly affected by the assumptions we make and the modeling strategy we choose as the basis for creating human rights country scores. Fariss (2014) introduced a statistical model that produced latent scores showing an improving trend in human rights. Consistent with his stringent assumptions, his statistical model heavily weighted rare incidents of mass killings such as genocide, while discounting indicators of lesser and more common violations such as torture and political imprisonment. We replicated his analysis, replacing the actual values of all indicators of lesser human rights violations with randomly generated data, and obtained an identical improving trend. However, when we replicated the analysis, relaxing his assumptions by allowing all indicators to potentially have a similar effect on the latent scores, we find no human rights improvement.
      PubDate: 2018-11-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0003055418000254
      Issue No: Vol. 112, No. 4 (2018)
       
  • Quantifying Political Relationships
    • Authors: SIMON WESCHLE
      Pages: 1090 - 1095
      Abstract: In this article, I introduce a method that uses large-scale event data and latent factor network models to provide a new comparative measure of cooperation and conflict in public relationships among politicians, nonpartisan political actors, and societal actors. The approach has a number of advantages over existing techniques: It captures public relationships in a multitude of venues on a continuous basis, incorporates both partisan and nonpartisan actors, allows quantifying the relationship between any pair of actors, reflects that communication is not unidirectional but rather a back and forth, and can be applied to a large number of countries over time. I apply the method to 13 Western European countries from 2001 to 2014 and demonstrate that party relationships are determined by coalition status as well as policy differences. The measure is publicly available and can be incorporated into standard research designs.
      PubDate: 2018-11-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0003055418000461
      Issue No: Vol. 112, No. 4 (2018)
       
  • Ethnoracial Homogeneity and Public Outcomes: The (Non)effects of Diversity
    • Authors: ALEXANDER KUSTOV; GIULIANA PARDELLI
      Pages: 1096 - 1103
      Abstract: How does ethnoracial demography relate to public goods provision' Many studies find support for the hypothesis that diversity is related to inefficient outcomes by comparing diverse and homogeneous communities. We distinguish between homogeneity of dominant and disadvantaged groups and argue that it is often impossible to identify the effects of diversity due to its collinearity with the share of disadvantaged groups. To disentangle the effects of these variables, we study new data from Brazilian municipalities. While it is possible to interpret the prima facie negative correlation between diversity and public goods as supportive of the prominent “deficit” hypothesis, a closer analysis reveals that, in fact, more homogeneous Afro-descendant communities have lower provision. While we cannot rule out that diversity is consequential in other contexts, our results cast doubt on the reliability of previous findings related to the benefits of local ethnoracial homogeneity for public outcomes.
      PubDate: 2018-11-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0003055418000308
      Issue No: Vol. 112, No. 4 (2018)
       
  • Protecting the Right to Discriminate: The Second Great Migration and
           Racial Threat in the American West
    • Authors: TYLER T. RENY; BENJAMIN J. NEWMAN
      Pages: 1104 - 1110
      Abstract: Taking advantage of a unique event in American history, the Second Great Migration, we explore whether the rapid entry of African Americans into nearly exclusively White contexts triggered “racial threat” in White voting behavior in the state of California. Utilizing historical administrative data, we find that increasing proximity to previously White areas experiencing drastic Black population growth between 1940 to 1960 is associated with significant increases in aggregate White voter support for a highly racially-charged ballot measure, Proposition 14, which legally protected racial discrimination in housing. Importantly, we find that this result holds when restricting the analysis to all-White areas with high rates of residential tenure and low rates of White population growth. These latter findings indicate that this relationship materializes in contexts where a larger share of White voters were present during the treatment and exercised residential-choice before the treatment commenced, which is suggestive of a causal effect.
      PubDate: 2018-11-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0003055418000448
      Issue No: Vol. 112, No. 4 (2018)
       
  • Distributive Politics with Vote and Turnout Buying
    • Authors: AGUSTIN CASAS
      Pages: 1111 - 1119
      Abstract: The objective of this paper is to model the incumbent’s allocation of efforts that maximize his electoral chances in the presence of both vote buying (persuasion) and turnout buying (mobilization). The existing literature on distributive politics concludes that political candidates should concentrate their campaigning efforts either on safe districts or on swing districts. This paper shows that when candidates can use both persuasion and mobilization strategies, and the ideology of voters is unknown to the incumbent party, a third option should be taken into account. In fact, the optimal allocation of resources—rather than focusing on safe or swing districts—should target opposition strongholds, that is, the incumbent should try to sway voters in those districts in which the challenger is favored. The intuition for this result is simple. Since the incumbent does not know individual preferences (he only observes the distribution of preferences in the districts), all voters in a given district look identical to him. Hence, when approaching voters in a district to buy their vote, the incumbent always faces the risk of buying the vote of his supporters (who would have voted for him anyway).
      PubDate: 2018-11-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0003055418000291
      Issue No: Vol. 112, No. 4 (2018)
       
  • Exit, Voice, and Public Reason
    • Authors: KEVIN VALLIER
      Pages: 1120 - 1124
      Abstract: Public reason liberals appeal to public deliberation to ensure that a legal order can be publicly justified to its citizens. I argue that this voice mechanism should be supplemented by exit mechanisms. By allowing citizens to exit legal orders they believe cannot be publicly justified, citizens can pressure states to change their laws. This exit pressure is sometimes more effective than deliberation. I explore federalism as an exit mechanism that can help public deliberation establish a publicly justified polity.
      PubDate: 2018-11-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0003055418000539
      Issue No: Vol. 112, No. 4 (2018)
       
  • What Makes a Good Neighbor' Race, Place, and Norms of Political
           Participation – CORRIGENDUM
    • Authors: ALLISON P. ANOLL
      Pages: 1125 - 1125
      PubDate: 2018-11-01T00:00:00.000Z
      DOI: 10.1017/S0003055418000564
      Issue No: Vol. 112, No. 4 (2018)
       
 
 
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