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Phenomenology and Mind
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ISSN (Print) 2280-7853 - ISSN (Online) 2239-4028
Published by Firenze University Press Homepage  [41 journals]
  • Two Semiotic Shifts in the Philosophy of Norms: Meaning Shift and Referent

    • Authors: Paolo Di Lucia, Lorenzo Passerini Glazel
      Abstract: In this introductory paper the guest editors (Paolo Di Lucia and Lorenzo Passerini Glazel) of the special issue “Norm: What Is It' Ontological and Pragmatical Perspectives” maintain that the word norm is subject to two kinds of semiotic shifts: shifts in the meaning and shifts in the referents. Philosophical research on norms and on the normative has, indeed, broadened its dominion of investigation in both directions. The phenomena of norms and normativity, intersecting different orders of phenomena, are investigated by different disciplines from different methodological perspectives.
      Issue No: Vol. 0
  • Norme: cinq référents

    • Authors: Amedeo Giovanni Conte
      Abstract: La question: “Qu’est-ce qu’une norme'” est une fausse question, parce qu’elle présuppose l’unité, l’unicité, l’unitariété de la désignation du terme norme. L’auteur montre, au contraire, que le terme norme désigne à la fois un énoncé déontique, une proposition déontique, une énonciation déontique, un état-de-choses déontique, un noème déontique. À travers le concept d’état-de-choses déontique, l’auteur réfute la thèse de l’universelle linguisticité des normes (la thèse selon laquelle les normes sont toutes soit des énoncés déontiques, soit des énonciations déontiques, soit des propositions déontiques).
      Issue No: Vol. 0
  • Comment je vois le monde du droit

    • Authors: Paul Amselek
      Abstract: L’expérience juridique se développe, non pas simplement et abstraitement autour du droit, des règles juridiques, mais plus exactement autour du droit positif, des règles juridiques posées: ce sont là deux données fondamentales indissociables qui doivent être clairement prises en compte pour une bonne compréhension de la réalité. L’auteur résume ici, d’une part, les approfondissements ontologiques qu’il a consacrés, à la lueur de la méthode phénoménologique husserlienne, aux règles en général et aux règles éthiques et juridique en particulier, et, d’autre part, les approfondissements pragmatiques qu’il a effectués, à partir de la théorie austinienne des actes de langage, à propos des actes sociaux d’autorité que sont les actes de position des règles juridiques.
      Issue No: Vol. 0
  • Les critères et l’ordinaire de la norme

    • Authors: Pascal Richard
      Abstract: “Le droit est ce que le droit considère comme du droit”: cette définition circulaire, qui permet bien de structurer un discours de droit et d’engager une axiomatique du droit, ne dit rien pourtant sur le droit et sur ses éléments constitutifs. L’auteur, en partant de l’analyse du contentieux juridique, réfléchi, à partir de Wittgenstein et de Cavell, sur l’arrière-plan des critères qui s’attachent au droit en tant que “forme de vie”. Ces critères peuvent toujours être remis en question: il est donc nécessaire de se confronter avec une incontournable perspective sceptique. En critiquant la perspective fondée sur la normativité des concepts, l’auteur propose d’adopter un réalisme pragmatique interne et incarnée, fondé sur l’idée que ce sont plutôt les critères sur lesquels les sujets s’accordent dans la “conversation de la justice” qui nous permettent de comprendre notre engagement dans les normes et dans le langage.
      Issue No: Vol. 0
  • Constitutive and Regulative Rules: a Dispute and a Resolution

    • Authors: Adriana Placani
      Abstract: This paper examines the distinction between constitutive and regulative rules by way of the philosophical dispute between John Searle and Joseph Raz. These theorists disagree inasmuch as Searle claims that constitutive and regulative rules represent distinct types, while Raz argues that such a differentiation is untenable. This work acknowledges the merits of Raz’s position, but argues that Searle’s distinction between constitutive and regulative rules is sound given certain refinements. The paper argues that the distinction between constitutive and regulative rules should be grounded on the rules’ distinct capacity for guidance (i.e., whether or not the rules themselves constitute normative reasons for action for subjects).
      Issue No: Vol. 0
  • Vers une phénoménologie de la normativité. Une circonscription
           préliminaire du domaine

    • Authors: Pedro M. S. Alves
      Abstract: I discuss, from a phenomenological point of view, the distinction between judgments and norms. I stress the limits of the Husserlian canonical analysis in order to rightly account for the sense and content of normative intentionality. Based on some Kelsenian insights, I draw a clear distinction between judgments and norms, criticizing some classical trends coming from Husserl himself that consider norms as a kind of intentionality founded upon objectifying acts. However, taking distance from Kelsen, Kaufmann, and Cossio, I stress that the ought-proposition (Sollsatz) cannot be a good rendering of the sense-content of norms, based on the phenomenological distinction between the intentional matter and the quality of intentional acts. Finally, I propose my own account based on the concept of “ductive force”. I stress that the ductive force of norms cannot be identified with simple coercion. I show that there is, even inside the juridical sphere, a variety of ductive forces, going from sheer coercion to council and recommendation. To end, I stress the centrality of the concept of “ductive force” for a phenomenology of the social world.
      Issue No: Vol. 0
  • Eidetics of Law-Making Acts: Parts, Wholes and Degrees of Existence

    • Authors: Francesca De Vecchi
      Abstract: In my paper I introduce the phenomenological concept of “eidetics” and its application to law. I show that, according to this approach grounded in the works of Reinach (1913/1989) and Stein (1925), the problem of the existence and validity of the law can be fruitfully analysed in terms of parts-wholes which constitute law-making acts as wholes, both as performed and fulfilled acts. I argue that the parts of law-making acts can be subject to varying degrees of constraint – necessary, possible or contingent parts – and that it is the possible part of law-making acts that makes the difference between the existence of law-making acts and their validity: between their mere existence as performed acts, and their full existence as fulfilled and valid acts. I show this in focusing on Stein’s suggestion of filling the inter-personal gap between legislator and citizens in legal provisions by introducing “integrative acts”, which facilitate the uptake and, consequently, the enforcement of legal provisions by citizens. I suggest that Stein’s work on the integrative acts of legal provisions is grounded in the eidetic claim that essential parts of a whole also include possible – and not only necessary – parts, and that these are essential relations of tendency: legal provisions tend essentially to be fulfilled and their existence acquires a full sense only when they are enforced. Finally, I deal with eidetics and the issue of degrees and quality of existence in social ontology.
      Issue No: Vol. 0
  • Normative Experience: Deontic Noema and Deontic Noesis

    • Authors: Lorenzo Passerini Glazel
      Abstract: What is a norm' A. G. Conte replies to this question by enumerating five possible referents of the word norm (§ 1.). Focusing on the fifth referent, the “deontic noema”, I raise the question (§ 2.): How is the deontic noesis of a deontic noema to be understood' Through a reconstruction in terms of deontic noema of H. Kelsen’s “merely thought norm” (§ 3.), of O. Weinberger’s “Normgedanke” (§ 4.), and of L. Petrażycki’s psychological analysis of normative experience (§ 5.), I propose to distinguish (§ 6.) a genuine deontic noesis from theoretical (cognitive or hypothetical) noeseis of a deontic noema, and I will argue that, in the hypothesis that no normative phenomenon would be possible without a consciousness capable of the deontic noesis of deontic noemata, the concepts of deontic noema and of deontic noesis deserve further investigation.
      Issue No: Vol. 0
  • On the Question of How Social Rules and Social Norms Exist

    • Authors: Christian Bispinck-Funke
      Abstract: The objective of this paper is to grasp the mode of being of social rules and norms. I begin by analyzing how mental representations of rules and norms structure social interaction. Then I demonstrate that the actual existence of rules and norms is a multi-dimensional phenomenon that encompasses mental and linguistic realization (linguistically expressed or habituated doxastic attitudes) as well as socially organized bindingness. I conclude that social rules and norms can be described merely by refering to dispositions and notions.
      Issue No: Vol. 0
  • Norms, Norms, and Norms: Validity, Existence and Referents of the Term
           Norm in Alexy, Conte, and Guastini

    • Authors: Alice Borghi, Guglielmo Feis
      Abstract: In this paper we examine the interplay between validity and existence of a norm. We compare Amedeo Giovanni Conte’s five-folded conception of norm with the “semantic” conception of Robert Alexy’s and Riccardo Guastini’s idea of existence-as-legal-membership. We show how Alexy’s model encompasses all the referents of Conte. We investigate the interplay between different theses on the relationships between validity and existence of norms and the referents for norm that a theory is able to admit. In particular, we show that if we want to encompass all five Contean referents we have to give up the (Kelsenian) validity-as-existence thesis.
      Issue No: Vol. 0
  • Normative Events

    • Authors: Federico L.G. Faroldi
      Abstract: I introduce the novel concept of normative events and I defend the thesis that they are normatively heterogeneous but metaphysically homogenous.
      Issue No: Vol. 0
  • The Challenge of the K-Principle in Deontic Logic (and Well Beyond)

    • Authors: Wojciech Żełaniec
      Abstract: I go through various arguments why the K-principle (aka Distributivity Axiom), O(p→q)→(Op→Oq), a cornerstone of all deontic logic as the latter is standardly conceived, is of little use for the logical analysis of real-life deontic discourse. It is empirically false, I argue. Then I proceed to the question why it is so attractive, and I submit the hypothesis that to blame is Kripke semantics, making use of the imagery of possible worlds, accepted as a de facto standard in deontic logic. This semantics, however, is not attuned to the needs of controlling real-life deontic discourse, as the latter is mostly about things entirely this-worldly. For this-worldly relations possibly founding the deontic modalities the K-principle stands poor chance of working, I argue.
      Issue No: Vol. 0
  • Logical Semantics and Norms: A Kantian Perspective

    • Authors: Sérgio Mascarenhas
      Abstract: It’s widely accepted that normativity is not subject to truth values. The underlying reasoning is that truth values can only be predicated of descriptive statements; normative statements are prescriptive, not descriptive; thus truth value predicates cannot be assigned to normative statements. Hence, deonticity lacks logical semantics. This semantic monism has been challenged over the last decades from a series of perspectives that open the way for legal logics with imperative semantics. In the present paper I will go back to Kant and review his understanding of practical judgments, presenting it as supported by a pluralistic semantics. From this perspective a norm of Law is a logical expression that includes as content a generic description of a possible behavior by a generality of juridical agents, and assigns to that content the assertion of its obligatory character, accompanied by a disincentive for non-compliance. From this perspective legal norms can be syntactically formalized and assigned appropriate semantic values in such terms that they can be incorporated into valid inferential schemes. The consequence is that we can put together legal logics that handle both the phenomenal and the deontic dimensions of legality.
      Issue No: Vol. 0
  • The Epistemic Novelty of Norms

    • Authors: Giovanni Tuzet
      Abstract: The idea of the paper is to look at the way we learn about norms, as a contribution to an understanding of their nature. It is the idea of an a posteriori ontology of norms. For it is pointless to argue about the nature of norms without paying any attention to what we do when we learn something about them or when we act with them. In its turn, the epistemic account presented here is discussed in inferential terms: different cognitive sources and inferences determine different degrees of epistemic novelty that help distinguish kinds of norms and normative systems.
      Issue No: Vol. 0
  • Expressing Rules

    • Authors: Giacomo Turbanti
      Abstract: The notion of conceptual normativity is grounded on the idea that our conceptual contents are established by the norms of the discursive social practices we engage in. This idea involves two major problems. First, where do the norms of discursive practices come from and how can the contents that they establish be objective' Second, what is the role of the vocabulary that we use to express such norms as explicit rules' This article draws the outline of an account that could possibly answer both questions. First, it explores the viability of a naturalism about conceptual normativity. Second, it defines the characters of a rational expressivist analysis of the language of the rules.
      Issue No: Vol. 0
  • Reconstructing Intersubjective Norms

    • Authors: James Trafford
      Abstract: Robert Brandom famously attempts to provide an account of norms that are grounded in intersubjective practices, so dealing with problems raised by Wittgenstein’s regress arguments. This relies upon providing an explanation of the correctness of those practices in terms of our dispositions to treat each other’s practices as correct or incorrect. The view faces a number of hurdles, however, particularly when it comes to providing a non-circular account of the norms of practice, from within those practices themselves. This essay argues that Brandom’s attempt to ground norms in intersubjective practices is circular, and requires communal stability. I go on to suggest that, by taking practices of interaction as foundational, we can ground norms in action coordination. Norms, on this view, become sedimented through our interactions, and explicit normative talk is required to keep our interactions coherent with each other.
      Issue No: Vol. 0
  • The Imperative of Reputation Between Social and Moral Norms

    • Authors: Gian Paolo Terravecchia
      Abstract: For the philosophy of normativity, the study of reputation helps a better understanding of the conflict that may arise between social and moral norms. It is a conflict which has been discussed in recent years and which has never been treated specifically from this perspective before. The paper discusses the dilemma, firstly showing its roots and meanings and secondly giving the reasons to choose one of the alternatives. This helps to show the normative conflict between social and moral norms and to explore its complexity, presenting some solutions. In so doing, the ontology of reputation is developed and discussed, also by presenting and discussing the two forms of the imperative of reputation.
      Issue No: Vol. 0
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Heriot-Watt University
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