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Journal Cover Asian Journal of Management Science and Applications
  [4 followers]  Follow
   Hybrid Journal Hybrid journal (It can contain Open Access articles)
   ISSN (Print) 2049-8683 - ISSN (Online) 2049-8691
   Published by Inderscience Publishers Homepage  [423 journals]
  • The political economy of deforestation when distributional interests
           matter - a dynamic approach
    • Authors: Stéphane Dang-Nguyen, Yves Rakotondratsimba
      Pages: 317 - 337
      Abstract: Market and political forces are analysed in a two-sector political economy model as main determinants of deforestation and land conversion decisions. User groups involve in lobby and pressure activities to influence the decision maker to release land towards their specific sectors. The interaction is modelled as a cooperative bargaining process and the Nash solution corresponds to the political organisational equilibrium where the interests of all parties, including that of the decision maker are maximised. Using dynamic theory, the steady-state demand for forest land is derived, and the conclusion is that deforestation and land conversions are adjustment processes based on distributional interests, lobbying and the decision maker's self-interest motive, mainly to enhance the welfare of user groups.
      Keywords: deforestation; political economy; interest groups; lobbying; cooperative games; Nash solution; market forces; land conversion; pressure groups; modelling; cooperative bargaining; forest land
      Citation: Asian J. of Management Science and Applications, Vol. 2, No. 4 (2016) pp. 317 - 337
      PubDate: 2017-03-17T23:20:50-05:00
      DOI: 10.1504/AJMSA.2016.082961
      Issue No: Vol. 2, No. 4 (2017)
  • R&D investment game strategies under uncertain patent acquisition and
           non-infringing imitation
    • Authors: Stéphane Dang-Nguyen, Yves Rakotondratsimba
      Pages: 338 - 355
      Abstract: We construct R&D competition between two firms as a game, and reconstruct it as a probabilistic model. By differentiating variables of non-infringing imitation probability and patent acquisition probability in the sensitivity analysis, we suggest advantageous competitive strategy for each of the two firms engaged in asymmetric R&D competition. Analytical outcomes under the conditions of zero-sum and non-zero-sum games are as follows: regardless of patent acquisition probability, the superior gets higher R&D incentives in zero-sum game. Thus, it is strategically favourable for the superior firm to make R&D investment under zero-sum game; the inferior conditionally gets higher strategic R&D incentives under non-zero-sum game.
      Keywords: R&D investment strategy; R&D incentives; patent protection; R&D competition; patent acquisition; investment games; patent acquisition; non-infringing imitation; research and development; game theory; patents; probabilistic models; zero-sum ga
      Citation: Asian J. of Management Science and Applications, Vol. 2, No. 4 (2016) pp. 338 - 355
      PubDate: 2017-03-17T23:20:50-05:00
      DOI: 10.1504/AJMSA.2016.082959
      Issue No: Vol. 2, No. 4 (2017)
  • A proof of the existence of φ-stable sets in N-player games via
           Glicksberg's fixed point theorem
    • Authors: Stéphane Dang-Nguyen, Yves Rakotondratsimba
      Pages: 356 - 364
      Abstract: It is shown that if we represent the widely studied class of finite games with mixed extensions by some general abstract system, then the existence of a non-empty phi-stable set follows from Glicksberg's fixed point theorem.
      Keywords: Glicksberg; fixed point theorem; phi-stable sets; finite games; mixed extensions
      Citation: Asian J. of Management Science and Applications, Vol. 2, No. 4 (2016) pp. 356 - 364
      PubDate: 2017-03-17T23:20:50-05:00
      DOI: 10.1504/AJMSA.2016.082958
      Issue No: Vol. 2, No. 4 (2017)
  • Game algebra: algebraic system of strategic-form games
    • Authors: Stéphane Dang-Nguyen, Yves Rakotondratsimba
      Pages: 365 - 375
      Abstract: In game theory, a 'game' is a system in which two or more decision makers interact with each other. This article proposes and investigates the properties of a new approach, which we call 'game algebra', which represents the strategic form (or normal form) of a game as an algebraic entity. In game theory, the representation of games as mathematical models allows them to be treated as algebraic entities in a way similar to the algebra of relational database theory. In game algebra, we regard the coupling of two games in strategic form as an algebraic operation. We prove that these operations preserve various game solution properties, such as strategic dominance and Nash equilibria. We show that a class of n-person games in strategic form are a commutative (abelian) group and a commutative monoid.
      Keywords: strategic form games; normal form games; abstract algebra; commutative groups; abelian groups; commutative monoids; complex decision problems; decomposition; game theory; mathematical modelling; strategic dominance; Nash equilibria
      Citation: Asian J. of Management Science and Applications, Vol. 2, No. 4 (2016) pp. 365 - 375
      PubDate: 2017-03-17T23:20:50-05:00
      DOI: 10.1504/AJMSA.2016.082968
      Issue No: Vol. 2, No. 4 (2017)
  • Outsourcing and performance in Japanese manufacturing firms
    • Authors: Stéphane Dang-Nguyen, Yves Rakotondratsimba
      Pages: 376 - 393
      Abstract: The purpose of this study is to offer theoretical explanations for the conflicting relationships found between outsourcing and firm performance. Two hypotheses have been developed to show why the relationship between the degree of outsourcing and firm performance could be represented as either an inverted U-shape or a U-shape (when the degree of outsourcing is plotted on the x-axis and firm performance on the y-axis) by linking transaction cost economics (TCE) and the capability theory with product architecture. Data from 2009 to 2013 pertaining to 254 Japanese manufacturing firms in the electronic device industry are used to test these hypotheses. The results suggest that the analysed relationship is represented by an inverted U-shape because a firm can maximise its performance by combining its own core capabilities with those of other companies when a firm's overall activities are studied. However, it is U-shaped at an industry level because a firm can improve its performance by increasing either production outsourcing or own production when production, one of its main activities, is studied.
      Keywords: outsourcing; firm performance; transaction cost economics; TCE; capability theory; manufacturing industry; product architecture; interdependent product design; modular product design; U-shape; inverted U-shape; Japan; modular design; electronic devices; el
      Citation: Asian J. of Management Science and Applications, Vol. 2, No. 4 (2016) pp. 376 - 393
      PubDate: 2017-03-17T23:20:50-05:00
      DOI: 10.1504/AJMSA.2016.082966
      Issue No: Vol. 2, No. 4 (2017)
School of Mathematical and Computer Sciences
Heriot-Watt University
Edinburgh, EH14 4AS, UK
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Fax: +00 44 (0)131 4513327
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